Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[alexsa]

So in other words, numbers haven't dropped at all, although serviceability may have taken a bit of a hit.

I dare say if you went back 20 years no one would be complaining about taking ships out of service for a few years to upgrade them with state of the art radar systems or upgraded weapons. It was hardly all rosy back then.

If you look around at how other Western nations have shrunk since the end of the cold war, the RAN has done pretty well. It is hardly all doom and gloom.

Tend to dsagree as the RAN's fortunes were in decline in the 70s and 80's. The DDL programme was batched leading to the FFG's, Melbourne went and much of the fleet (6 River class frigates) had limited war fighting ability (the thought of having an Exocet fired at a river class frigate was not pleasant), however, what the RAN was called on to do was at a much lower tempo than has been the case until the last couple of decades.

When the first Fiji crisis hit and PM Hawke had the 'fleet' weariing a rut in the ocean off Fiji the short comings became very apparent........ then we got the LHA's (and the rust and rebuild cost).

From this point on with the Gulf, the boats, Timor, piracy and humaniarian relief the work load has been dramtically increased with no increase in the number of hulls in real terms.

I am a real fan of the corvette light frigate concept combined with a robust OPV as these certainly provide an ability to deal with the lower level (from a conflict perspective) obligations without shagging the MFU's.

 

[Volkodav]

Alex maybe we could form a single issue political party on getting some OPVs and light frigates and win some senate seats?

The RAN needs ships party.

 

[protoplasm]

Alex maybe we could form a single issue political party on getting some OPVs and light frigates and win some senate seats?

The RAN needs ships party.

I'll vote for you. Is there an intention to keep our OHPs in service alongside the Hobarts, or will they be decommed as the Hobarts replace them. Just thought I'd read somewhere that they may be kept (or maybe just the younger two) to maintain a larger fleet. Happy to be corrected

 

[Volkodav]

I'll vote for you. Is there an intention to keep our OHPs in service alongside the Hobarts, or will they be decommed as the Hobarts replace them. Just thought I'd read somewhere that they may be kept (or maybe just the younger two) to maintain a larger fleet. Happy to be corrected

Sydney is definitely being retired as her crew will go to Hobart and she is I believe in the worst material state of the four. Not sure what Darwins condition is but I get the impression that the RAN doesn't have enough personnel to keep FFGs and commission the AWDs. I will add that from the mid 2000s until recently there were usually at least 1 but often 2 Collins and 1 or 2 Anzacs laid up due to manning shortages at any given time. The RAN just doesn't seem to have enough qualified people for the ships we have.

With the time frame involved the RAN should be able to provide the extra crew so they could at least keep both Melbourne and Newcastle but with the current economic climate I believe it is more likely that all four will be retired once the three Hobarts are in service.

 

[StoresBasher]

Sydney is definitely being retired as her crew will go to Hobart and she is I believe in the worst material state of the four. Not sure what Darwins condition is but I get the impression that the RAN doesn't have enough personnel to keep FFGs and commission the AWDs. I will add that from the mid 2000s until recently there were usually at least 1 but often 2 Collins and 1 or 2 Anzacs laid up due to manning shortages at any given time. The RAN just doesn't seem to have enough qualified people for the ships we have.

With the time frame involved the RAN should be able to provide the extra crew so they could at least keep both Melbourne and Newcastle but with the current economic climate I believe it is more likely that all four will be retired once the three Hobarts are in service.

Sydney will be the next FFG to be retired, but when exactly is not yet known.
The buzz is she will stay on in service past her December 2014 pay off date.

Hobart's crew will be formed and doing training long before Sydney goes.
The RAN is pretty full, with many branches overborne and only recruiting is to fill discharges.

 

[Oberon]

Sydney will be the next FFG to be retired, but when exactly is not yet known.
The buzz is she will stay on in service past her December 2014 pay off date.

Hobart's crew will be formed and doing training long before Sydney goes.
The RAN is pretty full, with many branches overborne and only recruiting is to fill discharges.

