Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I didn't mean it to be. I haven't seen or heard any PR on how the ARE/ARG's fit into the Beersheba organisation, I really don't know where to look and because its a work in progress I had assumed that the ASPI stuff was new.
Please excuse my ignorance.
No harm done.

It is a bit frustrating sometimes though to see people on forums give an issue about 5 minutes thought and then proclaim to world the way things should be done, and call the establishment idiots because they aren't doing that, when there is usually reams and reams of internal documentation written by very knowledgable and experienced people for why that isn't being done. If you follow my meaning.

On this forum we are all interested amateurs (including myself outside of a very narrow lane), and sometimes I think we need to give the powers that be at least a little bit of credit. Not everyone in positions of responsibilities are idiots, and there are no guarantees any of us would do any better given the same responsibilities.

Now, that aside, let's get back to telling the world how things should be done!
 

Ranger25

Active Member
Staff member
No harm done.

It is a bit frustrating sometimes though to see people on forums give an issue about 5 minutes thought and then proclaim to world the way things should be done, and call the establishment idiots because they aren't doing that, when there is usually reams and reams of internal documentation written by very knowledgable and experienced people for why that isn't being done. If you follow my meaning.

On this forum we are all interested amateurs (including myself outside of a very narrow lane), and sometimes I think we need to give the powers that be at least a little bit of credit. Not everyone in positions of responsibilities are idiots, and there are no guarantees any of us would do any better given the same responsibilities.

Now, that aside, let's get back to telling the world how things should be done!

Agreed, I always appreciate your knowledge here, yourself, Volkodav, Robin etc are all great experts.

That said.

It always seems that when most western Navies generally build smaller classes ie The Perry class, even the new USN LCS, these smaller class ships always are under armed compared to typical Russian/PLANcounterparts of similar displacement. Those Regimes like to stack ASMs on the smallest hull vs typically sized Western counterparts and seem to work to load a max lethality on hulls

Given economics and the price per hull today, why don't more Western Navies add that additional level of OTH ASM etc on their hulls? I understand the designed versatily of ASW, MCM etc for the LCS and understand the USN has relooked the LCS and are up gunning it with an OTH ASM, but why not from the beginning like many potential adversaries? Especially given the new USN intent of Distributed Lethality.

Basically it appears that many western Navies hull are outgunned by typical opposing Navies of similar size.

Thoughts?
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Looking at the ASPI document, In regard's to the Army and the changes they need to make, Would it not make more sense to create a dedicated marine force attached to the Navy? rather then trying to get the Army and Navy on the same page..

Before our amphibious force for the most part was small so we could get away with it, But with the growth in capabilities I think it is something that we shouldn't ignore.
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Looking at the ASPI document, In regard's to the Army and the changes they need to make, Would it not make more sense to create a dedicated marine force attached to the Navy? rather then trying to get the Army and Navy on the same page..

Before our amphibious force for the most part was small so we could get away with it, But with the growth in capabilities I think it is something that we shouldn't ignore.
A 'dedicated marine force' would require an enabled brigade of about 5-6000 soldiers including armour, artillery, attack aviation, specialist engineering etc. Do you really think it makes sense to include that as part of the Navy?

It's worth pointing out, that neither the army nor the navy 'own' the amphibious capability. The same as everything else, both the army and navy will generate single service capability which will the be force assigned and operationally employed by HQ JOC. At the point where the capability gets used, neither army nor navy (nor Air Force) 'own' any capability.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Agreed, I always appreciate your knowledge here, yourself, Volkodav, Robin etc are all great experts.

That said.

It always seems that when most western Navies generally build smaller classes ie The Perry class, even the new USN LCS, these smaller class ships always are under armed compared to typical Russian/PLANcounterparts of similar displacement. Those Regimes like to stack ASMs on the smallest hull vs typically sized Western counterparts and seem to work to load a max lethality on hulls

Given economics and the price per hull today, why don't more Western Navies add that additional level of OTH ASM etc on their hulls? I understand the designed versatily of ASW, MCM etc for the LCS and understand the USN has relooked the LCS and are up gunning it with an OTH ASM, but why not from the beginning like many potential adversaries? Especially given the new USN intent of Distributed Lethality.

Basically it appears that many western Navies hull are outgunned by typical opposing Navies of similar size.

Thoughts?
Appearances can be quite deceiving.

