Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[gf0012-aust]

I actually wonder if there was an audit of all the outsourced functions that defence, or for that matter government, used to do for themselves if it would find that the outsourcing was more expensive, less efficient, involved pork barrelling and possibly corruption.

I was in a task force set up to look at how efficient outsourcing was amongst all our major friends and allies

out of the 50+ we looked at only 1 (within the USN) was actually realising any efficiency and savings - every other contract outsourced to the private sector ended up costing the respective governments more - it's an absolute nonsense for govts to say with their hands on their hearts that its more efficient - it clearly is not

outsourcing is driven by ideology - there's no metrics in the last 15 years in any NATO country or 5I's that shows that its of value to the respective taxpayer.

we spend more to get less capability and we end up with less ability for the services to actually self sustain and manage in times of need

 

[phreeky]

outsourcing is driven by ideology - there's no metrics in the last 15 years in any NATO country or 5I's that shows that its of value to the respective taxpayer.

we spend more to get less capability and we end up with less ability for the services to actually self sustain and manage in times of need

I'd argue that it's driven by the risk of impact to reputation. I cannot claim to have dealt with the sort of things you would've looked at (on that scale), but when it comes to lower-level outsourcing, even down to engaging consultants unnecessarily, it's largely utilised as a way of passing blame to somebody else when things go wrong.

Just look at the Qld Health vs IBM stuff up. It doesn't matter how much the Qld Gov stuffed that one up they haven't just blamed IBM but threatened legal action to save face. Even when the vendor/supplier is at fault governments will also ignore the fact that they selected them as if it were insignificant, even blaming the consultant (who they hired!) who does the selection.

When people towards the top are prepared to take responsibility and ownership of projects internally is when you see innovation, efficiencies and results.

 

[Volkodav]

In a major project I worked on a Principle Technical Officer was told by the contracts team to stop helping the subcontractor prepare to do the work as it would give the contractor an out if something goes wrong. So basically, covering your a$$ contractually is seen as more important than active risk mitigation to ensure the job is done properly in the first place.

 

[Waylander]

What was the initial reason for army to reject a HIMARS capability? The hope for the SPG purchase materializing? Manning issues?

 

[ADMk2]

What was the initial reason for army to reject a HIMARS capability? The hope for the SPG purchase materializing? Manning issues?

I suspect it was a legacy of the same era when many 'thought bubble' ideas existed in Army that 'precision fires' could solve every problem we'd ever face in combat. Such things as heavy armour, heavy artillery and long range rocket fires were seen as anathema to the idea of the 'light footprint and precise striking' way of the future. Capability such as HIMARS / MLRS seemed to be seen in some quarters as 'too heavy' for us...

Out of such thinking we see such things as the Tiger helicopter because it is a 'armed reconnaissance helicopter' not a 'gunship' (like the AH-64 is) and so on. It is political correctness gone mad. The 'paper' idea that 'tanks up the guts' had no place in modern warfare and 'precision' would allow us to neatly (and near bloodlessly) defeat our enemies and obviate any need to be able to 'take' a hit and continue fighting.

Thankfully it seems nearly 15 years of ACTUAL operations has brought some sense of what warfare is actually like back into Army and we see the increasing results and turn away from 'light infantry' based ops to 'light armoured' ops. With the move to far much survivable vehicles under LAND 400 this should continue the overall move back to combined arms operations (infantry, artillery and armour) as a bare minimum level of combat power.

 

[StingrayOZ]

The current situation by which 2 RAR is the dedicated amphibious battalion is really only an interim solution to raise the capability. It has yet to be decided what the enduring solution will be to maintain the capability. There are lots of options, including maintaining 2 RAR as the dedicated battalion, rotating the capability within a single brigade and rotating the capability across all three brigades.

I say fully commit to the amphibious concept and rotate the capability across all three bridgades, then it makes it worthwhile to invest in some of the amphibious mobility/connectors etc. You then can expand the army capability with what it should have as well. You then have a large and sustainable and flexible amphibious force and all those other capabilities we should have included long ago. You can then build up that ARG capability, which is a much more useful and realistic capability for the type of missions we may have to do.

We are half way there the big items are already in play. To me IMO it doesn't make sense not to fully commit and get the most out of what your trying to build.

I don't think its a shame to pull 2rar apart, they will forge the concept for the rest of the army, it will be a decade before we get close to full ARG capability, and until then you will still have that core capability. Its a pretty major shift in concept and will be a generational change.

It also really justifies what the army needs and many would be joint projects particularly with Navy.

