There are many challenges that face NZDF and some of these result from inadequate resourcing and funding over the previous four decades. Part of the problem centres around that fact that many New Zealanders, the general public and politicians alike, are afflicted by sea blindness and this has been detrimental to NZDF costing the loss of capabilities that the country needs now and in the feature. Defence plans for the worst (war) and hopes for the best (peace) but it can only do so properly if it is given the proper resources by nations government. There is also the issue of procurements where very little thought has been given to the long term impacts upon the overall balance of forces by the political elite who tend to view the defence world through the lens of costs and electoral cycles. Part of the problem appears to be that defence acquisitions, use of equipment etc., is different to that normally encountered by politicians and non defence government personnel. For example one of the common criticisms against the A4K Skyhawk replacement was that they were never used in anger, but that must be a good thing not a bad thing.
One has an insurance policy for fire in their home that they hope never to use, but one day that may happen and they will be thankful that they had fire insurance, or in Christchurch's case earthquake insurance. It was paid for hoping we never had to use it, but one day many of us had to. It is the same with defence capabilities - they are like insurance policies.
There needs to be a long term strategy determined and well defined by the government which clearly states the nations intentions. Then a plan needs to formulated by defence planners which meets the aims of the strategy. Central to this is a clearly defined set of capabilities which provide for a well balanced NZDF and the individual services within it. Thus, any acquisitions must fit within that capability plan and any acquisitions should be such that they can be updated in the future easily. This is future proofing the NZDF in a way that any upgrades are not going to be expensive in their installation because of structural issues of the platform. As an example, if a ship with flight deck and hangar is being acquired, then ensure that it will be operate a helicopter that may be acquired in the future, something that could be somewhat larger and heavier. Also ensure that any platform acquired is not going to be an orphan platform and be costly in maintenance and operation because spare parts are rare or unavailable. Those who give final approval for acquisitions should be aware that cheap is not economic in the long run and if something looks too good to be true then it probably is. Also acquiring the minimal numbers of a platform usually proves to be quite costly in the long term and it restricts NZDF operationally which in turn restricts the governments options.
China is rising as a great nation which is to be expected given its population, economic and military strength. This author does not have an issue with that, however it is the manner in which it is now asserting itself that is creating significant amount of tension in the South China Sea and East China Sea, to whit its methods of assertion and enforcement of sovereignty to territory to which it has marginal claims at best. The major problem with this is that it is not honouring agreements that it has signed, such as UNCLOS or with ASEAN, and it is directly challenging the internationally accepted rules based system which has evolved since the Second World War. It is through these waters that a significant amount of world trade, including New Zealands, passes and any significant disruption to those trade routes would prove quite harmful to New Zealand economic life, possibly even deleterious. Those trade routes are a part of our SLOC and whilst we can and do use diplomacy to encourage and protect our trade, unfortunately diplomacy also has been known to fail. That is when military force becomes involved and the tension in East and South East Asian may lead to confrontation. This is where New Zealand has to be prepared, however unfortunately we are ill prepared and equipped if diplomacy fails.
Further afield Russia has encroached upon Georgian and Ukrainian territory annexing territory using military force or dubious plebiscites to achieve their aims. They have also increased their military operations in the Baltic and North Seas. Both the Chinese and Russian actions have a 20th Century historical precedent in the Nazi German orchestrated Sudetenland and Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938 along with the Austrian Anschluss of the same year. Hitler's policy was lebensraum and the unification of the Germanic peoples. These moves by China and Russia appear to have similar motives; acquisition of territory and resources by the use of force - implied, threatened or actual.
The spectre of Islamic terrorism is real and expanding especially through ISIL. At present ISIL have replaced Al Qaeda as the most successful Islamic terrorist group and even Al Qaeda is perturbed by ISILs brutality. ISIL through forming a caliphate are attempting to give themselves legitimacy amongst the world's Muslim population forcing them to pledge allegiance as required under Sunni law. They are also highly skilled in utilising the internet and social media to publicise their message, garner recruits and fighters and encourage terrorist strikes abroad in non Muslim homelands. If they manage to gain a foothold in Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia they will become a major problem in the region. In New Zealands case they will be sitting astride our SLOC and they have shown their ability to conquer and adapt. Hence it is best if this group is defeated at source rather than left to expand.
New Zealand needs to repair its defence relationship with Australia and start pulling its weight in that relationship. Whilst this has already been discussed in depth in Question Five the point is reiterated here for reinforcement. Failure to do so will see New Zealand cast aside at some stage in the future regardless of historical ties. What also must be remembered is that Australia is New Zealands last line of defence before the New Zealand coast and it is in New Zealands best interest to ensure that the defence of Australia is sound and strong. That means New Zealand spending money on proper capabilities for a defence force, not cutting back defence capabilities as has happened since 1991. To be counted at the table one must take something worthwhile to that table.
Capabilities for the three services have been presented and discussed. The costings for these are presented in Table 2. It should be noted that the figures obtained for these costings have been obtained from a variety of open sources and as such do may not reflect the actual costs because not all of the costing details were provided. Military costs are notoriously difficult to quantify through open sources, because each contract is different and every government uses different accounting methods for calculating life cycle costs. Secondly, such contracts are always commercially sensitive. In some cases the figures have been estimated, because costs were not found for that particular item so something of a similar capability was used as the base cost. For example with the SPAAGSAM a tracked cost was found and so an estimate was done from that. Where possible platforms cited are one that will be in service for the medium future and will future proof the NZDF. That is why aircraft such as the F16 or F18 were not chosen because their production runs are due to end before 2020.