Take for instances, what is required for the OTH capability of a weapon system to be useful and employable. The shooter requires a spotter for targeting data, and comms between the two to relay that data.

The spotter itself needs to have sensor systems sufficient to obtain the targeting data, and due so without being taken out by the target, and/or assets escorting the target. One way to have sufficiently capable sensor systems is to install high-end kit, another way is if the target(s) designs make them 'loud' or 'bright' targets. If one looks at much of the Soviet-era designs in service in the Russian Navy, there are a great many more edges and protrusions which can allow radar returns. In short, many of the designs of non-Western navies can be easier to 'see' as it were.

The above benefit, in concert with the generally superior comms/datalinks of Western forces, as well as their sensor systems, will usually give a navy like the RAN a greater chance of earlier detection. With earlier detection, the RAN would then have a better chance to set the terms of the engagement, and/or launch an attack or attacks before the hostiles were even aware a RAN force was in range to due so.

I deliberately left out a USN CBG, because few amateurs really grasp the extent of a CBG's capabilities. A fully loaded USN CVN has ~same number of fighter/attack aircraft has the RAAF, which is more than a number of the Middle Powers around the world. The organic detection capabilities of a CBG alone are greater than that of most nations, never mind all the other US capabilities which exist and could inform and support a deployed CBG.

One needs to keep in mind that just like has been mentioned in the Air Force category, individual combat units/vessels do not operate completely on their own, in a vacuum. They operate together to achieve results which are greater than the sum of their parts.
 

Stock

Member
Well, just wonder, does any news/rumors about 2nd RAR wants some AAV-7 in the Land400?

I do not expect something as fancy as LCAC, but a total absent of any interest in IFV/AFV Specialised for amphibious warfare still surprised me.

by the way, does steel hull really suitable for mine hunting/sweeping warfare? If not, may be we really need some aluminium hulled LCS in our fleet.
There is no requirement for the Land 400 CRV to be amphibious in any capacity, not even swimming across water obstacles. Only a fording requirement. Expect the same with the IFV.

No mention or rumour whatsoever about AAVs or similar from Land 400.
 

Ballistic

Member
There is no requirement for the Land 400 CRV to be amphibious in any capacity, not even swimming across water obstacles. Only a fording requirement. Expect the same with the IFV.

No mention or rumour whatsoever about AAVs or similar from Land 400.
While Land 400 certainly does not make any mention of any kind of AAV or similar, "Army 101 Brief Ver 7 - Modernising from Beersheba and Beyond" does make very specific mention of an Amphibious Assault Vehicle in the "Round Out the Amphibious Battle Group" section.

While most of it reads like a wish list, it does seem like the Army is cognisant of the requirement for such a capability. Maybe they are stalling in anticipation of the USMC choice for their ACV 1.1 decision?
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Not saying a composite hull is the way to go for the OPV / corvette but I should point out that far from being a structurally weak solution it is actually just about the strongest and you also don't need to worry about corrosion or fatigue. The issue it has is cost and disposal, i.e. about the only way to get rid of the hull at the end of life is to cut it up and bury it in land fill.

I also disagree on the want and need for a fully armed corvettes. Ever since the RAN retired the last of their war built corvettes and frigates there has been a recognized gap between the RANs major fleet units and patrol boats they have desired to fill. In WWII there were the Fairmile D HDMLs (Harbour Defence Motor Launch) as well as the Bathurst class corvettes which were actually designed seaward defence vessels rather than mine sweepers pressed into escort and patrol work. As these were retired the RANs Ton class mine sweepers had to step up, in particular during the Indonesian Confrontation, this was when the Attack class PBs were developed and a class of corvette planned.

The corvettes evolved, first with the addition of a helicopter, which in turn necessitated improved self defence, in the late 60s that meant Tartar and what had been a gun armed patrol vessel intended to support and free up destroyers and frigates had become the DDL light destroyer, basically a guided missile frigate, in its own right. There was still a need but scope creep had derailed the project meaning the RAN not only missed out on their corvettes but also additional high end destroyers as a simpler, less capable, Light Destroyer or FFGs, evolved from the DDL project, were procured instead. Interestingly in the late 70s it had been intended to procure a class of six gun / missile armed FAC derivatives of the Fremantle class PBs which would have to a degree filled the corvette mission but these did not proceed for cost reasons.

