Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Volkodav]

Sorry Volk, but I tend to disagree with you here on a number of points. I do have a number of issues with the USN's LCS programme, chief amongst them is that due to decisions made to enable such a high maximum speed, there are a number of limitations which the LCS have. Deadweight tonnage for instance, puts some very sharp limitations on the number of personnel, victuals, bunkerage and munitions which an LCS can have. The can quickly become a significant limiting factor is an LCS were to attempt to sustain operations with four embarked helicopters and their associated air and ground crews.

Another area is the overall combat capability of an LCS v. an OHP FFG. While an OHP that had undergone modernization which deleted the Mk-13 launcher without replacement would have had a significant drop in combat capability, the OHP still retained the 76mm gun, which has a similar ROF to the 57mm of the LCS (once all ready-fire rounds are accounted for) but fires a larger, heavier shell, further. Once more mission modules are finished and really available for service, then an LCS might possess more firepower than a modernized OHP. When looking historically, IMO the LCS lacks a comparable level of firepower to peer-sized vessels, which the OHP FFG's did have when they first began entering service. IMO it would have been better for the USN to be less ambitious in terms of speed, and go with a more conventional frigate-type vessel with mission module sockets. Especially since there have been significant troubles encountered with developing said modules.

As for the whole OPV/OCV/corvette question for the RAN, from my POV the first question which needs to be answered is just what role(s) will these vessels actually have and/or be expected to carry out. If due to security threats and gov't policy, only constabulary tasks would be assigned, then spending more funding on upgraded weapon systems would be a waste of time and resources. OTOH if these OPV/OCV/corvette-type vessels might be tasked with independent operations in potentially threatening areas in lieu of a major fleet unit, then having enhanced systems, or at least the potential for them, is much more sensible.

Agree totally ref the compromises made to achieve (well actually to not quite achieve) the required speed. Personally I can not see that specifying a far more reasonable 35kts, instead of 45kt (50kt specified) would have done irreparable damage to the LCS concept, what it would have done however is remove a lot of the compromise and perhaps many of the issues you listed. On the gun, I do prefer the 76mm but the 57mm is still a very capable and effective system. I don't really understand the point of the 30mm cannon arrangement when Typhoon is available and when it is actually less flexible and effective than the 57mm. To me for the money spent why didn't they go for either something as capable in every way but speed for a lower unit cost, or alternatively go for something more capable (in everything but speed) for the same money, i.e. the often mooted on these pages mini Absalon.

The thing many miss in the LCS debate is that it is the low end of a high low mix that was meant to include dozens of DDG 1000s as replacement for the Spruance class destroyers, both being intended to serve along side the Arleigh Burke and Ticonderoga class AEGIS destroyers and cruisers. The DDG1000 program was curtailed at three hulls but the USN has continued to order new DDGs and there are many more of them (62 so far and possibly as many as 42 Flight III) than there were Spuances (31) or Perrys (51). In fact if you look at it there were only 23 Adams class DDGs, 10 Farraguts (originally DLGs), 4 Kidds, 18 DLGs and 2 DLGNs reclassified as CGs and 6 CGNs, a grand total of 63 ships, not counting the 27 Ticonderoga class AEGIC CGs. This was all before the peace dividend at the end of the cold war that saw most major navies cut back combatant numbers by a huge amount (look at the RN). This is basically a very long winded way of saying the Perry's high end capabilities have very effectively been replaced by AEGIS DDGs.

To me, when you have so many high end DDGs that have so effectively replaced FFGs, DDs, DDGs, CGs and CGNs, would you really need a new FFG as well? A slower batch 2 or 3 LCS or FF (or corvette as this is the RAN topic) with a single 8 cell VLS and a 76mm with DAVID / DART could as well as RAM / SEARAM would easily be more capable than an SM-1 armed Perry, let alone one that had the Mk-13 GMLS suppressed.

 

[rockitten]

The "range issue" on Soryu again...... I wonder how Type 216 and Shortfin Barracuda can be immune to such issue? Wish the reason is not because they have not passed the stage of vaporware.

Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian

"Japanese subs bid not a done deal: Defence Minister Kevin Andrews

The Australian
July 30, 2015 12:00AM

Concerns about the capability of Soryu-class submarines have been raised by Defence Minister Kevin Andrews a day after Japan’s ambassador promoted the vessel as the closest to fulfilling Royal Australian Navy requirements.

Mr Andrews, who was in Adelaide yesterday for a series of defence*-related meetings, told The Australian that while there was some strategic benefit to the Japanese bid to build Australia’s next-generation fleet of submar*ines, capability was the key crit*eria. “The Soryu is about the size that we’re looking at, but there are also other questions in terms of its endurance,” Mr Andrews said.

“Obviously we are interested in strategic alliances with like-minded countries in the area, but at the end of the day it is going to be the capability of the submarine that counts. We’ve got to have a submarine which is as good and preferably better than the Collins.

“It has got to be able to travel very long distances and sit under the water for long periods of time and come home.

“It’s all about capability. Cost and schedule then have to be taken into account. As we’ve said, Australian industry involvement is part of the factor, but the first thing we have to deliver is to give the Chief of Navy a vessel that does what is required.”

Mr Andrews’s comments contrast with those of his predecessor, David Johnston, a year ago, when he described the Japanese submarine as the most capable conventional submarine in service and closest of all contenders, includi*ng European boats, to meeting Australia’s needs.

