Weak state diplomacy

[Gkell]

Good day everyone.

Im a first time poster but have had the privilage of reading the great posts on this forum for some time now.

I recently read a work by Ali Naseer Mohamed titled "Diplomacy of Micro states."

He said that micro states have little military and economic capabilities that they have no other recourse to impact the international scene apart from diplomacy.

I see the sense in his work but i want to hear from everybody here. In your opinion, Is diplomacy the best option for weak states? My reasoning is that they just need competent leaders to make their country strong and not really have to rely on diplomacy beause if they do they are prone to exploitation and just going along with the currents.

Singapore is a very small island with no resources other than a pile of rocks but Lee Kuan Yew turned it into one of the most progressive and powerful countries in Asia.

I realize that conditions are different for each state but i believe that whatever the Circumstance, a competent leader can raise his country up even with limited Resources.

What are your thoughts?

Thank you for the reply, its great to be a part of this community

 

[tonnyc]

There are so many things, well, not exactly wrong, but rather you aren't looking deep enough.

First, in term of natural resources, you are forgetting that natural resources aren't just oil or gold or even fish. Singapore sits on a major trade route with an excellent natural harbor in a very friendly climate. This is a big natural resource that many other countries wish it has. Heck, Russia wishes it has a harbor as good as Singapore.

Then you are falling into the Great Man trap. Lee Kuan Yew is a very capable man, but if he's in, say, Tonga, I doubt he can turn it into another Singapore. (By the way, Tonga has had very good leaders too. It's just not blessed with Singapore's strategic location.)

Then you are forgetting that the British poured quite a bit of resources into Singapore prior to Singapore's independence. During colonial times Singapore was better developed than many of the surrounding areas. This gave Singapore a headstart compared to its neighbours.

Singapore is an example of micro-state diplomacy done right. With all due respect to Singapore's military, Singapore can not afford to piss their neighbours off. This doesn't mean knuckling under, but who says diplomacy means knuckling under? Diplomacy also means being able to say "No, we aren't doing that", but notice that it doesn't say "Fuck you, come at me, bro". Singapore is friendly with everyone and I mean everyone. That's diplomacy done right. Having a strong defense helps but the adage says "speak softly and carry a big stick". It's not one or the other. It's both. Diplomacy is the "speak softly" part. Defense is the big stick part. You want both.

But Singapore's way is not the only right way of doing micro-state diplomacy. Consider Costa Rica. It has no military. Only a police force. However, it is doing very well by any measure you care (except militarily). How did it manage to do that? Whatever your answer is, part of the reason is that Costa Rican diplomacy paid off.

No country can guarantee the emergence of a leader that's good for the nation continuously. Lee Kuan Yew's autocratic manner happened to work well, but Fidel Castro is as strong a leader and as autocratic and cares about his country and people too. And yet they took their respective countries toward very different paths. Besides, who decides what's good and what's bad anyway? What's good today can easily be denounced next decade. You can't hope for a good leader all the time. Consistent diplomacy is a lot more dependable compared to hoping for yet another good leader.

 

[Gkell]

Thanks for the thorough and very informative reply. I realize that i failed to look deeper into the details of the scenario's I've given. I appreciate the effort to educate and clarify.

I guess what got me thinking about great leadership can solve a countries problems (hence the great man syndrome) is that leaders tend to focus more on internal issues and not really on foreign affairs because for people to give their vote, they want to know from a candidate how he will benefit them most.

But after reading your post and furthering my studies, I've come to appreciate diplomacy as a top priority not only for small states but for major powers as well.

Major powers need to maintain diplomatic relations with even the smallest states because they will have global interests and they will need to protect it and secure themselves from outside threat. They being a world power means they can be prone to attacks that they wont see coming like the 9/11.

Qatar comes to mind as another model of how a small state can conduct diplomacy in an effective manner, despite its inherent riches and advantages, I realize that it must result to diplomacy by being a mediator and using its financial capabilities to fund projects of other countries.

if you or anyone else have more to share with your knowledge on Diplomacy and small states it will be greatly appreciated.