Since then there has been the OPC / Transfield 81m corvette (cancelled in 1996) and more recently the OCV, indefinitely deferred in 2013. To me this clearly shows there is an identified requirement otherwise it wouldn't keep reappearing, only to be cancelled and smaller less capable vessels bought instead.

Now we could build a class of OPVs which would be a massive improvement over the preceding patrol boats and able to relieve frigates in some capacities, they would still lack any real combat capability. While more durable and more effective than patrol boats they would be completely incapable of defending themselves at all meaning in any conflict they would have to be able to operate under a defensive umbrella provided by our limited number of major combatants (or allied vessels) or be left at home, they would be less effective and versatile than smaller missile armed craft used in our region. Basically once there was any degree of threat at all they would have to be left at home leaving or very limited number of major combatants to try and do everything on their own.

If we reuse the weapons, sensors and combat system from the ASMD upgraded ANZACs we could, for limited outlay, grant the RAN an additional eight warships able to do everything an OPV is intended to, even in higher threat scenarios. Instead of having to be left home, or defended, they would be able to operate independently or even add to the combat power of our major combatants. Remember, as with the cancelled DDL of the 1970s, once you add a multirole helicopter, worth tens of millions of dollars, you really need to ensure the ship can defend itself.


Volk, thanks for a good overview

I guess the question is what do you throw into harms way?

Assuming that destroyer / Frigate sized vessels deal with the wider variety of naval threats from, Air / surface / sub surface, then what can we expect of the smaller classes in the fleet? Can we expect in the 21st century that the Corvette / OPV / OCV sized ships to actually do war fighting or are they purely for constabulatory duties and those fitted with mission bays providing some sort of light logistical support. Are they really destined to be confined to port in times of conflict? Or with some modest armament do they have a place within a deployed taskforce where they are actualy an ASSET rather than a BURDEN? If so then some appropriate allowance of weight and space for weapons and sensors make sense. However if realistically we will not send this style of ship into harms way, then save your money and go with a simple weapons fit similar to the Armidales but with one exception, and that is a 76mm gun rather than the 25mm bushmaster.
I'm just asking the above question with no passion one way or another.
Suggest we clarify the mission first, then allocate to the ship it's required military muscle.From that we should know its size and weight which will then determine the ships class / description.

On a lighter note.
Volk as you suggest the names and duties for ships classes have changed over the years. I'd speculate now with ship creep that a modern battleship would come in about a kilometre long and weight about a million tonnes.
Certainly good for international flag waving!!!!
Do we order one?

Regards S
 

hairyman

Active Member
Order one? We would have to sell the country to pay for it!

On the Corvette issue, I could see a return to anti-submarine warfare a function for them. I remember they used to have depth charges on them.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
On a lighter note.
Volk as you suggest the names and duties for ships classes have changed over the years. I'd speculate now with ship creep that a modern battleship would come in about a kilometre long and weight about a million tonnes.
Certainly good for international flag waving!!!!
Do we order one?

Regards S
Maybe we could order one as part of a massive stimulus for the mining industry. It could be a 5:1 scale reproduction of the WWI Battlecruiser HMAS Australia built in China along side the Titanic reproduction. Built from Australian iron ore in China and powered by coal burning steam plant it would give China a massive economic boost, help out our starving billionaires and multinationals by increasing demand for iron and coal. Best of all is none of our neighbours will feel the slightest bit threatened by this tactically useless monstrosity.
 

Goknub

Active Member
Don't say that too loudy, Clive Palmer would love that idea. Lambie would probably think it's a great idea too.

As for Corvettes, I doubt they would be seen as politically worth the risk outside of our neighborhood unless they came equipped with a decent CIWS. That ISIS attack on the Egyptian patrol boat would be a disaster for an Australian government trying to explain why a Frigate wasn't sent instead. No one wants to be accused of penny pinching that costs lives.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
On the OPV verses corvette discussion I refer to the debate over the USNs LCS project. Basically they developed a high performance vessel to replace their mine countermeasures vessels, patrol boats, patrol frigates (Perrys that have lost their Mk-13 GMLS). They were better armed and better protected with better performance than any of the legacy vessels yet were criticised (as the MV-22 and F-35 have been), incessantly, for being too vulnerable, too poorly armed and unfit for service.

We seem to be heading down the same illogical path with the on again off again medium combatant requirement (PBs and mine hunters being minor combatants, frigates and destroyers being majors).