Mr Andrews said yesterday that question marks over the Soryu’s endurance would be addresse*d by the government’s competitive evaluation process that was under way.

The government has invited Japan, Germany and France to submit their designs plus options for construction in Australia, overseas or a hybrid build, along with indicative costs and delivery schedule.

Mr Andrews’s comments about the Soryu come during a sensitive phase in the bidding war, ahead of an announcement of a winner early next year.

Japan plans to send a high-level delegation to Adelaide next month for talks on the lucrative contract, joining French and German delegations already in Australia.

Japan’s ambassador to Australia, Sumio Kusaka, told the National Press Club on Tuesday that the Soryu-class submarine came the closest to fulfilling Australia’s requirements. “The Soryu is on everybody’s mind,” he said.

Mr Andrews said while there were “pluses and minuses” for all three bidders, it was currently a “buyer’s market”.

He rejected repeated claims by Labor that Tony Abbott had done a secret deal with Japan, pointing to an expert oversight panel chaired by former US secretary of the navy Don Winter and including former Federal Court judge Julie Anne Dodds-Streeton.

“Someone like Don Winter and Julie Anne Dodds-Streeton are not going to put their names to something that’s dodgy,” Mr Andrew*s said.

Asked if the defence white paper due for release in April would ensure a future for Australia’s shipbuilding industry, the minister said: “We’ve accepted the advice from RAN that the only way to do that is to have a contin*uous build, so that is what we’re working towards.”

Mr Andrews said there would be more work “than there currently is” for Adelaide’s ASC."

 

[Alf662]

I myself haven't seen LCM-8's or photos of LCM-8's completely high and dry. No doubt it has been done, its just an Army operator I had a chat with about them said it was not an ideal situation or a great idea, something to do with the rudder and shafting arrangements.

LCM-1E do not need a cradle.

And your right well decks are much more practical. We had to have very good conditions to crane LCM-8's on board. Even just outside of Townsville harbour we have had to wait a couple days or try and find a more sheltered location along the coast or around Magnetic Island to do it.

LCVP are excellent little boats, just like you said out dated compared to what's available now days and ours are getting a bit tired. Choules has been operating Success's old LCVP T7 for some time and T5 and T6 off Tobruk will be getting used by Choules as well. Choules actually took T5 to Tailsman Sabre instead of T7. T6 and T7 are sitting on cradles just behind Harry's Café. Not sure if they're going to start using all 3 of them at once, there is certainly enough room for them on deck.

I found a profile drawing of an LCM8. The running gear is fully exposed, ie the shaft runs through an "A" bracket and the propeller and rudder have no protection.

This sort of set up is found in many twin engined pleasure craft and groundings can be catastrophic. If they are involved in a grounding and pressure is put on the shaft and rudder, two things can happen. The rudder can be damaged by forcing it up through the rudder gland and causing a flood. The propeller shaft can also get bent, if the vessel is then operated serious damage can occur to the stern gland and in the worst case scenario the engine can be ripped of the engine mounts.

Another consideration is that if the engine is raw water cooled it can cause a blockage and a catastrophic failure of the engine can occur. That is why many vessels that operate in shallow water are keel cooled. The running gear is also protected by a skeg going under the propeller and supporting the bottom of the rudder.

The best solution here is that the LCM-8's are modified so that their running gear is fully protected or they are retired and newer and more technically appropriate replacements acquired.

Hope this helps.

 

[vonnoobie]

I think you have read into it a little too much rockritten, He did state that all the boat's had there pluses and minuses, He did not go out of his way to deride one nations proposal over another but rather pointed out that at the current stage it could go toward's any one of the three.

Quite simply he is actually doing his job and quite well, Not jumping on the Abbott Soryu is the be all end all band wagon but neither hitching to one of the others. Actually with that article while still cautious about an over seas build I am actually calmer that we may end up choosing what is actually best for us.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Er, what?

As I mentioned yesterday, I really think you need to understand what is happening before trying to tell the ADF they are doing it wrong. I'm about to go to bed so I can't be bothered doing the usual line by line reply, but please don't think reading a couple of publicly available documents qualifies you to tell the services they are not only doing it wrong, but doing it badly wrong.

I'm not commenting on anything the Army (or ADF) is currently is doing. In fact I think the Army are doing a bang up job getting the capability ready by the ambitious dates set. (9 tigers LHD by 2017, 6 chooks?) Its about the long term future of which I am (and ASPI at least) are not aware if a decision has been made.

Which is what the paper about. ASPI isn't telling the ADF what to do. They are trying to clarify the questions to politicians about what is the next move. Getting upset at ASPI, think tanks, forum members and the government isn't going to change that. They aren't trying to micro manage experts and tell them how to do their jobs. Its bigger picture stuff. The experts (ADF service personnel) are asking the questions.

Its more about what is the final capability we want to settle on and why and then the how. That's why the paper is called "Beyond 2017". If this answer is known I'm sure many would be interested.

IMO every voting Australian should be informed and part of the discussion on the capability we want to support. Not necessarily the individual platform, not the individual procedures but the capability. I don't see how stopping people from discussing that, stopping the informing of their opinion, is helpful to that aim. Surely then ignorance prevails. People are then more likely to believe any sensationalist crap touted in the media or by their (or an element of) government.

 

[Bluey 006]

Well, just wonder, does any news/rumors about 2nd RAR wants some AAV-7 in the Land400?

