Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Volkodav]

There's only going to be 30 Merlin Mk2s in the Royal Navy and they will have to juggle both ASW and ASAC/AEW work with the new carrier/carriers in operation. That's a lot of work for the RN.

And given the difference in the extent of deployments, the RAN doesnt look that bad. It still holds quite a punch.

You are still talking a yet to occur reduction to 30 to an increase to 24, with no Lynx or Lynx Wildcat in support. Don't forget 19 escorts, 8 of which are specialist ASW platforms, verses 12 (reducing to 11) escorts, none of which are specialist ASW. Then there is the elephant in the room of the two QE class carriers and what they bring to the ASW mission.

The RAN has a very long way to go.

 

[StingrayOZ]

This 27,000 tonne ship will be able to land a force of over 2,000 personnel by helicopter and water craft, along with all their weapons, ammunition, vehicles and stores.

Wait, I thought a LHD would only be able to land ~1200 personnel and equipment. Where is the RAN getting the idea that just one LHD can carry 2000+?

Navy: Engineering jobs - Defence Jobs Australia

 

[ngatimozart]

Is that meant to be irony?
A bit rich for a New Zealander to spray any overseas politician in terms of allocation of money.
What proportion of GDP does NZ spend on defence, now and on average over the last 20 years. What does Australia?
And before you think I am criticising NZ politicians, they just reflect what the NZ people think important and will vote for. Their military do a lot with little, but it is little they get from their population in financial support.

Well then no irony. I'm speaking from experience and if you have followed my posts you will know exactly what I think of politicians and Kiwi politicians in particular especially where allocation of expenditure is involved, so don't come the raw prawn with that on me.

 

[t68]

But the cost to convert some of a F-35A purchase to a F-35B purchase is relatively little. If the last squad was a mix of 14 F-35B/14 F-35A the price difference would be perhaps a $100-$200 million. The F-35B can perform nearly identically to a F-35A in all other roles, so if they can operate in any useful way off the LHD then for $100-$200m you have gained useful capability. Throw in $50m to make improvements for operating LHD's with F-35B and you have a fairly low cost project with low risk and high common logistics that may give Australia useful capability and enhance our F-35A, AWD and LHD capability augmenting, multiplying and complimenting it.

You would be able to train Army, Navy and Air force with F-35B's, so that we can integrate more closely with allied forces. The F-35 is such a game changer in terms of situational awareness, ISR, CAS, low observables, EW etc that we will need to spend considerable time with Army and Navy to embed and make use of those new capabilities. Our pilots would become better/more diversely trained, with more opportunity to work with US, UK etc forces and greater relevance for the air force for international missions.

Acquiring a completely new ship (and or new ship type) would add a huge cost (Billion plus, for CATOBAR multi billions), huge risk etc. Thats not on the table at this stage.

Acquiring F-35B would impact on LHD use and upgrades, fleet oilers purchase, RAAF training facilities and upgrades, RAAF logistics etc. It would be good if we looked into this now to ensure suitable funds/equipment etc are made available.

It might come back and say the F-35 in no way can operate off the LHD's, or huge sum of money would need to be spent to make it compatible. Or operations so compromised its not worth pursuing.

The purchase of a different aircraft is not going to happen till the 2020’s at least no matter which aircraft is chosen (B/C) till then we have the capability to train with existing aircraft on either US or French carriers till a new carrier is inducted in the system, if you do not want to compromise the capability of the LHD we still need a third LHD the cost of a new ship is still needs to be taken into account.

Expeditionary operations are not easy they are specialized and costly activities and need to be taken seriously. To turn the new LHD into fully functioning capability the ADF will need new doctrine, new procedures it does not need to be burdened with vessel that will swing between its core capabilities to non –core, with the ongoing necessity for short notice operations, the concept of readiness is one of the key features of LHD operations.

 

[rjtjrt]

Well then no irony. I'm speaking from experience and if you have followed my posts you will know exactly what I think of politicians and Kiwi politicians in particular especially where allocation of expenditure is involved, so don't come the raw prawn with that on me.