Would a 4th AWD be something that the RAN would still be interested in? I was thinking that it would plug that "valley of death" in naval shipbuilding due in a few years time.

I know that the original contract included an option for a fourth hull, but it has probably expired by now.

 

[Volkodav]

Sydney will be the next FFG to be retired, but when exactly is not yet known.
The buzz is she will stay on in service past her December 2014 pay off date.

Hobart's crew will be formed and doing training long before Sydney goes.
The RAN is pretty full, with many branches overborne and only recruiting is to fill discharges.

That's good news,things have obviously changed since I was told that about two years ago. I do remember the previous government was talking life extensions for the FFGs but thought this was off the cards now. Glad to be wrong.

 

[ADMk2]

Would a 4th AWD be something that the RAN would still be interested in? I was thinking that it would plug that "valley of death" in naval shipbuilding due in a few years time.

I know that the original contract included an option for a fourth hull, but it has probably expired by now.

Pardon the pun, but I think that ship has well and truly sailed...

To be honest if we need more work for our industry, then pushing future projects forward is the way to do it IMHO.

AWD's will be great but I think we need to look beyond them to address the 'valley of death.' As Volk has argued I think we need a new class of frigate (the future frigate if you will) to rebuild our fleet numbers.

I'd suggest a class of least 12 to replace the ANZAC's and FFG's (yes I know the AWD's are technically the replacement for the FFG fleet) with a combination of capabilities within the one overall frigate fleet as other nations do to keep costs down. (Some boats will have ASW focus, some air warfare, all have ASuW capabilities etc).

If possible some sort of capability to add or mix and match capabilities within the fleet as needed for operations could make these boats a truly excellent capability as a whole, ie: the ASW frigates, could be re-rolled for primarily AsuW or air warfare or vice versa the air warfare frigates re-rolled for ASW operations as necessary.

 

[rand0m]

This is probably a kick in the guts for anyone hoping for an early replacement. ...
Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian

 

[gf0012-aust]

This is probably a kick in the guts for anyone hoping for an early replacement. ...
Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian

unsubscribed snapshot blurb:

THE navy’s Collins-class submarines — long derided as “dud subs” — have won international praise for an “astonishing” and “remarkable” turnaround in their performance that could ease budget pressures for the Abbott government, which faces a $40 billion bill to build 12 new boats.

A new report by British engineer and submarine specialist John Coles reveals the six Collins submarines were delivering performance not considered possible two years ago. The improvement in the fleet is so impressive that it is likely to see the boats’ operational lives extended.

 

[Oberon]

This is probably a kick in the guts for anyone hoping for an early replacement. ...


Yes, I read the story in this morning's paper. As a taxpayer, its good to see that we might finally be getting some value for money out of these boats even if it means their replacements are put off for 10, or more, years.

 

[ngatimozart]

Yes, I read the story in this morning's paper. As a taxpayer, its good to see that we might finally be getting some value for money out of these boats even if it means their replacements are put off for 10, or more, years.

Who says that you haven't been getting value for money out of the boats? Define what you as a taxpayer would expect as value for money and how you would assess that? The submarine service is not known as the silent service for nothing.

 

[Volkodav]

I was at a presentation from the current head of ASC, Steve Ludlum, a couple of years ago and he made it very clear that the Collins Class were extremely capable boats with an individual availability second, on a global scale, only to the RNs Vanguard class. He also stated that ASC had a superb team that were more than capable of fixing the issues at hand it was just a case of managing things smarter and excepting the things that needed to change.

The impression I get is Ludlum, being an extremely experienced submarine man with an engineering background, sorted the wheat from the chaff working out which of his people were worth listening too and which, in management, were stifling innovation. Many of the "ground breaking" changes in submarine maintenance are things that many people in ASC have been pushing for years but getting nowhere, some due to management, most due to lack of funding.