 

[OPSSG]

Let me start by welcoming both of you to the forum and I appreciate the attempt to highlight key issues and the effort to discuss the issues on hand. I am replying with view to pointing out the weakness of the current discussion. If I may be so bold as to state the obvious for three weaknesses in the current discussion:

One, a small state is not the same as a micro-state (a country, small in land size, with a population of less than 1.5 m, located in a developing region). It would be far better if we don't confuse them (as the range of options open to a small state is very different to a micro-state). Even in Ali Naseer Mohamed's article, that analytic distinction is made - so I am not sure why the definitions are being used such a loose manner in this thread discussion. The article is referenced but the concept of micro-state contained therein is immediately discarded by Tonnyc. With a defence budget of US$9.7 billion in 2012 (the largest in ASEAN), Singapore does not fit the definition of a micro-state nor does it have the armed forces a typical small state (ie. it has the hard power of a rising power). Be careful when you read articles where Singaporeans or Singapore politicians describe Singapore as small and weak relative to other powers (the key operative word is 'relative', as Singapore's leaders consistently understate the SAF's actual military capabilities - see the Backgrounder on the SAF below). With the 4th largest GDP in ASEAN (with a 2012 GDP of US$276 billion - IMF figure), it is one of six major states in ASEAN.

The 3rd Generation (3G) Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is getting smaller as our capabilities improve. The 3G SAF is an Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2) force that is capable of forward defence. Singapore has reduced the number of fighter squadrons from 7 to 5; but have acquired more capable platforms like the F-15SGs. Singapore is replacing the eleven Fearless Class patrol vessels with eight 1,150 ton Littoral Mission Vessels from 2016 onwards. These are sensible trade-offs of numbers for quality.

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) with six 3,200 ton Formidable Class frigates, four 8,500 ton Endurance Class LPDs, and with six submarines (including two AIP equipped Archer Class submarines) is also the most technologically advanced in the region - a navy that is capable of operating in all three dimensions of sub-surface warfare, surface warfare and air warfare. For those who are interested in the RSN - please read Collin Koh's 2012 article in the US Naval War College Review on the same topic for background: SEEKING BALANCE: Force Projection, Confidence Building, and the Republic of Singapore Navy.

See this Air Power 101 discussion on noteworthy rising powers (at paragraph (1) (v) of the discussion on Air Power and Statecraft). With five squadrons, comprising of over a hundred aircraft (1x F-15SG squadron, 3x F-16C/D squadrons, and 1x F-5 squadron - with 2 detachments in the US), the air combat arm of the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) is bigger than Malaysia and Indonesia combined; and in terms of capabilities, it is the most advanced in all ten ASEAN states. The RSAF is the only tertiary air force within the ASEAN - see this 2009 RSAF 40th Anniversary Video

If you notice, Singapore is very dependent on the US for air power purchases (Apaches, Seahawks, Chinooks, F-16C/Ds, F-15SGs, Harpoon missiles, AIM-120C7, AIM-9X, Scaneagle UAV, I-HAWK, FPS 117 Radar, EW systems, and so on) and things like HIMARS and Maxxpro Dash but we also need to maintain our relationship with other suppliers and I would like to name 3 big ones:

(i) Sweden supplies the 4 Challenger and the 2 Archer Classes of submarines, the 4 Bedok Class mine-hunting vessels, the new upgraded Sea GIRAFFE for the 6 Victory Class vessels, GIRAFFE AMB for air defence, RBS 70 and ARTHUR;

(ii) Israel supplies the G550, UAVs (Hermes 450 and Heron 1), a range of missiles (Spyder, Spike, and Barak 1), EW systems, the IAI/ELTA EL/M-2238 radar on the Endurance Class, the Typhoon Weapon Stations on the Bedok Class, Formidable Class, Endurance Class and Shark Class (PCG); and

(iii) France supplies the design for the six Formidable class frigates (with five built locally), and it is also an important partner in research and development in defence technology (Mistral missiles, the Herakles radar system, the new Thales STING-EO Mk2 FCR and Sagem's Gun Fire-Control System for the 8 Littoral Mission Vessels to be delivered from 2016 onward).​

I have listed some of Singapore's weapon suppliers to give you an idea of the scale of the problem that the SAF has with logistics. And Singapore is also a supplier to other countries (Oman 4x 75m OPVs, Thailand 1x 141m LPD & some Broncos, UK 100x Warthogs, UAE some 120mm SRMS, and so on).

Notable SAF deployments over the years :

1. First overseas mission in 1970 when a 47-man team was deployed to provide humanitarian assistance to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) when the country was hit by a deadly cyclone.

2. First partnership with the UN in 1989 when a 14-man team was deployed to Nambia, Southwest Africa to assist the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) during the country's elections.

3. In July 1990, a massive earthquake that struck Baguio, Luzon Island, in the Philippines. A 28-man SAF medical team was deployed by C-130 and their mission lasted from 19 July to 2 August 1990. This small SAF medical team treated visited all of the major villages surrounding Baguio and had treated a total of 5,500 patients.