I don't follow your posts, so no I can't say I am aware.
"Raw prawn" - how quaint.

 

[ASSAIL]

can we please ease up on all the speculation re fixed wing carriers, it detracts from real issues within the RAN, IMHO naturally.
There will be a new Defence Capability Plan out before the end of the year so if it includes carriers, which is as likely as the Palmer United Party gaining the Treasury benches, we can then all go for broke.

 

[Volkodav]

Even if Australia's economy found its self back in the boom days and our politicians were able to avoid the temptation to buy an election or two rather than invest the windfall properly this time, there is really no way I could see a CTOL carrier happening or even being the best value for money.

Australia has a comparatively small population which means there will always be difficulties recruiting and retaining defence personnel while there is good money to be made elsewhere. CTOL carriers, while very capable and powerful, are manpower hogs and are only of real value when of sufficient size to carry enough aircraft to generate a minimum number of sorties. The other advantage a CTOL carrier offers is the ability to operate large specialist fixed wing aircraft ASW, AEW, ELINT, etc. this would be great but unaffordable for the RAN and all missions to a degree that can be covered by other platforms. Even the USN has moved away from carrier based fixed wing ASW making it hard, if not impossible for Australia to pick up the capability.

Personally I would like to see the RAN one day operate a number of STOVL capable helicopter carriers/cruisers/destroyers with the capacity to swing to a sea control or mini strike carrier as required. Ships whose primary role is to expand a task forces ASW screen, provide heli-bourne MCM, AEW, ELINT and transport, as well as the ability to engage missile launch platforms (air, land or sea) before they can launch through the use of F-35B. These ships would operate with the RANs major surface combatants complementing and supporting each other, escort the amphibs and also operate in conjunction with RAAF assets, Poseidon, BAM, Wedgetail.

The ideal as I see it is an evolution of the Japanese strategy of being able to sanitise sectors of ocean for the use of their allies in the event of armed conflict. Ensure we can protect USN CBGs so they can in turn protect us and our neighbours. This will require a massive increase in capability across the board that can only be achieved through the addition of a number of suitable helicopter carriers. This has been known by major navies for decades, through deck carriers are the most efficient and effective way of deploying helicopters operationally at sea. You can go bigger and more capable but you can't go smaller.

 

[Monitor66]

Wait, I thought a LHD would only be able to land ~1200 personnel and equipment. Where is the RAN getting the idea that just one LHD can carry 2000+?

Navy: Engineering jobs - Defence Jobs Australia

They are most likely getting confused with the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of 2056 personnel comprising infantry (two battalion groups) plus supporting armour, artillery, engineers, helos etc.

According to the ADAS concept, the ARG requires two or more ships (both LHDs basically or a combination of LHD, Choules, LCH replacement and so on). But not one LHD.

 

[StingrayOZ]

The purchase of a different aircraft is not going to happen till the 2020’s at least no matter which aircraft is chosen (B/C) till then we have the capability to train with existing aircraft on either US or French carriers till a new carrier is inducted in the system, if you do not want to compromise the capability of the LHD we still need a third LHD the cost of a new ship is still needs to be taken into account.

With the B's you could train with US/UK or/and utilise the LHD for training and qualification. IMO any "lets get a real carrier" would only be done after we have the 35-B's and trained pilots. 2020 I think is pulling it early. Then you have to ask yourself if its worth getting slightly better capability over running the B's off the LHD.

I think it highlights the need for a 3rd LHD. For Australia to do what was originally intended (in the early Rudd WP) and communicated by Cosgrove we will need two LHD's deployed. If we want to be able to conduct and sustain amphibious operations with a battalion size troop force and equipment. On top of that we want to run/train ASW ops, do humanitarian, possibly fixed wing strike or air/sea defense ops, deploy smaller forces on separate operations in locations, UAV deployment, be involved in international missions, anti piracy, sustain any deployment longer than ~6 months etc. It all requires a 3rd LHD. What we have done is look at the requirements and bought 2/3 of what we need to meet them.

