Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Goknub]

Reading some of the opinion pieces and thought bubbles of many ex-Senior ADF members it is a view not limited to defence analysts.

Our inability to deploy a Brigade to Iraq 2003 is probably their crowning achievement.

Given that we still lack equipment that was standard issue at the end of World War Two, it's a mindset that is deeply ingrained in Australia.

I believe we have only managed to make the improvements we have because the memory of Vietnam and the Empire have receded far enough.

 

[Leadline]

At the risk of being unpopular, I think Hugh has a point, if not necessarily for the right reasons.

My main contention with heavier vehicles is interoperability and suitability on a modern battlefield.

Interoperability with existing platforms and strategies:
The ADF is shifting its focus to an expeditionary type operational outlook. LHDs and the "like brigade" concepts feed into the ability to deploy more agile forces as capability bricks, tailored for a specific mission profile and sustainable within organic structures without so much "chop and change". This was a major issue in campaign design for SLIPPER and resulted in some serious problems with the RTS model.

Looking at the existing platforms for the expeditionary campaign, the LHD and the Choules are not inherently suited to deployment of a heavy force. Before you folks highlight the lift capacity, let me explain.

The LHDs have got a tank deck and a light vehicle deck, with the intent that the heavy deck carries tanks and the light deck carries everything else. With LAND121, some of the logistic platforms are already on the heavy end of the scale, thus will impinge on the heavy deck. If we throw in additional heavier combat vehicles, our ability to deploy a balanced force with the appropriate follow on support will be inhibited. Sea basing as is our proposed sustainment concept will alleviate this to some extent, but not enough. Heavier combat vehicles will require heavier support platforms, e.g. Recovery platforms, higher fuel requirements, etc. given we are already facing anticipated issues of sustaining the existing forces when deployed, a even higher logistic liability will only further stress the issue. Before anyone talks about having the Choules and the second LHD, allow me to explore these. The Choules is not conceived for deploying into an environment of threat. That's why she has no fitted armament (though she is capable). It has almost no self defense capability against maritime threats. As for the ADELAIDE, let me point out that a) the RAN concept of RTS means only one LHD will be operationally deployed to war at a time, and b) the gov't is exploring the concept of using her as a a/c carrier with the F35 B. The necessary conversions required if this goes ahead will all but eliminate her lift capacity for heavy forces.

Then we got the deployability problem - how do we get the platforms into the theatre. Apart from sea lift, C-17 is the only real viaible option. I only need to point to force insertion/extraction from MEAO to demonstrate the problem involved with heavier vehicles. You fellows have any idea how hard it was to just get the ASLAVs out in a reasonable time frame?

Modern battlefield:
There is no recent experience that necessarily demonstrated heavier is better. Rather superior mobility, detection threshold and design were what improved our survivability. What the MEAO has shown us was that when faced with a heavier, better protected threat, insurgents just became more innovative. What allowed us to get inside their operational decision cycle was our greater ability in adaptation. This is bolstered with more mobile platforms with greater situational awareness. There is no reason to believe a conventional force would not do the same thing if they face the ADF/coalition. Thus agility, sensors and tactics are what will give us greatest advantage in this aspect.

Against an adversary with technological parity, armour will not save us. Ask a tank crew their survivability against a gunship or a modern anti-armour weapon with a top down attack. The best tactic is usually range overmatch, greater sensor capability so they can kill the threat first, or the mobility to move their vehicle into cover.

It is for these reasons that I think Hugh has hit the nail on the head. Economic realities are important, but for military professionals, we need to consider tactics.

 

[Goknub]

Ok, I'll try to address most of your points.

Firstly, I agree that "like" Brigades are a better design. It's a change that in hindsight should have been done after World War 2. Every war we have ever fought has been overseas, we need to be prepared for that.

Yes, I also agree that the space on the LHDs will run out very quickly. After witnessing first-hand the 2006 amphib move to Dili I think we will still be lacking capacity. I believe each LHD should be teamed up with heavy lift ship (but that's a discussion for the RAN thread).
---------------
Now for the rest.

Sensors vs armour.
A belief in a light-weight, networked force was all the rage in the 90s. That mostly ended in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those wars demonstrated that armour is just as important as networking. You can't get inside your opponents OODA loop if your vehicles are all burning.
The Marines and Canadians have also shown the utility of MBTs in Afghan, something I wish the ADF took more notice of. Armour gives you time to react and win the fight.

Logistics
Yes, the heavier the vehicle the higher the logistics burden. But that is why planning and organising now is so important. The mentality/culture required of a medium weight force is much different to how we have operated in the past. Our experience as the lead nation in Timor/Solomons is incredibly valuable.

I still think the adage : "Amateurs talk Tactics, Professionals talk Logistics" is the defining difference between the US and everyone else.

To summarise, Hugh White is only correct if you ignore all combat/operational experience of the last 50 years.