I do not expect something as fancy as LCAC, but a total absent of any interest in IFV/AFV Specialised for amphibious warfare still surprised me.

by the way, does steel hull really suitable for mine hunting/sweeping warfare? If not, may be we really need some aluminium hulled LCS in our fleet.

I think if the ADF is serious about developing an Amphibious capability, eventually LCAC of some kind will have to acquired. Perhaps not in the next 5 years, but certainly in the next 10.

While these are typically seen as a nice to have niche capability, when you consider the variety of things they could be useful for, perhaps they should be higher on the list.

They can support rapid deployment of amphibious forces and material from ships (large and small); they could allow freedom of movement in our tropical north during the wet season (something that is currently very difficult);can operate over mines; support international HADR;medical evacuation, transport supplies and people during local floods (consider how useful they would have been during Brisbane or Victorian floods);SAR; survey/research; surveillance ( especially the RSUs) they also have applications for ice operations (so potentially Tasmania and Antarctica), and in the river systems of tropical jungles of our northern neighbors (our primary operating environment).

To me they are more versatile than other capabilities we are looking at.

With their long list of uses and degree of "sexiness" surely it couldn't be to hard for a BDM to wow some politicians

During TS15 the US marines used them very effectively- Link

Wonder if there were envious eyes from the ADF personnel? I am guessing that is a yes

 

[hairyman]

I am not sure if I have posted this before but I feel strongly about it, so here goes.
We are currently planning to have a surface fleet of 11 - 12 destroyers/frigates. Our fleet a short time ago was 14 frigates, Anzacs and Perrys. I would like to see us return to 14, but with 6 destroyers and 8 frigates. By destroyer I mean a ship with more weaponry than our AWD's, say 60 or 64 VLS cells. The three additional destroyers would be General Purpose, have close to the same anti aircraft/missile defence as the AWD's. 44 to 48 cells, and the extra cells used for Tomahawk or similar, and anti sub torpedo carrying missiles. Perhaps base these vessels on the Meko 400 or the F125. which would both have to be bigger than they are planned at the moment. Then the eight frigates based on the T26, which at this stage looks a very competent ship.

 

[vonnoobie]

A few years old but an interesting read none the less that I find sum's up roughly what we should be aiming for and how to use it..

http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Australian-Army-Journal/Past-editions/~/media/Files/Our%20future/LWSC%20Publications/AAJ/2004Winter/11-TheAustralianDefenceFor.pdf

 

[John Newman]

I am not sure if I have posted this before but I feel strongly about it, so here goes.
We are currently planning to have a surface fleet of 11 - 12 destroyers/frigates. Our fleet a short time ago was 14 frigates, Anzacs and Perrys. I would like to see us return to 14, but with 6 destroyers and 8 frigates. By destroyer I mean a ship with more weaponry than our AWD's, say 60 or 64 VLS cells. The three additional destroyers would be General Purpose, have close to the same anti aircraft/missile defence as the AWD's. 44 to 48 cells, and the extra cells used for Tomahawk or similar, and anti sub torpedo carrying missiles. Perhaps base these vessels on the Meko 400 or the F125. which would both have to be bigger than they are planned at the moment. Then the eight frigates based on the T26, which at this stage looks a very competent ship.

All fourteen in Commission? Actually that's not accurate, there never were all 6 FFG's and 8 Anzacs in commission at the one time.

When Toowoomba (the 7th of the Anzacs) was commissioned in October 2005, all six FFG's were in commission (making 13 frigates in total), but that only lasted for 'one month' because Canberra was then decommissioned in November 2005, bringing the total back down to 12.

Then for another period of time it bounced back up to 13 again, Perth, the 8th of the Anzacs was commissioned in August 2006 and Adelaide was decommissioned in January 2008.

Adelaide was supposed to decommission in November 2006, but because of the delays with the FFG upgrade program, she lasted another 14 months, and after that we were back down to 12 again.

The frigate fleet is now 'effectively' down to 11 with Sydney tied up at FBE but not 'officially' decommissioning until the end of the year.

Fourteen Destroyers and Frigates?

Can't see that happening, there is the possibility that a ninth Future Frigate being produced (which in reality may end up having more to do with sustaining Naval Shipbuilding) and if a ninth does end up being ordered, I'd imagine that it's going to be right at the end of the 2030's or early 2040's, unless the Government actually adds the production of a Frigate 'in between' the end of the AWD's and the scheduled commissioning of the first Future Frigate in 2026.

I think it's going to be eleven for a long long time to come!

 

[Volkodav]

All fourteen in Commission? Actually that's not accurate, there never were all 6 FFG's and 8 Anzacs in commission at the one time.

When Toowoomba (the 7th of the Anzacs) was commissioned in October 2005, all six FFG's were in commission (making 13 frigates in total), but that only lasted for 'one month' because Canberra was then decommissioned in November 2005, bringing the total back down to 12.

Then for another period of time it bounced back up to 13 again, Perth, the 8th of the Anzacs was commissioned in August 2006 and Adelaide was decommissioned in January 2008.

Adelaide was supposed to decommission in November 2006, but because of the delays with the FFG upgrade program, she lasted another 14 months, and after that we were back down to 12 again.

The frigate fleet is now 'effectively' down to 11 with Sydney tied up at FBE but not 'officially' decommissioning until the end of the year.

Fourteen Destroyers and Frigates?

