Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

Status
Not open for further replies.

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Another factor not commonly known is while ASC and BAE use predominantly Australian labour working on strategic projects of national significance, Austal make extensive use of 457 visas to push the contracts out as quickly as possible and maximize profit for the private owners.

Feeding government work to Austal not only leaves BPC and the RAN short on capability and exposed to higher through life costs, it also fails in terms of maintaining ship building skills between major projects and up skilling Australians so as to be able to adequately support construction booms when they come.
 
maximize profit for the private owners.
Maximise profit might be a loose term. They've been bleeding cash for a long time and only the US operation has saved them. The Henderson yard isn't profitable on its own. Only this year did they turn a mediocre profit.

They had to dump their share price down to .40 just to raise enough cash to pay off bad debts.

Hull270, their 100 million dollar gambit to keep people working in the Henderson didn't pay off with it still sitting there unsold from 2010.
 

Jhom

New Member
Just cut a deal with the Spaniards already with their Buque de Acción Marítima/Meteoro OPV's. Somewhat of a proven design, a credible builder, they could surely follow the same rollout as the LHD's & AWD's - Semi built in Spain & here thus keeping people in jobs (with a political spin on it!). A little larger than outlined and slower than the ACPB but surely 'overcomeable'.
I dont recall the Meteoro class being discussed for the OPV competition by the australian goverment, but it would make a whole lot of sense.

The only thing that may be an issue is the speed, and thinking about it the crew requirements are a little higher compared to the Armidales.

And then there is the price issue, at nearly 200 million bucks one of them covers almost all the cost of the entire Armidale class. ;)
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Maximise profit might be a loose term. They've been bleeding cash for a long time and only the US operation has saved them. The Henderson yard isn't profitable on its own. Only this year did they turn a mediocre profit.

They had to dump their share price down to .40 just to raise enough cash to pay off bad debts.

Hull270, their 100 million dollar gambit to keep people working in the Henderson didn't pay off with it still sitting there unsold from 2010.
Hull 270 is quite a sight I must admit and believe it is a real shame it hasn't found a buyer. Perhaps with the A$ dropping to a more reasonable level Henderson may be able to pick up more commercial work again.

I have nothing against Austal per say it just doesn't make sense to me to give work to them building an update of something that, to be honest, has not worked as planned when there is an industry, built at great expense to the tax payer that could easily and affordably produce exactly what the RAN needs. The cost of rebuilding ASC and BAE Williamstown following a valley of death would far exceed the cost of getting them to build the RAN a class of 10 to 15 OPVs (OCV, corvettes what ever you want to call them) to tide them over to the new frigates.

Maybe look outside the square and design something along the lines of the French L-CAT but larger as a LCH replacement.
 
The big question here that no one seems willing to attempt to answer is which parts of the Australian shipbuilding should stay in Australia?

Just like car manufacturing is it simply too costly to keep attempting to build things ourselves when it's proven that others do it better and cheaper. I'd like to see some detailed analysis on everything from AWD, LHD, Frigates, Corvettes/OPV and patrol boats. What's should stay (if any) and what should go in terms of government favouritism?

The valley of death only exists because our own shipbuilders build ships that no one else wants so everything is a costly bespoke solution.

It's no use propping up ASC, BAE, Austal etc etc if they are just going to fall over again after the next cycle. So I guess what is the strategic advantages and disadvantages of building it ourselves?

Regarding PBs and OCV, if the boat people issue has taught us anything is that our borders are porous and unable to be patrolled effectively. That we need a combination of good intelligence collection assets and good interception assets and that interoperability between them all is mandatory. The current system of everything being routed through Canberra thereby delaying real time intelligence is just ridiculous.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
A viable option could be for Austal to design and develop Fast Interceptor Craft and Combat Boats to be operated from larger OPVs. There could also be an argument for a class of fast SAR craft. These are options that a talented designer like Austal could fill and complement the larger vessels we really need.

The ANZACs were intended as patrol frigates and ended up evolving to fill a more GP mission set at the expense of a proper replacement for the FFGs. I cant help but feel the RAN would have been better off had we gone for an OPV or Corvette instead of the Meko for the ANZAC and then a more capable design down the track to replace the FFG and DDG. That way there would have been a more suitable, more affordable platform available for the high tempo high sea state border protection work allowing the PBs to be used in a more sensible fashion.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The big question here that no one seems willing to attempt to answer is which parts of the Australian shipbuilding should stay in Australia?