Given how the Navy, Army and Air force may all be centered around a giant fat purple asset, how short it seems to only have two. Given every time we have had one or two of anything we have always had issues of having them ready when needed (carriers, Kanimbla etc) or flogging the hell out of them so they weren't upgraded or maintained enough when we needed them. How the heck we intend to get around this by deploying the two we have at the same time is beyond me. To have them both available we would need to have both unavailable for a large part of the time.

As recent issues in the South China seas highlight, we can't rely on the USN or USMC or USAF to save us or our region and every disagreement in it. They aren't mercenaries. There are real situations where they are going to sit on the sidelines or be unavailable or not suited. We are eventually going to disagree on something. We need to decided if we want to be able to make our own decisions and run our own plans or have others decide for us.

Procurement should be driven by need.

 

[King Wally]

At risk of entering back into the realm of reality I did hear whispers in the media that an announcement regarding 2 supply ships may be made in the coming weeks ( I recall reading the Australian and at least one other source). Any word on this? Hinted at local build.

 

[Raven22]

I think it highlights the need for a 3rd LHD. For Australia to do what was originally intended (in the early Rudd WP) and communicated by Cosgrove we will need two LHD's deployed. If we want to be able to conduct and sustain amphibious operations with a battalion size troop force and equipment. On top of that we want to run/train ASW ops, do humanitarian, possibly fixed wing strike or air/sea defense ops, deploy smaller forces on separate operations in locations, UAV deployment, be involved in international missions, anti piracy, sustain any deployment longer than ~6 months etc. It all requires a 3rd LHD. What we have done is look at the requirements and bought 2/3 of what we need to meet them.

I think you'll find the limiting factor with the amphibious capability will not be the ships, but the things that go in them. At the end of the day, the LHDs are just big empty boxes, they provide no capability without men, equipment and helicopters embarked, and their aren't that many men, equipment and helicopters to go around.

The only capability that needs both LHDs (plus Choules) is the full ARG. The ARG is not a full time capability - only the ARE is, which can be deployed with either LHD or Choules. Therefore there is no capability that requires two LHDs ready to go at all times. If the full ARG were to be used, it would be an ADF main effort. It would need every single available helicopter, an entire brigade to provide the men and equipment, every available escort etc. It is a one shot capability and does not need to be sustained afloat for any significant period of time. There are so many places that the ARG capability could fall down at short notice that it's unlikely to be the lack of ships that is the problem.

ASW, fixed wing strike and half the other things you mentioned are not a requirement for the LHDs to fill. You have stated procurement should be dictated by need - that is exactly what has occurred. A capability was identified and the vessels bought to enable it (more or less). Trying to turn the LHDs into ASW assets, fixed wing carriers etc is the sort of mission creep that results in disastrous procurements or no procurements at all, which would then have everyone on this forum complaining about it.

 

[t68]

Stingray Oz
I don’t totally disagree with what you are saying, but to sustain the ADF concept of its core expeditionary capabilities we need that third LHD regardless of whether we have F35B or not. To undertake these expeditionary operations the ADF/RAN needs to maintain and develop a high readiness, strategic mobility and have the ability to sustain such a force.

I am just of the opinion if government feels there is a need for fixed wing fast air of the LHD then they are saying that the ADF needs an aircraft carrier period, STOVL or CATOBAR. I’m not fussed if they want an ASW centric vessel by all means go for a modified Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer with 6x F35B and 6x MH-60R. But if they want more than that in my mind cats with E2 Hawkeye, F/A-18F, EA-18G, S-3 Viking and MH-60R in the short term long term are the F35C and whatever electronic warfare aircraft develops in the future.

 

[t68]

The only capability that needs both LHDs (plus Choules) is the full ARG. The ARG is not a full time capability - only the ARE is, which can be deployed with either LHD or Choules. Therefore there is no capability that requires two LHDs ready to go at all times. If the full ARG were to be used, it would be an ADF main effort. It would need every single available helicopter, an entire brigade to provide the men and equipment, every available escort etc. It is a one shot capability and does not need to be sustained afloat for any significant period of time. There are so many places that the ARG capability could fall down at short notice that it's unlikely to be the lack of ships that is the problem.