4. Joining coalition forces for the first time, the SAF deployed a 30-strong SAF medical team during the First Gulf War (from 20 January to 13 March 1991). Led by then MAJ (Dr) Tan Chi Chiu, the SAF medical team was assigned to the 205th General Hospital, a 600-bed British Army Rear Hospital located inside King Khalid International Airport.

5. On 27 March 1991, Singapore special operations forces killed four terrorists to rescue the passengers and crew members of SQ117, which was hijacked in KL (see here for details). 1991 was also a period of tension between Singapore and her neighbours. See this video for details: The 1991 SQ117 Hijack

6. The SAF participated in the UN Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) in 1991 to monitor the demilitarised zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border after the first Gulf war. The SAF had deployed a total of nine teams by the time the mission ended in 2003.

7. In 1993, four Super Puma helicopters and 65 SAF personnel were dispatched to Cambodia to assist the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN mission overseeing the electoral process in Cambodia.

8. In 1996, the Indonesian and Singapore armed forces worked together in a hostage rescue operation in West Papua. Singapore sent a remotely piloted vehicle detachment to provide ISR for Indonesian special forces in Timika, West Papua, which facilitated the successful rescue of Indonesian and foreign hostages (from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany) taken by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Movement.

9. On 9 July 1997, six flights of C-130 aircraft flew about 450 Singaporeans and foreigners out of the Phnom Penh, Cambodia and it marked the first successful non-combatant evacuation operation conducted by the SAF.

10. The RSAF Chinook training detachment in Texas had in the past assisted in:-

(i) fire-fighting operations in May 1998 (when a forest fire broke out in the Chinati mountain area in southwestern Texas);
(ii) flood relief operations in September 1998 (in southern Texas); and
(iii) in Hurricane Katrina relief operations in September 2005.​

11. Between 1999 and 2003, the SAF, in support of the UN peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste, contributed over 1,000 personnel and equipment that included naval vessels (LSTs) and UH-1H helicopters in the international effort to restore peace and security to Timor-Leste. The UH-1H helicopters was used to insert LRRPs to conduct green helmet patrols at the border of Timor-Leste. The conduct of these border patrols, intelligence gathering efforts, and presence of a quick reaction force enabled the SAF to effectively disarm militia-men and criminal elements in their assigned sector (to stop the cycle of violence). Further, at one stage of the mission, Singapore Navy LSTs provided up to 50% of all sea-lift to support the UN peacekeeping mission.

12. Between 2003 and 2008, more than 998 SAF personnel participated in the multinational effort to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq via deployment of a C-130; multiple deployments of Endurance Class LPDs, which helped the elite Naval Diving Unit develop its ROEs to deal with coordinated suicide boat attacks on Iraqi oil terminals in the Persian Gulf; the Singapore navy also brought into service, the Protector USV is a four ton, 9 meter (30 foot) long armed speedboat to deal with suicide boat attacks on the Iraqi oil terminals; and multiple deployments of KC-135R tankers. Between 2004 to 2008, the RSAF deployed KC-135R tankers (in 5 deployments for 3 month stretches each time) in support of coalition forces in Iraqi. RSAF KC-135Rs offloaded 14 million pounds of fuel to more than 1,400 coalition aircraft in over 300 refuelling sorties. See this video: In the Service of Peace

13. In the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004, more than 1,500 SAF personnel were deployed to Indonesia (along with Commander 21st Division and his command staff to Banda Aceh) and Thailand to provide humanitarian assistance / disaster relief assistance in the largest SAF overseas operation conducted so far. The SAF unilaterally deployed three Endurance Class LPDs (RSS Endurance was the first foreign navy ship to re-established a life-line to Meulaboh, a coastal town in West Sumatra that was previously completely cut off after the tsunami), eight CH-47 Chinook and four Super Puma helicopters, six C-130 transport aircraft, two F-50 utility aircraft and a mobile air traffic control tower as part of Singapore's direct contributions to the relief effort. With host nation support in Singapore, US Commands (Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific and Naval Regional Contracting Center Singapore) worked 24/7 to surge supply capacity in support of the humanitarian effort in Operation Unified Assistance. Further, during the conduct of Operation Unified Assistance by US PACOM, two SAF officers proficiently in Bahasa Indonesia, with in-depth knowledge of Indonesian culture, psyche, and sensitivities to the presence of foreign military forces, were posted as Liaison Officers to enable the US to deliver aid to Indonesia with less fiction.

