Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Raytheon AMDR probably wasn't on the horizon (no pun intended ) when the AWD was ordered way back in 2007.
Indeed.

The original selection process, was way back in 2005 (and called for back in 2000). The F-105 wasn't even originally considered (just the F-100). While some technologies existed, many weren't even functional demonstrators (ie high risk).

IMO I quite like the idea of using a F-105 hull variation. Not to say its a good idea, just a reasonable option given the alternatives. Given the tens (hundreds ? Billions?)of millions invested in getting production up and going (and the considerable time) would seem to get the most out of a less than great situation. Any other local build basically starts us back at square one. An international build basically destroys local industry and again, sets us back at square one with most likely a smaller and less capable design. Leaving only 3 small AWD's to do the heavy lifting.

With Sea5000 Ceafar2 seems to be coming of age. It will be a useful augment to the proven but older Spy on the AWD.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
With the DDG-51 Flight III being upgraded to the Raytheon - Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) from the start of next year, it makes you wonder if the AN/SPY-1D(V) was the right choice for the AWD? Longevity, support, upgrades etc

Anyone have thoughts on this?
1D(V) barely fit on the Hobarts, AMDR would have no hope, in fact from what I have read fitting AMDR to the proposed Flight III Burkes has involved very major compromises, such as giving one helicopter hanger over too an additional generator and even then cooling has been a major obstacle. Basically AMDR as it stands needs a Zummwalt sized hull to be viable, which ironically is precisely what the Navy Magazine or APDR proposed back at the start of the project, instead of trying to cram the latest systems into old generation, too small hulls, we should be looking at waiting for a next generation platform such as the Zummwalt (I would also add the Type 45 to this).

In hindsight, considering the delays and cost overuns experienced by the AWD project, we may have been better off waiting for a much better platform. The FFGs would have required a further life extension, or an interim type, such as surplus early Ticonderogas, may have been required. Then again with the delays being experienced currently, maybe the more advanced platform could have been in service in the same sort of time span as the Hobarts, the industry could have been rebuilt on a 100% local construction of the LHDs, larger but simpler ships and followed by the AWDs.
 

AegisFC

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
With the DDG-51 Flight III being upgraded to the Raytheon - Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) from the start of next year, it makes you wonder if the AN/SPY-1D(V) was the right choice for the AWD? Longevity, support, upgrades etc

Anyone have thoughts on this?
SPY-1D(V) is currently installed on about 40 ships along with Flight IIA restart until AMDR is ready. It isn't going anywhere for a long time and it will be supported for the foreseeable future.
 

hairyman

Active Member
I hope we go with the Type 26 incorporating CEAFAR for the frigate replacement.
I would also like to see us build two further destroyers, not necessarily AWD's maybe GP ships, to get our numbers up closer to where they should be.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I hope we go with the Type 26 incorporating CEAFAR for the frigate replacement.
I would also like to see us build two further destroyers, not necessarily AWD's maybe GP ships, to get our numbers up closer to where they should be.
If this is to avoid the valley of death there is one issue that will be a problem, and that is the time to go to build noting this ships not yet in construction and plans are yet to be finalised. This adds a whole new level of risk and amy not solve the problem of a lack of orders as construction may be quite a way down the path.

If you want to building soon then more F105 hulls, even with updated equipment, will be the quickest way to go ..... even if it is only a run of 4 hulls as a large ASW frigate with reasonable number of cells.
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
If this is to avoid the valley of death there is one issue that will be a problem, and that is the time to go to build noting this ships not yet in construction and plans are yet to be finalised. This adds a whole new level of risk and amy not solve the problem of a lack of orders as construction may be quite a way down the path.

If you want to building soon then more F105 hulls, even with updated equipment, will be the quickest way to go ..... even if it is only a run of 4 hulls as a large ASW frigate with reasonable number of cells.
Agree, if we are to avoid the valley, the F105 will be pretty much the only choice for the many reasons discussed.

There are other options available, but nothing where the workforce, tooling and experience are up to speed within the required time frame.

Regargless of that I believe the three definates for the FF are:

Auspar
Mk41 VLS (Total numer of cells up for debate, but definately strike length)
SAAB 9LV

Tonight was budget night, I dont think the DWP will be too far off :)

Cheers
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
If this is to avoid the valley of death there is one issue that will be a problem, and that is the time to go to build noting this ships not yet in construction and plans are yet to be finalised. This adds a whole new level of risk and amy not solve the problem of a lack of orders as construction may be quite a way down the path.