Just like car manufacturing is it simply too costly to keep attempting to build things ourselves when it's proven that others do it better and cheaper. I'd like to see some detailed analysis on everything from AWD, LHD, Frigates, Corvettes/OPV and patrol boats. What's should stay (if any) and what should go in terms of government favouritism?

The valley of death only exists because our own shipbuilders build ships that no one else wants so everything is a costly bespoke solution.

It's no use propping up ASC, BAE, Austal etc etc if they are just going to fall over again after the next cycle. So I guess what is the strategic advantages and disadvantages of building it ourselves?

Regarding PBs and OCV, if the boat people issue has taught us anything is that our borders are porous and unable to be patrolled effectively. That we need a combination of good intelligence collection assets and good interception assets and that interoperability between them all is mandatory. The current system of everything being routed through Canberra thereby delaying real time intelligence is just ridiculous.
Lets be honest Austal have already acquired a yard in the Philippines and is in production. It was rumoured that production in Australia will move there for the majority of products due to cost. In other words, if this transpires, the US with LCS and Philippines will get the greatest benefit from this Australian company.

Naval shipbuilding is just about the only thing left beyond fishing boats and those still building HSC or super yachts (and the latter is dwindling). Batch production and projects like an OPV will keep that ticking along. To be honest I would prefer to see the money spent on the bigger end of the market as I think there are a number of Australian concerns capable of producing patrol boats as well as other products).

It would be pretty grim if we give Austal a large carrot at the expense of critical capability only to have them leave the scene after manufacture as could be the case.

As a post script; Interesting observation in the Command and Control of operations. Given these are centralised at BPC (now Op Sov Borders) to coordinate operations and liaison between the military arms, Customs and other agencies ............... how would you see it done? Local level.? This is a political minefield and noting previous coronial inquests into the loss of life I doubt a disjointed approach would be considered.

This is not to say the current system is perfect and I will not comment on that, however, a local response is not likely to be accepted for a myriad of reason.

Finally, you appear to claim inside knowledge of the operations .......... care to elaborate.
 
To be honest I would prefer to see the money spent on the bigger end of the market as I think there are a number of Australian concerns capable of producing patrol boats as well as other products).
Why?

Haven't our current builds shown that we can't do it ourselves. Wouldn't it be better to just focus on a strong maintenance ability rather then hull construction. I appreciate that there is a lot of skills maintenance in construction that follows onto the support contracts laters but I think the shipbuilding industry has the wool pulled over governments eyes.

How many billions is Australian made worth? We seem to have committed 25-35 billion to produce our own subs so going off past DMO results that's likely to be 60-100 billion for 12 subs.

At what point do we say, it's too expensive as the money to build and maintain will have to be diverted from other strategic expense.

There has to be a tipping point, there was for Holden, but no one is willing to say what it is for each type vessel in shipbuilding.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
How many billions is Australian made worth? We seem to have committed 25-35 billion to produce our own subs so going off past DMO results that's likely to be 60-100 billion for 12 subs.
You do realise that the weighting for being built in australia is a Govt requirement?

If any govt changes their mind on the relevance and/or need for that weighting - then we will go offshore for foreign builds really quickly.

In fact we are doing so already. Its just not in the public domain

subs are different by a golden mile, there is inherent tech which we would be mad to get done offshore,

For a variety of reasons, the reqs for building locally make sense - its just not about sheer cost.

for a green/grey water boat - the imperative to build locally becomes hard to defend
 
for a green/grey water boat - the imperative to build locally becomes hard to defend
This what what I'm getting at. There has to be a tipping point where it's simply no longer possible to build locally because of cost. Just like the rest of our manufacturing industry. Our own successes in providing qualities wages and a great quality of life will be our downfall in term of being able to pay people to do hard manual work.

I think there is still a hell a lot of doctrine based on Australia's ability to "ramp up" it's capabilities during war, which I think due to technological and education reasons is now less possible than ever.

If I remember correctly in WWII a spitfire could be churned off the line in something like 40 days whereas an F35 takes 18 months. How on earth do you ramp that up?

We simply can't build new factories, train people and get them building new ships etc in a reasonable timeframe as we have done in the last due to the sheer complexities of the job's involved. You'd need to start your ramp up 5 years prior with apprentices.

People who talk about nuclear subs for example forget that currently takes 11 years just to train a diesel sub captain, so even if someone turned up tomorrow with more vessels we don't have anyone qualified to use them.