Can't see that happening, there is the possibility that a ninth Future Frigate being produced (which in reality may end up having more to do with sustaining Naval Shipbuilding) and if a ninth does end up being ordered, I'd imagine that it's going to be right at the end of the 2030's or early 2040's, unless the Government actually adds the production of a Frigate 'in between' the end of the AWD's and the scheduled commissioning of the first Future Frigate in 2026.

I think it's going to be eleven for a long long time to come!

True, unfortunate but true. As I understand it the plan in the early 90s had been to replace the three DDGs and first four FFGs with a class of six new FFGs, possibly based on a stretched ANZAC although I do recall the German F-123 and /or F-124 being mentioned but can't remember if that was as a proposal or defence media speculation. The RAN was apparently keen on a license build of three or more Flight IIA Burkes, even at the expense of numbers.

Irrespective of these plans the recently completed Melbourne and Newcastle required a systems upgrade as they had been completed to the same baseline as HMAS Darwin a decade earlier. This would have seen eight ANZAC class patrol frigates supplementing the patrol boats (to be replaced by corvettes), two upgraded FFGs and either six new, possibly with AEGIS and SPY-1F, or three (hopefully more) Flight IIA DDGs. By the mid 90s the DDG replacement had been deferred, and the FFG upgrade was expanded in scope and to to cover all six and to include a life extension for the first four US built ships. Apparently a life extension for the DDGs was also considered, including major structural work and reengining but discarded.

What eventually happed was the FFGupgrade went ahead and the feasibility of upgrading the ANZACs with AEGIS and SPY-1F was investigated in was was called ANZAC WIP (Warfighting Improvement Program) and the corvettes were cancelled requiring the Fremantles to be life extended. When ANZAC WIP was determined impractical AWDwas kicked off and unfortunately FFGUP was a fiasco, running massively over budget and behind schedule while failing to deliver expected capabilities, requiring two FFGs to be deleted from the program, inpart to reduce costs, but mostly to maintain fleet numbers as none of the upgraded vessels were fit for service.

That, in a nut shell, is how we dropped from a planned fifteen or sixteen, to fourteen and now eleven. While we had thirteen on paper, the problematic FFG UP actually resulted in us often having fewer than ten useful frigates, making ASMD critical.

 

[Todjaeger]

Agree totally ref the compromises made to achieve (well actually to not quite achieve) the required speed. Personally I can not see that specifying a far more reasonable 35kts, instead of 45kt (50kt specified) would have done irreparable damage to the LCS concept, what it would have done however is remove a lot of the compromise and perhaps many of the issues you listed. On the gun, I do prefer the 76mm but the 57mm is still a very capable and effective system. I don't really understand the point of the 30mm cannon arrangement when Typhoon is available and when it is actually less flexible and effective than the 57mm. To me for the money spent why didn't they go for either something as capable in every way but speed for a lower unit cost, or alternatively go for something more capable (in everything but speed) for the same money, i.e. the often mooted on these pages mini Absalon.

The thing many miss in the LCS debate is that it is the low end of a high low mix that was meant to include dozens of DDG 1000s as replacement for the Spruance class destroyers, both being intended to serve along side the Arleigh Burke and Ticonderoga class AEGIS destroyers and cruisers. The DDG1000 program was curtailed at three hulls but the USN has continued to order new DDGs and there are many more of them (62 so far and possibly as many as 42 Flight III) than there were Spuances (31) or Perrys (51). In fact if you look at it there were only 23 Adams class DDGs, 10 Farraguts (originally DLGs), 4 Kidds, 18 DLGs and 2 DLGNs reclassified as CGs and 6 CGNs, a grand total of 63 ships, not counting the 27 Ticonderoga class AEGIC CGs. This was all before the peace dividend at the end of the cold war that saw most major navies cut back combatant numbers by a huge amount (look at the RN). This is basically a very long winded way of saying the Perry's high end capabilities have very effectively been replaced by AEGIS DDGs.

To me, when you have so many high end DDGs that have so effectively replaced FFGs, DDs, DDGs, CGs and CGNs, would you really need a new FFG as well? A slower batch 2 or 3 LCS or FF (or corvette as this is the RAN topic) with a single 8 cell VLS and a 76mm with DAVID / DART could as well as RAM / SEARAM would easily be more capable than an SM-1 armed Perry, let alone one that had the Mk-13 GMLS suppressed.

Okay, I think there might have been another bit of misunderstanding. When I was referring to the overall capabilities of the OHP vs. the LCS, I was not referring to a direct comparison between the two. What I meant was what capabilities the class of vessel brought to the USN, when the class was first introduced. In other words, how the OHP stacked up against both other USN but also potentially hostile vessels starting in ~1977, vs. how the LCS stacked/stacks up against other USN and potentially hostile vessels both in ~2008, and the present day. Given what a number of US Gov't studies have determined, that the LCS has survivability issues in contested areas... It does seem to me that end goal was either poorly defined, or thought out. Perhaps even both.

Now I do understand the idea had been to have the LCS be the "Lo" capability in a "HiLo" mix of vessels. What I do not understand is how/why anyone would consider a frigate-sized vessel with a price tag of USD$200 mil. (the initially projected cost for a LCS) before factoring in mission modules and/or embarked aircraft costs a "Lo" capability. Or how wise it would realistically be to have such a large vessel zipping along at 40+ kts in most likely unfamiliar and unfriendly shallow/littoral waters. While the designs do have a shallow draught when compared with conventional frigates, they are still capable of running aground or hitting rocks or reefs, especially when operating in areas where the USN does not have good charts of.