If you want to building soon then more F105 hulls, even with updated equipment, will be the quickest way to go ..... even if it is only a run of 4 hulls as a large ASW frigate with reasonable number of cells.
The smart move would have been to have ordered a fourth AWD, or even better a second batch or three improved ships during the GFC as part of the stimulus. It would have given the security to the contractors to expand their work forces for the long term, encouraged the government to fix the baseline earlier and just build the ships to print while moving all the improvements onto the second batch. No stuffing around reallocating blocks from BAE to Forgacs, ASC and Navantia, then back again after BAE sorted their issues. Hindsight, just leave them at BAE and put resources into Williamstown to fix the problem earlier (best solution is order the AWDs earlier and from Williamstown, so Tenix never sells to BAE and the workforce that built the AMZACs is never made redundant in the first place).

Anyway what has happened has happened so we need to get on with building something now, that means a batch II AWD, an F105 based ASW frigate, or a decent number of OPVs. As I see it we have just spent a significant amount on ASMD so realistically an ANZAC replacement is not urgent so maybe the batch II AWD (which sounds like the start point for the proposed ANZAC replacement anyway) or an OPV would be the way to go.

Its a laugh, back when the OCV was first postulated all the knockers came out of the wood work saying the project was undoable as there was not the spare capacity in our shipyards to build them. There were all these estimates of the amount of material and labour required and opinions that our industry could not sustain it. Bit of a what if here, how about Gillard never knifes Rudd and the 2010 DWP is never scrapped and instead the OCV is progressed through to the point that metal is cut in 2016 or 17, no shipbuilding black hole, no need to advance the ANZAC replacement, no confusion over what to replace the Armidales with.

Ironic isn't it the PBs are shagged and need replacement, the shipyards need work and MOTS OPVs are clearly the answer to both problems, yet were are talking about locking the RAN into 1990s tech for the next forty years for their major surface combatants instead, really smart. IMO we should just order several large MOTS OPVs and make sure we do a better job selecting or next majors. Same with subs, approve the life extension on the Collins, that the external experts not only said was possible but recommended, an make sure we select the best future option going forward. We should avoid the past situation of delaying decisions for so long that we have no, or limited choice, rather than much better options that would have been available if we didn't leave things to the last minute.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Agree, if we are to avoid the valley, the F105 will be pretty much the only choice for the many reasons discussed.

There are other options available, but nothing where the workforce, tooling and experience are up to speed within the required time frame.

Regargless of that I believe the three definates for the FF are:

Auspar
Mk41 VLS (Total numer of cells up for debate, but definately strike length)
SAAB 9LV

Tonight was budget night, I dont think the DWP will be too far off :)

Cheers
Agree on SAAB 9LV, AusPAR, MK41 as the intergration has been done. I am a fan of 64 cells (if practical) as it allows for the intergration of other weapons (even as a task force arrangement) such as land attack, SM6, ASROC.

It woudl be nice if the volume search 3D radar from CEA was developed to a stage it could be intergrated.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The smart move would have been to have ordered a fourth AWD, or even better a second batch or three improved ships during the GFC as part of the stimulus. It would have given the security to the contractors to expand their work forces for the long term, encouraged the government to fix the baseline earlier and just build the ships to print while moving all the improvements onto the second batch. No stuffing around reallocating blocks from BAE to Forgacs, ASC and Navantia, then back again after BAE sorted their issues. Hindsight, just leave them at BAE and put resources into Williamstown to fix the problem earlier (best solution is order the AWDs earlier and from Williamstown, so Tenix never sells to BAE and the workforce that built the AMZACs is never made redundant in the first place).

Anyway what has happened has happened so we need to get on with building something now, that means a batch II AWD, an F105 based ASW frigate, or a decent number of OPVs. As I see it we have just spent a significant amount on ASMD so realistically an ANZAC replacement is not urgent so maybe the batch II AWD (which sounds like the start point for the proposed ANZAC replacement anyway) or an OPV would be the way to go.

Its a laugh, back when the OCV was first postulated all the knockers came out of the wood work saying the project was undoable as there was not the spare capacity in our shipyards to build them. There were all these estimates of the amount of material and labour required and opinions that our industry could not sustain it. Bit of a what if here, how about Gillard never knifes Rudd and the 2010 DWP is never scrapped and instead the OCV is progressed through to the point that metal is cut in 2016 or 17, no shipbuilding black hole, no need to advance the ANZAC replacement, no confusion over what to replace the Armidales with.