.

You would have a far better understanding of this than I do, but whilst it is an unlikely event the ADF is supposed to be “Capable of Concurrency” – a future force must be able to conduct operations in more than one location simultaneously either independently or with coalition forces.,

We need to have enough assets to be able to surge a future force element for short-notice deployments which must also be able to respond rapidly to a diverse range of missions and tasks, and have ability sustain combat operations concurrently.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I think you'll find the limiting factor with the amphibious capability will not be the ships, but the things that go in them. At the end of the day, the LHDs are just big empty boxes, they provide no capability without men, equipment and helicopters embarked, and their aren't that many men, equipment and helicopters to go around.

The only capability that needs both LHDs (plus Choules) is the full ARG. The ARG is not a full time capability - only the ARE is, which can be deployed with either LHD or Choules.

That is true. If we look at the ADF we would struggle to put together a ARG even with significant notice and favorable conditions, IMO that should be the concept that guides our procurement. However, with such an operation it is unlikely that we would be the sole nation involved. So individual components could be augmented by close allies. Singapore and New Zealand providing helos or areas that we are short or require additional. UK could make pitch in as they have done in the past. US could cross deck an asset with out disrupting major operations. What we need is the capability to lead and backbone the operation.

If we are short a company, or short a few helos, we could probably acquire this through allies or plan around. Its not ideal, and its not the solution but its a reality.

However, who else in our region has a ship as capable or more capable than our LHD other than the US that we could integrate? With only two assets its unlikely we would ever be able to form a ARG. If we are reliant on the US then we are back to the beginning about unable to act.

ASW, fixed wing strike and half the other things you mentioned are not a requirement for the LHDs to fill. You have stated procurement should be dictated by need - that is exactly what has occurred. A capability was identified and the vessels bought to enable it (more or less). Trying to turn the LHDs into ASW assets, fixed wing carriers etc is the sort of mission creep that results in disastrous procurements or no procurements at all, which would then have everyone on this forum complaining about it.

Well ASW is kind of. It needs to be able to operate the seahawks(MH60r and the s70b). So it could be used in a ASW role. Fixed wing carriers is stretching the relationship further, and thats part of whats will most likely be looked at. The scope creep isn't really on the LHD, but on its availability.

Inevitably I believe the LHD will turn into very useful ships, which will be worked hard in their many roles. They will acquire new roles, deploy new equipment and personnel. New equipment will be purchased with LHD compatibility in mind.

This is aside to the whole F-35B and carrier thing, which honestly is just a big distraction at this stage.

 

[Volkodav]

I think you'll find the limiting factor with the amphibious capability will not be the ships, but the things that go in them. At the end of the day, the LHDs are just big empty boxes, they provide no capability without men, equipment and helicopters embarked, and their aren't that many men, equipment and helicopters to go around.

The only capability that needs both LHDs (plus Choules) is the full ARG. The ARG is not a full time capability - only the ARE is, which can be deployed with either LHD or Choules. Therefore there is no capability that requires two LHDs ready to go at all times. If the full ARG were to be used, it would be an ADF main effort. It would need every single available helicopter, an entire brigade to provide the men and equipment, every available escort etc. It is a one shot capability and does not need to be sustained afloat for any significant period of time. There are so many places that the ARG capability could fall down at short notice that it's unlikely to be the lack of ships that is the problem.

ASW, fixed wing strike and half the other things you mentioned are not a requirement for the LHDs to fill. You have stated procurement should be dictated by need - that is exactly what has occurred. A capability was identified and the vessels bought to enable it (more or less). Trying to turn the LHDs into ASW assets, fixed wing carriers etc is the sort of mission creep that results in disastrous procurements or no procurements at all, which would then have everyone on this forum complaining about it.

