Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[ASSAIL]

The reason Navantia has been contracted to send additional personnel to Australia is because the recently sacked defence minister was incompetent and in the pocket of multinationals who were determined to sideline ASC and secure a bigger chunk of the contract for themselves. While I have no issue with any of the Navantia people I worked with I was very disappointed with them at the corporate level specifically relating to the quality and timeliness of design changes and not telling us about issues encountered on F-105, leaving us to find them for ourselves, further mucking up the schedule.

That said Navantias part in the mess is nothing compared to that of Rod Equid (Raytheon employee and head of the Alliance) and BAE Australia the mangler of blocks, to quote my old boss, handing management of the build over to BAE, Raytheon and Navantia is like putting the fox in charge of the hen house.

On risk management, the Australian government was very poor at it from the late 90s onward, just look at FFGUP, ANZAC WIP, ACPB, LCM2000, Super Sea Sprite, MRH90, ARH, MU90, Wedgetail, Vigilaire, and M-113 upgrade off the top of my head. Can't blame the workers or unions for any of those and they were all different contractors too (although some of the contractors are not blameless), the common factor was Cabinet and more to the point dept of PM&C, can't even blame the DMO as they were set up after many of the troubled projects had started so they were not a common factor either. The real shame is Australia's predominantly privately owned defence industry, i.e. before ASC was nationalised, had been doing quite well for quite a while before this, delivering world class products and securing exports at ever improving schedule and cost.

The Australian National Audit Office report gives a pretty good analysis of both the problems faced during build and the problems involved with the way the project was incorporated and managed. ASC has as much to answer for as the other alliance members.

 

[Volkodav]

The Australian National Audit Office report gives a pretty good analysis of both the problems faced during build and the problems involved with the way the project was incorporated and managed. ASC has as much to answer for as the other alliance members.

But the way it is being spun is ASC cant be trusted to "build a canoe" while Raytheon, BAE and Navantia are the knights in shining armour who (after being paid hundreds of millions tax payers money) will ride in and save the day.

I know some in ASC are not blameless, I was there, I saw incompetent "experts" hired in for their knowledge, I saw some senior managers ignoring problems. I and others bashed our heads against the wall telling senior managers of issues that were never addressed. I saw three absolutely pointless, government instigated, reorganisations, including some very stupid redundancies, in as many years that only ever seemed to affect ASC and saw increased Raytheon dominance in the project. The fact that the full story of BAEs incompetence wasn't made public stuns me, as does them now being brought in to "fix" things now. Following BAEs take over of Tenixs ship building operations they lost, through redundancy and natural attrition with many of the best moving into resources infrastructure

The reviews into the project have been very unbalanced, pretty much targeted at ASC with a specific agenda involved. ASC has been targeted with Raytheon and government influence in what happened ignored or down played. Under Rudd / Gillard the CEO of ASC was forced out for daring to stand up to the government on budget and contract negotiations. The submarine maintenance budget was cut and hundreds of technical redundancies were forced. Then a new CEO was brought in from the UK a stack of experienced and competent managers were forced out and replacements brought in from the UK, handing many pivotal positions and functions over to Raytheon. A change of government, the new CEO is gone and another management team is being brought in. I am surprised any work has been done at all.

At the end of the day if new ships had been ordered from Tenix in a timely manner in the late 90s / early 2000s, perhaps instead of the FFG UP, the new ships would be in service having been built within budget and schedule. We had an experienced and capable yard that had just successfully delivered two major projects that was starved of work until it's owners sold out to a multinational with a track record of cost and schedule blowouts on pretty much every project they touched.

 

[rjtjrt]

With regard to the ANZAC Frigate build program, I seem to remember it did not go well at first, and a number of people from the German designer were brought in to get it back on track. After that it did go well.
Is my memory correct in that?

 

[StobieWan]

Daft question on the AWD program - did Type 45 ever get seriously offered up or was it just a passing thought? I seem to recall a version with either SPY1 or a SAMPSON ICWI offering was talked about but not sure how seriously.

