Three squadrons worth, 36 aircraft, of Vigilantes were recommended as a suitable interim type to get Australia through the danger period during the late 60s. Either the TSR2 or more likely the F-111 were seen as the long term options but would not be available in the required time frame where as the A-5 was already in production.
That’s right. The Government (Federal Cabinet) in 1963 considered options for 36 A-5Bs, renamed from A3J-2 in 1962 and basically a RA-5C without the recce gear fitted but fully able to be fitted as so, versus 24 F-111s. The 36 A-5Bs costed A£88 million and the 24 F-111s were expected to cost A£56 million. The F-111 was selected over the A-5B and against the advice of the RAAF because it was expected to have a much longer life and because it was cheaper! Of course it was only cheaper because it was 24 vs 36 airframes and the real cost by 1968 ended up being A£106 million. For which the RAAF could have brought 48 A-5Bs/RA-5Cs and had all of them in service before 1968. That’s twice as many aircraft and in service before the first F-111 was even promised to be in service (and it wasn’t).
Interestingly CAC initially proposed the Grumman Panther, the predecessor to the Tiger, for the RAAF before the Sabre was considered.
The CAC Panther was not proposed as a tactical fighter to replace the Mustang but as the basis of some CAC designed all weather fighters (night fighter). At this time, late 1940s, the RAAF and CAC were planning on building the Hawker P.1081 “Australian Fighter” to replace the Mustang and be the new fighter. It was only when this aircraft was delayed (1950-51) that the RAAF and CAC turned to the Sabre.
The Grumman Panther was selected as the basis for the RAAF’s new night fighter back in the mid to late 1940s because it was nice and big and used the Rolls-Royce Tay as an engine. The Tay had been selected at this time by the RAAF and CAC as being the basis of the next generation of RAAF aircraft. At this time the R-R Avon was still on the British Top Secret list and the RAAF didn’t know about it. The R-R Tay, built by CAC, was to power the CAC built Hawker P.1081, CAC’s new night fighter and the GAF built Canberra bomber. CAC was already building the R-R Nene for the DHA built Vampire and the Tay was just a bigger Nene so it all made a lot of good sense.
CAC designed two sequential versions of a Panther night fighter. One with the radar operator in the nose forward and below the pilot’s cockpit (the infamous “coal hole” position). The second version put the pilot and radar operator side by side in the cockpit and added a partially swept wing and a bigger fin (CAC P.186). This was early 1948 and the RAAF liked it but the Government was unable to come up with the 40,000 American dollars to buy a pattern aircraft and the detailed design from Grumman. Foreign exchange was rare in these days! So CAC had to design from scratch their own all weather fighter leading to the CA-23 and the whole capability was put on the back burner.
The un-super Tiger, due to its small size and low weight, may even have been able to operate from our carrier but I am not sure on that.
The F11F Tiger or Super Tiger was light enough and slow enough to fly from a Majestic class light fleet carrier like HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne brought up to the standard needed to fly Skyhawks.
Going Grumman could have seen continuous production of then world class fighters from the late 40s through to the early 70s allowing the RAAF to always stay ahead of the curve and never be forced into interim buys, urgent updates and expensive upgrades usually only delivering marginal improvement in capability at great cost and often leaving Australia at a tactical, if not strategic disadvantage.
It’s a nice idea but wasn’t going to happen from the 1947 night fighter selection of the Panther. Also that kind of strategic partnership was not something that was likely in this time frame. CAC had a much closer relationship with North American based on coming from the same corporate ownership (General Motors) and three generations of licensed programs (Wirrway, Mustang, Sabre). They had plenty of good planes to offer the RAAF after the Sabre but none were taken up. In the late 1950s the Government had decided that rationalsition of the aircraft industry was needed and wanted to only order aircraft from their own GAF. CAC was supposed to just focus on building engines and DHA got the short end of the stick and was supposed to just fade away. Ironically it was last man standing of the big three as Hawker De Havilland. So goes Government long term industry planning in Australia!
The fact Indonesia had a more modern and capable airforce than Australia during the early 60s was an election issue at the time with the F-111 order defusing one of the biggest policy differences between the two parties.
Even more than the disaster of Dibb’s “Defence of Australia” the Menzies defence planning of the late 1950s early 1960s was Australia’s most significant defence planning failure of all time. They had decided after the Korean War hadn’t turned into WWIII to cut back on defence. Just at the time that our region was turning into a powder keg fuelled by local military growth. Significant modernisation like the air force’s new fighter and medium bomber and the navy’s carrier recapitalisation were all cancelled. And the Army after having the ineffective national service scheme fostered onto it had its long standing and still effective reserve forces dismembered. By 1962 when it was obvious that things weren’t so rosy in the region they tried to turn it around and we needed conscription for active service to bring the Army back up to speed and the Air Force and Navy spent much of the 1960s with a weaponry deficit. Fortunately a range of possible local wars didn’t get out of hand and we still had British and American forces on hand to take care of things. But it was a close run thing.