Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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No the story was printed in the Advertiser but the sources are the highly regarded professionals listed in it. Basically the majority of experts, even overseas ones are coming out in favour of a local build, even the Japanese are now being said to be considering it, hardly surprising considering the normalisation of the exchange rate to historic levels.
If I was the CEO of a major shipbuilding company, and bidding for a contract of several billion bucks, I would say whatever it took to secure a contract. Monitring the news etc, public opinion etc. I would sell my company the best way possible, yes we can build them in Australia, it would be good for us both, create jobs, an industry blah blah blah and do as I planned anyway.
What Ive seen from big industry is penalties applied by a government watchdog when schedules are not met.
To avoid these penalties, companies just get the job done, knowing its substandard work, with the plan to fix it later.
The watch dog, who is on a very good deal, then hangs around for as long as possible nit picking the project in order to prolong his job (his being his team) and deleying the project further.
End result is a product that looks ok, but has mainly minor problems everywhere, that will continue for the life of the end product.
In the mean time, some of the sub contractors disolve their companies and cant be recalled to fix their problems. So they raise another company to fix the problem and the disfunction continues....
What Ive seen from big industry is penalties applied by a government watchdog when schedules are not met.
To avoid these penalties, companies just get the job done, knowing its substandard work, with the plan to fix it later.
The watch dog, who is on a very good deal, then hangs around for as long as possible nit picking the project in order to prolong his job (his being his team) and deleying the project further.
End result is a product that looks ok, but has mainly minor problems everywhere, that will continue for the life of the end product.
In the mean time, some of the sub contractors disolve their companies and cant be recalled to fix their problems. So they raise another company to fix the problem and the disfunction continues....
I would like to see Sweden included in the countries willing to build our subs. After all they are the only country we have worked with to build submarines, and the Collins have ended up to be a highly regarded product, dispite being rubbished shamefully by people playing politics with the issue.
Winter is not involved with any of the bids, he the bloke who was brought in to conduct an independent review. Same thing happened when Coles was brought in from the UK to look at submarine maintenance, it was expected that he would cane ASC and blame them for all the problems, what happened instead was he found that the issue was the contractual structure and cost cutting. Basically attempts to reduce upfront costs were causing more expensive and time consuming problems latter on, i.e. not upgrading the diesels resulted in very expensive failures later on, not having a rotable parts pools increased the cost and time taken to complete a Full Cycle Docking.
Every expert who has had a close look at Australian shipbuilding has found the same thing, delays and overruns are caused by the inconsistent flow of work with the stop start nature of procurement we have had over the last few decades, but when up to speed Australian yards are competitive. With a dozen major surface combatants, tankers, amphibious ships and OPVs there is sufficient work to make a local industry viable and perhaps even more cost effective than building overseas.
Trackmaster
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So correct me if I'm wrong. A South Australian Government committee hearing.
Again, correct me if I'm wrong. The SA Government does not set Australian defence policy.
As I see it, a meaningless committee hearing aimed at the local electorate. French and German officials are attending because they know they have to play to the local 6pm news and the local paper. Bells and whistles, smoke and mirrors and a lead story.
In the grand scheme of things, meaningless outside of Adelaide.
Let us hope the professionals are allowed to make a decision focused on the defence of Australia, and if it involves work for SA, so be it.
Again, as I see it, the local media should put some energy into asking questions about why the order book stayed closed for six years.
If the Professionals advice is ignored then you can bet it will make the problems of the current Collins class look like a walk in the park and the politicians will lay the blame solely on the RAN who will be left to pick up the pieces.
The professionals never make the decision, the government does, if we are lucky the decision is based on advice from relevant professionals.
The professionals recommended that the evolved option be selected for the AWD project because it was the closest thing to what they really wanted, the Flight IIA Arleigh Burke class DDG. The professionals didn't really care where the ships were built, they just wanted the capability in a timely and affordable manner, they are still waiting for an inferior capability that has cost significantly more than the originally desired one. A timely order for Bath, Ingalls or Williamstown built Burkes by Keating or Howard would have seen the required ships in service a decade ago for a fraction of the current cost, this is what the professionals wanted but didn't get.
