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Plans to choose a new submarine for the navy are bedevilled by the wrong but apparently unshakable view that the Collins-class submarine is a “dud sub”.
Current and former submarine commanders in the Royal Australian Navy say the Collins is a very good submarine and for Australia’s purposes probably the best of its type in the world.
It can certainly do some major things no other conventional *submarine can do: travel at more than 20 knots submerged and patrol off the coast of China without refuelling.
According to former submarine commanders such as Matthew Keough and Rod Fayle, the Collins is remarkably effective.
Keough, who heads the Australian Submarine Institute, says the Collins is an excellent submarine that is serving the nation well.
Given these uncertain times and increasing friction over territorial claims in the South China Sea, it is vital that Australia has a strong force with 12 long-range and highly capable submarines, Keough says: “A strong submarine force gives you the ability to do more than just ‘shirt-front’ your enemy — it allows you to rip their arms off!”
Fayle was driven by years of frustration recently to write an open letter in which he said the Collins was arguably the world’s best diesel electric submarine.
“What started as an orches*trated misinformation campaign against the Collins submarine has now spilt over to the next generation of submarines,” Fayle wrote.
“Why is it so? Our defence policy is based on deterrence and modern, capable submarines provide a very powerful deterrence. But, repeatedly, we are being told that our Collins submarines are ‘duds’, that the ‘building of those submarines in Australia was an expensive disaster’, and now ’we are going to do it again’.”
Fayle says the Collins project is, in many ways, a remarkable success, both as an industrial build and operationally, having produced a highly effective submarine. There were problems but they were identified and fixed, Fayle says.
In the early days a poorly manufactured propeller and water flow issues caused noise problems.
“These were both solved long ago, and for many years the boats have been exceptionally quiet,” Fayle says.
“The noise levels are so low that it has been very difficult to find an area where we can measure their noise. The boats are quieter than the background noise in the ocean.
“Playing politics with a major part of Australia’s Strategic Defence should not occur. Have an informed debate, by all means, but keep the politics out of it.”
There is no diesel electric submarine available “off the shelf” anywhere that has the range and endurance the navy needs. That means whatever boat is chosen will have to be significantly redesigned — or built from scratch with an ally.
Even Japan’s much-praised Soryu-class submarine would have to be heavily modified.
The Soryu is a very good submarine but it was designed to deal with Japan’s concerns about Russia, and before tensions arose with China.
It has the range to get to its patrol areas off those two nations, remain quietly “on station” there, then return home.
While there is little information about the Soryu publicly available, The Australian has been told it lacks the range our navy needs. As it is now designed, a Soryu would be able to sail from the HMAS Stirling naval base, just south of Perth, as far as Darwin — and then would have to refuel.
The Collins, on the other hand, has the range to patrol far up into Asian waters without refuelling. The best weapon to destroy a submarine is another submarine and the best place to do that is off the enemy submarine’s home port.
The head of the navy’s Future Submarine project, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, has rejected suggestions that Australia is committed to buy a Japanese submarine.
Sammut stresses that the government’s competitive assessment process to choose the new design will be rigorous and fair.
Most modern submarines are extremely quiet, and among the quietest of them is the Collins. That makes them very difficult to find once they are on the loose in a vast ocean.
In times of war, Australia’s submarines would join their US counterparts sitting quietly off the naval bases of a potential enemy waiting for its submarines to emerge.
If the unthinkable happened and tensions with China increased dramatically, an obvious target for this activity would be the People’s Liberation Army Navy submarine base on Hainan Island.
A recently retired American submarine officer tells The Australian the US wanted Australia to have “a world-class submarine force that would prevail in combat” to supplement its own attack submarine forces.
He says advanced conventional submarines were potent and very effective.
“To us you are a force multiplier,” the officer says. “The US Navy cannot be everywhere at all times.”
Australia is a well-trusted ally with forces tailored to operate with US forces, the former officer says: “When you show up to the fight you are instantly part of the battle group.
“A capable 21st-century capable RAN submarine force is essential for peace and stability in Southeast Asia,” he adds.
“Six submarines that are world-class, albeit conventional, would represent 10 per cent of our attack force. Twelve submarines would represent 20 per cent of our attack force.
“That’s a significant force multiplier, especially when you are operating in the waters you are most familiar with.”
He says a conventional submarine could “absolutely” be effective in a war against nuclear submarines.
Given the possibility that after the current assessment process Australia may buy a Japanese submarine, the officer raises another issue that has not been discussed widely.
Every class of submarine has a sound “signature” that can be recorded and stored by enemies and friends alike during the peacetime intelligence-gathering missions that are the daily work of the world’s undersea fleets.
When a submarine is located, even heard briefly, in wartime the faint noise made by its engines and other equipment can be fed into a database and a match found to identify the boat.
“If a Japanese submarine does something untoward, how does Australia like the possibility that China thinks that was done by an Australian submarine?”
Much of the original criticism of the Collins came from a small number of officers in the navy’s surface fleet, resentful of what they saw as the focus of the commanders and then defence minister Kim Beazley on submarines over surface warships.
The “dud subs” tag was used later by Coalition defence minister Peter Reith to bash Beazley’s reputation at a time when the Labor leader appeared to be heading for an election victory; the tag has persisted even while the Collins boats have been on operations far up into Asia.
Submarines are highly complex machines and require comprehensive maintenance that takes them out of action for lengthy periods.
During World War II the US never had more than a third of its submarines on patrol. Australia’s navy now regularly has three of its six submarines at sea.
Australia can build submarines; the country’s submariners insist it has built a perfectly good one in the Collins but as a nation we have convinced ourselves otherwise.
Through politics and in-service rivalry we have accepted that an extremely difficult project was a disaster. It wasn’t.
Major problems emerged but they were certainly no worse than the technical issues, cost overruns and delays that have stricken US and British submarine projects.
The British Astute nuclear submarine program ran six years behind schedule and its budget blew out by 50 per cent. Even the vaunted US Virginia-class had serious problems in its early days.
Spain was building its latest submarine when engineers worked out it would certainly be able to submerge but lacked the buoyancy to ever surface again.
Nothing remotely as bad has ever happened to the Collins.
There is no diesel electric submarine available off the shelf anywhere that has the range and endurance the navy needs. That means whatever boat is chosen will have to be significantly redesigned — or built from scratch with an ally.
While Australia can build a submarine, it does not have the skills to design one and that just means choosing a partner from among the Japanese, Germans, French or the Swedes, who so far have been cut out of the assessment and selection process.
The three European nations all say they can build the submarines, or most of them, in Australia.
Japan may want to build them all in Japan.
Navy chief Tim Barrett has warned that any new submarines must come with the complete knowledge to operate and repair them in Australia.
Wherever the submarines are built, they will be maintained in Australia. It would be strategically dangerous and highly impractical to send them thousands of kilo*metres away to be repaired.
The Abbott government is impressed by the Japanese process of producing a submarine each year in what has been called a “rolling build”, to give the industry continuity and make it more sustainable in the long term.
That example is being considered by Defence Minister Kevin Andrews as the key to ultimately saving Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry.
Apart from the submarines, another major project on the horizon is the purchase or building or purchase of new frigates for the navy.
The government is considering a number of options. One is to build eight frigates based on the same hull design as the three air warfare destroyers now nearing completion, but packed with anti-submarine equipment and an Australian-designed anti-missile system.
Another option is the British Type 26 frigate, which could be built here. Yet another is a joint European design.
At the Australian Strategic Policy Institute conference in Canberra this week, Andrews sent a strong signal to industry that if it did improve its performance the government would have the frigates built in Australia.