Once the LCH replacements come on line, depending if they remain the qualitative improvement proposed with increased capacity and improved sea-keeping, the lift situation will be even better so should not be an issue long term. Of greater concern is the RANs ability to adequately defend such a valuable force, it seems some what odd to me that we aspire to have the capability of unilaterally deploying an ARG yet will likely need allied help to defend it in all but the most benign of circumstances.

Totally agreed on the mission creep on the LHDs, they are purpose designed to do a specific job and to attempt to convert them to sea control ships or even just to add a half dozen F-35B to their decks for CAS could very well guarantee the platform will fail at both roles rather than be successful the one it was procured to fill in the first place.

If the strategic environment has changed to the degree that a sea control ship or carrier is required then the government should issue the requirement and procure a solution, i.e. a purpose designed platform.

 

[Raven22]

That is true. If we look at the ADF we would struggle to put together a ARG even with significant notice and favorable conditions, IMO that should be the concept that guides our procurement. However, with such an operation it is unlikely that we would be the sole nation involved. So individual components could be augmented by close allies. Singapore and New Zealand providing helos or areas that we are short or require additional. UK could make pitch in as they have done in the past. US could cross deck an asset with out disrupting major operations. What we need is the capability to lead and backbone the operation.

If we are short a company, or short a few helos, we could probably acquire this through allies or plan around. Its not ideal, and its not the solution but its a reality.

However, who else in our region has a ship as capable or more capable than our LHD other than the US that we could integrate? With only two assets its unlikely we would ever be able to form a ARG. If we are reliant on the US then we are back to the beginning about unable to act.

This is nonsensical. Either we have an independent capability or we don't. If we are operating in a coalition, why would our allies be able to support with troops and helicopters but not ships of their own? Why would we rely on augmentation of the landing force but not augmentation of the amphibious shipping? Where is the US 'cross-decking an asset' from, and if it's close enough to cross deck why can't they support from their own vessel?

There's a whole lot of assumptions there, and I don't think many of them are founded in fact. Considering that the ARG is recognised to be a surge capability needing strategic warning, you still haven't articulated why we need a third LHD (but not more of everything else).

 

[Monitor66]

Once the LCH replacements come on line, depending if they remain the qualitative improvement proposed with increased capacity and improved sea-keeping, the lift situation will be even better so should not be an issue long term. Of greater concern is the RANs ability to adequately defend such a valuable force, it seems some what odd to me that we aspire to have the capability of unilaterally deploying an ARG yet will likely need allied help to defend it in all but the most benign of circumstances.

Totally agreed on the mission creep on the LHDs, they are purpose designed to do a specific job and to attempt to convert them to sea control ships or even just to add a half dozen F-35B to their decks for CAS could very well guarantee the platform will fail at both roles rather than be successful the one it was procured to fill in the first place.

If the strategic environment has changed to the degree that a sea control ship or carrier is required then the government should issue the requirement and procure a solution, i.e. a purpose designed platform.

Speaking of defending the LHDs, here's an article in APDR highlighting how woefully underarmed the LHDs are. Hard to fathom, particularly when the cost to remedy the situation is trivial.

Asia Pacific Defence Reporter : APDR April 2014, Page 24

 

[Todjaeger]

There's a whole lot of assumptions there, and I don't think many of them are founded in fact. Considering that the ARG is recognised to be a surge capability needing strategic warning, you still haven't articulated why we need a third LHD (but not more of everything else).

Unless ADF/RAN doctrine on deployment of the LHD differs from other that of other RAN vessels, then yes, three LHD's really should have been ordered. With only two having been ordered, most of the time one will be either on a deployment or available for deployment, with a surge capacity of up to two LHD's being available.

Where this can break down is when one of the LHD's is undergoing a refit, ship trials and workups, etc anything that can make vessel unavailable for deployment for significant periods of time. This leaves the other LHD as the one to be either available for a deployment, or more importantly might already be on a deployment. It is that last bit where the wheels start to come off and things break down.