The professionals also wanted eight as opposed to six submarines to meet the governments stated mission requirements, this was for the Oberons as well as the Collins. They also wanted a rotable parts pool to support timely and efficient maintenance. The professionals were also recommending that a new or evolved class of submarine should be built to supplement then replace the Collins as far back as the early 2000s. The idea was that there were not enough submarines available to support existing operations and that it would be more cost effective to build an improved, evolved, design to increase numbers then roll out as many of the the improvements as possible to the existing boats in theform of prefabricated and texted modules, than to attempt to cram everything in during scheduled FCD and MCD (full and mid cycle dockings).
On top of all of this, after the professional advice was ignored, industry experts, naval and shipbuilding experts from overseas were brought in to advise where things went wrong. These experts found that the professionals had not been listened to and mistakes had been made at the contractual and structural level and that the decision makers were still not listening and were actually forcing the RAN and industry to operate inefficiently and unproductively because having not listened to advise the decision makers had gone for the apparently cheaper options making cost blowouts later on inevitable.
Germany, France, UK may bid for frigate contract for Australia | afr.com
"by John Kerin
A fierce international competition to build a $20 billion frigate fleet is expected after the Abbott government dumped a tainted "low risk" option ahead of the release of next month's defence white paper..
The plan, which was detailed by former Defence Minister David Johnston in May, last year would have utilised the hull of the troubled, 6500-tonne air warfare destroyer which is currently being built in Adelaide as the basis for the new fleet.
The destroyer hull would simply have been fitted with lower capacity radar, armaments and combat systems than those aboard the destroyer and a follow-on build would have preserved jobs.
Defence argued at the time that using the destroyer hull would be less risky given three destroyers are already being built for the Navy and build shortcomings should be overcome by the early 2020s when frigates are due for replacement.
However, the $8 billion destroyer project has been plagued by cost overruns and delays and the destroyer hull is considered too noisy for a submarine-hunting role.
The dumping of the option opens the way for a competition and a field of ready contenders with the project to build a fleet of up to nine frigates to be included in next month's white paper.
It is also understood there were concerns Australia could have been vulnerable to the build-up of regional submarine fleets without an effective frigate fleet.
"It was a sensible decision given the destroyer hull was not really suited to the submarine hunting role of a purpose-built frigate," Australian Strategic Policy analyst Dr Andrew Davies said.
"It was supposed to be a low-risk option but it was also more about preserving jobs than the Navy getting the warship it needs," he said.
Dr Davies has suggested splitting the fleet between destroyers and frigates and smaller corvettes to perform all the roles short of war that Navy warships are now expected to perform.
The UK is the latest country to show interest in supplying the Royal Australian Navy with a purpose-built frigate even before the project details have been released.
The first of the 6400-tonne Type 26 frigates which is being developed for the Royal Navy is to be delivered from 2022 – a timeframe which suits the Royal Australian Navy with the current Anzac fleet expected to be phased out by the mid 2020s.
The BAE Systems warship has been designed with international export orders in mind.
German-based TKMS may offer its Meko 600 escort frigate or larger F125 for the project.
TKMS Australia chairman Dr John White told The Australian Financial Review the firm could offer several warship designs to the Royal Australian Navy.
Dr White said he also believed the ships could be built in Australian shipyards.
Dr White was involved with Tenix (now BAE) and the successful build of eight Anzac class frigates for the Australian Navy in the late 80's and early 90's.
"TKMS has a range of designs it is building for German and other foreign navies and could offer a warship which meets the requirements of the Royal Australian Navy," Dr White said.
"We showed with the Anzac project that you can successfully build ships in Australia and there is no reason why such a model could not be reprised," Dr White said.