 

[t68]

Daft question on the AWD program - did Type 45 ever get seriously offered up or was it just a passing thought? I seem to recall a version with either SPY1 or a SAMPSON ICWI offering was talked about but not sure how seriously.

I remember reading somewhere that type 45 was looked at but was seen a risk to fit Aegis combat systems

 

[John Fedup]

But the way it is being spun is ASC cant be trusted to "build a canoe" while Raytheon, BAE and Navantia are the knights in shining armour who (after being paid hundreds of millions tax payers money) will ride in and save the day.

I know some in ASC are not blameless, I was there, I saw incompetent "experts" hired in for their knowledge, I saw some senior managers ignoring problems. I and others bashed our heads against the wall telling senior managers of issues that were never addressed. I saw three absolutely pointless, government instigated, reorganisations, including some very stupid redundancies, in as many years that only ever seemed to affect ASC and saw increased Raytheon dominance in the project. The fact that the full story of BAEs incompetence wasn't made public stuns me, as does them now being brought in to "fix" things now. Following BAEs take over of Tenixs ship building operations they lost, through redundancy and natural attrition with many of the best moving into resources infrastructure

The reviews into the project have been very unbalanced, pretty much targeted at ASC with a specific agenda involved. ASC has been targeted with Raytheon and government influence in what happened ignored or down played. Under Rudd / Gillard the CEO of ASC was forced out for daring to stand up to the government on budget and contract negotiations. The submarine maintenance budget was cut and hundreds of technical redundancies were forced. Then a new CEO was brought in from the UK a stack of experienced and competent managers were forced out and replacements brought in from the UK, handing many pivotal positions and functions over to Raytheon. A change of government, the new CEO is gone and another management team is being brought in. I am surprised any work has been done at all.

At the end of the day if new ships had been ordered from Tenix in a timely manner in the late 90s / early 2000s, perhaps instead of the FFG UP, the new ships would be in service having been built within budget and schedule. We had an experienced and capable yard that had just successfully delivered two major projects that was starved of work until it's owners sold out to a multinational with a track record of cost and schedule blowouts on pretty much every project they touched.

As you have said previously, the start and stop (boom and bust) nature of naval ship procurement is depressing and extremely expensive if local builds are desired. Many of the issues you raise will be applicable to Canada's CSC program (likely worse).

I managed to digest some of the important points made in the document regarding the benefits of the ANZAC program that you referenced to me on the RCN site. I agree the benefits were significant and the Halifax program in Canada was similar but not to the same extent as Australia's. Australia has been more fortunate in that naval programs did continue after completion of the ANZAC frigates. In contrast, after completion of Halifax frigate program, much of the capability to build warships was allowed to die in Canada. We are now trying to rebuild this.

Given the collapse of oil prices which in turn has trashed our exchange rate, increased deficits in both federal and provincial governments, and the lack of faith in the economy in general, Canada's defence procurements are in trouble. Add in the issue of our overheated real estate market and we could see some huge problems down the road....no blue water navy, no F-35s, and maybe no fast jets period.

 

[Volkodav]

That's the thing the short termist morons in Canberra don't get, when commodity prices and the local currency drop we have less dollars to spend and each of those dollars buys less. An inescapable effect of this is all the stuff we used to buy cheap from overseas is now going to cost much more and we will have less money to buy it with. That is the raw economics of the matter and doesn't take into account the "Australia Tax" a nickname for the corporate practice of jacking up the prices of products the corporate entities know we cannot source alternatives to. I hope everyone is ready for $50000 entry level Hyundais.

 

[t68]

That's the thing the short termist morons in Canberra don't get, when commodity prices and the local currency drop we have less dollars to spend and each of those dollars buys less. An inescapable effect of this is all the stuff we used to buy cheap from overseas is now going to cost much more and we will have less money to buy it with. That is the raw economics of the matter and doesn't take into account the "Australia Tax" a nickname for the corporate practice of jacking up the prices of products the corporate entities know we cannot source alternatives to. I hope everyone is ready for $50000 entry level Hyundais.