Unless the doctrine is for one LHD to be kept in/near Australia for deployment while the other is undergoing refit, then the RAN could one that one of the LHD's might be deployed away from Australia on a HADR mission, or serving as a command or mothership for anti-piracy ops like off the coast of Africa, on a show the flag mission, participating in international exercises, etc. There are quite a number of different potential situations where with only two LHD's, something could occur that Australia would want or feel the need to respond, but be unable to because there was no LHD available to respond with in the needed timeframe.

Also as has been pointed out regarding the deployments of Bill & Ben... only having two assets, especially such useful that can support operating helicopters, have a hospital, have command/comms facilities, those assets are likely to be worked often, and hard. As has been observed, this causes problems balancing the operational desires and needs of the ADF, with the vessel's need for maintenance and periodic refit. Having a third vessel can spread the workload around a bit more, allowing more time for a vessel to be alongside or in drydock.

-Cheers

 

[t68]

There's a whole lot of assumptions there, and I don't think many of them are founded in fact. Considering that the ARG is recognised to be a surge capability needing strategic warning, you still haven't articulated why we need a third LHD (but not more of everything else).

As seen by the British in the lead up to the Falklands conflict, whilst there were enough reports that the UK should have been interpreted Argentinian’s intensions better, it still came as a shock to the British when the Argentinian’s invaded the Falklands. The RN had no strategic warning and the task force was put together from whatever vessels were available, HMS Hermes was due to be decommissioned in 1982 but became the flagship for the task force.

Strategic warning may or may not give time for the RAN to adequately prepare for expeditionary operations but having the capacity to “surge” with numbers is a force multiplier in itself

“Capability warning time” the time between a contingency arising and the need for the ADF to produce a responding capability eventuating and “crisis warning time” the time between Australia learning that a crisis might occur and that crisis taking place.
Source -Joint operations of the 21 century

 

[Raven22]

Unless ADF/RAN doctrine on deployment of the LHD differs from other that of other RAN vessels, then yes, three LHD's really should have been ordered. With only two having been ordered, most of the time one will be either on a deployment or available for deployment, with a surge capacity of up to two LHD's being available.

Where this can break down is when one of the LHD's is undergoing a refit, ship trials and workups, etc anything that can make vessel unavailable for deployment for significant periods of time. This leaves the other LHD as the one to be either available for a deployment, or more importantly might already be on a deployment. It is that last bit where the wheels start to come off and things break down.

Unless the doctrine is for one LHD to be kept in/near Australia for deployment while the other is undergoing refit, then the RAN could one that one of the LHD's might be deployed away from Australia on a HADR mission, or serving as a command or mothership for anti-piracy ops like off the coast of Africa, on a show the flag mission, participating in international exercises, etc. There are quite a number of different potential situations where with only two LHD's, something could occur that Australia would want or feel the need to respond, but be unable to because there was no LHD available to respond with in the needed timeframe.

Also as has been pointed out regarding the deployments of Bill & Ben... only having two assets, especially such useful that can support operating helicopters, have a hospital, have command/comms facilities, those assets are likely to be worked often, and hard. As has been observed, this causes problems balancing the operational desires and needs of the ADF, with the vessel's need for maintenance and periodic refit. Having a third vessel can spread the workload around a bit more, allowing more time for a vessel to be alongside or in drydock.

-Cheers

Three LHDs is always going to be better than two. But that is the same for every capability we have. For example, the full ARG needs six Chinooks to meet capability requirements. Six. Every single one we own. Available at the same time. Deployed on the LHDs. That is obviously not feasible - we need more Chinooks. There's a similar pattern for lots of other capabilities that make up the amphibious capability.

Saying we need a third LHD because it is 'better' just isn't that helpful. More chinooks would be better. More MRH-90s would be better. More Seahawks would be better. More landing craft would be better. More escorts would be better. Etc etc. Follow this line of thinking and Australian will end up with a couple of Nimitz carriers because it is better (we have seen this in this thread).

The current amphibious fleet meets capability requirements and can embark more 'stuff' than would be available anyway. There's a lot better ways we can spend money than on more big amphibious ships, particularly ones with JSFs on them.