Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Volkodav]

Okay... Where to start, where to start, keeping in mind the Mods are watching this thread and not especially pleased with the degree of, or lack thereof, thought that people are putting into some of their posts.

The first is that without an up to date DWP and DCP, much of this is speculation and guesswork, with occasional input from the Wag Institute.

First, it seems there are some misunderstandings and misconceptions which need to be addressed and cleared up.

First has to do with costings. Australia, unlike a number of other nations, do an estimated "whole-life" cost for a piece of kit/programme, whether it is a ship, aircraft, or tank. This is where it can be quite different from the cost of a US defence programme, which the cost of an AB DDG is the actual purchase price of it just to enter service. It has been mentioned a number of times here and elsewhere, that the US is/has been looking at the Australian costing model, because of what it helps keep account of and track. The actual, straight cost to buy (flyaway cost for aircraft typically) is usually around one-half to one-third the total programme cost for Australian defence programmes. The SLEP or MLU which is typically done for major pieces of kit (aircraft, warships, etc) at the midpoint of the respective service lives, along with various other upgrades and modifications done is usually also about a third of the total programme cost, or nearly the cost to actually purchase the kit in the first place. The final (typically another third) is the anticipated operating cost. In some cases, the divisions are a bit different, depending on the initial cost, and/or how long kit is kept in service, etc.

Next up is the bit about paying a 'premium' for having kit built in Australia. It depends on the type of kit. For some things, like tanks and aircraft, the cost just is not worthwhile. Australia has assembled modern(ish) fighters from knockdown kits, but that is not the same as actually having an actual production line, and from an economic standpoint, Australia does not the volume to sustain combat aircraft assembly. France as an example, has placed only enough orders for Dassault to keep the Rafale production line going at the rate of about one per lunar cycle, or 13/year. This was done to make sure the line stayed open, but IIRC the production costs were approximately those of a LRIP Rafale. For tanks, I forget the exact numbers but the costs to setup a modern production line, design, manufacture tanks, etc. would require something on the order of 1,000+ units ordered to reach the breakeven point. Realistically, only Germany and the US (from the Western nations) have had order volumes which approached or exceeded those numbers, and of the friendly/allied Eastern nations, only South Korea has reached that number with production of their MBT. With Australia having had 100 tanks or less in service and stockpile following the end of WWII, setting up to produce tanks also seems a bit senseless.

Ships are a bit different, since there is some domestic shipbuilding an maintenance, as well as a need for an organic capability to repair/modify RAN vessels. Now for the actual premium bit. Before, during part of the natural resources/rawmat mining boom, a 30%+ premium would still have been economically viable for warships produced in Australia.

What that meant at the time, is that the net economic cost to Australia for a AUD$1.3 bil. DDG built in Australia, was approximately the same as an AUD$1 bil. DDG built overseas and 'imported'. The reason an Australian-built warship could cost AUD$300 mil. more and have the same economic cost, is that all the extra costs associated with buying 'in Australia' would get recouped via taxes paid on the economic activity generated by the Australian build. Taxes paid directly by the shipyard workers is obvious, but also by the various parts suppliers supporting the shipyards, and of course taxes paid by employees of those parts suppliers. Then of course there is the economic activity all those employees and their companies generate, and so on.

Last (for now) I will cover maritime aluminum construction. Austal does have a reputation as being amongst the world's best at working with maritime grade aluminum. Now, if a large OPV-sized vessel was desired, it could be constructed out of aluminum. However, to get the sort of size/strength desired for most OPV's using aluminum, extra work needs to be done, which ends up negating many of the weight/displacement advantages aluminum has in small vessels. Making matters worse, it is hard to work with and more expensive than steel. Therefore, what might be appropriate for a vessel just would not work for larger vessels in most cases.

More later.

Definitely need a like button.

I would only add that the calculation of cost benefit to the Australian economy needs to include the amount of skilled labour required and what those workers would be doing otherwise.

During the ANZAC project the workers were the same who had delivered the Australian Frigate Project, were already trained and experienced, working for an established and experienced organisation at a recently upgraded existing facility, in conjunction with a competent designer who was highly experienced in supporting foreign builds and also the project had been planned and evolved for years before hand.

The corresponding submarine project involved a new builder, work force, facility and a designer, that had never worked on on open ocean sub or exported any design, in fact they had only ever worked very closely with one particularly knowledgeable and proactive customer. There was also a completely inexperienced combat system designer that was independent of the prime contractor and often defended by the customer, even though they consistently failed to deliver. Compare the two projects and the amount of funding and effort to deliver the required capability.