 

[Todjaeger]

Given that we still lack equipment that was standard issue at the end of World War Two, it's a mindset that is deeply ingrained in Australia.

Mind stating what the equipment is/was? I am drawing a blank.

-Cheers

 

[Volkodav]

The other factor is the planned LCH replacement for a larger more sea worthy design to replace the retiring LCHs. If, at a minimum, something along the lines of a US army LSV is adopted then each will provide a heavy vehicle squadron lift which is something for the planners to look into.

The detrimental effect of adapting either LHD into a "carrier" has been discussed on the RAN thread pointing out just the issue of the loss of core amphibious capability. If the F-35 is seen as a must have in support of amphibious operations then a proper CVL may be the most efficient way to go.

At the end of the day if we can not get the equipment the Army needs to do its job where it needs to go and support it then we need to reassess the RAN and RAAF logistics capabilities. There is no point what so ever sending the Army in under equipped, far better to invest in additional lift capability and do the job properly.

 

[Leadline]

Goknub, I do acknowledge some very good points above. Survivability is important, however I would like to propose a few points.

In regards to sensor vs armour, I need to clarify I am not arguing we can abandon all together the importance of armour. However to argue that we need to "up armour" all of our combat capabilities (at least the mechanised and motorised), as appears to be the case with LAND400, would be a step backwards to attrition warfare.

Afganistan demonstrated the importance of survivability, but this was not generally as a result of heavier armour. The combat vehicles the ADF employed, being the Bushmaster and the ASLAVs, had greater survivability due to their design (namely the v-hull vs IEDs). Bar armour increased survivability against RPGs, but this just demonstrated heavier armour is not necessarily the solution, rather innovation.

Afghanistan, and to a degree both the first and second Iraq, are poor examples of operational experience to justify the requirement for a shift in our mix of vehicle capabilities from a light/medium emphasis to a heavier one would be to ignore a number of key facts:

a) with the exception of a few occasions, Iraq did not see any pitched battles between tanks;
b) the greatest employment of tanks in both Iraq and Afghanistan was in support of infantry;
c) the employment (admittedly to great effect) of armour in Afghanistan was predominantly as mobile bunker busters - thus employing the tanks for firepower rather than their primary purpose - destroying other tanks.
d) where combat vehicles were used for direct support of operations (i.e. they applied kinetic force against targets), we generally used them for a firepower and range overmatch rather than increased survivability.

Our current doctrine, and indeed the development of the Army's future doctrine, still evolves at it's core from manoeuvre warfare. This means the "shock and awe" effect of armour is only one component. The crux of the doctrine still relies on a sensory superiority over our adversary, greater freedom of movement achieved through mobility and dislocation of our adversary via some means (e.g. geographic, deception) and hitting him at those areas that are weakest. If we are to accept this premise and not redefine our future concepts of land warfare, this means that in the majority of engagements, a reliance on superior protection has resulted from a operational failure of sorts.

Now survivability is still important. As demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, we cannot always achieve a sensory superiority over the enemy. Where we face an asymmetric threat, the adversary is often below our detection threshold. Similarly with an adversary of technological parity, they would be doing their utmost to conceal their assets from us. However should we accept this premise, it goes again to argue that a heavier platform will not necessarily be more survivable. The Afghans, even with minimal understanding of tactics and our technology, were able to evolve (sometimes within a single fighting season) to our attempts to improve our protection. To concentrate the premise of a new fleet of combat vehicles would only buy us a very few number of engagements before our adversary similarly adapt.

What the Afghan experience did teach us was the importance of greater tactical mobility. This plays to our strength, both against a conventional and unconventional enemy. Where we were able to detect an enemy through either sensory network (be they electronic or intelligence), greater tactical mobility allowed us to hit the enemy when and where we want, before he could withdraw to safety or back into hiding. Where we were unable to locate the enemy, superior mobility enabled us to rapidly deploy to counteract the enemy's action. Even where the enemy has not acted, their operational and tactical options are limited by their need to mitigate against our superior reaction speed.

In terms of logistics, planning and organising only gets us so far. Any operational deployment is a series of compromises. To simplify the discussion, let us for now ignore government imposed manning caps. The fact is that any ATG can carry only so many vehicles and personnel into the theatre. The ARG (as their current model) already maximise the number of fighting vehicles they load on to the RAN assets to maximise their tactical flexibility (generally finer planning can not occur until the force is enroute to the theatre due to the operational and tactical picture constantly developing). This comes at the cost of logistic assets.

The ARG mitigates the risk to their logistic capability by relying on sea basing - that is they rely on the RAN assets to provide logistic support until follow on forces external to the ATG is deployed into theatre. With heavier combat vehicles and the consequential heavier support platforms being required, this option becomes less viable. You'd have fewer combat vehicles loaded because you won't have room, you'd have fewer mobile logistic platforms that can be put on shore because of the need to load those bigger combat vehicles, and you'd have fewer options to deploy those platforms because heavier platforms would generally require a more developed beach head - especially as they can't deploy by air platforms.