Agree with the sentiments, rare spares should make a killing on the old Holden's and Fords, Cuba seemed to do all right with 1950's GM and Fords cars and ute's

 

[Volkodav]

Agree with the sentiments, rare spares should make a killing on the old Holden's and Fords, Cuba seemed to do all right with 1950's GM and Fords cars and ute's

Shipbuilding isn't dead yet and we can always increase Australian content but the plans to buy subs from Japan are getting more expensive by the day. Other projects will also end up costing more for the same reasons. The same, predominantly external, cost factors that made local manufacturing / construction so uncompetitive are cyclical and now moving towards the more traditional norm. Unfortunately a lot of manufacturing has moved offshore during the extended "boom" times (due to Chinas construction boom and the GFC) and will take years to rebuild, if it ever can be.

 

[rjtjrt]

Shipbuilding isn't dead yet and we can always increase Australian content but the plans to buy subs from Japan are getting more expensive by the day. Other projects will also end up costing more for the same reasons. The same, predominantly external, cost factors that made local manufacturing / construction so uncompetitive are cyclical and now moving towards the more traditional norm. Unfortunately a lot of manufacturing has moved offshore during the extended "boom" times (due to Chinas construction boom and the GFC) and will take years to rebuild, if it ever can be.

Can you give an idea of what proportion of the cost of Collins Program (the acquisition, not subsequent sustainment) was spent in Australia, and what was spent on imported items?

 

[Volkodav]

Can you give an idea of what proportion of the cost of Collins Program (the acquisition, not subsequent sustainment) was spent in Australia, and what was spent on imported items?

Not off the top of my head, I do know that many systems were imported for Collins but manufactured locally for the remaining five, including main motor and generators. I know some of the systems, not all and couldn't tell you the costs, there are probably reports that have this information but I would be guessing. Maybe another member has some references at hand.

 

[hairyman]

Have we ever considered the Japanese 30'000 ton air craft carrier Izumo class? They are costing Japan $1.5bill US each, cheaper than our AWD. Japan are building two, which we would proba bly also require if we were to get into aircraft carriers again. They would obviously need to be adapted to our requirements, but they would be a step in the right direction.

 

[Todjaeger]

Have we ever considered the Japanese 30'000 ton air craft carrier Izumo class? They are costing Japan $1.5bill US each, cheaper than our AWD. Japan are building two, which we would proba bly also require if we were to get into aircraft carriers again. They would obviously need to be adapted to our requirements, but they would be a step in the right direction.

What role is planned for them in the JMSDF orbat, and what role would you see them fufilling in the RAN orbat? Keep in mind that Japan already has several Aegis-equipped destroyers to provide area air defence which is what the AWD's are intended for in the RAN.

 

[pussertas]

Not off the top of my head, I do know that many systems were imported for Collins but manufactured locally for the remaining five, including main motor and generators. I know some of the systems, not all and couldn't tell you the costs, there are probably reports that have this information but I would be guessing. Maybe another member has some references at hand.

From Wikipedia

One of the main criteria of the project was that Australian industries contribute to at least 60% of the work; by the conclusion of the project 70% of the construction and 45% of the software preparation had been completed by Australian-owned companies. Work was sub-contracted out to 426 companies across twelve countries, plus numerous sub-sub-contractors:jump2

 

[Volkodav]

Have we ever considered the Japanese 30'000 ton air craft carrier Izumo class? They are costing Japan $1.5bill US each, cheaper than our AWD. Japan are building two, which we would proba bly also require if we were to get into aircraft carriers again. They would obviously need to be adapted to our requirements, but they would be a step in the right direction.

I have been speculating for several years that something like them, or the earlier, smaller Hyuga class, would be an ideal complement to the AWD and LHDs instead of a one for one replacement of the ANZACs with a large ASW oriented frigate. My thinking was with three Hyugas handling ASW as well as operating a range of MCM, CSAR, AEW helos and various UAV/UCAV for ISR , force protection, even limited strike roles, the replacement frigates could be much cheaper (though not necessarily smaller).

My proposal is to spend most of the SEA5000 money on three DDH/CVH and the remainder on new hulls with modern propulsion and other systems to reuse the CS, including all ASMD and weapon systems from the ANZACs to save money. The new frigates could be smaller, although ideally they would be like a modern iteration of the Spruance class, with each designed to be upgraded to a full DDG if required.