Ironic isn't it the PBs are shagged and need replacement, the shipyards need work and MOTS OPVs are clearly the answer to both problems, yet were are talking about locking the RAN into 1990s tech for the next forty years for their major surface combatants instead, really smart. IMO we should just order several large MOTS OPVs and make sure we do a better job selecting or next majors. Same with subs, approve the life extension on the Collins, that the external experts not only said was possible but recommended, an make sure we select the best future option going forward. We should avoid the past situation of delaying decisions for so long that we have no, or limited choice, rather than much better options that would have been available if we didn't leave things to the last minute.
I think part of the problem is how long it takes Defence bureaucracy to work through an RFT stage to implementation combined with shifting political priorities or even changes in government. Have a look at the work programme for the the Pacific Patrol Boat and the anticipated build and delivery dates ............... this is a very long process for a basic 39m patrol boat.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
I think part of the problem is how long it takes Defence bureaucracy to work through an RFT stage to implementation combined with shifting political priorities or even changes in government.
It certainly seems to take a long time for Australia. Really about 10 years from "this needs to happen" to cutting steel. We commonly have 3 or 4 governments in that time, even multiple leaders of the same in power party.

I wonder if the key point of the DMO being separate from the Department of Defence and be effectively a total separate entity that acquires things with out the changing focus of politics.
 

hairyman

Active Member
Did the RAN, or for that matter any of the ADF, get anything out of the budget? I cant see anything for the armed services there.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
My take on procurement delays is usually the ADF and industry are well aware of what is required and when, the different options, lead times, etc. There was already discussions on options to replace the DDGs in the early 90s with the chosen path being no direct replacement and an extensive upgrade and life extension of the FFGs while the RAN wanted Arliegh Burkes and either something like the German Type 123 Hamburgs or at least a stretched ANZAC to replace the FFGs. There were also other options thrown in such as the ex USN Kidd class DDGs, or even early (pre VLS) Ticonderogas, any of which could have been well under way before 2000. What happened instead was we canned most existing plans, except the FFGUP, initiated an investigation into retrofitting AEGIS (with SPY-1F) to the ANZACs and then sat on our hands until the early 2000s.

In my opinion the problem isn't the procurement process per say but rather successive governments stuffing around and not making decisions. This means decisions are often left far too long, reducing options, increasing cost and risk, leading to rushed last minute choices, further delay or even cancellation.
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
Did the RAN, or for that matter any of the ADF, get anything out of the budget? I cant see anything for the armed services there.
Did you notice that Defence spending is going up to 1.9% of GDP? In dollar terms that is $31.9B for the 2015-16 time period (last financial year was 1.8% and $29.3B expenditure as a comparison).

But you also have to realise that with the new DWP due in a few months (I've heard anywhere from August to September as the released date), until then I can't see that the Government is going to pre-empt what's in the new DWP, especially equipment decisions, until it's official announcement.

Just have to be patient and wait till then!
 

Oberon

Member
Did the RAN, or for that matter any of the ADF, get anything out of the budget? I cant see anything for the armed services there.
No. No new commitments. We will have to wait for the DWP later in the year and the DCP which follows it. The Forward Estimates would have been updated to include the P-8A announcement etc.
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
No. No new commitments. We will have to wait for the DWP later in the year and the DCP which follows it. The Forward Estimates would have been updated to include the P-8A announcement etc.
Projects such as the P-8A's have been 'programmed' in for quiet a while now, it's more the case that 'out of the blue' purchases such as additional C-17A's, HMAS Choules and Ocean Shield, that hadn't been originally planned for, that extra dollars have to be found and accounted for.

Sometimes those purchases are from 'supplementary' funding from the Government's 'unallocated' bucket of money that is regularly part of the budget process and sometimes it from 'unspent' money from the Defence budget itself.

Below is the Def Min's statement from last night:

Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence – Budget 2015: Defence Budget Overview

As you can see no new details of course, but a recap of equipment decisions made in the last 12 months and an update of the Defence budget 'financials' for this coming year and the period of the forward estimates too.