At the risk of redefining my previous closing statement, military professionals need to consider operational art (thus encompassing logistics as well as tactics), but we also need to read the tea leaves and see economic and political realities:

Given the economic environment, it is unlikely any option to purchase a significant amount of heavier, more expensive fleet of vehicles would be fully realised. This means pursuing this option would take a very long time to accomplish to a meaningful state, and more than likely never fully realised due to volatility in both economics and politics.

 

[Goknub]

Mind stating what the equipment is/was? I am drawing a blank.

-Cheers

From WW2: Rocket artillery, SPGs, heavy mortars.

------------------------------------
I'll try to respond point-by-point to keep things easier to read.

Yes, innovation is good but those examples were in the form of new(ish) armour. Armour doesn't have to be heavy but it needs to be enough to keep the vehicle alive
If it (A vehs) can't take an RPG hit or 14.5mm it shouldn't leave our shores IMO.

Use of armour.

Those examples are exactly why we need armour.
a) Armour is not just for tank battles
b, c) Armour supporting infantry saves lives and is why I believe an infantry-support tank based on an IFV hull should be part of Land 400.
d) Again that is the exact reason why we need heavier armoured vehs, they can do the exposed tasks and survive. A lighter vehicle can't.

Freedom of movement also comes from mobility and survivability. A heavier tracked veh can get through rougher terrain and can operate in areas that a lighter veh won't go due to it's vulnerability to enemy fire.

I'm always surprised how much the Afghan engagments look like a World War 1 battlefield. Our blokes in gullies shooting at their blokes in gullies with a no-mans-land of poppy fields in between. A few more decent armoured vehs would have been useful.

Logistics/Politics

The sea-basing concept I view as PowerPoint BS, anything that required an LHD will need a land base soon enough. The compromise between teeth and tail is always going to exist but the benefits of heavier IFVs etc is worth the effort. If we need more tankers and RAN support to achieve this then so be it.

Politically, a heavier force gives the decision-makers more options and the prospect of fewer casualties. Economics will follow if the decision-makers see an advantage.

Basically, a heavier force is a more flexible force and worth the costs. It's easy enough to leave kit at home.

 

[knightrider4]

Goknub, I do acknowledge some very good points above. Survivability is important, however I would like to propose a few points.

In regards to sensor vs armour, I need to clarify I am not arguing we can abandon all together the importance of armour. However to argue that we need to "up armour" all of our combat capabilities (at least the mechanised and motorised), as appears to be the case with LAND400, would be a step backwards to attrition warfare.

Afganistan demonstrated the importance of survivability, but this was not generally as a result of heavier armour. The combat vehicles the ADF employed, being the Bushmaster and the ASLAVs, had greater survivability due to their design (namely the v-hull vs IEDs). Bar armour increased survivability against RPGs, but this just demonstrated heavier armour is not necessarily the solution, rather innovation.

Afghanistan, and to a degree both the first and second Iraq, are poor examples of operational experience to justify the requirement for a shift in our mix of vehicle capabilities from a light/medium emphasis to a heavier one would be to ignore a number of key facts:

a) with the exception of a few occasions, Iraq did not see any pitched battles between tanks;
b) the greatest employment of tanks in both Iraq and Afghanistan was in support of infantry;
c) the employment (admittedly to great effect) of armour in Afghanistan was predominantly as mobile bunker busters - thus employing the tanks for firepower rather than their primary purpose - destroying other tanks.
d) where combat vehicles were used for direct support of operations (i.e. they applied kinetic force against targets), we generally used them for a firepower and range overmatch rather than increased survivability.

Our current doctrine, and indeed the development of the Army's future doctrine, still evolves at it's core from manoeuvre warfare. This means the "shock and awe" effect of armour is only one component. The crux of the doctrine still relies on a sensory superiority over our adversary, greater freedom of movement achieved through mobility and dislocation of our adversary via some means (e.g. geographic, deception) and hitting him at those areas that are weakest. If we are to accept this premise and not redefine our future concepts of land warfare, this means that in the majority of engagements, a reliance on superior protection has resulted from a operational failure of sorts.

Now survivability is still important. As demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, we cannot always achieve a sensory superiority over the enemy. Where we face an asymmetric threat, the adversary is often below our detection threshold. Similarly with an adversary of technological parity, they would be doing their utmost to conceal their assets from us. However should we accept this premise, it goes again to argue that a heavier platform will not necessarily be more survivable. The Afghans, even with minimal understanding of tactics and our technology, were able to evolve (sometimes within a single fighting season) to our attempts to improve our protection. To concentrate the premise of a new fleet of combat vehicles would only buy us a very few number of engagements before our adversary similarly adapt.