The other fact is at the time these projects were running the Australian economy was more balanced, the dollar was lower and there was no skill shortage. By the time the AWD project kicked off much of the capability and momentum gained had been lost and the the government capped this off by first awarding FFG UP to Thales instead of Tenix then AWD to ASC, again instead of Tenix. A new facility had to be built, a designer that had never exported a design or supported an overseas build was selected. Also, in the middle of a never before seen mining construction boom and associated skill shortage, a new work force had to be hired, trained and certified. Perhaps the most damning is there appears to have been nowhere near the level of planning and preparation that the earlier projects received. Is there any doubt why there have been issues?

Now this work has been done it appears we have let momentum be lost again through the decision to build the new AORs offshore. A local build would have involved sufficient steel bashing to keep ASC, BAE (they bought Tenix's defence operations after Tenix lost the AWD bid) and Forgacs busy until the OPVs and frigates came on line. A fourth AWD would have been sensible as well but the AORs would have been sufficient.

Now the economy is returning to it's pre-boom base, minus a number of industries that were not adequately protected from what was obviously a temporary economic distortion, the factors determining the efficiency of a local build are returning to normal as well. The situation now is more like those in the late eighties than the early 2000s meaning many assumptions made about costs and efficiencies probably need to be reassessed. Actually, the governments changing stance on continuous builds and the possibility of local construction of the future submarines suggests that just such a reassessment has occurred.

 

[Volkodav]

Back from the dead.... and I see that the RAN thread is still having this tendency to derail with minimal help.....

I'd suggest that a lot of the nostradamus stuff be suspended until the DWP comes out as that will be the catalyst for rounding up a lot of the current random particles that are flying around the room

quite frankly there would even be some in the snr head sheds that would struggle to provide predictions with any confidence

as for submarines how is it that we're now chatting about 18 subs when that figure has NEVER been put forward in any of the properly informed discussions.

12 was the baseline from Rudd and was always offered up as a through life number, not a block acquisition. If anything the feeling was that the likely number would be 8 bearing in mind economic pressures that face the entire force development structure. 12 is and was aspirational under best case circumstances with all the political planets, economic planets and real-politik regional plannets and national strategic planets aligning at once.

The other thing worth remembering is that ASPI doesn't and is not representative of Govt and/or Defence policy - so any articles published by them as really just more informed "thinking out loud" papers where more rigour and a lot more background knowledge might be present but is still not a waypoint as to to where Defence (and more critically) the Govt of the day will be heading - let alone thinking

Welcome back, missed you!

 

[Todjaeger]

Definitely need a like button.

I would only add that the calculation of cost benefit to the Australian economy needs to include the amount of skilled labour required and what those workers would be doing otherwise.

Glad you appreciated the post content.

I deliberately kept the economic side somewhat simple, just because once one actually starts looking at the differences in the purchase impact between a domestic vs. imported warship build programme, there are second, third, and so on, orders of calculations to make.

To expand on the differences in economic impact a bit more, so that people can better grasp the potential value of a domestic build (vs. domestic assembly, there is a difference) I will attempt to expand on it, without getting too dull.

First, the monies go into the business actually handling the build. From there, some gets paid back to the CoA, and pertinent state, territorial, and/or local governments in terms of taxes, fees, etc. Pretty much the rest of the funding then goes to pay either the workers (of all levels), or the suppliers of the parts and rawmat used to produce the kit being built. To keep things simple (and naval relevant) I will use ASC and warships going forward.

The CoA gives ASC nn AUD to build a warship. In turn, some of that money will flow back to the CoA, SA, Adelaide and/or local councils via taxes, fees, and other methods which entities have to pay for things from gov't.

A good portion of those AUD go to the skilled workers who will actually be doing the manufacture of the warship, as well as the management of ASC who run the company, the unskilled/semi-skilled workers who maintain and provide services for the facilities, etc. let us call this Payroll funding.

Another significant (perhaps the major portion) will be spent by ASC for the various parts and materials required to actually assemble the warship. Given a build done in Australia, most if not all of those parts and materials will be sourced from Australia and/or New Zealand. The parts which would be imported IMO would be those which cannot be sourced domestically. The SPY-1Dv1 radar panels as well as the software and possibly even computer terminals of the Aegis combat system for the AWD are good examples of components which need to be imported. Going by the ANZAC frigate programme, a 70% domestic content is quite achievable in warship production. The domestic businesses providing the parts and materials would be paid with what we can call Supplies funding.

