Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[t68]

Just had a coffee with one of "Border Force's" supervising engineers (an ex Attack class shipmate) and it appears that some of the ACPB's are so badly knackered that Navy has requisitioned 2 x Cape class PB's (Nos 3&5) in order to fulfil their obligations. He also suggested that Austal would build 2 x more Capes for Navy 9 & 10 to reinforce the ACPB fleet at which time 3&5 would be returned.

Further, Border Force are so short of qualified engineers that they are operating the fleet with only 2 and the remainder have exemptions from AMSA to allow Class III 's to man their ships (a class III is well below the required qual). This is despite advice from crews, during the Cape class build, that extra training would be urgently required to meet the standards, advice that was totally ignored by Canberra. (Border Force vessels are manned under AMSA rules)

Sounds all too depressingly familiar when operational control of a fleet is centrally micro managed from an ivory tower.

That would that also be compounded by the loss off HMAS Bundaberg

 

[vonnoobie]

That would that also be compounded by the loss off HMAS Bundaberg

Also doesn't help they were built to operate so many hour's annually but in recent times appear to be operating above that.

 

[alexsa]

Getting back to the frigate/destroyer issue, I would prefer us to increase the number of AWD class ships, but with 56 to 64 VLS cells. Already the weapons systems of the AWD are being superceeded, with european countries using 9 cell instead of 8 cell ESSM systems, 36 missiles instead of our 32. If we were to arm the additional ships with 18 instead of 16 ESSM VLS, and use all of the additional cells for Tomahawk or other land attack or anti maritime missiles, use Auspar instead of the expensive Aegis system,we would end up with a more general purpose vessel than the current AWD's.

Which European VLS system has a standard grouping of 9 cells .... I cannot find any record of any configuration on current european builds with a 9 cell system

 

[Volkodav]

Just had a coffee with one of "Border Force's" supervising engineers (an ex Attack class shipmate) and it appears that some of the ACPB's are so badly knackered that Navy has requisitioned 2 x Cape class PB's (Nos 3&5) in order to fulfil their obligations. He also suggested that Austal would build 2 x more Capes for Navy 9 & 10 to reinforce the ACPB fleet at which time 3&5 would be returned.

Further, Border Force are so short of qualified engineers that they are operating the fleet with only 2 and the remainder have exemptions from AMSA to allow Class III 's to man their ships (a class III is well below the required qual). This is despite advice from crews, during the Cape class build, that extra training would be urgently required to meet the standards, advice that was totally ignored by Canberra. (Border Force vessels are manned under AMSA rules)

Sounds all too depressingly familiar when operational control of a fleet is centrally micro managed from an ivory tower.

So Austal are effectively rewarded for delivering a substandard product that has to be replaced at the half life mark because it was on budget and schedule, while ASC is crucified for cost and schedule over runs even though all reports from international experts clearly state that the standard of work completed is world best practice.

Think on it, the fact that the ACPBs are so inadequate means they cannot perform the task for which they were designed and need to be replaced at half their anticipated life therefore are incapable of receiving a life extension, even though it was part of the original requirement. This means the ACPB is effectively three times more expensive than a design that actually met requirements, not counting all the additional structural work they have needed in their short lives.

Total procurement cost for the ACPB platforms was $488million and, although I hate doing a simple division to determine individual platform cost it is perhaps more reasonable to do this for the Armidales as all fourteen were built in only three years, this gives an average cost of $38m. Using this figure the simple fact the class needs to be replaced at half life and is incapable of being life extended means each boat has effectively cost $76m without extension and $114m with. Now considering that HMAS Perth, the final ANZAC, was said to be under $100m, less in affect than a repeat ANZAC would have cost. Using the same calculation for the entire class and you get $976m and $1.464b. This is a very rough calculation that doesn't include operating cost s of a frigate verses a patrol boat or the additional maintenance required by the ACPBs but it does serve as an example of just how much the ACPB debacle has possibly cost us.

Now considering there was a 1300-1500t, steel hulled, 81m, Tenix Corvette / OPC that was cancelled in favour of life extending the Fremantles (another extra cost) and building the ACPBs, that realistically, while a lot more expensive than a patrol boat, would have been significantly cheaper than a repeat ANZAC. The corvette, while being much more capable than a PB and able to supplement frigates on boarder protection, counter piracy and UN operations, would also have been much more durable, capable of operating in higher sea states, over longer ranges and longer periods. They have more space, aviation facilities, including hanger, VLS with ESSM, 57mm gun, Harpoon, the Super Sea Sprite and Penguin would have been made to work (NZ has them now so we could have done the same as them) and, unlike the ACPBs, would have had a long service life still left in front of them.