Ludlum's biggest achievement, with aid from Coles' initial report, was to get government buy in for the improvements and increased upfront funding. Funding has been the biggest issue for the entire project with the lack of a rotable parts pool being a killer, refusal to order sufficient spares because of the cost, refusal to cut the hull due to the perceived risk (and the upfront cost), not to mention constant delays to approved configuration changes that would increase reliability and reduce cost of ownership due to insufficient money to implement them. Huge sums would be spent on sexy stuff, more than some would argue was necessary but there was never enough for boring stuff that would actually improve the reliability of the diesels etc.

Basically anything that was perceived as expensive or risky was not permitted even when experts argued that they would in actually fact reduce overall cost and risk. Ludlum has fixed this, great news and ample proof that the real damage was the artificial shackles placed on the project by the Howard government and the board they appointed. Just imagine what would thing be like if the Government hadn't taken control of ASC after Kockum's was taken over by TKMS.

 

[t68]

Who says that you haven't been getting value for money out of the boats? Define what you as a taxpayer would expect as value for money and how you would assess that? The submarine service is not known as the silent service for nothing.

Collins was and still is an ambitious project for Australia; there have been a lot of lessons learned over the years. I guess fundamentally the Collins project suffered from a clear lack of commitment from government to fully release the design potential from the software demanded for the combat system, to the management of the actual contract, the risks were to the government were formidable, every aspect of the project involved technical challenges to which were new to industry. With guidance from the USN we have cleared most of the troubles associated with the boats in there early years.

As far as I am aware the only problems with the hull construction turned out to be the work in Sweden on two sections of the first hulls, these sorts of problems are not immune to us or others the USN Seawolf submarine program saw the first two hulls scrapped because of welding problems.

The McIntosh-Prescott report on the submarines detailed the most serious technical defects in the submarines which included problems with the diesel engines, noise levels, propellers, periscopes, masts and the combat system, It would be surprising if there had not been problems with the project considering it was Australia first attempt at building something which people compare with things like the space shuttle we’ve got the front end sorted now we just have to do the same to the rear.

In war games with the US Navy they have regularly penetrated the protective screen guarding US carrier battle groups. Every project of this size runs a risk and it’s a matter of personal opinion if we tax payers are getting value for money, in the early years there was a valid comment regarding value for money from the project just as it was with the Sea Sprite program.

 

[Volkodav]

Collins was and still is an ambitious project for Australia; there have been a lot of lessons learned over the years. I guess fundamentally the Collins project suffered from a clear lack of commitment from government to fully release the design potential from the software demanded for the combat system, to the management of the actual contract, the risks were to the government were formidable, every aspect of the project involved technical challenges to which were new to industry. With guidance from the USN we have cleared most of the troubles associated with the boats in there early years.

As far as I am aware the only problems with the hull construction turned out to be the work in Sweden on two sections of the first hulls, these sorts of problems are not immune to us or others the USN Seawolf submarine program saw the first two hulls scrapped because of welding problems.

The McIntosh-Prescott report on the submarines detailed the most serious technical defects in the submarines which included problems with the diesel engines, noise levels, propellers, periscopes, masts and the combat system, It would be surprising if there had not been problems with the project considering it was Australia first attempt at building something which people compare with things like the space shuttle we’ve got the front end sorted now we just have to do the same to the rear.

In war games with the US Navy they have regularly penetrated the protective screen guarding US carrier battle groups. Every project of this size runs a risk and it’s a matter of personal opinion if we tax payers are getting value for money, in the early years there was a valid comment regarding value for money from the project just as it was with the Sea Sprite program.

The McIntosh-Prescott report was a political hatchet job that saw Prescott appointed to the ASC board as a political stooge after the government took control of ASC. I notice they are at it again now with Mirabella on the board now where Labor had been choosing mostly ex military and expert ship and submarine types.

