Part 3 of 3
17. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) is the smallest of the three services, but it is the home of big ideas; and effectively communicating its ideas to the public in Singapore. This two minute commercial captures the navy's contributions towards Singapore's seaward defence, centred on four key roles:-
[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uecbDdItsxM&feature=c4-overview&list=UU4BCUrNe2X5UJkvzeRG12gQ"]Defending our Everyday - YouTube[/nomedia]
(i) ensuring maritime security, everyday by patrolling Singapore's waters;
(ii) enhancing diplomacy by working with like minded nations;
(iii) protecting Singapore's SLOCs; and
(iv) securing the peace for Singapore and its citizens.
18. Please take two minutes to watch the above video, to fully appreciate the importance of these four key roles to Singapore (as a port, and as a city-state) to understand the RSAF's focus on developing maritime ISR and attack capabilities to support the RSN. The Singapore Navy has two Archer-class AIP equipped submarines (each with a pressurized diver's lock-out to facilitate special forces operations), provides a key ISR capability that gives a larger nation a cause-for-pause, when taking the SAF's capabilities into consideration.
19. From
22 to 24 April 2013, Dr. Ng visited Germany; and on 22 April 2013, met with his counterpart Dr Thomas de Maizière in Berlin, where they discussed political and security developments in Europe and Asia, as well as bilateral defence cooperation. Dr Ng also conveyed Singapore's appreciation for the German government's support for the
SAF's armour training in Germany. With the recent agreement to provide a second training window from 2013 onwards, the SAF will now be able to train in Germany twice a year. Singapore and Germany interact regularly in a range of defence interactions, such as visits, military exchanges, professional courses, policy dialogues and technology collaboration. Both countries signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement in September 2005 and Singapore will acquire two new
Type 218SG submarines from Thyssenkrupp Marine System GmBH. These new submarines (with a customised design) are to be delivered by 2020; with ST Electronics, co-developing the combat system with Atlas Elektronik GmbH.
Felix Seidler, has a post on the Type 218SG at the Center for International Maritime Security blog. And given that Singapore is a maritime nation,
the SAF will spend far more on submarines and the JMMS with it's embarked aircraft than what it will spend on its ABGs (and main battle tanks, which form part of the ABG).
20. Prior to citing comments by others on the RSAF, I think it is important to repeat the four roles of air power for Singapore (see
Air Power 101 for New Members for more examples of air power at work). They are as follows:-
One Force - 2014 RSAF:
http://youtu.be/2kSvnRItrvM
(i) to fight for control of the air in support of SAF operations, through the use of F-16C/Ds, F-15SGs and F-35Bs (in the near future), supported by G550 AEWs and KC-135Rs, to gain air superiority;
(ii) to attack any aggressor's forces, through the use precision munitions delivered by fighters or other platforms, on land or at sea;
(iii) to provide air mobility to enable the SAF to insert troops or send supplies in support of missions conducted on land or at sea; and
(iv) to conduct ISR, in other words to gather intelligence, conduct surveillance or reconnaissance using fighters (as ISR assets), MPAs, Heron 1 UAVs, Hermes 450 UAVs and Scaneagle UAVs launched from land or from the sea.
21. As
Lt. General (Retired) Deptula (of the USAF) noted in discussing the future of air power:-
"Today the situation is reversed—finishing adversaries is easy… finding them is the challenge, and that places a premium on the importance of conducting effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or ISR. ISR today is the linchpin of our ability to conduct traditional find-fix-finish operations, and it’s increasingly being performed by fighter aircraft as an integral part of their traditional missions."
22. The US Air Force is stepping up its collaborative efforts and capabilities with key regional air forces, including with Australia, Singapore, South Korea and Japan. In a
November 2013 Breaking Defense interview with Pacific Air Forces, Gen. Hawk Carlisle, underscored that the US Air Force is adopting innovations from partners and he said:-
“Singapore is doing very innovative things with their F-15s, notably in evolving the capabilities of the aircraft to contribute to maritime defense and security. We are looking very carefully at their innovations and can leverage their approach and thinking as well. This will certainly grow as we introduce the fleet of F-35s in the Pacific where cross national collaboration is built in.”