Now with the Payroll funding being paid out to ASC's various employees, again the CoA, various state, and local gov'ts will collect some of that back, again via taxes and fees. The rest, the ASC employees will spend purchasing goods and services from various businesses, save/invest, and otherwise expend. Now some of that Payroll funding spent purchasing goods from local businesses, goes into the local business enabling them to purchase goods from a supplier for their local business, as well as providing payroll funding for the employees of the local business.

The local business & local business employees in turn will again pay some back via taxes and fees, and the local business employees will also spend some of their payroll funding to purchase goods and services from even more businesses. The local business will also spend money to purchase the parts and materials they require, to enable them to provide the goods and services the employees of ASC and other local businesses, want/need.

The money spent on parts and materials would go to businesses which supply them, to pay their (the supplier's) employees, as well as actually to get the parts and/or materials.

The same sort of process occurs with the funding ASC spends to acquire the parts and materials actually required for the warship to be constructed. The money gets spent, and then re-spent, over and over again, as the economic activity essentially radiates away from the actual warship build.

First the funding supports the business (ASC) and its workers, then it supports the businesses which support ASC, and ASC's workers, and by extension the workers of the supporting businesses. Then the businesses which support the supporting businesses get part of the funding, which serves to pay the employees of the businesses supporting the supporting businesses, etc. And so it goes on, for quite a few layers

When that warship gets imported, the funding ends up going through very similar 'layers' of businesses and employees, however those layers are largely not within Australia, which means there is no method or right for Australian gov't entities to collect taxes and fees on the funding. Also, without the funding going into ASC (again, just using the company as an example) the various company employees are redundant unless/until there is something else for the company to do to receive payment for. These unneeded employees then are without work and not generating economic activity unless/until they find work again, and the ASC and ASC employees would not be in a position to pay supporting businesses for goods and services, which in turn means the supporting businesses would have either diminished or no operations, meaning less demand or ability to pay supplier businesses for parts and materials, or have/pay supporting business employees, and so it goes on.

Also, for all those employees without work, or under-employed so that they are unable to support themselves, that would draw funding from Gov't to meet their basic needs, or those needs go unmet which will cause further issues.

The principal historical cause I see for Australia having such a problem maintaining a successful defence and naval construction industry is a lack of long-term planning and consistency on the part of the various Gov'ts of the day, as well as the tendencies of the various political parties to make defence spending decisions based upon what benefits them politically at that moment.

An example of what I mean can be found in the Bushmaster IMV, and how/why it was selected in place of the other contender.

 

[Todjaeger]

Maritime/marine aluminum construction, cont'd:

As I mentioned previously, it is certainly possible to construct vessels larger than smallcraft or patrol boat sized with aluminum. However, in order for the vessel to be 'safe' adjustments to the design are needed, due to the different properties of marine aluminum vs. soft/mild steel used to construct ships. I believe this means that more aluminum is required, to the point that the displacement weight of a large aluminum vessel begins to approach the displacement weight of a steel vessel. Someone like Alexsa should be able to confirm or explain that.

Now for ship construction, there is a saying that "steel is cheap and air is free," which has been around for some time. The same cannot be said for marine or maritime grade aluminum, or the cost/amount of skilled labor required to work with it. On checking the prices per ton of marine grade aluminum and steel, the lowest price I saw for aluminum was ~USD$1,000 per ton, with most prices in the USD$2k - 4k range. When I looked at the price per ton for steel, the lowest price I saw was USD$385 per ton, with most prices being in the USD$450 - 850 range.

In order for aluminum to be a better construction material than steel at those sorts of price differences, a vessel constructed using aluminum would need to be able to operate in the same types of conditions as a vessel constructed using steel, yet only require between one-half, and one-tenth the tonnage of material to construct, in order for the cost per vessel to be potentially viable. Realistically that does not occur, which is partially why there are not more large, open ocean-going/bluewater ships constructed from marine grade aluminum.

Now in terms of hull materials used for RAN patrol boat construction, until the final Fremantle-class Patrol Boats were decommissioned in May, 2007 the RAN had steel-hulled patrol boats in service. Until HMAS Armidale was commissioned in June, 2005 the RAN did not have an aluminum-hulled patrol boat in service. This should 'break' the notion that Australia has a commitment, or even a need, for aluminum-hulled naval vessels.

