Sounds like a good argument for Collins mk II
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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It would have been if design work had started 5 years ago. Hear and now Collins Mk II is vapourware (with regards to gf)
Joe Black
Active Member
Now it appears Raytheon wants a bigger slice of the AWD work:
Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian
I also stumbled across an old article:
Shipbuilding companies lobby Government for a fourth Air Warfare Destroyer
It has a photo of AWDA chief executive Rod Equid standing in front of what appears to be Typhoon mounts with some of them armed with 25mm Bushmaster chain guns.
Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian
I also stumbled across an old article:
Shipbuilding companies lobby Government for a fourth Air Warfare Destroyer
It has a photo of AWDA chief executive Rod Equid standing in front of what appears to be Typhoon mounts with some of them armed with 25mm Bushmaster chain guns.
the road runner
Active Member
There was also IP issues with who owned what regarding collins. ... don't know how that turned out but i am assuming Collins IP right's did not go in favor of the commonwealth??? If IP rights did go in favor of the commonwealth (assuming again here)i would have thought a Collins MK2 would be a natural progression
Energy management is the main reason the IKL proposal was rejected for the Collins project. IKL ignored the RAN requirements and instead proposed that all but minimum crew should be in their bunks and all but minimum systems should be switched off in order to obtain the required transit and patrol performance. This is basically how their coastal designs operate, but rarely ever lasting more than a couple of days, in some Baltic navies their patrols go out at dawn and they are back by dusk.
Those who argue against the RAN needing a bespoke design are ignoring the simple fact of our unique geography. For our submarines to do nothing more than patrol our territorial waters requires what any other nation would consider to be an ocean going fleet submarine. That is what the Oberons where, designed in a time when the RN still had global responsibilities and have now been superceded by SSNs, for various reasons Australia hasn't gone down the nuclear path which leaves unique long range conventionals as the only option.
Those who argue against the RAN needing a bespoke design are ignoring the simple fact of our unique geography. For our submarines to do nothing more than patrol our territorial waters requires what any other nation would consider to be an ocean going fleet submarine. That is what the Oberons where, designed in a time when the RN still had global responsibilities and have now been superceded by SSNs, for various reasons Australia hasn't gone down the nuclear path which leaves unique long range conventionals as the only option.
Well, it certainly seems to be a tough nut to crack. Doesn't appear to be any easy answers.
I would imagine the Japanese engines are generations ahead of what Collins is running, which were problematic from the get go. With Collins you have that engine space and you have that fuel fraction.
Its in the interest of the Japanese for Australia to have the best and most suitable capability. They seem keen to help facilitate that. If Australia has something inappropriate, then they are left to fend for themselves and global security and confidence suffers.
I wonder what the time/cost/risk difference would be between a Collins package (Mk1 upgrade + Son of build) verse bringing in service modified Soryu class subs.
I think its worth still having that discussion.
I would assume it would be unacceptable to have the subs based not in Australia.
Well actually design work started back in 2008 but then Rand said we weren't actually capable of doing what we were already doing and the work was all for nothing.
I always thought it was a bit rich Rand saying an experienced multinational team led by the former head of the Nordic Viking project that was backed up by the expertise of the entire Collins project and reach back into EB and the USN, was incapable of designing new submarine.
Yes, I understand but with no ongoing funding and support the design work has atrophied into vapour
Over the last twelve months or so only, it had actually been ramped up and brought back into ASC proper when the previous government announced a local design was one of the preferred options.
What I find interesting is extensive reviews have unequivocally stated that not only are the Collins class are not only capable of serving their full planned service lives but also of receiving another Full Cycle Docking each meaning we have about fifteen years before we need to lay down a replacement class and twenty years before the first boat is needed in service. ASC have shown they can open up the Main Generator Room sufficiently to permit replacement of the diesels and generators making swap out of the propulsion plant (the sole remaining major issue) a viable option.
I just can't understand why there is this sudden panic, yes work needs to proceed, but not so urgently as to make a local option unviable.
I'm not suggesting local production is unviable.
What I am suggesting is that ASC lacks the design resources to implement a fully spec'd sub in the time available. If built locally, it needs to build a boat under licence with input from an experienced submarine design team which may include a number of ASC's current personnel who may or may or may not be employed by ASC but most likely a new owner. It should be given time to develop that expertise by a possible overseas build possibly followed by incremental steps maturing into a full Australian build.
In the meantime, it will continue to sustain and improve Collins for another 15+ years (about 12 Full Cycle Dockings in total). This alone is a huge undertaking
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The range numbers OZ gives are also found at Wikipedia. The Soryu numbers are for the existing model not some future upgrade. Who knows how accurate either specs are?
I agree, there is no reason why the Soryu range and speed can't be upgraded with bigger engines and more fuel as it is a somewhat larger boat than the Collins. The volume is bigger so more stuff can perhaps be fitted in. Now the Soryu displaces almost 700 tons more than the Collins submerged and I am not sure what effects this would have on range and speed submerged but I would not think it matter much for surface operation. Perhaps others could comment on this.