What the Afghan experience did teach us was the importance of greater tactical mobility. This plays to our strength, both against a conventional and unconventional enemy. Where we were able to detect an enemy through either sensory network (be they electronic or intelligence), greater tactical mobility allowed us to hit the enemy when and where we want, before he could withdraw to safety or back into hiding. Where we were unable to locate the enemy, superior mobility enabled us to rapidly deploy to counteract the enemy's action. Even where the enemy has not acted, their operational and tactical options are limited by their need to mitigate against our superior reaction speed.

In terms of logistics, planning and organising only gets us so far. Any operational deployment is a series of compromises. To simplify the discussion, let us for now ignore government imposed manning caps. The fact is that any ATG can carry only so many vehicles and personnel into the theatre. The ARG (as their current model) already maximise the number of fighting vehicles they load on to the RAN assets to maximise their tactical flexibility (generally finer planning can not occur until the force is enroute to the theatre due to the operational and tactical picture constantly developing). This comes at the cost of logistic assets.

The ARG mitigates the risk to their logistic capability by relying on sea basing - that is they rely on the RAN assets to provide logistic support until follow on forces external to the ATG is deployed into theatre. With heavier combat vehicles and the consequential heavier support platforms being required, this option becomes less viable. You'd have fewer combat vehicles loaded because you won't have room, you'd have fewer mobile logistic platforms that can be put on shore because of the need to load those bigger combat vehicles, and you'd have fewer options to deploy those platforms because heavier platforms would generally require a more developed beach head - especially as they can't deploy by air platforms.

At the risk of redefining my previous closing statement, military professionals need to consider operational art (thus encompassing logistics as well as tactics), but we also need to read the tea leaves and see economic and political realities:

Given the economic environment, it is unlikely any option to purchase a significant amount of heavier, more expensive fleet of vehicles would be fully realised. This means pursuing this option would take a very long time to accomplish to a meaningful state, and more than likely never fully realised due to volatility in both economics and politics.

I guess it depends on what you want your Army to achieve on the battlefield. If you wish to close on a enemy position that is held by peer opposition then heavy armoured vehicles will get you to the last 300 meters to dismount and engage with a reasonable chance of succsess and a relatively low casualty count as opposed to turning up in a lightly armoured vehicle and be mincemeat. If you never have to engage in close combat all well and good then you won't mind sending the lads out in a nissan patrol. Sensor over match goes out the window in complex terrain and reaction times are minimal. This is where heavily protected vehicles have no comparison they can take a hit and have the ability to stand and deliver. Light vehicles equals more body bags its that simple.
Hugh does have a point though if you only equip your force for a light infantry role then they will never be exposed to high intensity close combat, because the politicians know that they aren't equipped for the job therefore you won't be sent. As per Iraq war and the no show of our promised armoured brigade, because surprise surprise we weren't adequately equipped for the role.

 

[Goknub]

That's a briefing I would have loved to have been a witness to.

When Howard learnt the true capabilities of our mighty 1st Mech Brigade after having offered it up as our part Coalition of the Willing.

Leopard 1s and M113s going up against Republican Guard T-72s and BMPs. It'd be fairly even, which is not a good thing to be in a war.

-----------------------
Actually that's a reason I'm less fond of the G-Wagons. We could have gotten kitted up Patrols, painted them green and used the saved dollars for Hawkeis

 

[gf0012-aust]

Actually that's a reason I'm less fond of the G-Wagons. We could have gotten kitted up Patrols, painted them green and used the saved dollars for Hawkeis

the hawkeis are just an industry con job IMO, they don't have the flexible options of the G's.

we've been suckered by Thales and rolled over for all the wrong reasons

 

[Leadline]

Sea basing as a concept is what we already practice on exercise and the basis for both ADF and coalition concept for amphibious operations. I think the confusion is that critics do not fully understand the concept of why we conduct amphibious operations and this inter-relationship with sea-basing.

Amphibious operations in any nation, and in all conflicts I can think of, is only intended as a short term operation with limited objectives. For those with access, the joint doctrine pubs have got the full list of objectives, but for us, it is suffice to say that what we are looking at (STOM) is to either achieve a break in and secure other POEs for follow on forces in the case of protracted operation, or to conduct limited raids on operationally significant targets as a part of a larger scale operation. What amphibious operation cannot achieve (at least efficiently or effectively) is a protracted land battle. Aside from the logistic difficulties of sustaining a LHD and it's attendant fleet for a protracted period of time, such an employment of assets defeats the purpose of an amphibious assault - the element of surprise. There's no surprise if we employ the LHD as a defacto island that is permanently there.