23. But maybe the USAF are talking about the RSAF using the
AN/ASQ-236 externally mounted sensor pod's synthetic aperture radar or such other sensor (that provides detailed maps for surveillance, coordinate generation and bomb impact assessment purposes) for use in a maritime domain. Instead of just using the AN/ASQ-236 pod to precisely geo-locate points of interest and conduct surveillance activities day or night, in adverse weather conditions, the RSAF could also use it as an AESA sea-search sensor, in combination with the use of the F-15SG's Sniper targeting pod. I suspect that Singaporean WSOs could be developing tactics for searching or targeting ships by using both.
24. In the November 2013 Breaking Defense interview, Gen. Hawk Carlisle also noted "the ability of 5th generation aircraft to provide forward target identification for strike missiles from a surface or subsurface maritime asset. He described the ability of advanced aircraft, in this case the F-22, to provide forward targeting through its sensors for submarine based T-LAMS (cruise missiles) as both a more effective use of the current force and a building block for the emergence of the F-35 fleet in the Pacific. This is a harbinger of things to come with the emergent weapons revolution associated with the laydown of a new generation of combat systems enabled aircraft." As
Dr. Robbin Laird recently said:-
"We usually think of technology as the driver.. but in fact we are entering a decade where the CONOPs changes are as important as the technologies."
25. The future is no longer about platforms but how these platforms are used as part of coalition CONOPS. As
Mike Yeo of the Baseleg blog has recently noted on the maritime role of the F-15SGs:-
"While not some exciting, big bang secret weapon many of us were probably hoping for, this is essentially the future of warfare: where disparate, totally different platforms can communicate and work together seamlessly to maximise their effectiveness during a time of conflict. One can only imagine F-15SGs, using their sophisticated AESA radars and distributing information over secure networks via datalinks while operating from high altitude, providing updated, over the horizon targeting information for the Republic of Singapore Navy's Formidable-class frigates. Or in the future, even working with the recently-acquired Type 218SG submarines in a similar fashion. And that may not even be restricted to Singaporean platforms. It is not entirely inconceivable that the F-15SG's can do the same for allied ships, for example with Australia's upcoming Hobart-class Air Warfare destroyers in a future coalition ops scenario.
Or, it may really be an exciting, big bang secret weapon. Like the AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons that were included in an U.S. Foreign Military Sales notification to Singapore a few years back having been upgraded to C-1 standards to add the capability to hit moving targets..."
26. As Lee Kuan Yew once said, a small country like Singapore seeks a maximum number of friends, while maintaining the freedom to be itself as a sovereign and independent nation. Both parts of the equation –
a maximum number of friends and freedom to be act - are equally important and inter-related. This is why the SAF's mission in furtherance of Singapore's forward defence posture is as follows:-
"To enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor."
Our investments in training, technology and logistics are but tools to enable the SAF to act decisively in accordance with our mission statement. That is why I take a considered view that the defence of Singapore against any aggressor should be dynamic, and considered. However, Singapore must guard against operational complacency and the unfounded assumption that any aggressor at war would want to meet the SAF in decisive engagements.