As for continuing with Collins 2 or an upgraded Soyu, you Australians here are the best for sorting that issue. I agree with Volk, you have time to think about this and Australia has already committed a lot to developing sub technology. A way to retain and improve this technology should be found.
Joe Black
Active Member
Here's a different take from BAE Australia's involvement in the AWD point of view:
BAE Systems concerned about naval sector future | Australian Defence News & Articles | Asia Pacific Defence Reporter
"BAE Systems Australia describes their relationship with Navantia on the LHD project as excellent – with a seamless flow of data between the two companies. The relationship is simple and direct: BAE Systems are the prime contractor, and Navantia are subcontractors and designers.
The situation regarding the Air Warfare Destroyer work has been more complicated and less happy. For this project, BAE Systems is under contract to the AWD Alliance, which is made of the Defence Materiel Organisation, ASC Shipbuilding and Raytheon Australia - of which Navantia is not a part. This means that if any issues come up regarding Navantia’s design drawings – and they frequently do – the query first of all goes to the Alliance (in effect ASC), where it is considered and prioritized before being sent to Spain. This means that resolving issues often takes several days – and sometimes substantially longer. In the case of the LHDs, most design issues can be sorted out overnight."
BAE Systems concerned about naval sector future | Australian Defence News & Articles | Asia Pacific Defence Reporter
"BAE Systems Australia describes their relationship with Navantia on the LHD project as excellent – with a seamless flow of data between the two companies. The relationship is simple and direct: BAE Systems are the prime contractor, and Navantia are subcontractors and designers.
The situation regarding the Air Warfare Destroyer work has been more complicated and less happy. For this project, BAE Systems is under contract to the AWD Alliance, which is made of the Defence Materiel Organisation, ASC Shipbuilding and Raytheon Australia - of which Navantia is not a part. This means that if any issues come up regarding Navantia’s design drawings – and they frequently do – the query first of all goes to the Alliance (in effect ASC), where it is considered and prioritized before being sent to Spain. This means that resolving issues often takes several days – and sometimes substantially longer. In the case of the LHDs, most design issues can be sorted out overnight."
Sort of half true, the system of getting data sorted by Navantia was cumbersome and inefficient but to blame ASC is a bit rich. Within the Alliance was a group called the Navantia IPT, staffed by Navantia, ASC, DMO and Raytheon personnel, ASC representation and technical expertise within the IPT was increased to streamline things, i.e. the Shipbuilding Chief Engineer was seconded to the IPT to fix things.
To say BAEs relationship with Navantia was seem less is a fiction, they had smoother data flow and faster turn around but there were still a lot of problems resulting in rework and I believe even the scraping of some fabricated sections. One of the issues ASC had with BAE was they often pulled resources off the blocks for the AWD to concentrate on LHD work because they were having issues and were behind schedule.
BAE also had most of their work force trained at the AWD Alliances expense, even to the point of experienced ASC personnel being based at Williamstown and others rotated through to help BAE relearn how to build ships. Inspite of all the help they got reskilling their workforce and the experience they got on the AWD blocks they built (badly) as well as the entire hull of each LHD being built in Spain on schedule BAE still managed to deliver Canberra late with multiple faults resulting in commissioning being about 12 month behind schedule. Remember also, while larger, the LHDs are much simpler ships than the Destroyers.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
For anyone who is interested, here's a link to a Rand report on Australia's SEA 5000 options.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR767/RAND_RR767.pdf
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR767/RAND_RR767.pdf
RAND reports have been taken with a touch of salt ever since they were "damned by association" and misrepresented on JSF a few years back
This one would have more clout as one of the authors (at least) is a known quantity and has some valid credentials in his background
not familiar with some of the others
Not sure if it really is for sea5000. Should be titled how to run successful militatry aquistions. Should be required reading for government.
Over 200 pages doesnt get in any of the specific requirement of sea5000. Thats ok as we need to put the horse before the ship (or submarine)
Over 200 pages doesnt get in any of the specific requirement of sea5000. Thats ok as we need to put the horse before the ship (or submarine)
quite frankly all of the lessons learnt are available (classified) in the doc that the USN and US Dept of Commerce did on the UK and specifically the Astute prog before the USN stepped in and assisted (contrary to what BAE would have people believe that they fixed the probs)
It was made avail to Aust, RAND don't have access to some of the critical docs
That's something that gets me, the government has access to far more relevant information than private consultants or think tanks ever could yet rather than using their own highly qualified and experienced people (that they have to pay for anyway) to conduct a full investigation with all available information, they spend stupid sums of money on external groups to write reports with only part of the story.
The "answer" for almost-any politican is to go to so-called independant Consultants whether those consultants are truly independant, truly proficient in arriving at any reasonable conclusion someone here couldn't have reached over coffee in the morning, and produce something that will serve as a guide to be actually followed, rather than serve as a shelf weight.
I am not optimistic...........
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