French bidder DCNS may also put up its 6500-tonne FREMM European multi-role frigate.
DCNS Australia chief executive Sean Costello said earlier this week that the firm was interested in bidding for the frigate project and was involved in designing building and maintaining all the French Navy's warships and exporting designs around the globe.
The French and German firms are also involved in a fierce three-way competitive evaluation process for Australia's $50 billion submarine project.
Japan remains a favourite to win the submarine bid as part of a strengthening of defence and strategic ties between the two countries.
Japan-based Mitsubishi/Kawasaki is putting forward its 4000 tonne Soryu class, DCNS is proposing its 4000 tonne shortfin Barracuda and TKMS its 4000 tonne Type 216.
Japan has not expressed interest in the Australian frigate replacement project."
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So the AWD hull is out, and it will be a war between MEKO 400, Type 26 and the French FEMM. Hang on, didn't we want the Italian version? How come it is now the French bidding for the contract?
"by John Kerin
A fierce international competition to build a $20 billion frigate fleet is expected after the Abbott government dumped a tainted "low risk" option ahead of the release of next month's defence white paper..
The plan, which was detailed by former Defence Minister David Johnston in May, last year would have utilised the hull of the troubled, 6500-tonne air warfare destroyer which is currently being built in Adelaide as the basis for the new fleet.
The destroyer hull would simply have been fitted with lower capacity radar, armaments and combat systems than those aboard the destroyer and a follow-on build would have preserved jobs.
Defence argued at the time that using the destroyer hull would be less risky given three destroyers are already being built for the Navy and build shortcomings should be overcome by the early 2020s when frigates are due for replacement.
However, the $8 billion destroyer project has been plagued by cost overruns and delays and the destroyer hull is considered too noisy for a submarine-hunting role.
The dumping of the option opens the way for a competition and a field of ready contenders with the project to build a fleet of up to nine frigates to be included in next month's white paper.
It is also understood there were concerns Australia could have been vulnerable to the build-up of regional submarine fleets without an effective frigate fleet.
"It was a sensible decision given the destroyer hull was not really suited to the submarine hunting role of a purpose-built frigate," Australian Strategic Policy analyst Dr Andrew Davies said.
"It was supposed to be a low-risk option but it was also more about preserving jobs than the Navy getting the warship it needs," he said.
Dr Davies has suggested splitting the fleet between destroyers and frigates and smaller corvettes to perform all the roles short of war that Navy warships are now expected to perform.
The UK is the latest country to show interest in supplying the Royal Australian Navy with a purpose-built frigate even before the project details have been released.
The first of the 6400-tonne Type 26 frigates which is being developed for the Royal Navy is to be delivered from 2022 – a timeframe which suits the Royal Australian Navy with the current Anzac fleet expected to be phased out by the mid 2020s.
The BAE Systems warship has been designed with international export orders in mind.
German-based TKMS may offer its Meko 600 escort frigate or larger F125 for the project.
TKMS Australia chairman Dr John White told The Australian Financial Review the firm could offer several warship designs to the Royal Australian Navy.
Dr White said he also believed the ships could be built in Australian shipyards.
Dr White was involved with Tenix (now BAE) and the successful build of eight Anzac class frigates for the Australian Navy in the late 80's and early 90's.
"TKMS has a range of designs it is building for German and other foreign navies and could offer a warship which meets the requirements of the Royal Australian Navy," Dr White said.
"We showed with the Anzac project that you can successfully build ships in Australia and there is no reason why such a model could not be reprised," Dr White said.
French bidder DCNS may also put up its 6500-tonne FREMM European multi-role frigate.
DCNS Australia chief executive Sean Costello said earlier this week that the firm was interested in bidding for the frigate project and was involved in designing building and maintaining all the French Navy's warships and exporting designs around the globe.
The French and German firms are also involved in a fierce three-way competitive evaluation process for Australia's $50 billion submarine project.
Japan remains a favourite to win the submarine bid as part of a strengthening of defence and strategic ties between the two countries.