 

[t68]

I have been speculating for several years that something like them, or the earlier, smaller Hyuga class, would be an ideal complement to the AWD and LHDs instead of a one for one replacement of the ANZACs with a large ASW oriented frigate. My thinking was with three Hyugas handling ASW as well as operating a range of MCM, CSAR, AEW helos and various UAV/UCAV for ISR , force protection, even limited strike roles, the replacement frigates could be much cheaper (though not necessarily smaller).

My proposal is to spend most of the SEA5000 money on three DDH/CVH and the remainder on new hulls with modern propulsion and other systems to reuse the CS, including all ASMD and weapon systems from the ANZACs to save money. The new frigates could be smaller, although ideally they would be like a modern iteration of the Spruance class, with each designed to be upgraded to a full DDG if required.

That's the thing for the RAN with our geographical position a large ocean on both sides of the country, should we be equipped with two identical ASW fleets(1xEast/1xWest)and an Amphiboius fleet? What size should these fleets be? if not should make the West the preeminate ASW surface force with a combination of frigates and aircraft carriers helicopter only or combination of VTOL/STOVL or even CTOL aircraft?



The focus of ADF anti-submarine force has resulted in the acquisition of several different capabilities that operate either separately or collaboratively in support of the ASW operations, namely the Anzac and Collins fleet, the P3 Orions and now the MH-60R. The Anzacs and Collins fleet and P3 replacement are in numbers resembling at best a training capability, should we compromise numbers of submarine's and Anzac replacement to achieve the aim of having more helicopters at sea(with a strike capability)or should we expand the longer ranged future P8 Poseidon fleet increase the submarine and Anzac replacement fleet moving from a training capability to sustainable operational fleet I believe it's crunch time on what the ASW requirements, its not much use having a Amphibious capability that capability won't deploy in times of heightened tension if their is a fear of not being able to clear our SLOC.





Volks merits and thought's in that fast moving helicopters and planes would have the advantage of defeating a submarine than a surface vessel, once a submarine has been detected but it's the large systems based platforms that have the power to detect at longer ranges with such things as the towed array

 

[ASSAIL]

[QUOTE it's the large systems based platforms that have the power to detect at longer ranges with such things as the towed array[/QUOTE]

Not so, escorts remain with the high value target and as such are constrained by a requirement to remain within a high noise environment. Its true that towed arrays and helos deploying sonar buoys/dipping sonar are a great improvement from the "frigate" navy of the past 30 years but they're limited to within about 20 miles from the main body (I'm unaware of the current tactical employment of the 70B Seahawks with their sonar buoys)

Fixed wing ASW a/c operate along the line of advance 100miles+ ahead, in choke points or wherever intel directs. Search areas vary from 15,000 - 30,000square miles+ depending on coverage required.

Again I reiterate my mantra that ships don't find subs, the opposite occurs. Submarines and aircraft find submarines.
Cheers

 

[Volkodav]

As I understand it the JMSDF has always desired hunter killer groups centred on a CVS with fixed wing ASW aircraft but has had to make do with destroyers and embarked helicopters. Their primary role, in conjunction with the JASDF, is to control choke points and to sanitise the closed waters around Japan to create a safe operating zone for reinforcing USN groups.

As submarine speeds increased the number of helicopters needed to for a successful prosecution increased to more than could be carried by the ships in the group. This left the JMSDF with the choice of increasing the number of destroyers, specifically traditional DDHs, or going for a larger CVH type, which is what they have done with the Hyugas and Izumo classes.

Ironically Australia has gone from having what the JMSDF wanted but couldn't have, to having less than they have in just one of their groups.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Good to see Canberra took center stage in the harbor with the Australia day celebrations, holding station just off the harbor bridge.

To bad it was rainy.

 

[Raven22]

Good to see Canberra took center stage in the harbor with the Australia day celebrations, holding station just off the harbor bridge.

To bad it was rainy.

I know now why they paint navy ships grey. I was catching a ferry home on Australia Day when it was drizzling, and you could barely spot Canberra through the mist.