I was thinking of compatabillity with Land 121 protected vehicle, (if that is the Bushmaster) reduceing the logistic impact of a new system.
i would have thought so. I've seen proposals/drawings of mlrs systems on stretched bushmaster 6x6's and they were regarded as unworkable
its the wrong vehicle for the system
The Himars is mounted on an uparmoured FMTV 5 ton truck. The 6x6 Bushmaster has a load of 10-11 tonnes, nearly double if I converted correctly.
One of the things we need to do is avoid australianising everything when a perfectly adequate if not good solution already exists -or worse try to turn platforms into a universal baseline solution
certainly the stuff I saw on an MLRS Bushmaster platform was less than flattering
we should learn our lesson from the ADI/Thales M113 fiasco
Reminds me of the saying "better is the enemy of good enough".
not saying that at all - read what I said
we continue to australianise kit that sometimes is not necessary. there's no shortage of recent examples where the vendors eventually decide that modifying platforms for small builds is a disproportional expense to capability gained (and often at par, not superior)
I've seen a number of aust land platforms suffer this malaise
Would the SPH be the main example GH or are you also thinking of others.
I remain surprised that Army wasn't prepared to come up with a request that would have resulted in a 90% solution for this.
They would have received a leap in capability as a result.
Massive
I think you missread the intent of the saying - it is meant to be taken as meaning don't keep striving for increasingly difficult to attain improvement, when what you have is good enough!
yes
there is a rising increase in reality that acknowledges that an 80/20 rule exists
ie the final 20% of finishing the build and design before FOC will end up consuming 80% of the allocated funds - and often chewing into contingency (which technically isn't there for scope creep, but there to deal with exchange rate fluctuations etc in the main)
australia isn't the only one realising this, the US in particular acknowledges it (and they don't have the same contingency model as the UK and Aust)
Sometimes there needs to be an a blinkers off and an agnostic look at the final 20% where a project is struggling and make a defensible assessment of whether that final 20% is needed or whether it does need reviewing. Its the last 20% which invariably delays things going into service on expected dates
I'm deliberately oversimplifying this to make a point - but the core of my comments remains intact
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yes, I did misread - my apols
I think that would be a dreadful idea and would end being a re-run of the SPG fiasco all over again.
The capability is sought for 'deep fires' (ie: >50k - 300K depending if ATACMS is bought).
It's ability to maneuver with our IFV / MBT fleets, I think is irrelevant, so long as the base vehicle is roughly equivalent in performance with our existing up-armoured B vehicle fleets.
For around 18 vehicles, re-engineering the base platform is a WOFTAM of the highest order and typical of such 'wunder' projects in Australia's recent history as the SPG, M113, FFG-UP and similar projects, IMHO. It would be work for the sake of work, rather than improving the system and could quite possibly exceed the additional cost of supporting the additional vehicle type anyway...
Just do as Singapore relatively recently did, IMHO. Spend about $350m, order 18 launchers, plus trucks, operational and practice launch pods, plus a weapons inventory and support and create a single 'deep fire' regiment to support 1 and 2 Division, the way 1 Avn Regt supports the whole of Army. The base vehicle is armoured well enough for the US Army, USMC and the Singaporean Army seemingly. I think it will suffice for us in the role we envisage for it...
Let's hope Army gets 4 batteries.
Army of 4s by stealth...
It will be interesting to see what the artillery deployed with a Beersheba battlegroup looks like.
If you end up with a 155mm, HIMARS and NLOS combination you have a very capable but very large artillery unit supporting a battalion sized battlegroup.
Regards,
Massive
Personally I can't see Army getting any at all. There's just no one to man a HIMARs regiment. The gun batteries can currently only man 8 guns in a regiment. At best it will be 12 guns in a regiment.
To man a HIMARs regiment, government would either have to authorise an extra 200 odd soldiers be added to establishment, or another compromise would have to be made with another capability. I don't think either will happen.
HIMARS imo, will be a non event.
SP arty may still be on the cards, but with defence looking at JSF, More MRTT, C17, Growlers, P8, Collins replacment, ANZAC replacment,Armidale patrol boat replacements, Westralia and Sirius replacments, SARP, UAV, s and Sub equiv, Armoured vehicles, including replacment for M113, and a govt still trying to find savings from the previous govts spending spree......Army will be lucky to get their new AMCU cams.
SP arty may still be on the cards, but with defence looking at JSF, More MRTT, C17, Growlers, P8, Collins replacment, ANZAC replacment,Armidale patrol boat replacements, Westralia and Sirius replacments, SARP, UAV, s and Sub equiv, Armoured vehicles, including replacment for M113, and a govt still trying to find savings from the previous govts spending spree......Army will be lucky to get their new AMCU cams.
Under Beersheba is this OK though?
Realistically there will only be two battlegroups generated per brigade so 2 batteries is not really a problem?
Thoughts?
Massive
I think this reinforces my earlier comment that Army is very poor at getting new capability through.
If you look through you list the cost of the Army capability additions is relatively low.
Regards,
Massive
I take your point, major modifications on such a limited production is a waste of money and resources. I had thought (in error it seems) that HIMARS was a little more bolt on bolt off than most weapon systems.
An interesting side note, the HIMARS was tested as a launch unit for a SAM version of the AMRAAM.
The low cost of Army programs is often a disadvantage. With a very limited time in front of decision makers to make a case a get programs moved forward, it's no surprise it's the high cost, high publicity (usually RAAF or Navy) programs that get all the air time. Trying to get Government to care about a small program for, say, a mechanised breaching capability is not easy.
Having only 36 guns in the entire army is not a good thing. It's good enough to tool around the South Pacific, but if we ever fight a 'real' war we're screwed. This is where I think the Reserve should be used. Most of the Reserve is being transformed from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, however I think the reserve still has a place in maintaining capabilities not needed most of the time but would be in the event of a major war.