The relevant paragraphs are:

The Government will provide Defence with $31.9 billion in financial year 2015-16 and $132.6 billion between 2015-16 and 2018-19. This is an increase of $9.9 billion compared with the four-year estimates announced in the 2014-15 Budget (2014-15 to 2017-18).
And:

The delivery of the Defence White Paper, along with the Defence Investment Plan (incorporating a Defence Capability Plan) and Defence Industry Policy Statement later this year, will provide the Australian community and defence industry with the clarity and certainty that Labor failed to deliver. We will lay out a clear, fully-funded plan for a strong and secure Australia.
The picture is fairly clear as to how much money is being allocated to Defence over the next four years, and when the DWP and it's accompanying documents are released, then we will be able to see how the allocation will be 'split' amongst the various projects.

Cheers,
 

Oberon

Member
Projects such as the P-8A's have been 'programmed' in for quiet a while now, it's more the case that 'out of the blue' purchases such as additional C-17A's, HMAS Choules and Ocean Shield, that hadn't been originally planned for, that extra dollars have to be found and accounted for.

Sometimes those purchases are from 'supplementary' funding from the Government's 'unallocated' bucket of money that is regularly part of the budget process and sometimes it from 'unspent' money from the Defence budget itself.



Yes, you're right. I realise my mistake just after posting. What I meant to say is that the Forward Estimates would have been updated for Treasury's revised estimate of exchange rate movements etc
 

Joe Black

Active Member
For subscribers only Joe.
What is it about?
MB
Plans to choose a new submarine for the navy are bedevilled by the wrong but apparently unshakable view that the Collins-class submarine is a “dud sub”.

Current and former submarine commanders in the Royal Australian Navy say the Collins is a very good submarine and for Australia’s purposes probably the best of its type in the world.

It can certainly do some major things no other conventional *submarine can do: travel at more than 20 knots submerged and patrol off the coast of China without refuelling.

According to former submarine commanders such as Matthew Keough and Rod Fayle, the Collins is remarkably effective.

Keough, who heads the Australian Submarine Institute, says the Collins is an excellent submarine that is serving the nation well.

Given these uncertain times and increasing friction over territorial claims in the South China Sea, it is vital that Australia has a strong force with 12 long-range and highly capable submarines, Keough says: “A strong submarine force gives you the ability to do more than just ‘shirt-front’ your enemy — it allows you to rip their arms off!”

Fayle was driven by years of frustration recently to write an open letter in which he said the Collins was arguably the world’s best diesel electric submarine.

“What started as an orches*trated misinformation campaign against the Collins submarine has now spilt over to the next generation of submarines,” Fayle wrote.

“Why is it so? Our defence policy is based on deterrence and modern, capable submarines provide a very powerful deterrence. But, repeatedly, we are being told that our Collins submarines are ‘duds’, that the ‘building of those submarines in Australia was an expensive disaster’, and now ’we are going to do it again’.”

Fayle says the Collins project is, in many ways, a remarkable success, both as an industrial build and operationally, having produced a highly effective submarine. There were problems but they were identified and fixed, Fayle says.

In the early days a poorly manufactured propeller and water flow issues caused noise problems.

“These were both solved long ago, and for many years the boats have been exceptionally quiet,” Fayle says.

“The noise levels are so low that it has been very difficult to find an area where we can measure their noise. The boats are quieter than the background noise in the ocean.

“Playing politics with a major part of Australia’s Strategic Defence should not occur. Have an informed debate, by all means, but keep the politics out of it.”

There is no diesel electric submarine available “off the shelf” anywhere that has the range and endurance the navy needs. That means whatever boat is chosen will have to be significantly redesigned — or built from scratch with an ally.

Even Japan’s much-praised Soryu-class submarine would have to be heavily modified.

The Soryu is a very good submarine but it was designed to deal with Japan’s concerns about Russia, and before tensions arose with China.

It has the range to get to its patrol areas off those two nations, remain quietly “on station” there, then return home.

While there is little information about the Soryu publicly available, The Australian has been told it lacks the range our navy needs. As it is now designed, a Soryu would be able to sail from the HMAS Stirling naval base, just south of Perth, as far as Darwin — and then would have to refuel.

The Collins, on the other hand, has the range to patrol far up into Asian waters without refuelling. The best weapon to destroy a submarine is another submarine and the best place to do that is off the enemy submarine’s home port.

The head of the navy’s Future Submarine project, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, has rejected suggestions that Australia is committed to buy a Japanese submarine.

Sammut stresses that the government’s competitive assessment process to choose the new design will be rigorous and fair.

Most modern submarines are extremely quiet, and among the quietest of them is the Collins. That makes them very difficult to find once they are on the loose in a vast ocean.