Japan-based Mitsubishi/Kawasaki is putting forward its 4000 tonne Soryu class, DCNS is proposing its 4000 tonne shortfin Barracuda and TKMS its 4000 tonne Type 216.
Japan has not expressed interest in the Australian frigate replacement project."
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So the AWD hull is out, and it will be a war between MEKO 400, Type 26 and the French FEMM. Hang on, didn't we want the Italian version? How come it is now the French bidding for the contract?
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Joe Black
Active Member
I really like the Meko A-400 proposed for Sea 5000. But I suspect it could be the most expensive proposal out of the 3 designs.
As for the FEMM, I suspect DCNS is bidding for it because it already has an office in Australia and it sees Australia (together with Sea 1000) as a strategic area for their business to be involved in. As for the actual proposed design, it could be based on the Italian version with Australian specific components such as CEAFAR and Saab 9LV combat management system.
Actually the MEKO system has consistently proven cheaper and less risky in domestic builds, it is ideal for block construction at multiple sites and the RAN has had a very positive experience with the MEKO 200 ANZ. The only issue I can honestly see with the ANZACs is what was specified turned out to be too small which made upgrading them more difficult and expensive, but then again when they were ordered it was assumed that they would only ever be a second tier EEZ and regional patrol vessel that would work in conjunction with a first tier FFG / DDG force of eight ships.
Definitely not, it just means that they will have to spend more on rebuilding capability once they eventually kick it off. The original plan was that as the AWD project wound down personnel would transition to the submarine project and from there to the replacement frigate program, delaying the sub decision and considering the possibility of moving it overseas means that option has gone.
Joe Black
Active Member
I also suppose that means that Navantia F110 will not be considered for Sea 5000. Were they not looking at adopting CEAFAR as their primary sensor for F110?
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If the article is accurate it appears not. Come to think of it we don't seem to build and maintain relationships with ship designers / builders these days.
For decades we automatically bought or built British then seemed to be moving to US and indigenous designs before going French, German, Swedish, Italian, then Spanish but we never seem to go back for seconds. It would make sense to at least look at the F110 but look at whats happened with Kockums and the way they have effectively been banned from participating in SEA1000.
In regard's to the Submarines, With the Japanese Soryu class a Japanese sub commander stated at some point that Australia would not be able to build them because the metal's would be to hard for us to produce and weld, If this is the case (I take it with a grain of salt) then would this not also prevent us from performing maintenance on the vessel's as it is common practice to cut them open to do the work, If we can't weld it then either our maintenance schedule is going to be worse then with the Collins class or we wont be able to maintain them at all..
Just has me stumped that if some think we cant build them yet think that we can cut them open and weld them back up no worries...
Just has me stumped that if some think we cant build them yet think that we can cut them open and weld them back up no worries...
Thats actually very relevant vonnoobie, and a good point.
I worked for Halliburton quite a few years ago now, but when I was in Karratha, I remember talking to a guy who did maintanence work on the LNG pipeline. Its a very very long pipeline.
It was made by an Indian Company I believe, and the steel used was totally different to what aussie tradesmaen were used to.
It was what he described as "dirty steel" pretty low grade stuff, and he was telling me that it was very difficult to weld. Mainly because the steel he was using was a lot higher grade, and fairly incompatible with the original steel.
One of my old mates was the RSM of the Pilbera Regt while I was there, and they paid quite a bit of attention to the pipe line.....
I worked for Halliburton quite a few years ago now, but when I was in Karratha, I remember talking to a guy who did maintanence work on the LNG pipeline. Its a very very long pipeline.
It was made by an Indian Company I believe, and the steel used was totally different to what aussie tradesmaen were used to.
It was what he described as "dirty steel" pretty low grade stuff, and he was telling me that it was very difficult to weld. Mainly because the steel he was using was a lot higher grade, and fairly incompatible with the original steel.