A corvette is too vulnerable as can not possibly be as capable as a frigate, therefore it should be no better armed than a patrol boat, if its no better armed than a patrol boat then it can't defend itself, if it can't defend itself is it worth the risk of embarking a helicopter worth tens of millions of dollars, if it doesn't carry a helicopter does it need to be as big as it is? All of a sudden instead of a corvette that is capable of supplementing and supporting the major fleet units, conducting counter piracy patrols and global deployments we find ourselves with a new class of patrol boats, slightly larger than those it replaces and our frigates and destroyers continue to be worked to destruction doing a stack of jobs a corvette would be perfectly adequate for.

While I would love the RAN to have two dozen destroyers and several DDH / light carriers, its not going to happen. That means we are going to get three Hobarts and nine replacement frigates (for the FFGs and ANZACs), plus apparently at least four OPVs, if we are really lucky those OPVs may actually be corvettes and as such may have a medium calibre gun, a point defence missile system, an ASW capability and an anti-shipping missile of some sort. Considering we will have many still useful systems left over from the retiring Adelaides and then the ANZACs we have the potential to build a class of capable medium escorts / patrol frigates instead of just OPVs or even worse, yet another generation of patrol boats.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
On the OPV verses corvette discussion I refer to the debate over the USNs LCS project. Basically they developed a high performance vessel to replace their mine countermeasures vessels, patrol boats, patrol frigates (Perrys that have lost their Mk-13 GMLS). They were better armed and better protected with better performance than any of the legacy vessels yet were criticised (as the MV-22 and F-35 have been), incessantly, for being too vulnerable, too poorly armed and unfit for service.
Sorry Volk, but I tend to disagree with you here on a number of points. I do have a number of issues with the USN's LCS programme, chief amongst them is that due to decisions made to enable such a high maximum speed, there are a number of limitations which the LCS have. Deadweight tonnage for instance, puts some very sharp limitations on the number of personnel, victuals, bunkerage and munitions which an LCS can have. The can quickly become a significant limiting factor is an LCS were to attempt to sustain operations with four embarked helicopters and their associated air and ground crews.

Another area is the overall combat capability of an LCS v. an OHP FFG. While an OHP that had undergone modernization which deleted the Mk-13 launcher without replacement would have had a significant drop in combat capability, the OHP still retained the 76mm gun, which has a similar ROF to the 57mm of the LCS (once all ready-fire rounds are accounted for) but fires a larger, heavier shell, further. Once more mission modules are finished and really available for service, then an LCS might possess more firepower than a modernized OHP. When looking historically, IMO the LCS lacks a comparable level of firepower to peer-sized vessels, which the OHP FFG's did have when they first began entering service. IMO it would have been better for the USN to be less ambitious in terms of speed, and go with a more conventional frigate-type vessel with mission module sockets. Especially since there have been significant troubles encountered with developing said modules.

As for the whole OPV/OCV/corvette question for the RAN, from my POV the first question which needs to be answered is just what role(s) will these vessels actually have and/or be expected to carry out. If due to security threats and gov't policy, only constabulary tasks would be assigned, then spending more funding on upgraded weapon systems would be a waste of time and resources. OTOH if these OPV/OCV/corvette-type vessels might be tasked with independent operations in potentially threatening areas in lieu of a major fleet unit, then having enhanced systems, or at least the potential for them, is much more sensible.
 
I'm no expert, but I would've thought if we go down the Corvette path (which I personally think is a good idea) they should be fitted for but not with some decent ASW suites. With all the talk of 100's of subs floating around the Indian and Pacific oceans in the coming years a dozen or two ASW Corvettes could prove quite useful. Of course in peace time, they would be fitted out for standard patrol duties.
 

Flexson

Active Member
Thanks again Flexson
Certainly the LCH was the workhorse of the fleet for many decades and will be missed, but as discussed which way do we go? Is it for a like vessel or do we take another approach. Certainly an interesting area because of the dual military and increasingly important HADR role.
As for the LCM8 I've seen images of lost and lonely LCM8's taken in the high tidal areas of north / west Australia. Quite a sight to see these big bits of metal with no water to be seen for miles.
I knew the LCM8 needed a cradle for storage on deck but was unaware one was needed for in the dock of Choules.Does the newer LCM1-E need a crade? Also do you know how practical it is to crane on and off this size craft. My understanding is it was like having a wrecking ball over the side of the ship and could only be done in the most favourable conditions. Hence the move towards a well dock.
Do you know anything about the LCVP on Tobruk?.These old style craft are making a comeback in other navys and I think there simplicity and low cost give them a place on many diffferent styles of ships.They seem to be much faster craft now offering small patrol boat capabilities while maintaining a good amount of troop lift or light vehicle transport.
Regards S
I myself haven't seen LCM-8's or photos of LCM-8's completely high and dry. No doubt it has been done, its just an Army operator I had a chat with about them said it was not an ideal situation or a great idea, something to do with the rudder and shafting arrangements.