14. From May 2007 to June 2013, 492 SAF personnel have been deployed to Afghanistan to participate in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peace support operations and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Beyond reconstruction work, providing small teams of institutional trainers to train Afghan forces (artillery and counter IED combat engineers); multiple rotations of imagery analysts (to exploit data gathered from UAV feeds); the SAF also deployed a 52-man Search II UAV team; and multiple rotations of artillery hunting radar teams for 15 months to provide early warning for rocket attacks on the ISAF base in the outskirts of Tarin Kowt (within four seconds of rocket launch detection). For their service in Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror various SAF officers have been awarded US service medals as pats on their backs. These include the US Legion of Merit, the US Joint Service Commendation Medal, the US Army Bronze Star and the US Army Commendation Medal, just to name a few. The last six imagery analysts in SAF's final deployment in Afghanistan departed in June 2013. See this video: Tribute to the 492 soldiers who took part in Operation Blue Ridge

15. Since 2009, more than 1,200 Singaporeans have operated under the ambit of the multinational CTF 151 as part of the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden (GoA). In September 2012, a 145-person task group comprising of RSS Intrepid and a naval helicopter was deployed to the GoA under CTF 151. Further, Singapore naval officers and their command teams have been deployed to command CTF 151 in another three separate occasions, with the last Singapore command team of 28 and six international officers (Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Australia and Korea) deployed in March 2013. See this video: Ep 3: Helo (Securing Safe Passage - SAF In The Gulf Of Aden)

16. On 22 February 2011, 116 SAF personnel, were involved in an annual joint exercise with the NZDF, when the New Zealand earthquake struck. These SAF personnel were deployed along with NZDF personnel to Christchurch to provide disaster relief and to support the evacuation of civilians and emergency workers. To augment the relief efforts, additional SAF personnel (including a command team), 4 rescue dogs and the Singapore Civil Defence Force's (SCDF) heavy urban search and rescue team and their gear were airlifted over 8,400 km to Christchurch. Thereafter, the two RSAF C130s were deployed alongside NZDF aircraft to create an air bridge to transport relief supplies and people for the duration of the relief efforts - over a period of 11 days, RSAF's C-130s airlifted 50,000 kilograms of relief supplies and aid. For details, see this video: SAF Extends Helping Hand to NZ

Two, Ali Naseer Mohamed's article deliberately and without good reason excludes Brunei, which falls within the definition of a micro-state. Why? Brunei has substantial military capabilities for a micro-state; and is noted for how seriously they have taken armed forces modernization - raising and sustaining a navy and an army that is source of national pride - Brunei regularly punches above its weight class as a micro-state. In fact, Brunei puts some other ASEAN states to shame in this respect - see this ASEAN (and ADMM Plus) Military Exercises thread for details of how Brunei uses its military to foster confidence and enhance military-to-military relations within ASEAN and with ASEAN's plus eight partners.

Three, a weak state need not be a small state. That seems to be terribly unclear in the discussion thus far; and no progress has been made in demonstrating an awareness of the difference.

There are other areas where I disagree with some of the statements made; but these minor disagreements do not pertain to the three conceptual weaknesses in the current discussion. I hope that this attempt at constructive criticism will be taken in the right spirit. If I may, I would also like to share four additional points on Singapore in Q&A format for your general reading pleasure.

When I talk about military strategy, I mean the use of military power to achieve political and/or military ends. It is clear from the prior posts that Singapore has some military power. However, our ability to be seen in exercising this power is constrained by current geo-political reality.

Q1: Why is Singapore so reluctant to use military power as a strategy?

Ans: We use the SAF to achieve political ends but usually not to conduct war (because war in of itself is a blunt policy tool). The SAF is usually used by Singapore to win friends and influence other countries (and not to fight with them). An example of the SAF in non-combat roles is all the humanitarian relief deployments (eg. the Dec 2004 Tsunami) or peace support ops. And the SAF contributes to peace support ops too. If we can achieve the same political goal by negotiations or diplomatic efforts:- Why not? Further, the mere presence of the SAF deters potential aggressors from using force. So ironically, the presence of military power, may reduce the necessity of using military power.

Q2: Why does Singapore focus so much attention on air power?

Ans: Singapore lacks strategic depth and our forces cannot retreat from the city into the jungle. Therefore, it is crucial for us to at least maintain air parity, or if possible, win air superiority so that we can protect the city from aerial bombardment and employ our air power to our tactical advantage to enable us to establish local superiority in battles.

Q3: Why build the Singapore navy, when you have air power?

Ans: We are not self sufficient in food (over the long term) and we need trade to ensure that our city does not starve in a naval blockade. It is no good if we can defend Singapore island but cannot import food because of a naval blockage. In fact, just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Singapore. Being able to defend Singapore island itself is meaningless if we cannot keep our SLOCs open. Further, air power can have a multiplier effect on the RSN's capabilities and gives us a greater choice of tactics in any naval battle.