In the context of an amphibious operation of limited duration, sea basing means to minimise the footprint of support elements on land, with several key advantages -
i) reducing the amount of non-combat forces vulnerable to enemy counterattack against a beachhead
ii) maximise the tactical mobility of the landed force by reducing the logistic and combat support train that follows behind it by maximising use of support organic to the naval assets
iii) maximising the operational agility of the amphibious task force by reducing the length of time it takes to make the landed force operational viable, and by the same token enabling it's rapid redeployment by again reducing the size of the landed force that needs to withdraw to the LHD prior to it's redeployment.
iv) reduce the burden on ship-to-shore connectors by reducing the amount of things we put on to the beach.

Right now, sea basing, and maximising this concept, is the only way we'd be able to execute an amphibious operation in an environment of threat. Given the size of the ARG, we simply won't be able to devote forces to defend a sizeable beachhead without detracting significantly from the ARG's combat power. It also makes sense - the LHD offers a relatively benign environment compared to a beachhead, thus increasing the efficiency of any CSS operation such as maintenance on the aviation assets, bulk breaking stores, etc. Putting all these CSS and CS assets on the beach not only puts them at risk, it decreases their efficiency as they are then required to devote skilled labour to area defence.

Eventually, if there is a requirement for a protracted deployment, you are of cause correct in that we would need to land base. But this only occurs after we have stabilised the situation sufficiently that we can put down things like C17s and secured/built infrastructures such as a RO/RO capable dock.

For these reasons, your argument for more tankers and RAN support is only correct if we mean to conduct protracted deployment with only LHD support.

In relation to politics, I'd present a different perspective. Right now the Australian public are quite critically scrutinising the federal budget. Traditionally the Australian media has been careful in critiquing increasing the Defence budget, especially in light of the backlash against previous Defence budget cuts under Labor. Despite this, some very prominent and highly respected Defence analyst have came out to ask some very hard questions about our current Defence commitments - i.e. the F35s, new frigates, etc.

Defence has struck the jackpot in the announced federal budget, but that is not to say we don't need to critically assess how we spend our jackpot. Unfortunately that means economics has to be considered. Unless there is a direct credible threat to Australia or her interests, the fact is there is no appetite for even greater Defence spendings. When people are complaining about co-payment to see the doctor, or increases to pension age, they are not interested in spending even more money on purchasing more platforms unless they see some of direct benefit.

Politics aside, we (referring to Defence) also have a responsibility to the public to ensure we spend their tax dollars efficiently by building capabilities that are part of a coherent strategy. A shopping list for future procurements is a waste of money unless the ADF, within the context of the government's intent (in the form of a White Paper), can say "this is how we will fight, and we need this to do it". Now, if the ADF changes its strategy to say "the ADF will be capable of executing high end warfare against an enemy of technological superiority or parity, employing the tenants of shock and awe", then answers the question of how we are getting all those nice shiny stuff into theatre, then heavier combat vehicles in LAND 400 would make sense.

 

[Monitor66]

At the risk of being unpopular, I think Hugh has a point, if not necessarily for the right reasons.

My main contention with heavier vehicles is interoperability and suitability on a modern battlefield.

Interoperability with existing platforms and strategies:
The ADF is shifting its focus to an expeditionary type operational outlook. LHDs and the "like brigade" concepts feed into the ability to deploy more agile forces as capability bricks, tailored for a specific mission profile and sustainable within organic structures without so much "chop and change". This was a major issue in campaign design for SLIPPER and resulted in some serious problems with the RTS model.

Looking at the existing platforms for the expeditionary campaign, the LHD and the Choules are not inherently suited to deployment of a heavy force. Before you folks highlight the lift capacity, let me explain.

The LHDs have got a tank deck and a light vehicle deck, with the intent that the heavy deck carries tanks and the light deck carries everything else. With LAND121, some of the logistic platforms are already on the heavy end of the scale, thus will impinge on the heavy deck. If we throw in additional heavier combat vehicles, our ability to deploy a balanced force with the appropriate follow on support will be inhibited. Sea basing as is our proposed sustainment concept will alleviate this to some extent, but not enough. Heavier combat vehicles will require heavier support platforms, e.g. Recovery platforms, higher fuel requirements, etc. given we are already facing anticipated issues of sustaining the existing forces when deployed, a even higher logistic liability will only further stress the issue. Before anyone talks about having the Choules and the second LHD, allow me to explore these. The Choules is not conceived for deploying into an environment of threat. That's why she has no fitted armament (though she is capable). It has almost no self defense capability against maritime threats. As for the ADELAIDE, let me point out that a) the RAN concept of RTS means only one LHD will be operationally deployed to war at a time, and b) the gov't is exploring the concept of using her as a a/c carrier with the F35 B. The necessary conversions required if this goes ahead will all but eliminate her lift capacity for heavy forces.

Then we got the deployability problem - how do we get the platforms into the theatre. Apart from sea lift, C-17 is the only real viaible option. I only need to point to force insertion/extraction from MEAO to demonstrate the problem involved with heavier vehicles. You fellows have any idea how hard it was to just get the ASLAVs out in a reasonable time frame?