Given where RAN vessels can and are likely to operate, and how they will be operated, it does seem sensible to not order any further vessels built to the HSC standard, since they will quite likely not be operating under those conditions or restrictions.

Then again, that might just be my wishful thinking...

 

[Nick underscore]

Back from the dead.... and I see that the RAN thread is still having this tendency to derail with minimal help.....

I'd suggest that a lot of the nostradamus stuff be suspended until the DWP comes out as that will be the catalyst for rounding up a lot of the current random particles that are flying around the room

quite frankly there would even be some in the snr head sheds that would struggle to provide predictions with any confidence

as for submarines how is it that we're now chatting about 18 subs when that figure has NEVER been put forward in any of the properly informed discussions.

12 was the baseline from Rudd and was always offered up as a through life number, not a block acquisition. If anything the feeling was that the likely number would be 8 bearing in mind economic pressures that face the entire force development structure. 12 is and was aspirational under best case circumstances with all the political planets, economic planets and real-politik regional plannets and national strategic planets aligning at once.

The other thing worth remembering is that ASPI doesn't and is not representative of Govt and/or Defence policy - so any articles published by them as really just more informed "thinking out loud" papers where more rigour and a lot more background knowledge might be present but is still not a waypoint as to to where Defence (and more critically) the Govt of the day will be heading - let alone thinking

Welcome back gf. The quality has discernibly deteriorated since you left..

 

[hairyman]

The biggest thing I have against aluminium for our warships, is if an aluminium vessel is hit with a bomb, rocket, shell or torpedo, as well as the initial damage done by this event, there is the possibility that the aluminium will burn.
Am I correct in this assumption?

 

[ngatimozart]

The biggest thing I have against aluminium for our warships, is if an aluminium vessel is hit with a bomb, rocket, shell or torpedo, as well as the initial damage done by this event, there is the possibility that the aluminium will burn.
Am I correct in this assumption?

Yes. Apparently back in the 1970s the RN and USN had a series of fires on board ships with aluminium superstructures, so they reverted to steel superstructures. The RN Destroyer Sheffield which was sunk at the Falklands was supposed to have had a aluminium superstructure that contributed to the fire but that is supposed to have been refuted. I haven't seen the report on that.

Addition. I remember 3rd Form (Yr 9) chemistry back in 1970 that we set fire to some aluminium ribbon. It burned very well, hot and bright. Same class as one where we dropped sodium into water to see what happened. Does the same thing as putting naked flame to aluminium ribbon

 

[Oberon]

The biggest thing I have against aluminium for our warships, is if an aluminium vessel is hit with a bomb, rocket, shell or torpedo, as well as the initial damage done by this event, there is the possibility that the aluminium will burn.
Am I correct in this assumption?

Yes, this was a lesson from the Falklands War. HMS Sheffeild had an aluminium superstructure which burnt for days.

 

[vonnoobie]

The biggest thing I have against aluminium for our warships, is if an aluminium vessel is hit with a bomb, rocket, shell or torpedo, as well as the initial damage done by this event, there is the possibility that the aluminium will burn.
Am I correct in this assumption?

Not quite, All comes down to the circumstances involved. Aluminium does have a lower melting point however solid pieces of it don't actually catch fire but rather aluminium shavings do (or really thin pieces ie: foil).

In regards to the HMS Sheffield the actual BOI report in case any one is interested http://clashofarms.com/files/BOI_Rpt_HMS_Sheffield_May82.pdf

 

[rockitten]

The biggest thing I have against aluminium for our warships, is if an aluminium vessel is hit with a bomb, rocket, shell or torpedo, as well as the initial damage done by this event, there is the possibility that the aluminium will burn.
Am I correct in this assumption?

It is not that bad (most of our carss panel are made of aluminum ALLOY, it didn't burn that easily), and the superstructure of HMS Sheffield is made of steel, not aluminum. And the fire went out of control as the fire suppression systems was served, that ship is doomed regardless it is made of steel or aluminum alloy.

The USS Stark (a Perry class with aluminum alloy superstructure) took 2 Exocet missiles and managed to limp back home.

 

[rockitten]

Agree. I read an paper a while ago suggestion that as a worst case RAN would like 18 Submarines in that while Australia is most likely not to be invaded, but most likely blockaded.

A Submarine produce an effect far greater than numbers suggest and the operational tempo was for 2x submarine patrolling to together for 6 out at one time. The consensus was that even if 1 submarine was destroyed that there still will be a fear in red force as to the whereabouts of the second submarine in force for the patrolling box.