27. Our army has also progressively become more mechanized than other ASEAN countries; and in certain areas, our conscripts in specific vocations may be better trained than the full time professionals of our regional cousins (because of continuous improvements made over time). While there is much room for further improvement, Singapore's training standards are high by regional standards (in terms of cultivating an operational learning culture) and Brunei uses the SAF as a training benchmark, sending a number of their personnel for to train in upgrade courses conducted by the SAF. There are four additional points to note below:-
The SAF - For Singapore:
http://youtu.be/66ty29TyL4I
One, Singapore is a
status quo rising power, sitting at a major maritime chokepoint (that is interested in limited sea control for specific purposes and supportive of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore);
Two, the Singapore Navy is a green water navy, with some special features, including being used as a tool for diplomacy. Through the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF), Singapore's land based air power dominates these chokepoints, as a
status quo rising power;
Three, the hard power that controls the adjacent land to the chokepoint, also controls passage of vessels. The ability to operate via FOBs and disperse forces, gives the SAF flexibility in the conduct of the forward defence of Singapore, at a place and time of its choosing - aka choose where and when to give battle. More often than not, the more capable force gets to choose when to act with decisive force - however, Singapore's lack of depth and lack of natural resources makes it uniquely vulnerable; and
Four, when the SAF unveiled an upgraded Leopard 2SG and it is clear that the upgrade is the logical outcome of the discussions at SAF's 2006 Land Defence Asia Conference. And the acquisition of the Leopard 2SG and it's supporting platforms are designed to enable the Singapore Army to conduct a Thunder Run into the aggressor's centre of gravity. It took 5 years from concept to execution but the focus is not on a single platform, rather, it is on delivering a capability (supported by ISR, a range of sympathetic platforms and systems) with a strong focus on the SAF's ability to project, promote, persist, prosecute, and maintain a presence in an urban environment - however that does not mean that the SAF does not have capability gaps or can afford to be complacent.
28. IMHO, the reality is the SAF does not exist to just defend Singapore, within Singapore. The SAF also serves to defend Singapore's interests; and Singapore's interests as a port-city, have a strong maritime character. The recent announcement that the SAF will acquire the JMMS (in addition to the 8 Littoral Mission Vessels to replace the Fearless Class vessels) is further affirmation that Singapore is a maritime nation.
29. For those who are interested in reading more on Singapore, may I humbly recommend reading a couple of my prior posts:-
Further, the Little India Riot demonstrated that Singapore is not as prepared, as it wanted to be for even an internal security mission (with very, very restrictive rules of engagement and where only less lethal solutions are allowed). Therefore, there are plans to institute change in the SAF at three levels to deal with special circumstances that create a gap in our capabilities (as the Defence Minister noted in his facebook post, which is quoted in full below).
Little India Riot - Lessons for the SAF
“Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face.” - Mike Tyson
As a professional boxer, Mike Tyson knew the painful difference between plans and reality. You can train for an event, spectators and coaches can give great advice from the sidelines during or after the match but for the actual participants slugging it out, reality meant having to make instant decisions while being beaten.
We have not had a riot in more than 40 years and don’t wish to see any more, but this real-life situation holds many important lessons for the SAF, much more than from our exercises or scenario planning. If called upon by the Home Team to assist, how effective would the SAF have been? We should approach this honestly so that our systems can improve. SAF commanders are therefore scrutinising the entire incident to learn the right lessons.
Some big issues:
Communications – the SAF has its own network but how would it perform in an urban high-density environment?
Information – How would we get real-time accurate information on the ground when things are changing by the minute? What “sensors” would we deploy, when and how?
Mobility – How would we get men and machines to ground zero? How do we bypass urban traffic and grid-lock?
These are some important questions that will need to be addressed. We should be thankful and respectful that the Home Team did their job well, and no one got killed. But we must make sure we take full advantage of this real-life situation, learn from others and update the SAF’s tactics and procedures.
- Ng Eng Hen
30. The above links in my post should help set the context of gf0012-aust's reply in this thread, where he noted it is not about platforms but how they are to be used. The SAF is hard to fight against not just because the country buys the right hardware/platforms alone (aka technical competence) or that it has the force structure that is capable of forward defence (aka right force structure and logistics). Rather, the SAF is hard to fight against because it also noted for using the technology acquired or developed in an innovative manner.
So, when I read this, it raised question for me, why both Leo 2SG and Merkava 4. Not really surprising for me, on the based of close relationship between Singapore and Israel. However not really in line with Singapore ussual well planned procurement. 