Or how wise it would also realistically be to operate such a large and expensive vessel so close in to a hostile shore. The 57mm gun has a max range of ~5km IIRC, which means that a plethora of weapons could be fired at the LCS which would be capable of inflicting significant, potentially crippling damage, or even sinking an LCS outright, which the LCS would not be able to engage due to range.

To me, a "Lo" cost, inshore type of capability, where potential losses would be expected, would be a much smaller vessel, perhaps around the size of a large patrol boat or small corvette. Such a vessel would have sufficient, and sufficiently advanced systems to work with other vessels, but not so advanced/leading edge so as to drive up vessel costs significantly. That would rather defeat the purpose behind a "Lo" capability which some might consider expendable.

These are all amongst the reasons why I have issues with the LCS, as well as the prospect for US allies like Australia to have any enter into service.

 

[Bluey 006]

Deleted -Duplicate post

 

[Bluey 006]

But yes, anything is 'possible', but not necessarily 'probable', and that applies to both our comments too.

In all honestly too, I think a 'continuous' build program will be almost near impossible to achieve, yes I'm sure that the aim of the program will be to have a far more 'sustainable' or 'near continuous' Naval Shipbuilding program, but to achieve a 'continuous' program, I fear, will have a negative impact on the Navy itself, despite the potential good outcome for industry, I don't think it will be 'win win' it will be 'win loose'.

If you look at the Future Frigate programme (that currently), is planned to get the first hull commissioned in 2026 to coincide with the retirement of Anzac herself, yes that is certainly achievable, but by the time you get to the 'fourth' new hull it could be a different story.

To make sense of what I'm saying, the RAND report was talking about the 'drumbeat' of when a ship is commissioned, there is a drumbeat of 1 or 1.5 or 2 (eg, every 12 months, every 18 months and every 24 months), they are suggesting a drumbeat of '2'.

If you look at the production of the 10 Anzac Frigates (including the two NZ ships), they were commissioned over an 11 year period, just a fraction over a 'drumbeat of 1'.


If you look at the commissioning dates of the 8 Australian Anzac ships they were, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, if you look at a '30 year lifespan' then they should be decommissioned in 2026, 2028, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035 and 2036.

If you follow the RAND suggestion of a drumbeat of '2', the commissioning dates for the eight (8) replacements will be 2026, 2028, 2030, 2032, 2034, 2036, 2038 and 2040. Cheers,

I read the RAND report previously.

But I think continuous build is possible, if they fiddle with things a little.

While ambitious and not perfect something like this could work, and be not a bad fit for retirement schedules of existing ships and introduction of new ones ( based on 30 year life)

OPV (8)
Construction commences – 2018 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction Concludes - 2024

Future Frigates (9)
Construction commenced – 2024 (drum beat 1.5/18 months)
Construction concluded - 2038
First ANZAC frigate retires in : 2026
First Future Frigate completed -2026
Last ANZAC retires 2036
Last Future Frigate completed - 2038 (which is ok as we now have 9)

Corvette/OCV (12)
Construction commences – 2038 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction concludes - 2047

AWD replacement (3)
Construction commences - 2047 (drum beat 2/24 months)
Construction concludes – 2053
First AWD retires - 2046
First AWD replacement completed -2048 (ok as we now have 9 frigates)
Last AWD retires 2050
last AWD replacement completed -2053

Future Frigates replacement (9)
Construction commences -2053 (drum beat 1.5/18 months)
Construction concludes -2067

Corvette/OCV (8)
Construction commences - 2067 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction concludes -2073

What this doesn't allow for is mid life upgrades,submarines (construction,maintenance and block work) or Canberra class replacement block work - having said that there are 2-4 major shipbuilding companies.

There are still some small capability gabs and minor life extensions required but its not too bad and could work. Especially if the Future frigate has a decent CEA air defence suite, and there is a filler "patrol boat replacement"

N.B: when one class ends and another commences in the same year, assume that this is a opposite ends of the year to allow for tooling etc

Thoughts?

 

[John Newman]

I read the RAND report previously.

But I think continuous build is possible, if they fiddle with things a little.

While ambitious and not perfect something like this could work, and be not a bad fit for retirement schedules of existing ships and introduction of new ones ( based on 30 year life)

OPV (8)
Construction commences – 2018 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction Concludes - 2024

Future Frigates (9)
Construction commenced – 2024 (drum beat 1.5/18 months)
Construction concluded - 2038
First ANZAC frigate retires in : 2026
First Future Frigate completed -2026
Last ANZAC retires 2036
Last Future Frigate completed - 2038 (which is ok as we now have 9)

Corvette/OCV (12)
Construction commences – 2038 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction concludes - 2047

AWD replacement (3)
Construction commences - 2047 (drum beat 2/24 months)
Construction concludes – 2053
First AWD retires - 2046
First AWD replacement completed -2048 (ok as we now have 9 frigates)
Last AWD retires 2050
last AWD replacement completed -2053

Future Frigates replacement (9)
Construction commences -2053 (drum beat 1.5/18 months)
Construction concludes -2067

Corvette/OCV (8)
Construction commences - 2067 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction concludes -2073

What this doesn't allow for is mid life upgrades,and the Submarines. There are still some small capability gabs and minor life extensions required but its not too bad and could work. Especially if the Future frigate has a decent CEA air defence suite, and there is a filler "patrol boat replacement"

N.B: when one class ends and another commences in the same year, assume that this is a opposite ends of the year to allow for tooling etc

Thoughts?