LCM-1E do not need a cradle.

And your right well decks are much more practical. We had to have very good conditions to crane LCM-8's on board. Even just outside of Townsville harbour we have had to wait a couple days or try and find a more sheltered location along the coast or around Magnetic Island to do it.

LCVP are excellent little boats, just like you said out dated compared to what's available now days and ours are getting a bit tired. Choules has been operating Success's old LCVP T7 for some time and T5 and T6 off Tobruk will be getting used by Choules as well. Choules actually took T5 to Tailsman Sabre instead of T7. T6 and T7 are sitting on cradles just behind Harry's Café. Not sure if they're going to start using all 3 of them at once, there is certainly enough room for them on deck.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
I'm no expert, but I would've thought if we go down the Corvette path (which I personally think is a good idea) they should be fitted for but not with some decent ASW suites. With all the talk of 100's of subs floating around the Indian and Pacific oceans in the coming years a dozen or two ASW Corvettes could prove quite useful. Of course in peace time, they would be fitted out for standard patrol duties.
Agreed, In the past we have been able to get away with a dozen combatant's but with the growing fleet's of various nations in both the Indian and Pacific ocean's along with the capabilities of the individual asset's we need to be looking at increasing number's of our own especially considering how badly the country relies on international trade more today then we did in the past.

My only question since the agreed upon view is to roll over the equipment on the Adelaide and Anzac class frigates onto any such 'corvette' is would the particular equipment fit onto a 2,000t corvette in there current form? From my understanding the CEAFAR radar system fitted to the Anzac's is made to suit the particular size of the Anzac's, Fitting them to a smaller vessel would likely require it to be scaled down if I'm not mistaken.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
The ASPI paper is just an inform piece.

IMO the 2RAR is just a short term band aid. We should in fact make our entire army an "amphibious force". By that I mean we should be training the entire Australian army for amphibious operations and make the ARG a realistic component rather than a mirage capability. It looks like its there, people say its there, but when it comes to actually using it, its gone or not possible.

While an ARE force is useful, looking back 50 years and looking forward 50 years it isn't capable enough for the type of missions we are likely to encounter. Also by focusing on just an ARE we are abdicating any regional leadership or lead capability. Going back to service capability for a larger force. We might as well go back and disband our forces and prey powerful friends will do our bidding, which historically, every time, we have gone that way we have been disappointed and strained the relationship.

Of course the Army folk are generally against being fully amphibious. And the Navy folk aren't too hot on the idea either. The RAAF doesn't see it being integrated into it either. Its a game changer, so previous empires don't matter. Instead of creating a marine element we should look at making our entire force marine capable.

* Commander of 2RAR is expected just to step up to commanding a full ARG with minimal extra support, minimal training and most likely in a hot situation rather than regular training.
* Roles/Ranks of CATF and CLF during ARG
* Establishment of amphibious training centre not just for 2RAR but for the region including allied forces.
* Equipment for ARG
* Handing off from ARG to ARE.
* International ARG
* lack of depth in the Army to sustain lack of 3 to 1

I disagree with option 4. Mile wide and a inch deep. IMO the whole army should adopt a US marine style capability. I believe in purple, purple everything. Perhaps even adopt a combined ADF.

I see this as the opportunity for the army to ask for what i really needs and those needs should be met.
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The ASPI paper is just an inform piece.

IMO the 2RAR is just a short term band aid. We should in fact make our entire army an "amphibious force". By that I mean we should be training the entire Australian army for amphibious operations and make the ARG a realistic component rather than a mirage capability. It looks like its there, people say its there, but when it comes to actually using it, its gone or not possible.

While an ARE force is useful, looking back 50 years and looking forward 50 years it isn't capable enough for the type of missions we are likely to encounter. Also by focusing on just an ARE we are abdicating any regional leadership or lead capability. Going back to service capability for a larger force. We might as well go back and disband our forces and prey powerful friends will do our bidding, which historically, every time, we have gone that way we have been disappointed and strained the relationship.