The Singaporians had some sort of amphib vechicles we should probably look at, at least as some sort of capability. They may suit us more than AAV7 anyway which is a bit of dead end (IMO).

 

[old faithful]

With 10 C17, s , 12 C130J30, s and 7 MRTT, s training an airmobile element dosnt sound stupid, add the 8th RAR Bn, 3 Beersheeba brigades and an air mobile brigade, on a rotation, a la ODF of the 80, s.
Easy, light infantry, rapid deployment Bn group.

 

[Nick underscore]

With 10 C17, s , 12 C130J30, s and 7 MRTT, s training an airmobile element dosnt sound stupid, add the 8th RAR Bn, 3 Beersheeba brigades and an air mobile brigade, on a rotation, a la ODF of the 80, s.
Easy, light infantry, rapid deployment Bn group.

Not against the idea, but how would you rotate the 8 Btns into the 36 month cycle?
Brshba Bgde A ---> Brshba B ---> Brshba C
Amphib Btn ---> ?
Airmobile Btn ---> ?

 

[t68]

I was in a task force set up to look at how efficient outsourcing was amongst all our major friends and allies

out of the 50+ we looked at only 1 (within the USN) was actually realising any efficiency and savings - every other contract outsourced to the private sector ended up costing the respective governments more - it's an absolute nonsense for govts to say with their hands on their hearts that its more efficient - it clearly is not

outsourcing is driven by ideology - there's no metrics in the last 15 years in any NATO country or 5I's that shows that its of value to the respective taxpayer.

we spend more to get less capability and we end up with less ability for the services to actually self sustain and manage in times of need

Correct saw that first hand when I worked for the government own transport DAS carting EO for defence then once it went private the cost to government skyrocket.

Could never see how Howard said it was a long term saving, more of a short term fix for the books. It's why utility prices are soaring as the private entity has to make a profit people seem to forget that when it was government owned it didnot as all it had to returned was sufficient money to upgrade the system that's all it had to achieve

Governments are their to provide essential service's they went doing that at the moment it's the only real bugbear I have with the liberals

 

[Raven22]

Understand that ARA is to increase to ~31.5k throughout this year and next?

I'm pretty sure 30 500 is the cap on AFS numbers. I could be wrong though.

Any other options for the enduring solution, besides what you have mentioned above?

No, the ones I mentioned (2 RAR remains dedicated, a rotation within a single brigade, a rotation of all three brigades) are the three generic possibilities. There are different variations within each broad option though.

The key difficulties is linking in the maintenance of the Amphib capability with the maintenance of the RCT/RBG. The truth is, as everyone posting to 2 RAR is constantly being told, is that 2 RAR are the unit LEAST likely to deploy in the entire ADF. Whenever a deployment comes up, the army is not going to send the dedicated Amphib unit unless he deployment absolutely needs the Amphib skills to do the deployment. You don't have an Amphib capability if it's deployed doing other things you see. 2 RAR will be kept out of any future deployment rotations for the same reason. 2 RAR will spend a lot of time on the boat, but very little time on foreign shores doing the job for real.

 

[Raven22]

With 10 C17, s , 12 C130J30, s and 7 MRTT, s training an airmobile element dosnt sound stupid, add the 8th RAR Bn, 3 Beersheeba brigades and an air mobile brigade, on a rotation, a la ODF of the 80, s.
Easy, light infantry, rapid deployment Bn group.

Where are you going to get the ~1500 extra soldiers for the 8th battalion? Or, what are you going to give up in the current ORBAT to get the extra battalion?

The thing is, the army currently has more combat elements than it can support anyway. More significantly, the army already has more infantry than it can make useful with mobility and other support. If you read the PARs from the recent trial of the Beerheeba brigade, there was a whole lot of infantry sitting around doing not much because there was nothing useful it could do without mobility. On the other hand, you had the one APC squadron commander and the one ASLAV squadron commander collapsing from exhaustion because they went from rapid regrouping to rapid regrouping and received no rest whatsoever. Since there was only one of each in the brigade, they were constantly tasked and became a rolling brigade main effort.

An extra infantry battalion would be the last thing on any list of ways to improve the army. You don't need dedicated battalions to do airmobile anyway - any of the current standard infantry battalions could do it. The RCT/RBG has essentially been an airmobile battlegroup since inception. Although, the old adage remains - easy to deploy, easy to destroy.

 

[MickB]

The current situation by which 2 RAR is the dedicated amphibious battalion is really only an interim solution to raise the capability.

A question for those with a leaning towards history. If the ADF was originally based on the British military, why did the RAN not include a Marine Corps.