One of my old mates was the RSM of the Pilbera Regt while I was there, and they paid quite a bit of attention to the pipe line.....
I know a few people who would take issue with the "Japanese sub commanders" statement, well actually they would call BS as the welding experts on AWD have been assessed and certified by Lloyds, not just to do the work but also to train and certify the welders of subcontractors. Many of these senior people, welding engineers and supervisors cut their teeth on submarines and are acknowledged as among the best in the game, as too are the structural and materials engineers they work with. One thing ASC is unusually good at is welding, they even did a better job than the Swedes on Collins.
Personally I suspect this officers comments can be considered in a similar light to the "noisy as a rock concert" from a USN Admiral, i.e. ill informed bravado that there more enlightened peers do not agree with.
Joe Black
Active Member
More interesting development with Option J....
Japan eyes British help to sink German bid for Australian submarine
https://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/w...-german-bid-for-australian-submarine-sources/
It seems like it is more and more likely that we will see the likelihood of Australian built subs.
Japan eyes British help to sink German bid for Australian submarine
https://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/w...-german-bid-for-australian-submarine-sources/
It seems like it is more and more likely that we will see the likelihood of Australian built subs.
Very true, one of the things that indicated a problem with the copper pipe on AWD was it didn't weld the way it was meant to. Sure enough it was discovered, despite all the appropriate paperwork and certifications stating otherwise, that the pipe did not conform to spec and further investigation determined that the contractor had subcontracted the work to a Chinese mill that was literally incapable of producing conforming product.
The company concerned provided all the appropriate OQE saying all the right things but sadly didn't actually realise that what was in the OQE was meant to relate to the product they were supplying. May sound strange but it is a common problem when dealing with overseas suppliers that you don't have an opportunity to work closely with. If you are asking for something that they have never had to do before there is a lot of room for misunderstanding.
About a decade ago I was working with a product that had been outsourced to South Korea, the subbie was a competent designer and manufacturer in their own right which is why they were selected but there were mistakes. One mistake that I dealt with was a load bearing component that been tack welded and somehow missed the structural weld phase before being painted and assembled, it got to a customer, was installed operated and then after a couple of weeks failed catastrophically causing significant property damage but fortunately no serious injuries. First thing we did was relay the serial number to the manufacturer and request copies of the weld inspection sheets (among other documentation) for the item in question.
Sorry but there is no short way to tell the story. I received the failed component from the customer and the inspection sheet from the supplier at about the same time and had them sitting side by side on my desk, the component very obviously had not been welded but the inspection sheet for it was filled out correctly, including the individual weld beads being hand drawn in and signed by the welder as per contractual requirements. When the suppliers QA manger and sales engineer arrived we showed them the part and the inspection sheet and sat down to work out how this had happened.
Apparently the item had been started on one shift and the next shift didn't notice it hadn't been completed and pushed it through to painting, the inspection sheet was even easier to explain. We had specified that a weld inspection sheet was to be completed for each critical structural component and signed by the welder who did the work, we had not specified that the welder should be the one to fill out the sheet, or that this should be done as they were doing the welding so they simply treated it as another component and completed it as efficiently as they could. The weld inspection sheets were filled in off line by another worker ( in an office I believe) for the entire batch, and then given the welders to sign off in one go before being filed as per the contract.
It was purely and simply a break down in communication, we had always used inspection sheets, they never had and when we asked for them to be completed they had asked for an example and had simply followed the instructions we provided to them as they understood them. They had full ISO certification so we were not expecting a problem, unfortunately there was a very big one and we are lucky no one died.
The contract was before my time and it was not defence industry but this is an example of the sort of things that can and do happen when dealing with new or unfamiliar supplier that are too far away to work with closely. Had I, or even one of our welding inspectors or QA techs, been able to visit the facility and watch them work, or even audit it, then the problem may have been picked up but that cost money and the powers that be see no need for that as everyone concerned has their ISO9000 certification so nothing can possibly go wrong can it.
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