Of course the Army folk are generally against being fully amphibious. And the Navy folk aren't too hot on the idea either. The RAAF doesn't see it being integrated into it either. Its a game changer, so previous empires don't matter. Instead of creating a marine element we should look at making our entire force marine capable.

* Commander of 2RAR is expected just to step up to commanding a full ARG with minimal extra support, minimal training and most likely in a hot situation rather than regular training.
* Roles/Ranks of CATF and CLF during ARG
* Establishment of amphibious training centre not just for 2RAR but for the region including allied forces.
* Equipment for ARG
* Handing off from ARG to ARE.
* International ARG
* lack of depth in the Army to sustain lack of 3 to 1

I disagree with option 4. Mile wide and a inch deep. IMO the whole army should adopt a US marine style capability. I believe in purple, purple everything. Perhaps even adopt a combined ADF.

I see this as the opportunity for the army to ask for what i really needs and those needs should be met.
Er, what?

As I mentioned yesterday, I really think you need to understand what is happening before trying to tell the ADF they are doing it wrong. I'm about to go to bed so I can't be bothered doing the usual line by line reply, but please don't think reading a couple of publicly available documents qualifies you to tell the services they are not only doing it wrong, but doing it badly wrong.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Sorry Volk, but I tend to disagree with you here on a number of points. I do have a number of issues with the USN's LCS programme, chief amongst them is that due to decisions made to enable such a high maximum speed, there are a number of limitations which the LCS have. Deadweight tonnage for instance, puts some very sharp limitations on the number of personnel, victuals, bunkerage and munitions which an LCS can have. The can quickly become a significant limiting factor is an LCS were to attempt to sustain operations with four embarked helicopters and their associated air and ground crews.

Another area is the overall combat capability of an LCS v. an OHP FFG. While an OHP that had undergone modernization which deleted the Mk-13 launcher without replacement would have had a significant drop in combat capability, the OHP still retained the 76mm gun, which has a similar ROF to the 57mm of the LCS (once all ready-fire rounds are accounted for) but fires a larger, heavier shell, further. Once more mission modules are finished and really available for service, then an LCS might possess more firepower than a modernized OHP. When looking historically, IMO the LCS lacks a comparable level of firepower to peer-sized vessels, which the OHP FFG's did have when they first began entering service. IMO it would have been better for the USN to be less ambitious in terms of speed, and go with a more conventional frigate-type vessel with mission module sockets. Especially since there have been significant troubles encountered with developing said modules.

As for the whole OPV/OCV/corvette question for the RAN, from my POV the first question which needs to be answered is just what role(s) will these vessels actually have and/or be expected to carry out. If due to security threats and gov't policy, only constabulary tasks would be assigned, then spending more funding on upgraded weapon systems would be a waste of time and resources. OTOH if these OPV/OCV/corvette-type vessels might be tasked with independent operations in potentially threatening areas in lieu of a major fleet unit, then having enhanced systems, or at least the potential for them, is much more sensible.

Well I've given up on the super battleship,

Back to reality
.
Todjaeger your last paragraph somes up the OPV debate very well.
At this stage I guess we'll just wait for the DWP to show the way and fingers crossed the proposed OPV will have at least a NH-90 sized hanger and landing deck with a purposeful 76 cal gun forward.................Then, it can at least look like a warship!!!!

Regards S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Actually the Army used to own and operate their own medium sized amphibious ships the LSMs which were replaced with a larger number of smaller, less capable LCHs which ended up with the RAN instead. They also had their own cargo and logistics vessels and are apparently quite keen to obtain fast combat boats and enthusiastically embracing the capabilities being introduced by the LHDs and Choules.

As I understand it 2 RAR is primarily developing and perfecting the doctrine required to make the best use of the new assets and once this has been done the capability will be incorporated into the repertoire of each of the Beersheba brigades. Once there current job is done 2 RAR may be disbanded, sad but it makes sense as there are other, important functions that require the manpower. It would be nice to convert them into marine commandos or even para commandos to supplement and support our current special forces but is it the best use of resources. Could it be more use to use the manpower to form an AAAV regiment to provide a squadron to support each brigade, or maybe to provide manning for an extra couple of tank squadrons?

I would love it if we had the resources to establish a brigade of marines to support a deployable ARG but realistically there are other requirements that have to come first.
 
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