The ultimate irony is had these vessels been built instead of the ACPBs there would have been no shipbuilding black hole prior to the AWD and assuming the government of the day was smart enough to the give the contract to Tenix we literally would have saved billions. If I seem totally predisposed to the Armidales its because I am, they were incapable of doing the job at hand, are not robust enough to last their expected service lives, have cost far more than more suitable vessels would have and contributed to the issues we have with shipbuilding in Australia today. The fact that Austal is getting more orders when they ferked up so badly is pathetic and shows just how blinkered and narrow minded our political classes are. Delivering a substandard product, that is not fit for purpose, costs far more to maintain than planned, requiring numerous unscheduled repairs and has to be replaced early is fine because it was delivered on cost and schedule, who gives a damn about through life costs or inability to get the job done. Then you have ASC building a state of the art warship to the highest standards at a green fields site after a long break in large ship orders and they are getting caned because our political classes fail to understand they caused the problems in the first place.

 

[Raven22]

This is the sort of sea-lift ship I believe the RAN should be looking at. A pair of these to bring the logistical tail and maintain the support of deployed forces. Sea basing is a great concept but needs the size to back it up if we are going to be more than a token force. Just feeding a Brigade plus force of 5,000 would be a major effort.

out of interest, where are these 5000 soldiers coming from?

We still seem to be stuck in buying logistic vessels and aircraft to sustain a landing force that doesn't exist.

 

[Raven22]

No, the L&C's are re-supply ships for a Marine Expeditionary Unit just as they are needed for an ARG to support over 2,500 troops ashore and their supporting sea base.

The US MEUs are also a global capability expected to be able to hit a hostile shore with no notice anywhere in the world and be sustained independently until follow on force can arrive. That is a very, very different capability to that which Australia is developing.

It's also worth pointing out there are only two active MEUs at any one time, with the entire USMC and USN generating this capability. Which might put things in context as to what is achievable in an Australian context.

 

[t68]

The US MEUs are also a global capability expected to be able to hit a hostile shore with no notice anywhere in the world and be sustained independently until follow on force can arrive. That is a very, very different capability to that which Australia is developing.

It's also worth pointing out there are only two active MEUs at any one time, with the entire USMC and USN generating this capability. Which might put things in context as to what is achievable in an Australian context.

yep I think we maybe putting the cart before the horse, myself included

 

[vonnoobie]

So Austal are effectively rewarded for delivering a substandard product that has to be replaced at the half life mark because it was on budget and schedule, while ASC is crucified for cost and schedule over runs even though all reports from international experts clearly state that the standard of work completed is world best practice.

Think on it, the fact that the ACPBs are so inadequate means they cannot perform the task for which they were designed and need to be replaced at half their anticipated life therefore are incapable of receiving a life extension, even though it was part of the original requirement. This means the ACPB is effectively three times more expensive than a design that actually met requirements, not counting all the additional structural work they have needed in their short lives.

Total procurement cost for the ACPB platforms was $488million and, although I hate doing a simple division to determine individual platform cost it is perhaps more reasonable to do this for the Armidales as all fourteen were built in only three years, this gives an average cost of $38m. Using this figure the simple fact the class needs to be replaced at half life and is incapable of being life extended means each boat has effectively cost $76m without extension and $114m with. Now considering that HMAS Perth, the final ANZAC, was said to be under $100m, less in affect than a repeat ANZAC would have cost. Using the same calculation for the entire class and you get $976m and $1.464b. This is a very rough calculation that doesn't include operating cost s of a frigate verses a patrol boat or the additional maintenance required by the ACPBs but it does serve as an example of just how much the ACPB debacle has possibly cost us.

Now considering there was a 1300-1500t, steel hulled, 81m, Tenix Corvette / OPC that was cancelled in favour of life extending the Fremantles (another extra cost) and building the ACPBs, that realistically, while a lot more expensive than a patrol boat, would have been significantly cheaper than a repeat ANZAC. The corvette, while being much more capable than a PB and able to supplement frigates on boarder protection, counter piracy and UN operations, would also have been much more durable, capable of operating in higher sea states, over longer ranges and longer periods. They have more space, aviation facilities, including hanger, VLS with ESSM, 57mm gun, Harpoon, the Super Sea Sprite and Penguin would have been made to work (NZ has them now so we could have done the same as them) and, unlike the ACPBs, would have had a long service life still left in front of them.