No offence, but the problem with the list you have prepared is that you are 'filling gaps' with ship production when I seriously can't understand what those ships are supposed to be being produced for (highlighted in bold above).

If we look at ship production, currently based on 'commissioning' dates, there is going to be a six year gap in the last of the AWD's in 2020 and the first of the Future Frigates in 2026, I think we can all agree on that, ok?


The very first ships in your list are 8 OPV's between 2018 and 2024, are these the ships that you are suggesting be the ACPB replacements? Or are you doubling up the suggestion by RAND of a class of 4 ships as gap fillers?

Either way, yes no doubt construction of a class of OPV's will have to be undertaken in that time frame as either a 'gap filler' and/or at least the start of construction for the ACPB replacements, so I do agree that 'something' is likely to be constructed at that time, either a stand alone class of OPV's (as suggested by RAND) or the ACPB replacements themselves.


Next of course is the Future Frigates, you list 9 Future Frigates between 2024 and 2038, yes that probably near enough to the correct time frame for construction/commissioning of that class.


Before I go any further with your list, I think it's fair to say that from the end of the AWD's (2020) to the end of the Future Frigate production (around 2038/40), there will have to be a number of 'concurrent' ship production runs, NOT 'consecutive' production runs.

And during that time, the ships that will have to be replaced prior to the end of the 2030's are: the ACBP's, the Future Frigates (will be ending production of course), the Mine Warfare ships and the Hydrographic fleet too (and possibly the LCH(R), if proceed with, during that time frame too), can we agree on that? And it may also be that some of the 'smaller' ships may in fact be built at locations 'other than' Techport too?

The two LHD's are probably not going to be replaced until mid or late 2040's, the 2 'yet to be build new' AOR's probably closer to 2050 and that leaves Choules, which originally commissioned in the UK in 2006, say a 30 year life, so somewhere around the mid 2030's, another 'concurrent' program and possibly overseas build too (maybe tied to the time frame when the UK, Spanish and Dutch sisters/half sisters are being replaced).


So getting back to your list, the gap between 2038 and 2047 (first AWD replacement), you have listed a class of 12 Corvette/OCV's, correct?

What exactly are these 12 ships replacing? What exactly is their purpose and role? Because I don't understand what the purpose of that class of 12 ships is other than to fill 'another gap' in production, (everything else in the fleet will have to be replaced 'before' those dates or 'after' those dates).

Not to say a future Government, may or may not, throw continuing production work at Australian shipyards, but surely you just don't go ahead and build a class of 12 OCV's over a 10 year period just as a gap filler??

Anyway, I'm interested to understand what exactly is the reason/purpose of those 12 OCV's.

 

[Raven22]

I'm not commenting on anything the Army (or ADF) is currently is doing. In fact I think the Army are doing a bang up job getting the capability ready by the ambitious dates set. (9 tigers LHD by 2017, 6 chooks?) Its about the long term future of which I am (and ASPI at least) are not aware if a decision has been made.

Which is what the paper about. ASPI isn't telling the ADF what to do. They are trying to clarify the questions to politicians about what is the next move. Getting upset at ASPI, think tanks, forum members and the government isn't going to change that. They aren't trying to micro manage experts and tell them how to do their jobs. Its bigger picture stuff. The experts (ADF service personnel) are asking the questions.

I wasn't commenting on the ASPI report, I was commenting on your post:

"We should in fact make our entire army an amphibious force." "While an ARE force is useful, looking back 50 years and looking forward 50 years it isn't capable enough for the type of missions we are likely to encounter." "Also by focusing on just an ARE we are abdicating any regional leadership or lead capability." "Of course the Army folk are generally against being fully amphibious. And the Navy folk aren't too hot on the idea either." "Instead of creating a marine element we should look at making our entire force marine capable." "Commander of 2RAR is expected just to step up to commanding a full ARG with minimal extra support, minimal training and most likely in a hot situation rather than regular training." "IMO the whole army should adopt a US marine style capability." "Perhaps even adopt a combined ADF."

Random thought bubbles that imply that you know how to do things better, despite clearly not have thought through the issues.

 

[rockitten]

I read the RAND report previously.

But I think continuous build is possible, if they fiddle with things a little.

While ambitious and not perfect something like this could work, and be not a bad fit for retirement schedules of existing ships and introduction of new ones ( based on 30 year life)

OPV (8)
Construction commences – 2018 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction Concludes - 2024

Future Frigates (9)
Construction commenced – 2024 (drum beat 1.5/18 months)
Construction concluded - 2038
First ANZAC frigate retires in : 2026
First Future Frigate completed -2026
Last ANZAC retires 2036
Last Future Frigate completed - 2038 (which is ok as we now have 9)

Corvette/OCV (12)
Construction commences – 2038 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction concludes - 2047

AWD replacement (3)
Construction commences - 2047 (drum beat 2/24 months)
Construction concludes – 2053
First AWD retires - 2046
First AWD replacement completed -2048 (ok as we now have 9 frigates)
Last AWD retires 2050
last AWD replacement completed -2053

Future Frigates replacement (9)
Construction commences -2053 (drum beat 1.5/18 months)
Construction concludes -2067

Corvette/OCV (8)
Construction commences - 2067 (drum beat 0.75/9 months)
Construction concludes -2073

What this doesn't allow for is mid life upgrades,submarines (construction,maintenance and block work) or Canberra class replacement block work - having said that there are 2-4 major shipbuilding companies.