Q4: Singapore has a strong but small* air force and navy, why do you need an army?

Ans: Because without an army we cannot hold physical ground (we would have to give up the possibility of using forward defence as a potential tactic, if we cannot hold ground) and it would create a force imbalance, that can be easily overcome by a capable aggressor. Further, we are not a true island like NZ or the UK (where they are separated by miles and miles of water), as we are physically connected by 2 land bridges to Malaysia (and therefore physically connected to the rest of mainland Southeast Asia). In WWII, the causeway was demolished by the British but the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were able to cross it in a few hours and bring over their troops, tanks and supplies. So IMHO, a strong army component is essential in any land battle (keeping in mind that the IJA invaded Singapore by a land route). Our army components include recce elements (like LRRPS), armoured battle groups, infantry, artillery, combat engineers and so on.

Footnote:
*Small being a relative concept when compared to regional powers (the RSAF has the best trained and largest combat aircraft fleet amongst the ASEAN countries). The RSN has arguably the most capable naval fleet amongst the ASEAN countries (in terms of force balance).

Further, we are in the military strategy and tactics portion of the forum. Any attempt to link the discussion back to the military aspect would be appreciated. This may include a discussion on the current military capabilities of Maldives; or any further discussion on the backdrop to current security threats that affect a micro-state would be appreciated.

Cheers

 

[tonnyc]

Hi, OPSSG. I've been mulling on this topic for the past few days, which is why I didn't reply immediately.

You have pointed out several weaknesses in the premise that I failed to address. Indeed, I am embarrassed to admit that many of them didn't even occur to me until you pointed it out. I thought about it off and on for several days, but I don't think I can add anything new. Instead, let me try clarifying my position.

I use land-area as my measuring stick for a microstate. Which is why I did not bat an eye when Gkell mentioned Singapore as an example of a microstate even though the article uses population instead of land area as the measuring stick. However, this is an arbitrary measure based on convenience. One thousand squared kilometer is a nice round number. Same thing with 1.5 million people (although 1 million would've been a more convenient number).

However, since the measuring stick is just a convenient number, it is only linked weakly to power, if at all. Certainly having extra space is nice and having a good amount of population base is nice, but there are too many other factors in play such that neither is dominant. I can point to Singapore, Brunei, and even Vatican (the global political pull that Vatican has is disproportionate compared to its land/population size) as counter-examples. In contrast, states with large area and population can be weak.

The other half of the discussion is also obvious to me. No state can afford to ignore diplomacy. Not even superpowers. Even if the disparity of power is such that a stronger state can force the another state into a particular course of action, it is often cheaper and easier to use diplomacy to persuade the other state into the same course of action. Of course, words become far more effective when backed with credible force, but the idea is that you use words (diplomacy) first. Any competent leader will realize and practice this. Diplomacy is part of a country's arsenal in world politics, and no state can afford to ignore it.

Since this is a defense and military forum after all, I'll try to link this back to military matters. I don't want to talk about Maldives though, since I know nothing of Maldives. Instead, I'm going to use Timor Leste as an example. I don't claim any special knowledge or expertise, but at least I know more about it compared to Maldive.

With an area of 15000 km2, technically Timor Leste is not a microstate in my book, but with a population of just 1.1 million, it is a microstate according to the 1.5 million people benchmark. So I'll cheat and say it's a microstate for the purpose of this example. But either way it's a weak state.

Timor Leste's independence was not won militarily. Between the period of 1976 to 1998 the Falintil won no battle of note and in fact can not even engage in open conflict. Their independence was gained via diplomatic means. The Fretilin was able to gain international support in Australia, Europe, and also the UN in general. The Asian financial crisis gave the Fretilin a chance when the Australian Prime Minister made an agreement within 5 years for a referendum a condition for monetary help. Indonesia's counter-move, in comparison, was, well, let me be diplomatic and just say that it's an example of what not to do.

Fast-forward to today and we can still see Timor Leste relying on diplomacy instead of strength of arms. They could be hostile toward Indonesian interests, put an emphasis on defence spending, spend their aid money and gas royalties into arm purchases, and justify all those as protection against the possibility of another invasion. But they don't. Instead, having achieved their goal of independence, they realigned their position into a friendly-neutral position, applied for ASEAN membership, welcomed Indonesian investment, and all that friendly-relationship and mutual-benefit stuff. They still hedge by courting Australian interest, but even then that's still part of diplomacy.