Modern battlefield:
There is no recent experience that necessarily demonstrated heavier is better. Rather superior mobility, detection threshold and design were what improved our survivability. What the MEAO has shown us was that when faced with a heavier, better protected threat, insurgents just became more innovative. What allowed us to get inside their operational decision cycle was our greater ability in adaptation. This is bolstered with more mobile platforms with greater situational awareness. There is no reason to believe a conventional force would not do the same thing if they face the ADF/coalition. Thus agility, sensors and tactics are what will give us greatest advantage in this aspect.

Against an adversary with technological parity, armour will not save us. Ask a tank crew their survivability against a gunship or a modern anti-armour weapon with a top down attack. The best tactic is usually range overmatch, greater sensor capability so they can kill the threat first, or the mobility to move their vehicle into cover.

It is for these reasons that I think Hugh has hit the nail on the head. Economic realities are important, but for military professionals, we need to consider tactics.

The Land 400 project office has done some analysis of vehicle loads on LHD and Choules. Figures for LHD light vehicle/upper deck:
30 x Land 121 Ph 3B heavy 8x8 trucks
18 x Land 121 Ph 3A G-Wagon 6x6
25 x Land 121 Ph 3B medium 6x6 trucks
Plus hangar with 12 x MRH90

LHD heavy vehicle/lower deck:
26 x CRV
13 x MBT (incl 4 pre-loaded into LCM-1E parked in well dock)

For the vehicle deck on Choules indicative vehicle loads are:
53 x CRV (by volume)
35 x CRV (by weight)
or
42 x IFV (by volume)
29 x IFV (by weight)

These are significant numbers and far greater than Army has ever been able to deploy from the sea. Both ship types pack in a lot of AFV capability.

I for one don't understand Hugh White's rationale. How are heavier AFVs a waste of resources? What does he define as light? As protection level is the key weight driver in AFV design, is he/yourself suggesting that Bushmaster or ASLAV for instance are adequately protected for Army going forward? They are certainly light. Hope though the enemy doesn't own a 50 cal or RPG.

In terms of volume, the indicative CRV is likely to be about 1m longer and 200mm wider than ASLAV and twice the weight (i.e far greater protection). As the LHD/Choules load out figures show, those increases are hardly a deal breaker.

The reality is that Land 400 has no real option other than to acquire heavier vehicles as all candidate CRV platforms are 24 tonnes GVM and above, some as much as 33 tonnes. IFV candidates heavier again. They are heavier than previous vehicle generations for a reason: customer requirements based on operational experience/observations.

Whilst it is true that the candidate CRV solutions will not enjoy the amphibious capability of ASLAV they are all significantly more survivable and lethal. As for mobility, the CRV (very likely to be wheeled 8x8) will go anywhere the ASLAV can go now; the tracked IFV, at likely close to three times the GVM of ASLAV, will access and traverse terrain that will stop an ASLAV.

As for Choules, the UK RFA may not have had deploying her into harm's way in mind, but if she is to support LHD as part of the Australian ARG then she will certainly be in an environment which could very easily be contested by a state adversary. (And don't get me started on Choules having no armament!!!)

This type of vacuous argument by Hugh White and others is not unexpected. He has been a consistent opponent of Abrams, LHD and the acquisition of close combat capability for Army for near on a decade.

It's is clearly justifiable, according to White et al, for our northern neighbours to up armour and acquire heavy IFV and MBT capabilities (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan) but clearly inappropriate for the ADF. Almost like he doesn't want us to win.

 

[Leadline]

Knightrider, regarding the use of heavy vehicles (or lets use the term better protected) vehicle in complex terrain:

"This is where heavily protected vehicles have no comparison they can take a hit and have the ability to stand and deliver. Light vehicles equals more body bags its that simple."

This is true only if we are assuming the enemy is either unprepared or this is their first encounter with the vehicle you are bringing in.

Armoured vehicles have inherently reduced situational awareness - there's only so many prisms and ballistic windows you can put in before you start weakening the vehicle's protection. This means even assuming we survive the initial contact, we've effectively surrendered situational awareness to the enemy unless we decide to come out to fight. When armoured vehicles get bumped by sizeable enemy infantry in complex terrain, they either bug out or call for infantry support of their own. We (and our adversaries) learnt this in WWII and Iraq.

WWII - the Allies, Germans and Russians all learnt the hard way the easiest way to lose tanks (and any other armoured vehicles) was to send them into complex terrains.
Iraq - the only coalition armoured vehicles destroyed (as far as I am aware) were in complex terrain, e.g. during the taking of Baghdad.