The ultimate irony is had these vessels been built instead of the ACPBs there would have been no shipbuilding black hole prior to the AWD and assuming the government of the day was smart enough to the give the contract to Tenix we literally would have saved billions. If I seem totally predisposed to the Armidales its because I am, they were incapable of doing the job at hand, are not robust enough to last their expected service lives, have cost far more than more suitable vessels would have and contributed to the issues we have with shipbuilding in Australia today. The fact that Austal is getting more orders when they ferked up so badly is pathetic and shows just how blinkered and narrow minded our political classes are. Delivering a substandard product, that is not fit for purpose, costs far more to maintain than planned, requiring numerous unscheduled repairs and has to be replaced early is fine because it was delivered on cost and schedule, who gives a damn about through life costs or inability to get the job done. Then you have ASC building a state of the art warship to the highest standards at a green fields site after a long break in large ship orders and they are getting caned because our political classes fail to understand they caused the problems in the first place.

While not getting into a debate over Austal vs ASC, The cost's you have listed I am curious about.

Did they actually cost $38m per a ship or does that include scheduled maintenance/operation? Just have seen other cost's of $24-$28m a piece so there is a large disparity in the cost's listed between various sources.

As to the HMAS Perth FFH 157 only costing around $100m, That I can honestly say I don't believe. If you have a source I'd be happy to look at it but considering the 1986 ceiling price for the 10-12 vessels as $3.5 billion, With inflation that would have jumped to $7 billion for 2006 when the Perth was commissioned. I cant see any continuous build project achieving that level of savings.

In regards to the ACPB's, While I agree Austal did stuff up the design, For which it appear's to have been a one off situation so no need to beat the company up so much the extra cost's in maintenance can be directly attributed to the increased usage of the vessels above what was planned. More time in rough seas = more time being maintained.

As to Austal getting more order's, In what extra order's are they getting? I know they are building 8 CCPB's but have never seen any negative view's from Custom's in regard's to there vessels from Austal.

 

[Goknub]

out of interest, where are these 5000 soldiers coming from?

We still seem to be stuck in buying logistic vessels and aircraft to sustain a landing force that doesn't exist.

The 5,000 is a rough estimate of what an amphibious task force should be able to deploy and sustain. My use of this figure as a guide is for three reasons.

Firstly, recent amphibious operations (Timor, 1999 and 2006) have pushed the existing amphib capacity to its limits. In the same way that 8 x C17s could be seen as excessive, it is better that the ADF has more rather than less capacity. A professional force shouldn't have to use everything including the kitchen sink to achieve a task.

Secondly, it is a realistic sized force for Australia to be faced with supporting. Starting with a Brigade of aprox 3,500 then adding on Army Aviation, additional logistics, RAAF ground support, SOCOMD, etc would add up quickly.

What also should be taken into account is that if the ADF is to be "lead nation" ala Interfet then it will likely need to support/sustain additional foreign forces. This could be include Pacific island elements (Tonga, Fiji, etc), additional NZ forces (HMNZS Canterbury isn't that big) and sustainment of globally supplied forces (who's feeding the Nigerian/Portuguese troops?).

Thirdly, as part of a future Australian amphibious doctrine. I feel we would be better served drawing more on US Army experience as a guide as much as the USMC or British. Taking a historical perspective, the USMC has its rootes as a raiding force and the concept of sea-basing can be seen as an extension of that. The British have a record of conducting amphibious operations on a relatively haphazard nature. The US Army's approach of the amphibious component being just the first phase of a longer sustained land conflict would be more useful.

Ultimately, I see it as depending on whether Australia sees itself as a Regional or Medium power. As a Regional power we can get by with a smaller force. As a Medium power we should be looking to do things on a larger scale. Much of the old anti-LHD (Hugh White/Paul Dibb/etc) commentary was based on idea of Australia as just a Regional power that did not require such large vessels. If we are going to go down this route then lets do it properly.

 

[Goknub]

duplicate - Please delete

 

[Volkodav]

out of interest, where are these 5000 soldiers coming from?

We still seem to be stuck in buying logistic vessels and aircraft to sustain a landing force that doesn't exist.

Very true, purple has had a much needed boost but it is time for the services to start looking after core capabilities because there's no point at being able to lift everything we have if what we have it too light or out of date to be of much use. It usually doesn't matter how good or well trained troops are if they lack the combat weight to do the job at hand.

Every time someone mentions a third, possibly stretched LHD, I think of all other much needed gear that money could buy, for example the required AEVs and Breachers, enough additional M-1s to provide two or even three squadrons for each ACR. Some might think that an overkill but I am fairly sure most western mechanised brigades have a single tank battalion or regiment and armoured brigades and the current US Army Heavy Brigades have two, our two squadrons of tanks o support three brigades is less than the scale of tanks for an infantry division.