I have been searching for the paper for which I read but I'll be dammed if I can find it now.

If my memory serve me correctly, that was from a newspaper's "submarine information pack" back in 2014 with writers from SA, Department of defense and so on. And on the paragraph written by an Admiral (the commander of the navy?), he suggested RAN would like 18 Submarines as a justification why RAN need 12 submarine.

 

[rawcs]

Yes, this was a lesson from the Falklands War. HMS Sheffeild had an aluminium superstructure which burnt for days.

HMS Sheffield was all steel construction.

HM Ships Ardent and Antelope did have aluminium superstructures. In the case of Ardent it was hit by 7 x 500 and 1000 pound bombs. I don't think having all steel structure would have made any difference in this case.

Aluminium deforms and melts at a lower temperature than steel, is harder to maintain than steel but did not contribute to the sinkings of Sheffield, Ardent or Antelope.

 

[ngatimozart]

It is not that bad (most of our cars are made of aluminum ALLOY, it didn't burn that easily), and the superstructure of HMS Sheffield is made of steel, not aluminum. And the fire went out of control as the fire suppression systems was served, that ship is doomed regardless it is made of steel or aluminum alloy.

The USS Stark (a Perry class with aluminum alloy superstructure) took 2 Exocet missiles and managed to limp back home.

Are you an expert on damage control at sea? Have you ever served in a navy and done time at sea? It,s one thing reading it somewhere and another actually being trained in it and having to do it. So before you start yapping on about it can you give us some credentials so that others on here can assess your credibility.

 

[aussienscale]

Seriously, can we please move on ? 18 subs, no way in hell, full stop, end of discussion, get a grip !!

You have even had GF above tell you full stop, don't give a crap what you think you may or may not have read in a paper from whenever, its not happening, nor has it ever been considered.

So until, like GF said, the DCP and DWP come out and we have something serious to discuss, let's stop fluffing shall we ?

Cheers

 

[rockitten]

Thanks Todjaeger for feeding me so much about aluminum hulls, granted, notes taken. And again, thanks a lot.

Regarding to the economic part, we all know the economic benefit of spending money in Australia. What you guys don't get my point is, why it has to be spend on shipyards.

May be it can be spend on local build, but it can also achieved by imposing "offset" requirements. How about buy more produce from Australia, how about bio-chemical/medical research and investment in Australia? They save lots of Australian jobs too, and very likely to be more sustainable and more competitive in the global market than a submarine industry.

From my point of view, SEA1000 is a procurement project for our navy's submarine replacement. Not an alliance pack, not a job saving scheme or nation rebuilding project. First thing first should be get our navy the best submarine available. So if our navy found the Japanese bid is more suit to the mission requirement, even if those boats have to be build off-shore, why not? Just request for a 70% economic offset (and most of them can be spent on SA). The compulsory requirement should be fit for the job, not local construction.

But now, the whole navy procurements are getting ridiculously political, even more political than the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, so political that the next government may just scrap them all like the mining tax. And for that, I have a strong sympathy to our navy. While other services have a relatively free hand to choose their gear, our navy has become the receiving end of all those politicians' shit.

 

[vonnoobie]

It is not that bad (most of our cars are made of aluminum ALLOY, it didn't burn that easily), and the superstructure of HMS Sheffield is made of steel, not aluminum. And the fire went out of control as the fire suppression systems was served, that ship is doomed regardless it is made of steel or aluminum alloy.

The USS Stark (a Perry class with aluminum alloy superstructure) took 2 Exocet missiles and managed to limp back home.

No, Most cars are not made from aluminium 'ALLOY', Newer car's to various degrees have more aluminium in them be it in part and full but that is only something started in recent years and still not the industry norm, In this case I know because the automotive field is the field I work in for a living.

 

[vonnoobie]

Regarding to the economic part, we all know the economic benefit of spending money in Australia. What you guys don't get my point is, why it has to be spend on shipyards.

Couple of reasons, It serves as a highly skilled industrial project which has out flowing effect's across the broader economy, while at the same time secure's what could be viewed as a vital national skill set in the ability to both replace, fix and maintain various naval asset's. We don't have the luxury of having the mass number's of the US or Europe's ability to pop next door if needed, We are an extremely isolated nation (from our core group of allies/friends) closer to some of the most volatile regions then our allies/friends.