Armoured vehicles may have the advantage of being able to take hits that infantry can't, but equally they are unable to win the fight in complex terrain. I only need to point to what our own doctrine is for dismounted troops in hitting armour. We train to position our troops in terrain where the armour vehicles have reduced detection range, are unable to employ their range overmatch, and where our infantry have greater mobility. In short, we put our infantry into complex terrain so we can destroy armoured vehicles. Why should our own armoured vehicles perform any better against enemy infantry?

 

[winnyfield]

That's a briefing I would have loved to have been a witness to.

When Howard learnt the true capabilities of our mighty 1st Mech Brigade after having offered it up as our part Coalition of the Willing.

Leopard 1s and M113s going up against Republican Guard T-72s and BMPs. It'd be fairly even, which is not a good thing to be in a war.

Lateline - 11/7/2002: Hill defends new defence strategy . Australian Broadcasting Corp

TONY JONES: Alright, you made one thing very clear in your speech to the Defence Academy.

The ADF is increasingly likely to be deployed well beyond Australia.

Now let me ask you this.

Would Australia be even capable of sending an armoured brigade to the Middle East?

SENATOR ROBERT HILL: Well, I think we'd be capable.

You might want to define for me what you mean by an armoured brigade?

 

[Todjaeger]

Knightrider, regarding the use of heavy vehicles (or lets use the term better protected) vehicle in complex terrain:

"This is where heavily protected vehicles have no comparison they can take a hit and have the ability to stand and deliver. Light vehicles equals more body bags its that simple."

This is true only if we are assuming the enemy is either unprepared or this is their first encounter with the vehicle you are bringing in.

Armoured vehicles have inherently reduced situational awareness - there's only so many prisms and ballistic windows you can put in before you start weakening the vehicle's protection. This means even assuming we survive the initial contact, we've effectively surrendered situational awareness to the enemy unless we decide to come out to fight. When armoured vehicles get bumped by sizeable enemy infantry in complex terrain, they either bug out or call for infantry support of their own. We (and our adversaries) learnt this in WWII and Iraq.

WWII - the Allies, Germans and Russians all learnt the hard way the easiest way to lose tanks (and any other armoured vehicles) was to send them into complex terrains.
Iraq - the only coalition armoured vehicles destroyed (as far as I am aware) were in complex terrain, e.g. during the taking of Baghdad.

Armoured vehicles may have the advantage of being able to take hits that infantry can't, but equally they are unable to win the fight in complex terrain. I only need to point to what our own doctrine is for dismounted troops in hitting armour. We train to position our troops in terrain where the armour vehicles have reduced detection range, are unable to employ their range overmatch, and where our infantry have greater mobility. In short, we put our infantry into complex terrain so we can destroy armoured vehicles. Why should our own armoured vehicles perform any better against enemy infantry?

I could be misunderstanding your point, but it seems almost as if you are advocating for Army to remain a light infantry force, instead of a combined arms force with light/motorized/mechanized infantry operating with IFV's and tanks.

If that is correct, then you are potentially ceding the battlefield to an enemy because a light/light infantry force structure is not effective or efficient in certain types of terrain, or against certain types of opposing force structures.

In most situations, a light infantry attack unsupported by accompanying armour is going to be less effective against enemy infantry with tank and IFV support, then an infantry attack with supporting IFV's and/or tanks.

-Cheers

 

[Leadline]

Monitor66, thanks very much for the LHD capabilities. I stand corrected.

I do question the regional nations you've listed as up armouring their armies though. You do realise all those you've listed (including Indonesia and Thailand) are notionally our regional partners? Even Indonesia and Thailand, though our relation with them are strained for political reasons, are very closely tied with us as security and economic partners. The only nations which we are really concerned about - China and North Korea, we only envision having to fight (in current and past White Papers) as part of a coalition, likely including some of those nations you've listed.

 

[Leadline]

Do I like tanks and IFV? Yes. Do I see the importance of their employment? Yes.

What I propose is neither a light infantry army, or that we don't need heavier vehicles. What I am proposing is that LAND 400 needs to provide the ADF with a balanced option as part of a combined arms force. We do need some high end options (that is some heavier vehicles) as long as we face adversaries out there with tanks of their own. What we do not need is a force completely outfitted with heavy vehicles, or even a force that is mechanised at it's core.

Don't forget, the ongoing restructure of the Army has basically stopped that concept - infantry battalions will in the near future lose most of their organic PMVs;
- the CSS FMR is trying to find solutions as to how we will maintain the existing fleet within CSSBs (now that the PMVs are over there instead) without having to strip more RAEME elements from the battalions;
- we can't grow substantially more CSS pers because of manning cap, so that we can have more war fighters;
- more combat vehicles (essentially a new platform if we introduce them to battalions) will require CSS pers that we don't have; and
- even if we get them, we still haven't conceived how we will use the vehicles or how we will deploy them.

 

[Monitor66]

Do I like tanks and IFV? Yes. Do I see the importance of their employment? Yes.