This diplomatic approach advances Timor Leste's interests better than a hardline approach. Had Timor Leste gone hardline, Indonesia would be worried about the presence of a hostile outpost in their backyard and would ramp-up their defense accordingly. Given the disparity in size and economy, the only way Timor Leste can keep up would be through substantial foreign military aid. But from where? Having learned, Indonesia no longer took a hard approach regarding Timor Leste. Indonesia follows a "zero enemy, thousand friends" approach regarding diplomacy with Indonesia supporting Timor Leste's application for ASEAN membership. Overall this diplomatic approach work well for Indonesia. Had Timor Leste gone hardline, it would have been perceived as unreasonable paranoia. They might still get more foreign military aid if they actively seek them, but overall Timor Leste would get far less benefit compared to the current approach. It would have been impossible for them to maintain a link with the enclave of Oecussi, for example. It will also lose a major trade partner, a major source of investment, and a source of aid.

But Timor Leste diplomacy is not just limited to Timor Leste. Timor Leste also maintain good relations with other countries. In military-related matters, it's how Timor Leste police and military got training from Australia and America, bought ships from China plus the training to run them, and got a donation of three patrol boats from South Korea. So not only diplomacy lessens the need for defense, it can actually increases defense capability.

I'm not sure if there's anything else that I need to add. So let's just sum it up.
1. The definition of microstate is vague, but whatever it is a microstate isn't necessarily weak.
2. Regardless of size and strength, all states engage in diplomacy to further their interest. To do otherwise is foolish.
3. Diplomacy can win where conventional military defense can't.
4. Diplomacy makes defense easier, both because you need less defense and because you get more.

Actually, I'll go one step further and distinguish military strength from defense. (Huh, writing this out does clarify my train of thought.) Defense is a goal. An objective. A core interest. A state naturally wants to survive and thus defense is a core interest. Diplomacy and military strength are methods to achieve a nation's interests. So you use both diplomacy and military strength for defense, but you can also use both/either or some other means for other objectives. Some states (or state-like actors) also choose (or be forced) to forego conventional military strength and rely on diplomacy and other methods.

 

[OPSSG]

I've been mulling on this topic for the past few days...

You have pointed out several weaknesses in the premise that I failed to address... I thought about it off and on for several days... Instead, let me try clarifying my position.

Thanks for taking the time to think. It is appreciated.

I use land-area as my measuring stick for a microstate. Which is why I did not bat an eye when Gkell mentioned Singapore as an example of a microstate even though the article uses population instead of land area as the measuring stick. However, this is an arbitrary measure based on convenience. One thousand squared kilometer is a nice round number. Same thing with 1.5 million people (although 1 million would've been a more convenient number).

Description and classification is the start of analysis that may lead to insight. This classification, if accurate, can be helpful.

However, since the measuring stick is just a convenient number, it is only linked weakly to power, if at all.

Close but wrong.

Power is another dimension of analysis for micro-states/small states that can be expressed in the form of hard power (eg. sea power dimension, air power dimension or even land power dimension) and in soft power (eg. economic, political and other dimensions).

One of LKY's great contribution as a statesman is his leadership team's invention of what some American scholars have called geo-economics in the late 1960s/70s (rather than just the hard and soft power dimensions of geo-politics). It is a comprehensive approach to what is today called a 'whole-of-government' approach to affairs between states. Singapore use of hard power is always part of a 'whole-of-government' approach - be it with soft diplomacy or with coercive diplomacy. Singapore does engage in diplomacy, with a hard power edge, to manage our relations with our neighbours.

The Singapore Government's soft power approach is to essentially function as a 'consulting organisation' (i.e. Singapore Consulting) to other governments in the area of geo-economics.

A past client of Singapore Consulting, is China. While China may have out grown Singapore, they acknowledge Singapore's role in China's growth - which is why the Singapore Government has such good access to China's leadership - a resource that the Americans and the Taiwanese have tapped on from time to time. In the past, China has had three distinct phases spanning decades (of learn from Singapore), with the first phase initiated by Deng (with China going so far as to hire a retired Singaporean minister as a consultant for part of their development blue print of the coastal cities). Over 16,000 officials from China have been trained by Singapore through the years - which means that yesterday's junior Chinese officials trained in Singapore are in senior positions (and they have at one-time been hosted and subject to the hospitality of the Singapore Government).

Vietnam is now learning to take the same path that China trod in the past.

Certainly having extra space is nice and having a good amount of population base is nice, but there are too many other factors in play such that neither is dominant.

A good attempt but you are getting muddled in your thinking - go back to 'geo-economics'

I can point to Singapore, Brunei... In contrast, states with large area and population can be weak.

Pure description is not analysis. Accurate description is the start of analysis but is not the be all of analysis.