Of course being able to maintain what we have IS and always will be vital to our strategic interests, we could never send our ships away to be repaired in times of war but at the moment I think we still have such a focus on maintaining the ship building capability that we aren't questioning the need to build at all.

As I said above, the valley of death only exists because we can't make ships that anyone else wants at a price that is reasonable. If that's the case, we should we buy from ourselves?
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Why?

Haven't our current builds shown that we can't do it ourselves. Wouldn't it be better to just focus on a strong maintenance ability rather then hull construction. I appreciate that there is a lot of skills maintenance in construction that follows onto the support contracts laters but I think the shipbuilding industry has the wool pulled over governments eyes.

How many billions is Australian made worth? We seem to have committed 25-35 billion to produce our own subs so going off past DMO results that's likely to be 60-100 billion for 12 subs.

At what point do we say, it's too expensive as the money to build and maintain will have to be diverted from other strategic expense.

There has to be a tipping point, there was for Holden, but no one is willing to say what it is for each type vessel in shipbuilding.
Much earlier in either this RAN thread or one of the predecessors, there was discussion of a number of government reports on the cost-benefit of building in Australia. The numbers are from memory and could be off somewhat, or have changed a bit with time so please keep that in mind.

If two warships were under consideration for RAN service, with one being a foreign built vessel and the other being an Australian built vessel costing 30% more and everything else were exactly the same, the Australian built vessel would have a lower net cost to Australia. This is because despite the higher costs associated with materials, labor, etc with Australia, a much greater amount of money spent by the RAN/Australian Gov't would remain within Australia, and get re-circulated back into the Australian economy in the form of prices paid to (Australian) suppliers for materials, wages paid to shipyard employees, etc. Those suppliers would then go on to pay their suppliers and workers, the shipyard employees and other workers would pay taxes on those wages, and then pay their rent or mortgages, buy food and other goods and services from grocers and shops, and so on down the various chains and the money paid by the Gov't for the RAN warships re-circulates through the local, regional and national economies.

With that in mind, unless/until the RAN can purchase major warships from overseas yards which meet Australian service needs and cost something like 50% or more less than a comparable Australian-built vessel, then it is still better for the warships to be built within Australia when possible.

Given the current size limitations of Williamstown, Henderson and ASC and the closure of Cockatoo Island, I believe some vessels are better largely built overseas (or the hull at least) like the LHD's, and future AOR and other logistics, support and sealift vessels.

Keep in mind that due to the recurring planning problems different Australian Gov'ts have had in managing a ship building programme, that has only added to the difficulties and costs associated with building Australian warships. By allowing multi-year gaps between ships under construction, those skilled yard workers have their skills atrophy, requiring re-skilling, or replacement with new workers that require skilling. Either way, there is a learning curve before the yard workers are again skilled which can help increase production speed, reduce errors and lower cost. With the 'Valley of Death' in naval shipbuilding, different Australian shipyards keep having this boom/bust cycle.

Given the current capabilities of Australian shipyards, and the reasonable assumptions about future capabilities, then IMO future naval shipbuilding should focus one either ASC in SA, BAE in Williamstown or BAE in Henderson. Other yards and facilities could contribute with module construction, but one of those three should be the main/sole point of assembly. Austal (or Incat for that matter) could of course contribute to RAN and BPC vessels with smallcraft, and some minor vessels or landing craft. However, given Austal's specialty in marine grade aluminum hull construction, I do not see it as being reasonable to assume that Austal's Australian facility would switch to steel construction which most major warships require. I also do not think it likely or appropriate for Australia to follow the USN down the LCS route for some warships like the FFH replacement, given the range of operations RAN vessels require and the number of unknowns which still exist with the LCS designs in terms of capabilities, operational ranges, and initial and ongoing support costs.

Also given that due to the average timeline many Australia defence programmes have between programme start and first delivery (14 years IIRC) then if the ANZAC FFH replacement programme were to deliver the first vessel in 2022, the initial programme should have started in 2008 or thereabouts.

-Cheers
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
That's the most reasonable answer I've heard. I only hope we stick to the facts rather than bow down to industry and political pressure.
It is an answer given before and much of the discussion on building in batches and sustainment is predicated on this.

I find your comment trite as it suggests all previsous discussions were less than sensible.