What I propose is neither a light infantry army, or that we don't need heavier vehicles. What I am proposing is that LAND 400 needs to provide the ADF with a balanced option as part of a combined arms force. We do need some high end options (that is some heavier vehicles) as long as we face adversaries out there with tanks of their own. What we do not need is a force completely outfitted with heavy vehicles, or even a force that is mechanised at it's core.

Don't forget, the ongoing restructure of the Army has basically stopped that concept - infantry battalions will in the near future lose most of their organic PMVs;
- the CSS FMR is trying to find solutions as to how we will maintain the existing fleet within CSSBs (now that the PMVs are over there instead) without having to strip more RAEME elements from the battalions;
- we can't grow substantially more CSS pers because of manning cap, so that we can have more war fighters;
- more combat vehicles (essentially a new platform if we introduce them to battalions) will require CSS pers that we don't have; and
- even if we get them, we still haven't conceived how we will use the vehicles or how we will deploy them.

So exactly what vehicle types and protection levels are you suggesting for Land 400? Both for CRV and IFV please.

 

[Monitor66]

The other factor is the planned LCH replacement for a larger more sea worthy design to replace the retiring LCHs. If, at a minimum, something along the lines of a US army LSV is adopted then each will provide a heavy vehicle squadron lift which is something for the planners to look into.

The detrimental effect of adapting either LHD into a "carrier" has been discussed on the RAN thread pointing out just the issue of the loss of core amphibious capability. If the F-35 is seen as a must have in support of amphibious operations then a proper CVL may be the most efficient way to go.

At the end of the day if we can not get the equipment the Army needs to do its job where it needs to go and support it then we need to reassess the RAN and RAAF logistics capabilities. There is no point what so ever sending the Army in under equipped, far better to invest in additional lift capability and do the job properly.

Pretty sure something with that large a payload is unlikely to be considered for LCH replacement. More like something with a 200-300 tonne payload, such as the Caimen 200 concept or ADIK LCT just built for Turkey.

Even still, a pair of these would deliver to shore 3 MBT and 5-6 CRV/4-5 IFV, or a lighter mix of 3 CRV and 6-7 IFV - all vehicles loaded with troops. That sort of combat team landed where you didn't expect/want them would certainly get your attention.

 

[Leadline]

I am definitely not the best person to tell you a vehicle model, but I can definitely outline a few ideas for you:

The current thinking is that we will only engage in high end conflict as part of a coalition, thus the contribution asked of us would likely be to provide niche capabilities or qualitative capability similar to what we have in the past. E.g. even if we had high end armoured vehicles comparable to what the US and UK have, would they ask for it? No. They've got plenty of their own, and the doctrine to use it.

So we want something that would work best to the low to med level of threat, likely within our region (so that our existing and projected sea and air lines of communication are short enough that we can do those "ferry runs" that made East Timor feasible), or will be relatively small scale (even if higher level intensity) such that the LHD and attendant fleet can sustain the force.

IFV
- capable of standing up to multiple impact from 12.7 mm at short range of up to 50 m;
- purpose designed v-hull
- fitted for, not with reactive armour;
- fitted for, not with remote weapon station;
- compatible with existing C3I systems, including future proved for LAND200 platforms;
- equipped with 30 mm gun on gun variants, with 12.7 mm gun mounts on non-gun variants;
- fire control and mount for hellfire or similar anti-armour weapon;
- anti-armour weapon on designated anti-armour variants, with agreed contracts for rapid acquisition of additional systems on demand;
- wheeled, up to max of 45 t combat load (given the bridges in most of our region's country);
- semi-amphibious at least to sea-state 1;
- size and dimensions to be compatible with both C17 and LCM1E;
- highly desirable, but not essential, to be air-transportable by either C130 or Chinook;

CRV
- capable of standing up to multiple impact from 12.7 mm at short range of up to 50 m;
- purpose built v-hull
- fitted for, not with remote weapon station;
- compatible with existing C3I systems, including future proved for LAND200 platforms;
- redundant C3I band wave and platform for interoperability with naval and air assets;
- compatible with existing JFEC fire control systems;
- future proved C3I with sufficient band wave for direct feed from tactical UAV systems;
- minimum 12.7 mm gun mounts;
- fire control and mount for hellfire or similar anti-armour weapon;
- anti-armour weapon on designated anti-armour variants, with agreed contracts for rapid acquisition of additional systems on demand;
- wheeled,
- fully amphibious capability at least up to sea-state 2.5, with cruising speed of at least 13.5 knots (speed of a loaded LCM1E);
- size and dimensions to be compatible with both C17 and LCM1E;
- air-transportable by Chinook;
- desirable, but not essential to be air-transportable by MRH90.

Now you folks who do know armour can probably tell me if there's a platform out there that meets what I think are our requirements.