It will be noted from Table Two that the ships and aircraft are the most expensive items. Unfortunately this is a situation that cannot be avoided and because of previous government decisions, New Zealand is now in a block obsolescence and the rebuilding of disbanded capabilities position. Currently defence spending is 1.4 % of GDP ($229.7 billion)79 which clearly in dollar terms is insufficient. Therefore it is suggested that defence spending be raised to 2% GDP which in 2015 terms would be $4.6 billion plus inflation and exempt of the capital cost. Furthermore because of the capability shortage capital funding injections would have to be made over and above the suggested defence spending. Such injections using the calculations presented in Table Two would be $1.2 billion per annum if calculated over a 20 year period or $782 million if calculated over a 30 year period. This is using a 3% per annum capital cost. All these values are 2015 dollars. For example in year x between the Ministry of Defence and NZDF they would be voted $4.6 billion plus capital expenditure of 782 billion using the 30 year costing. However it should be noted because of New Zealands size, basing defence expenditure on GDP may not be practical because it does not take into account the buying power of the defence budget.
What hasn't been included in the table is full ownership costs as the Life Cycle Costs including personnel costings. The 100% costs, as stated, is just for spares, maintenance contracts, manuals, simulators, weapons etc. It does not include any consumables such as fuel, lubricants and ammunition.
One very important point to note is that the acquisition of second hand ships, vehicles or aircraft etc., becomes a false economy because of the high amounts and costs of maintenance required, plus the fact that to be effective in a modern environment costly upgrades will be required, they will have to be replaced in a 10 or 15 year period and finally they may not meet all of New Zealands requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
The following recommendations are made:
1) When formulating defence and security strategy plus capabilities:
a) Clarify Defence Strategy.
b) Evolve the ANZAC Relationship, the US Relationship and Diversify Regional Defence Relationships.
c) Make the NZDF more Versatile.
d) Develop a "Full Spectrum" Military Strategy and Matching Capabilities.
e) Implement a Comprehensive Strategic Risk management Process.
f) Shorten Acquisition Response Times And Rethink Mobilisation.
2) Political elite and planners must understand the reality that New Zealand is a maritime nation and our SLOC are the life blood of the nation and the national economy.
3) There needs to be long term political foresight and cohesion in defence planning and acquisition; that is much longer than the current electoral cycle with less politicalisation of defence strategy, capability and acquisitions by political parties.
4) That New Zealand needs to repair its defence relationship with Australia by being serious about its defence obligations both to itself and to Australia instead of taking the cheap option.
5) New Zealand needs to start building Antarctic capable naval vessels in order to fully monitor and enforce the regulations that apply in Antarctic waters. It also needs to acquire and build capabilities to ensure that it can enforce its sovereignty of its Antarctic claim if need be, especially when there are considerable mineral resources within its Dependency.
6) New Zealand needs to acquire a third frigate in the near term in order to bolster the frigate force. An Iver Huitfeld class frigate of the Danish Navy would be suitable and less expensive that current British, Spanish, French, German, Dutch or American vessels on offer.
7) New Zealand needs to expand its OPV force by four vessels that are armed and fitted with a system such as the Stan flex modular system.
8) Six AW109 Helicopters fully marinised, armoured fitted with maritime radar, Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR), Electro Optical Targeting System, add-on 25mm gun pod, 70mm Hydra rocket pods compatible with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) be acquired to operate from the OPVs
9) A Landing Helicopter Dock needs to be acquired in order that the JATF has a fit for purpose ship that will expand the JATF capability set and at the same time enhance HADR capability.
10) Wheeled Self Propelled Guns be acquired for the NZ Army in order to provide mobile artillery fire support.
11) Wheeled Self Propelled Anti Aircraft Guns and Missiles be acquired to provide anti aircraft protection for the NZ Army against low flying fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aircraft.
12) 12 AW109 Helicopters fully marinised, armoured, fitted with FLIR, Electro Optical Targeting System, add-on 25mm gun pod, 70mm Hydra rocket pods compatible with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) be acquired to be operated as Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters.
13) That the NZ Army Air Corp be reactivated in order to operate the helicopters above.
14) That the Air Combat Force be re-established comprising of 18 Fighter attack aircraft and 12 Lead In Fighter Trainers.
15) That six Tier One Multi Mission Aircraft be acquired for ISR, ASW, ASuW and other taskings as required; that six Tier Two Maritime Patrol aircraft be acquired for EEZ patrol and as back up to the tier one aircraft.
16) That six Strategic Airlifters such as the Airbus A400M be acquired and eight tactical airlifters be acquired for air mobility and Multi Engine Pilot Training.
17) That six fully marinised NHI NH90 Helicopters be acquired to boost the current numbers and allow for one or two helicopters to be aboard the MSC when required.
18) Another five AW 109 training helicopters be acquired.
19) That the combined Vote: Defence and Vote: NZDF be a minimum of 2% of GDP plus inflation and that this sum excludes the capital charge.
20) That a Capital Expenditure injection be made to Defence in order to cover the platforms required for the capabilities outlined above. This injection is over and above the 2% GDP because of the funding shortfalls since 1991.