There are still some small capability gabs and minor life extensions required but its not too bad and could work. Especially if the Future frigate has a decent CEA air defence suite, and there is a filler "patrol boat replacement"

N.B: when one class ends and another commences in the same year, assume that this is a opposite ends of the year to allow for tooling etc

Thoughts?

Well, that's similar to where's my "one yard build all" came from. My only concern(s) are:
1. What if some of the OPV/corvettes are going to be aluminum hulled LCS from Austal? I haven't seen any modern mine sweeping/hunting vessels in steel hull, yes, we can use USV/UAVs yes, we can degauss the steel hull, but most common practice will go for fiber-glass or wooden hull.

2. For a batch built so far in-between, it is nearly impossible to develope hi-end capability such as design and R&D.

3. Leaving LHD/LPD and ARO replacements for overseas may not be a bad thing, at least for the sheet metal fibraction: the batch is just too small. What we can do though, is to use the orders to get a better bargain for other procurement projects.

4. For the submarine manufacturing, I would prefer not to rebuild that capability, especially if RAN should seriously consider nuclear for the next replacement.

5. Instead of some extensive MLU, may be we should decommission/sold our vessels after 20 years of age. Many extensive MLU got so over-budgeted that it seems more worthy to build a new design. More jobs for the design team and R&D sectors as well.

So yes, those from SA probably won't like it, I am quite happy/consent with your plan.
-
IMHO, the more I read from john's post, the more I questioned should ship-building industry in Australia worth saving at all.

In the last 30+ years, we have built a new ship-yard for 6 submarines when we should go nuclear, pick a less capable design with a stupid management system rather than just bought the Burke Flight IIA or building just 1 AOR from a supplier who request you to learn French before reading their blue-prints. Isn't the main purpose for naval acquisitions should be for getting the best available (and affordable) gear for our navy? Yet so many decision(s) were made stupidly for reasons outside ADF requirements.

As the industries are long dead, no one cares a damn about RAAF and the army bought most of their gear overseas. If we let shipbuilding in Australia to meet its fate as well, may be that a blessing to the RAN: they can finally have a more political free procurement environment.

 

[Oberon]

The Australian
July 30, 2015 12:00A

Asked if the defence white paper due for release in April would ensure a future for Australia’s shipbuilding industry, the minister said: “We’ve accepted the advice from RAN that the only way to do that is to have a contin*uous build, so that is what we’re working towards.”

I hope this was just an error by the journalist and that the DWP hasn't been delayed 8 months!

 

[Milne Bay]

I hope this was just an error by the journalist and that the DWP hasn't been delayed 8 months!

I think that the original date for the release of the DWP was April 2015.
It should be just around the corner now after already being deferred once.
MB

 

[John Newman]

IMHO, the more I read from john's post, the more I questioned should ship-building industry in Australia worth saving at all.

Just to be clear, I'm not advocating, or never have advocated, that we shouldn't have a viable and productive Naval Shipbuilding industry, my concern has always been around ensuring that the RAN gets all the ships that it needs on time and on budget, and also accepting a 'reasonable' premium for local construction too.

The thing that I'm finding hard to get my head around (and even with the best possible support that this Government and the many future Governments that will have to continue to give support), is to actually visualise that an Australian Naval Shipbuilding Industry can be '100% sustainable' and achieve a 'continuous' build program.

The size of the RAN just isn't big enough, in my opinion, to be able to support a continuous build program, Naval Shipbuilding can certainly be far 'more' sustainable with the right support of Governments, I'm certain of that, but 'continuous'? I just can't see that being possible.

Realistically probably the only nation on this planet that can provide a continuous or near continuous build program for it's Naval Shipbuilding industry is the US.

Anyway, I am looking forward to seeing what the Governments plan is for the Naval Shipbuilding industry, and especially how it can address the failures of all the previous Governments (of both flavours too!).

 

[Bluey 006]

Anyway, I'm interested to understand what exactly is the reason/purpose of those 12 OCV's.

Ok John, my answers in blue

No offence, but the problem with the list you have prepared is that you are 'filling gaps' with ship production when I seriously can't understand what those ships are supposed to be being produced for (highlighted in bold above).

No offence taken but to be fair this plan fits with your wish list you posted some months ago. So hear me out and please keep an open mind. We are just speculating here.

If we look at ship production, currently based on 'commissioning' dates, there is going to be a six year gap in the last of the AWD's in 2020 and the first of the Future Frigates in 2026, I think we can all agree on that, ok?

Yes that is how it currently stands

Under my plan we are discussing, if we could get an OPV in construction by 2018, OPVs (1-8) are being commissioned during that time

Also the AORs will be commissioned around this time - If the BMT design is chosen, ASC will likely be involved in that too.


The very first ships in your list are 8 OPV's between 2018 and 2024, are these the ships that you are suggesting be the ACPB replacements? Or are you doubling up the suggestion by RAND of a class of 4 ships as gap fillers?