IMO most of the woes with the project in the past related to

• the government taking ownership,
• cutting links to the designer,
• failing to order an additional 2 boats that were optioned and needed,
• ferking up the IP agreement after the government take over (which in turn restricted how much access could be given to EB to help out), and
• failing to provide enough funding to pre-emptively fix identified issues before they failed and cost even more to fix, i.e. the diesels!

 

[Shanesworld]

I was at a presentation from the current head of ASC, Steve Ludlum, a couple of years ago and he made it very clear that the Collins Class were extremely capable boats with an individual availability second, on a global scale, only to the RNs Vanguard class. He also stated that ASC had a superb team that were more than capable of fixing the issues at hand it was just a case of managing things smarter and excepting the things that needed to change.

The impression I get is Ludlum, being an extremely experienced submarine man with an engineering background, sorted the wheat from the chaff working out which of his people were worth listening too and which, in management, were stifling innovation. Many of the "ground breaking" changes in submarine maintenance are things that many people in ASC have been pushing for years but getting nowhere, some due to management, most due to lack of funding.

Ludlum's biggest achievement, with aid from Coles' initial report, was to get government buy in for the improvements and increased upfront funding. Funding has been the biggest issue for the entire project with the lack of a rotable parts pool being a killer, refusal to order sufficient spares because of the cost, refusal to cut the hull due to the perceived risk (and the upfront cost), not to mention constant delays to approved configuration changes that would increase reliability and reduce cost of ownership due to insufficient money to implement them. Huge sums would be spent on sexy stuff, more than some would argue was necessary but there was never enough for boring stuff that would actually improve the reliability of the diesels etc.

Basically anything that was perceived as expensive or risky was not permitted even when experts argued that they would in actually fact reduce overall cost and risk. Ludlum has fixed this, great news and ample proof that the real damage was the artificial shackles placed on the project by the Howard government and the board they appointed. Just imagine what would thing be like if the Government hadn't taken control of ASC after Kockum's was taken over by TKMS.

Does this short skit sound kind of believeable regarding project management? It rings true with my experience with NZ govt work.

This is how an engineer feels when he's surrounded by idiots - CNET

 

[swerve]

Does this short skit sound kind of believeable regarding project management? It rings true with my experience with NZ govt work.

This is how an engineer feels when he's surrounded by idiots - CNET

Reminds me of a meeting in Sydney in 1999 where I & a colleague were asked why our test plan for year 2000 fixes (including a few for problems which would stop systems running) didn't include regression testing.

I think we both stared open-mouthed at the senior manager who asked. It took us a while to get our brains into a low enough gear to explain, & even then I'm not sure he got it.

 

[Todjaeger]

Does this short skit sound kind of believeable regarding project management? It rings true with my experience with NZ govt work.

This is how an engineer feels when he's surrounded by idiots - CNET

Thank you. Now my head hurts. And I am reminded of people that I deal with on a daily basis, who have no idea what they are talking about, but still feel the urge to speak.

 

[old faithful]

That clip should be mandatory viewing in managment/promotion courses world wide.
I will be forwarding it to one of my "bosses" who will think it is like one of those drunk walking up hill clip from you tube, wont understand it and delete it as boring video, then be entertained by a dancing dog clip he opens next......thanks for posting.

 

[Oberon]

Who says that you haven't been getting value for money out of the boats? Define what you as a taxpayer would expect as value for money and how you would assess that? The submarine service is not known as the silent service for nothing.

I meant to say utility rather than value for money. Being retired and merely a defence enthusiast my main source of information is from newspapers and the online magazines I subscribe to.

I'm old enough to realise that you cannot believe most of what you read in newspapers and I have first hand experience of the spin coming out of Canberra; but the history of the Collins subs has not been a good one ever since the first boat hit the water - noisy hull, combat system replaced, lack of crew, unavailability of more than one boat. Not a story that makes you feel confident and secure. I just about fell off my chair three years ago when the last White Paper came out and the then PM Rudd announced that Australia was going to build 12 new submarines.