Was it because Australian ships were only meant to suppliment the RN. Or were the Marines deemed to be expeditionary in nature and not suited to a defensive force.

If the later how does this tally with the facts that even before federation Australian troops had fought in several overseas conflicts.

 

[old faithful]

Not against the idea, but how would you rotate the 8 Btns into the 36 month cycle?
Brshba Bgde A ---> Brshba B ---> Brshba C
Amphib Btn ---> ?
Airmobile Btn ---> ?

I meant this.

Beersheeba brigade 1, 2and 3 rotate as amphib bdes. Every Bn would rotate through the Amph ready Bn except the 2 A/mobile Bns.

@ Battalians as air mobile, Bn a . rotate after 12 months Bn B.

 

[old faithful]

Where are you going to get the ~1500 extra soldiers for the 8th battalion? Or, what are you going to give up in the current ORBAT to get the extra battalion?

The thing is, the army currently has more combat elements than it can support anyway. More significantly, the army already has more infantry than it can make useful with mobility and other support. If you read the PARs from the recent trial of the Beerheeba brigade, there was a whole lot of infantry sitting around doing not much because there was nothing useful it could do without mobility. On the other hand, you had the one APC squadron commander and the one ASLAV squadron commander collapsing from exhaustion because they went from rapid regrouping to rapid regrouping and received no rest whatsoever. Since there was only one of each in the brigade, they were constantly tasked and became a rolling brigade main effort.

An extra infantry battalion would be the last thing on any list of ways to improve the army. You don't need dedicated battalions to do airmobile anyway - any of the current standard infantry battalions could do it. The RCT/RBG has essentially been an airmobile battlegroup since inception. Although, the old adage remains - easy to deploy, easy to destroy.

With a population of over 22 Million persons, finding 1500 to man a Battalian group should be no problem.
Finding money to equip an army of approximatley 33,000 regs, also no problem.
There were 32000 in the regular Army in 1985 when I joined, and 6 Inf Bns.
One major problem these days is the ridiculous OHS restrictions placed on defence force personel. pretty much the same as civvy Work place sftey. Some idiot officer in the 1990,s did a paper for part of his ADFA degree that completley ruined the way we used blackhawks. We used to move 18 soldiers on one, 2 sections. Then the "not enough seat belts" bacame an issue. Seat belts wont save you from 7.62mm etc etc.

 

[Raven22]

There were 32000 in the regular Army in 1985 when I joined, and 6 Inf Bns.

That actually illustrates my point. In 1985 you had 32000 soldiers and 6 infantry battalions. In 2014, we have 30000 soldiers and 8 infantry battalions (if you include 2 Cdo, which didn't exist in the 80s and is actually the largest unit in the army). In addition, today's army has three helicopter regiments, three fully manned armoured regiments, a special operations engineer regiment, an STA regiment and all sorts of other operational units that didn't exist in the 80s. So today's army has far more teeth to tail than the army of the past.

Where the army is hurting is CSS. We quite literally don't have enough CSS to support the combat units. We don't even have enough soldiers allocated to logistic units and echelons to man all the equipment. This is why bulk supply is being centralised in 17 CSS Bde, why health is brigaded into the CSSB, why clerks are brigaded into admin units etc etc. All terrible, horrible initiatives, but all designed to do more with less to support the F ech. Another infantry battalion will not help matters.

Using the size of the population to justify an increase in Army size isn't very helpful. The nation is big enough and rich enough to support the raising of a couple of armoured divisions. Doesn't mean it's a realistic option.

We used to move 18 soldiers on one, 2 sections. Then the "not enough seat belts" bacame an issue. Seat belts wont save you from 7.62mm etc etc.

Far be it for me to defend nonsense WHS impacts, but not doing OCL is a very good thing. It's not a lack of seat belts that limits numbers in a Blackhawk, it's a lack of crash proof seating. Rip the seats out and you might be able to fit more soldiers in, but if the chopper crashes every single one of those soldiers will be dead or seriously injured. If you look at our experiences with helicopters on ops in the last 15 years, how many soldiers have died due to enemy fire? How many have died in helicopter crashes? The USA doesn't do OCL at all anymore. In fact, they are amazed that we still have it on our books as an option.

OCL has been relegated to a 'break glass in the event of war' capability. And, by war I mean the 3rd Shock Army advancing across the Fulda Gap, not Afghanistan/Iraq/East Timor.

 

[t68]

That actually illustrates my point. In 1985 you had 32000 soldiers and 6 infantry battalions. In 2014, we have 30000 soldiers and 8 infantry battalions (if you include 2 Cdo, which didn't exist in the 80s and is actually the largest unit in the army). In addition, today's army has three helicopter regiments, three fully manned armoured regiments, a special operations engineer regiment, an STA regiment and all sorts of other operational units that didn't exist in the 80s. So today's army has far more teeth to tail than the army of the past.