The other half of the discussion is also obvious to me. No state can afford to ignore diplomacy. Not even superpowers.

Yes, correct. But not useful.

Even if the disparity of power is such that a stronger state can force the another state into a particular course of action, it is often cheaper and easier to use diplomacy to persuade the other state into the same course of action.

No. I disagree with your approach.

Nations with power will use their power in different ways - whether it is the use of soft power or the use of hard power. Diplomats are used to conduct coercive diplomacy as part of the normal interaction between states.

Both US and China do engage in coercive diplomacy. And at various times, the Philippines has been subject to either of their efforts. Being subject to coercive diplomacy sucks but it is a fact of life for many third world nations, especially micro-states in third world regions.

Of course, words become far more effective when backed with credible force, but the idea is that you use words (diplomacy) first. Any competent leader will realize and practice this. Diplomacy is part of a country's arsenal in world politics, and no state can afford to ignore it.

Yes, a truism but this is not analysis.

With an area of 15000 km2, technically Timor Leste is not a microstate in my book, but with a population of just 1.1 million, it is a microstate according to the 1.5 million people benchmark. So I'll cheat and say it's a microstate for the purpose of this example.

Agreed. As a descriptive label, a micro-state fits Timor Leste, very well.

Timor Leste's independence was not won militarily.

That is not the point; and an event of the past. You also need to catch up on reading about military aspects of the operations. Start with reading the 50 page, Working Paper No. 20 by David Stevens for the naval role in operations in Timor Leste. Read it in detail to gain a basic understanding military options for a middle power and coalition operations - where coercive diplomacy was applied by the Australian Government (exercising its military options) to moderate the actions of competing elements of the Indonesian state (keeping in mind that there are different competing interests in Indonesia, with the destiny of a micro-state handing in the balance). For a Singaporean perspective, see this 2004 Pointer article by Deep Singh.

Fast-forward to today and we can still see Timor Leste relying on diplomacy instead of strength of arms.

It is not working. It's request for membership into ASEAN is being blocked (see Timor-Leste and ASEAN: Doors Closing for Dili’s Membership?).

This diplomatic approach advances Timor Leste's interests better than a hardline approach. Had Timor Leste gone hardline, Indonesia would be worried about the presence of a hostile outpost in their backyard and would ramp-up their defense accordingly.

They have no alternative recourse as a micro-state that does not have a competent government.

Indonesia follows a "zero enemy, thousand friends" approach regarding diplomacy with Indonesia supporting Timor Leste's application for ASEAN membership.

But Timor Leste is not a member and not on track to becoming a member of ASEAN. Verbal support means nothing - it is just a public diplomacy ploy. In 2010, Timor Leste has even offered to provide a training area for the SAF, an offer which the Singapore Government does not intend to take up (see this article). This is another example of diplomatic failure by a micro-state. As you can see, with two RSIS links on Timor Leste, I have shown the limits of your understanding with regards to the issues faced by Timor Leste.

1. The definition of microstate is vague, but whatever it is a microstate isn't necessarily weak.

No. Description is not analysis.

2. Regardless of size and strength, all states engage in diplomacy to further their interest. To do otherwise is foolish.

Yes, a truism.

3. Diplomacy can win where conventional military defense can't.

Diplomacy is a tool of state power. Coercive diplomacy is but a sub-set of a tool of state power - where a government can take a multi-track approach to a particular problem. Those micro-states without power are subject to the application of state power by their neighbours.

4. Diplomacy makes defense easier, both because you need less defense and because you get more.

No, muddled thinking - deterrence is a function of hard power and diplomacy is not a good substitute for hard power (it defines the starting position of negotiations). There are also various dimensions of state power that you have not understood, which led to your strange conclusion.

Some states (or state-like actors) also choose (or be forced) to forego conventional military strength and rely on diplomacy and other methods.

Think on the story of the grasshopper and the ant. Grasshoppers die in winter, just as states do come and go (as historical entities). South Vietnam is an example of a former state that no longer exists.

Cheers

 

[Gkell]

OPSSG, thank you for the warm welcome, its an honor to engage in these sort of discussions with a great intellect as yourself and Tonnyc.

Sorry it took me a few days to reply ive been busy with school and the level of discussion we are engaged in needs a lot of research and thinking on my part, its not like a forum topic where i can reply with general knowledge haha!

I noticed something though, when Tonnyc said
Even if the disparity of power is such that a stronger state can force the another state into a particular course of action, it is often cheaper and easier to use diplomacy to persuade the other state into the same course of action.