A bit of both. They are gap fillers allowing the major ship builders to stay open (BAE, Forgacs, ASC etc) and skill a new work force for the Major combatants, hire apprentices, recruit graduates etc but also the start of the ACPB replacement. The ACPB are pretty shagged and lacking in capability for what we really need. As an OPV with option for mission modules, in addition to the patrol duties they can also experiment with ROVs etc for mine hunting and hydrographic survey (refining doctrine etc), while we still have the existing Mine hunter and Hydrographic fleet in operation (which are slated for a life extension)

The ACPB were slated for a 15-year life – see link meaning they will need to replace in the early 2020s. These OPVs do some of that and add capability but a fleet of interim patrol boat based on an existing design would be need to be acquired or leased as a short-term replacement as per the 2013 White Paper direction (possibly the Cape class). These would likely have a similar life span to the Armidale’s around 15 years. This interim class would likely not be built by one of the Major builders, rather Austral or a similar 2nd tier ship builder ( which need to be replaced in the 2030s).

Either way, yes no doubt construction of a class of OPV's will have to be undertaken in that time frame as either a 'gap filler' and/or at least the start of construction for the ACPB replacements, so I do agree that 'something' is likely to be constructed at that time, either a stand alone class of OPV's (as suggested by RAND) or the ACPB replacements themselves.


Next of course is the Future Frigates, you list 9 Future Frigates between 2024 and 2038, yes that probably near enough to the correct time frame for construction/commissioning of that class.

Good, agreed

Before I go any further with your list, I think it's fair to say that from the end of the AWD's (2020) to the end of the Future Frigate production (around 2038/40), there will have to be a number of 'concurrent' ship production runs, NOT 'consecutive' production runs.

Yes, the replenishment ships (2 x AOR) and the landing ships also need to be fit in somewhere. Like I said these could be slotted in, there are 3 -4 yards after all.

And during that time, the ships that will have to be replaced prior to the end of the 2030's are: the ACBP's, the Future Frigates, the Mine Warfare ships and the Hydrographic fleet too (and possibly the LCH(R), if proceed with, during that time frame too), can we agree on that? And it may also be that some of the 'smaller' ships may in fact be built at locations 'other than' Techport too?

Yes, keep reading

The two LHD's are probably not going to be replaced until mid or late 2040's, the 2 AOR's probably closer to 2050 and that leaves Choules, which originally commissioned in the UK in 2006, say a 30 year life, so somewhere around the mid 2030's, another 'concurrent' program and possibly overseas build too (maybe tied to the time frame when the UK, Spanish and Dutch sisters/half sisters are being replaced).


So getting back to your list, the gap between 2038 and 2047 (first AWD replacement), you have listed a class of 12 Corvette/OCV's, correct?

These are an evolution on the OPVs (build 2018-2024) to replace the
interim patrol boats, mine warfare and hydrographic fleets. Bringing our total OPV and Corvette/OCV fleet to 20 – the original goal of SEA 1180.
DSTO is working on SEA 1179 Phase 1 which will extend the MHC (mine hunting/hydrographic) life of type, extension by 15 years, IOC is expected around 2021. Now agreed 2038 is a little late to replace the mine and hydrographic fleets, but under this plan we will have the 8xOPVs built 2018-2024) which can take majority of the minor warfare load, and the interim patrol boats

What exactly are these 12 ships replacing? What exactly is their purpose and role? Because I don't understand what the purpose of that class of 12 ships is other than to fill 'another gap' in production, (everything else in the fleet will have to be replaced 'before' those dates or 'after' those dates).

Not to say a future Government, may or may not, throw continuing production work at Australian shipyards, but surely you just don't go ahead and build a class of 12 OCV's over a 10 year period just as a gap filler??

Anyway, I'm interested to understand what exactly is the reason/purpose of those 12 OCV's.

They are the 2nd block OPVs and first transition to OCV/corvette

So then after AWD replacements and future frigate replacements, you replace the 8 OPVs built in (2018-2024) with Corvettes/OCV to bring them in line with the 12 x Corvettes/OCVs built 2038- 2047. Giving you the 20 x OCV, 9 x Frigates and 3 AWD on a continuous build.

Plus, other work like the LHD replacements (which the hull is unlikely to build in Australia, only fitted out), Submarine maintenance or build (who knows) , Other auxiliaries like LPD ( again unlikely to be built in Australia) , Landing craft etc - but there are 3-4 yards for block work.

Under this program there will always be warships (including hull construction) built in Australia during our lifetime. Hence continuous build. - A the very least one warship is always under construction, which means we maintain a capability in Australia that can be built on as needed. Not completely degraded ( i.e valley of death)

Yes other ships will also be fitted out, maintained and blocks built also.

I am no expert and the experts in defence can no doubt improve on this, but this pretty basic project management schedule does deliver continuous build.

Of course plenty of elections during this time so – anything can happen.


Rock Kitten:

1. What if some of the OPV/corvettes are going to be aluminum hulled LCS from Austal? I haven't seen any modern mine sweeping/hunting vessels in steel hull, yes, we can use USV/UAVs yes, we can degauss the steel hull, but most common practice will go for fiber-glass or wooden hull.

in this plan, Austral would get the interim patrol boats and there is nothing to say they couldn't bid on the Corvette/OCV - Up to them to deliver a competitive bid. The initial 8 x OPVs - NO, as they are needed by the major yards to prevent closures (or so the media and their PR people would have us believe) and build a skilled workforce for the frigates.

Oh and rock kitten? Wooden hull ? Really ? a wood hull on a modern warship - errrrrr