I can't see that this is even a Defence of Australia thing, as most of the Australian continent is pretty much ideal for armoured operations and it would be the ideal defence against the sort of forces that could conceivably land on our shores. It isn't a left over of expeditionary operations as armour has and would continue to be vital, just look at most theatres in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, 1991 Gulf War and the war on terror. It appears to me to simply be a rut we seem to have been stuck in since our "Infantry Divisions" were converted to "Jungle Divisions" in response to the New Guinea campaign from 1942, which ironically the same period everyone else, including New Zealand were converting infantry division into mechanised and armoured divisions. We had armoured forces, originally a division intended for deployment to the Middle East, that were retained and expanded to defend Australia against invasion. A brigade was deployed to support our forces in the Pacific but few realise this, especially not our political classes. The cynic in me wonders if the fact it is cheaper to have light infantry, or perhaps even light or medium armour than maintaining a balanced force helps keep it in that rut.

 

[Stampede]

Irrelevant points because he didn't read my earlier posts where I explained in detail that if we refurbished and used systems pulled through from the FFGs and ANZACs we could quite possibly build light frigates and or corvettes instead of OPVs and OCVs for the same or less money. The hull is only a small part of the cost and, incidentally we are far more experienced at building frigates than OPVs, the largest cost is the ships systems, if you already own those systems the resulting ship is much cheaper than one you need to outfit with all new gear.

Steal is cheap and air is free, add size so you can fit systems you already own and you can have an ASMD equipped frigate for less money than an OPV.

Thanks for the reply
We might be a little bit more allied than you think.
Value your imput and keep up the good work.
Regards S.

 

[vonnoobie]

Very true, purple has had a much needed boost but it is time for the services to start looking after core capabilities because there's no point at being able to lift everything we have if what we have it too light or out of date to be of much use. It usually doesn't matter how good or well trained troops are if they lack the combat weight to do the job at hand.

Every time someone mentions a third, possibly stretched LHD, I think of all other much needed gear that money could buy, for example the required AEVs and Breachers, enough additional M-1s to provide two or even three squadrons for each ACR. Some might think that an overkill but I am fairly sure most western mechanised brigades have a single tank battalion or regiment and armoured brigades and the current US Army Heavy Brigades have two, our two squadrons of tanks o support three brigades is less than the scale of tanks for an infantry division.

I can't see that this is even a Defence of Australia thing, as most of the Australian continent is pretty much ideal for armoured operations and it would be the ideal defence against the sort of forces that could conceivably land on our shores. It isn't a left over of expeditionary operations as armour has and would continue to be vital, just look at most theatres in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, 1991 Gulf War and the war on terror. It appears to me to simply be a rut we seem to have been stuck in since our "Infantry Divisions" were converted to "Jungle Divisions" in response to the New Guinea campaign from 1942, which ironically the same period everyone else, including New Zealand were converting infantry division into mechanised and armoured divisions. We had armoured forces, originally a division intended for deployment to the Middle East, that were retained and expanded to defend Australia against invasion. A brigade was deployed to support our forces in the Pacific but few realise this, especially not our political classes. The cynic in me wonders if the fact it is cheaper to have light infantry, or perhaps even light or medium armour than maintaining a balanced force helps keep it in that rut.

Buying more M-1's would be the better bet, Along with other associated equipment. Much as a 3rd LHD would be great as you mention and others have pointed out in other area's the RAAF and the RAN are both pretty well off in the logistical sense while the Army is lacking in pretty much everything. The $1.5+ billion for another LHD would go a long way to equipping a force that would end up using the RAN/RAAF asset's.

 

[Zero Alpha]

VIt appears to me to simply be a rut we seem to have been stuck in since our "Infantry Divisions" were converted to "Jungle Divisions" in response to the New Guinea campaign from 1942, which ironically the same period everyone else, including New Zealand were converting infantry division into mechanised and armoured divisions.

That's a unusual comparison to make. When NZ converted a brigade (not the division), it was fighting in North Africa, not thrashing around in the jungle.

 

[Goknub]

The cynic in me wonders if the fact it is cheaper to have light infantry, or perhaps even light or medium armour than maintaining a balanced force helps keep it in that rut.