OPSSG answer was in the negative. In a scenario like this where a micro third world state is subjected to hard power by a stronger state, I cant see why diplomacy cannot be the best approach since they primarily have no capability to counter act the strong state actions. I understand the Philippines have been subjected to hard power by the US and China but i believe a more appropriate response to this is to exercise the Philippines soft powers more, because what choice do they have?

A reason why the Philippines have not focused too much on its armed Forces is because its under the wing of the US. Any external threat and the PH will refer the matter to the US. Isnt this a form of diplomacy?

Thank you for your replies

 

[OPSSG]

...the level of discussion we are engaged in needs a lot of research and thinking on my part, its not like a forum topic where i can reply with general knowledge haha!

I am just shooting the breeze. Please don't take this casual discussion too seriously. We are here to exchange ideas and learn from one another. You provided a source on micro-states, I read it and learnt something new from your post. So many thanks.

OPSSG answer was in the negative.

I explained why I think Tonnyc is wrong. But I am not sure you understand what I said in my prior post - partly because I don't know where you are coming from. Are you originally from the Maldives (and have a special interest in micro-states)?

In a scenario like this where a micro third world state is subjected to hard power by a stronger state, I cant see why diplomacy cannot be the best approach since they primarily have no capability to counter act the strong state actions.

Geography is important and a country cannot change its location nor geography. New Zealand is a small state that is geographically blessed with neighbours, like Australia, which is not a military threat. Whereas Kuwait is a small state that is geographically cursed with having Iraq and Iran as neighbours, having suffered from an invasion by Iraq before. Where you are located matters.

The competence (or lack thereof) of the government, matters. The outlook and competence of the people in a country matters too. IMHO, a country's outlook is often shaped by history or shared trauma.

I understand the Philippines have been subjected to hard power by the US and China...

If you have an interest in matters relating to the Philippines, you may want to consider reading and posting in the “South China Sea thoughts? thread”, rather than here (with my 18 point reply in relevant to your concerns).

Cheers

 

[Gkell]

Im from the Philippines. the reason im so interested in small and Micro states Is because I find that these are the states that should rely a lot more on strategy than anything since they are lacking in the physical department so to speak. So to survive and thrive in our world, the weaker states need to maneuver themselves in a position of relative advantage. I now believe that diplomacy can provide the weaker states room to maneuver into a more advantageous position rather than be completely subjected to the hard powers of stronger countries. Taking into consideration thats one should not disregard hard power as you have said.

Thats it basically.. My focus in on the study of strategy, hence this topic, although i do apologize for the theme, i understand this is about
Military strategy although i believe war and diplomacy to be very intertwined..

Everything aside, im humbled by your knowledge i hope
To learn more from you..

 

[OPSSG]

I now believe that diplomacy can provide the weaker states room to maneuver into a more advantageous position rather than be completely subjected to the hard powers of stronger countries.

No. In the real world, a weak state gets to maneuver from a weak position into another weaker position. The weaker a state is, the more likely continued escalation becomes the choosing of its enemies.

I was wondering if I should tell you the truth? Or would the truth be too painful? In the international arena of the regional diplomatic chess game, the Philippine diplomatic service is playing checkers. Let me explain in three steps, why being weak sucks:

One, in relative terms, the Philippines is the weakest of all states with claims in the South China Sea; and there is no threat of 'invasion' of populated areas. What we are seeing is the Philippines being subject to coercive diplomacy and everybody, namely, US, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei is content with the status quo.

Two, the US gets to give a statement of reassurance every now and then. The fact, that the US needs to make such statements every now-and-then (be it in front of Philippine press or at international events), is a constant reminder of Philippine naval impotence. This has the added benefit of showing the ruling class in the Philippines that they need their US ally, which ensures a more pliable Philippine ruling class to US led diplomatic initiatives in the years ahead, instead of the usual local resentment of Uncle Sam.

Three, given China's ability to conduct patrols with its now unified coast guard, it is also content with the status quo. Their ability to conduct presence patrols cements their advantage with the plus in that they get to demonstrate resolve in coercive diplomacy without needing to fire a single shot - all the while enjoying the benefits of the recent downturn in the Taiwan-Philippine bilateral relations. The Philippine and Taiwanese mis-steps in the arena of diplomacy destroys the earlier Japanese-Taiwanese plan to isolate China's extensive maritime claims (by signing a Japan-Taiwan fishery agreement). Other ASEAN members with claims are also content with the status quo - as ASEAN presses forward to keep the parties talking and not shooting. Actual Philippine naval impotence ensures the continuance of the current status quo, to the satisfaction of every party. Even the local Philipppine press is happy, it gives them viewership hits.