May be it can be spend on local build, but it can also achieved by imposing "offset" requirements. How about buy more produce from Australia, how about bio-chemical/medical research and investment in Australia? They save lots of Australian jobs too, and very likely to be more sustainable and more competitive in the global market than a submarine industry.

Because those such job's don't help sustain high end manufacturing which is the industry in the need, Agriculture is doing fine even with some of the highest cost's globally and bio-chem/medical field in Australia is growing quite well with out government's poking there noses into it with unneeded government policy. Usually to my knowledge when a nation specifies that the producing nation of a military product should reciprocate in buying an equal amount (financially) back from them it usually is in relation to the field of the product be it specifically naval or more broad based as a defence product.

From my point of view, SEA1000 is a procurement project for our navy's submarine replacement. Not an alliance pack, not a job saving scheme or nation rebuilding project. First thing first should be get our navy the best submarine available. So if our navy found the Japanese bid is more suit to the mission requirement, even if those boats have to be build off-shore, why not? Just request for a 70% economic offset (and most of them can be spent of SA). The compulsory requirement should be fit for the job, not local construction.

Yes the priority should be to get what is best for the Navy, What one shouldn't make the mistake of is assuming that there wouldn't be consequences of building offshore, Local production allow's for detailed knowledge of the vessel making maintenance and full cycle docking's safer and more efficient.

Just my 2 cents, Cheers.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Seriously, can we please move on ? 18 subs, no way in hell, full stop, end of discussion, get a grip !!

the thing worth remembering is that with a more or less formal acknowledgement of the "valley of death" scenarios (the new favourite buzz phrase) that any numbers will also be through life numbers, and with major acquisitions for navy being bought forward (into the open doesn't necessarily = bringing construction forward that much) then money gets chewed earlier

so the funding models are now up in the air - and they just can't add more ships to the mix as it will just screw up the broader force definition issues. RAN and RAAF can't keep on getting things blessed without it impacting on other service specific programs - and more importantly, chewing into army requirements.

govt policy for the last 6 years has been that whatever gets bought forward or increased in fleet numbers (fleet as in overall platform numbers be they ships, planes, trucks) must show a saving elsewhere. ie there is no extra money for extra platforms, if its not planned for then any increase in fleet must demonstrate a saving elsewhere. be it decommissioning, training cuts, logistics improvements etc....

the notion of getting 18 subs without stuffing up everyone elses reqs and with with just as compelling service development needs gives it 2 chances.

 

[aussienscale]

the thing worth remembering is that with a more or less formal acknowledgement of the "valley of death" scenarios (the new favourite buzz phrase) that any numbers will also be through life numbers, and with major acquisitions for navy being bought forward (into the open doesn't necessarily = bringing construction forward that much) then money gets chewed earlier

so the funding models are now up in the air - and they just can't add more ships to the mix as it will just screw up the broader force definition issues. RAN and RAAF can't keep on getting things blessed without it impacting on other service specific programs - and more importantly, chewing into army requirements.

govt policy for the last 6 years has been that whatever gets bought forward or increased in fleet numbers (fleet as in overall platform numbers be they ships, planes, trucks) must show a saving elsewhere. ie there is no extra money for extra platforms, if its not planned for then any increase in fleet must demonstrate a saving elsewhere. be it decommissioning, training cuts, logistics improvements etc....

the notion of getting 18 subs without stuffing up everyone elses reqs and with with just as compelling service development needs gives it 2 chances.

Exactly GF, thanks for the detail, it fly's in the face of the RAAF getting kit through the door for free etc

And totally agree, with the extra's for the RAAF and current/promised recent commitments for the RAN and ship building industry, it leaves me grave concerns for the Army, while not the thread for it, Land 400 springs to mind, let alone any poor bugger that has to do a future deployment for a future Iraq or Astan !!

Once again I fear they will be ill equipped and will be constantly playing catch up to get what they need

Cheers, good to hear from you again

 

[gf0012-aust]

Exactly GF, thanks for the detail, it fly's in the face of the RAAF getting kit through the door for free etc

at the risk of preaching to the converted, a lot of us know that there's no such thing as a free lunch

the cost is in the tail. RTS and whether there's an additional impost on the logistics.

free kit still hurts hence no such thing as "free kit"

its why the specials have a return home "parts bin". just because friends give you stuff when in theatre doesn't mean that you want to keep on using it

it comes out of someones budget - and everyone makes sure that if you want it then it comes out of your budget