In times of war, Australia’s submarines would join their US counterparts sitting quietly off the naval bases of a potential enemy waiting for its submarines to emerge.

If the unthinkable happened and tensions with China increased dramatically, an obvious target for this activity would be the People’s Liberation Army Navy submarine base on Hainan Island.

A recently retired American submarine officer tells The Australian the US wanted Australia to have “a world-class submarine force that would prevail in combat” to supplement its own attack submarine forces.

He says advanced conventional submarines were potent and very effective.

“To us you are a force multiplier,” the officer says. “The US Navy cannot be everywhere at all times.”

Australia is a well-trusted ally with forces tailored to operate with US forces, the former officer says: “When you show up to the fight you are instantly part of the battle group.

“A capable 21st-century capable RAN submarine force is essential for peace and stability in Southeast Asia,” he adds.

“Six submarines that are world-class, albeit conventional, would represent 10 per cent of our attack force. Twelve submarines would represent 20 per cent of our attack force.

“That’s a significant force multiplier, especially when you are operating in the waters you are most familiar with.”

He says a conventional submarine could “absolutely” be effective in a war against nuclear submarines.

Given the possibility that after the current assessment process Australia may buy a Japanese submarine, the officer raises another issue that has not been discussed widely.

Every class of submarine has a sound “signature” that can be recorded and stored by enemies and friends alike during the peacetime intelligence-gathering missions that are the daily work of the world’s undersea fleets.

When a submarine is located, even heard briefly, in wartime the faint noise made by its engines and other equipment can be fed into a database and a match found to identify the boat.

“If a Japanese submarine does something untoward, how does Australia like the possibility that China thinks that was done by an Australian submarine?”

Much of the original criticism of the Collins came from a small number of officers in the navy’s surface fleet, resentful of what they saw as the focus of the commanders and then defence minister Kim Beazley on submarines over surface warships.

The “dud subs” tag was used later by Coalition defence minister Peter Reith to bash Beazley’s reputation at a time when the Labor leader appeared to be heading for an election victory; the tag has persisted even while the Collins boats have been on operations far up into Asia.

Submarines are highly complex machines and require comprehensive maintenance that takes them out of action for lengthy periods.

During World War II the US never had more than a third of its submarines on patrol. Australia’s navy now regularly has three of its six submarines at sea.

Australia can build submarines; the country’s submariners insist it has built a perfectly good one in the Collins but as a nation we have convinced ourselves otherwise.

Through politics and in-service rivalry we have accepted that an extremely difficult project was a disaster. It wasn’t.

Major problems emerged but they were certainly no worse than the technical issues, cost overruns and delays that have stricken US and British submarine projects.

The British Astute nuclear submarine program ran six years behind schedule and its budget blew out by 50 per cent. Even the vaunted US Virginia-class had serious problems in its early days.

Spain was building its latest submarine when engineers worked out it would certainly be able to submerge but lacked the buoyancy to ever surface again.

Nothing remotely as bad has ever happened to the Collins.

There is no diesel electric submarine available off the shelf anywhere that has the range and endurance the navy needs. That means whatever boat is chosen will have to be significantly redesigned — or built from scratch with an ally.

While Australia can build a submarine, it does not have the skills to design one and that just means choosing a partner from among the Japanese, Germans, French or the Swedes, who so far have been cut out of the assessment and selection process.

The three European nations all say they can build the submarines, or most of them, in Australia.

Japan may want to build them all in Japan.

Navy chief Tim Barrett has warned that any new submarines must come with the complete knowledge to operate and repair them in Australia.

Wherever the submarines are built, they will be maintained in Australia. It would be strategically dangerous and highly impractical to send them thousands of kilo*metres away to be repaired.

The Abbott government is impressed by the Japanese process of producing a submarine each year in what has been called a “rolling build”, to give the industry continuity and make it more sustainable in the long term.

That example is being considered by Defence Minister Kevin Andrews as the key to ultimately saving Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry.

Apart from the submarines, another major project on the horizon is the purchase or building or purchase of new frigates for the navy.

The government is considering a number of options. One is to build eight frigates based on the same hull design as the three air warfare destroyers now nearing completion, but packed with anti-submarine equipment and an Australian-designed anti-missile system.

Another option is the British Type 26 frigate, which could be built here. Yet another is a joint European design.

At the Australian Strategic Policy Institute conference in Canberra this week, Andrews sent a strong signal to industry that if it did improve its performance the government would have the frigates built in Australia.
 
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