Still waiting for a response on your comments on BPC command and communications.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I suppose the best way forward would be to look at the past and analyse what did and did not work and why.

The constant theme I see is every couple of decades we get a government that thinks, for various reasons, we are better off buying everything from overseas and will deliberately starve local yards of work and sit back and watch them either go out of business of limp along on a slow drip feed of sustainment work.

On the other side of the coin we also get governments that desire to rebuild the industry most seem to force feed it work in big indigestible chunks, often driven by the fact that hulls that have been life extended to extremes are simply no longer able to be retained and have to be replaced, usually all within a comparatively short period of time. This requires massive investment in infrastructure and training and results in over capacity once the work has been done. In fact the cost and schedule estimates are usually miles off the reality which forces slips and often some work going off shore as well as budget blow outs.

Every now and then a government will try and develop a strategically sustainable plan but politics and external factors usually mess this up and result in either of the other two options getting their turn. State politics is a major issue as the states undermine and claw work off each other, resulting in over capacity and unnecessary duplication as well as inefficiencies and some blindingly stupid decision on where and how to do the work.

Getting late now but I will follow this up with my views on previous projects and how we could have been smarter and avoided our current situation. This will hopefully lead to some reasonable discussion on how we can move forward and avoid making the same mistakes while also clawing back some lost opportunities and capabilities.

I would start by saying one of the biggest issues in recent decades has been delaying kicking off projects until the last possible moment and then having to compromise when the overly ambitious schedule and budget falls over in the green field or rejuvenated facility that has been given the terminally delayed work.
 
Still waiting for a response on your comments on BPC command and communications.
For a very long time we've had the poster image of the ship talking to the aircraft taking to the tank. Yet it's mostly been different radios on different networks. Efforts like Link 11/16 have only taken so far.

In this example tracks and FMV feeds from surveillance aircraft aren't passed to the intercept vessel but through BPC man managed and then out to the vessels. This causes a quite significant time lag between what the air asset is seeing and what the guys on the group can see.

The issue is that we still treat surveillance at an organisational level. Customs has their solution, Navy has theirs and RAAF had theirs. There is a poor level of understanding the problem holistically from procuring the same equipment to using the same terms and symbols.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The issue is that we still treat surveillance at an organisational level. Customs has their solution, Navy has theirs and RAAF had theirs. There is a poor level of understanding the problem holistically from procuring the same equipment to using the same terms and symbols.
Thats not entirely accurate. and there are reasons why some of that loop is in place. I've worked in that C4ISR and comms space - both here and overseas. The US is gripping this up now, and we have solutions that are in dev across diff spectrum

There is an OPSEC issue here as well....
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
In this example tracks and FMV feeds from surveillance aircraft aren't passed to the intercept vessel but through BPC man managed and then out to the vessels. This causes a quite significant time lag between what the air asset is seeing and what the guys on the group can see
BPC surface assets have always had the capacity to talk directly to surveillance aircraft and at considerable range so within the scene of action there is not a problem.

The complications and time delays arise when a political direction is given/needed at the scene as to what action is to be taken and has been ever thus. I have waited for over 12 hours for a decision in the very dim past.
Hopefully that is changing with BPC assuming a more military chain of command.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
BPC surface assets have always had the capacity to talk directly to surveillance aircraft and at considerable range so within the scene of action there is not a problem.

The complications and time delays arise when a political direction is given/needed at the scene as to what action is to be taken and has been ever thus. I have waited for over 12 hours for a decision in the very dim past.
Hopefully that is changing with BPC assuming a more military chain of command.
Agree with you on this one. It is an evolving area that started way back.
 

rjtjrt

Member
This is a bit off axis to suggest, but.....
US would like to find a way to provide Taiwan with more modern submarines.
What if Aust trade in 2 of its current Collins subs to US, and get a long term lease on one of their older Los Angelis class.
That way we could start to get experience on operating nuclear subs, and US would solve one of its problems.
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Probably better ways to accomplish both objectives. I have no doubt the USN would be willing to pass on an older 688, but why would the RAN want to inherit what is likely going to be a more expensive boat to keep running? If the need for experience is actually warranted (ie if the RAN wants to really go nuclear), I'd think an exchange program run in parallel with a joint construction program would be far more valuable (again, to both sides), similar to what the RN is currently doing to maintain its stable of naval aviators while their carrier comes up to speed.

The real limitation in any military equipment transfers to Taiwan is always diplomatic/political.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top