Where the army is hurting is CSS. We quite literally don't have enough CSS to support the combat units. We don't even have enough soldiers allocated to logistic units and echelons to man all the equipment. This is why bulk supply is being centralised in 17 CSS Bde, why health is brigaded into the CSSB, why clerks are brigaded into admin units etc etc. All terrible, horrible initiatives, but all designed to do more with less to support the F ech. Another infantry battalion will not help matters.

Using the size of the population to justify an increase in Army size isn't very helpful. The nation is big enough and rich enough to support the raising of a couple of armoured divisions. Doesn't mean it's a realistic option.



Far be it for me to defend nonsense WHS impacts, but not doing OCL is a very good thing. It's not a lack of seat belts that limits numbers in a Blackhawk, it's a lack of crash proof seating. Rip the seats out and you might be able to fit more soldiers in, but if the chopper crashes every single one of those soldiers will be dead or seriously injured. If you look at our experiences with helicopters on ops in the last 15 years, how many soldiers have died due to enemy fire? How many have died in helicopter crashes? The USA doesn't do OCL at all anymore. In fact, they are amazed that we still have it on our books as an option.

OCL has been relegated to a 'break glass in the event of war' capability. And, by war I mean the 3rd Shock Army advancing across the Fulda Gap, not Afghanistan/Iraq/East Timor.

not familiar with the terminology OCL/WHS?

 

[Raven22]

not familiar with the terminology OCL/WHS?

OCL is operational contingency loading. Essentially when you rip the seats out on a helicopter and just sit on the floor. As the name suggests, it's only done in operational contingencies because of how dangerous it is.

WHS is just the fancy new name for OHS - workplace health and safety.

 

[t68]

OCL is operational contingency loading. Essentially when you rip the seats out on a helicopter and just sit on the floor. As the name suggests, it's only done in operational contingencies because of how dangerous it is.

WHS is just the fancy new name for OHS - workplace health and safety.

cheers thanks

 

[Nick underscore]

I'm pretty sure 30 500 is the cap on AFS numbers. I could be wrong though.

I was reading an article recently that the ARA was having difficultly in fulfilling the 2011-12 defence public budget statement - (p27, table 20) Army -31,076 for 14/15 projections. Fully understand circumstances have changed, but the actual numbers themselves I believed were based on the release of the Bersheeba plan that year in 2011. http://www.defence.gov.au/Budget/11-12/2011-2012_Defence_PBS_03_department.pdf

Looking at current projections (Defence PBS 14/15) & going forward, we are indeed at your numbers. Cheers for clarifying

No, the ones I mentioned (2 RAR remains dedicated, a rotation within a single brigade, a rotation of all three brigades) are the three generic possibilities. There are different variations within each broad option though.

The key difficulties is linking in the maintenance of the Amphib capability with the maintenance of the RCT/RBG... The truth is, as everyone posting to 2 RAR is constantly being told, is that 2 RAR are the unit LEAST likely to deploy in the entire ADF.

Whenever a deployment comes up, the army is not going to send the dedicated Amphib unit unless he deployment absolutely needs the Amphib skills to do the deployment. 2 RAR will be kept out of any future deployment rotations for the same reason.

Thanks again for sharing the information.

Makes sense, but with respect to a unilateral (forgetting the kiwis for the moment) regional response, could you see 2RAR being first to deploy or a Btn from 1,3 & 7(Multi-Role/ Manoeuvre) Bgde?

As part of a coalition response (assuming the Army is required) then it makes sense to avoid sending your dedicated amphib asset, unless the capability is required, of course.. Plus, a regional response will be limited if this coincides with other Army deployments..

Are many people trying to get into 2RAR internally?

Sorry for the questions - quite interested in the flexibility & capability of the ARA over the coming 4-5 years..

 

[Navor86]

Hello gents,
I got some questions regarding the future ACR's.
According to this:
Australia Revamps Reserve Brigades under Plan BeerSheba | Defense Update:
each ACR should compromise of 1 Tank Squadron and 3 Armored Cav Squadrons.
I was always under the impression that Armored Cav means ASLAV?
But posts from a few days ago suggest that those ACR's will also incooperate M113's.

Does that mean that those ACR's will be responsible for tank warfare, armored recon and armored infantry transport? (At a later point with Land 400 vehicles?)

What about the PMV Bushmaster's? Where will they belong to? To Infantry units or some other outfit?