I believe that is the reality. If the ADF was serious about the old Defence of Australia doctrine, the Army would have had 300 - 500 MBTs along with ancillary equipment. Tanks have demonstrated their worth repeatedly in the jungles to our north as well, both in World War 2 and Vietnam. At this point, anyone who believes otherwise hasn't opened a history book or checked the ORBAT of our SE Asian neighbours.

My view is that none of this matters if it can't be sold to the politicians. We've been through East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan without deploying tanks so what value would more make? Any asset has to have political value.

Which comes back to the desire for a larger amphib force. I see 4 ways of selling defence spending. For additional M1s I predict:

1. Domestic jobs: No value
2. Defence of Australia: No value - Air-Sea Gap doesn't need tanks
3. Regional Australian-lead deployments: Value
4. Global support for our US allies(Middle East): Limited value

Unless the ADF can sell deploying heavy armour to the Middle East the best bet is utility in Regional deployments. That needs big ships.

--------

Btw, this isn't an argument for a third LHD. There are far cheaper options of getting heavy stuff from A to B via water.

 

[Volkodav]

That's a unusual comparison to make. When NZ converted a brigade (not the division), it was fighting in North Africa, not thrashing around in the jungle.

The 4th Infantry Brigade was converted to become the 4th Armoured Brigade specifically to add combat weight to the division following the hard won experience in the Western Desert where the 5th and 6th Brigades were both over run in Tunisia due to the lack of even anti-tank guns. They fought through Sicily and Italy as a combined arms formation with Montgomery even requesting they be transferred to England for the Normandy invasion.

Prior to this Australia had raised the 1st Armoured Division for service in North Africa but it never made it there due to the threat from Japan.

The reason for the comparison was lessons learned in the first years of the war saw most combatants, including Australia and New Zealand form and make use of armoured forces but for some reason Australia chose to ignore what was happening everywhere except for the Owen Stanley Ranges. Basically Australia needed armour in virtually every major engagement they were involved in during WWII, pretty much the only exception being Kokoda, yet that seemed to the battle that was burnt into our psyche with armour virtually being ignored until 80s.

Yes I know armour, including tanks, was deployed to Vietnam and we had Cavalry and APC regiments in addition to our one tank regiment, but the issue is we concentrated excessively on light infantry when logically we probably should have had far more tanks in the mix.

 

[Raven22]

I believe that is the reality. If the ADF was serious about the old Defence of Australia doctrine, the Army would have had 300 - 500 MBTs along with ancillary equipment.

Actually if we were serious about Defence of Australia we would have few if any tanks. What's needed in that scenario is a force with excellent operational mobility, able to be sustained a long way from any civilian infrastructure, which is certainly not tanks. Something along the lines of US Stryker units would be ideal - mobile, lethal platforms, able to self deploy and be sustained relatively easily (compared to tracked vehicles) at extended ranges.

Funnily enough this is actually what army was trying to develop in the 90s, with the ASLAV purchase and project Bushranger. Tanks certainly have their place, but Defence of Australia is not it.

 

[swerve]

Depends on whether you expect & intend to defend Australia on its mainland, or believe that forward defence would work better.

Is it best to wait until an enemy lands troops on Australia's shores before defending against it?

 

[t68]

Depends on whether you expect & intend to defend Australia on its mainland, or believe that forward defence would work better.

Is it best to wait until an enemy lands troops on Australia's shores before defending against it?

Nope the best defence for Australia is to fight them anywhere but here.Hence why we need a heavy deployable tri-service combat team.

 

[Goknub]

Yes I know armour, including tanks, was deployed to Vietnam and we had Cavalry and APC regiments in addition to our one tank regiment, but the issue is we concentrated excessively on light infantry when logically we probably should have had far more tanks in the mix.

I was actually agreeing with you. It has been to the detriment of the ADF, and Army in particular that the celebrated battles are also the worst conducted.

Gallipoli against Gen Monash's well-drilled combined arms force.
Kokoda against the much better conducted later New Guniea campaign.
Long Tan against the successful combined-arms operations.

The bronzed Aussie digger armed with little more than a .303 has been a massive hurdle the ADF continues to struggle to overcome.

--------------------

I would contend that tanks would still be a primary force in DoA. If you're taking Australia then that means taking cities. I've never understood the belief that a hostile force would land in the north and drive south over thousands of kms of outback. Taking Perth or an south-east coast city makes far more sense. The fighting in the Soviet Union demonstrated that large tank fleets have their place.

Any force with a fleet big enough to sustain an invasion of Australia would be big enough to make short work of a dozen frigates and a few subs. Far better to use the protection of the fleet and land somewhere that can be defended against a counterattack.

Straying a bit from navy stuff