Role of Light Tanks

RobWilliams

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It's a more flexible solution too i'd imagine, it's not unreasonable to assume that direct fire support may be required and deploying MBTs may be impractical for whatever reason.

Like recently with Operation Serval in Mali, the French used plenty AMX-10s in lieu of MBTS with the Leclerc's being held back only to be deployed "when neccesary". They had the ports to be able to get them there, but the situation didn't require them, unless the sh*t hit the fan.

So i'd say there are uses for them, situations which you want to give light inf the support the indicators say they should get but not have to deploy heavy armour.
 

Waylander

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The Centauros were bought to fill the role of a very mobile direct fire capability to be employed on their long coastline. Wheeled vehicles can cover huge distances on their own power.

They also serve the french well in Africa. But Africa is a special place. The enemy is usually very low tech as well as bad trained/organised/led. And the transport networks are often very rough, too. Nevertheless the French units based in surrounding countries arrived in Mali in a very good time.

If confronted with the possibility of a more sophisticated enemy the French also deploy tanks like they have done in Lebanon.
 

Abraham Gubler

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Wheeled light tanks like Centauro, Rooikat and Stryker MGS can actually be more lethal than main battle tanks in open terrain combat. This is because they can move much quicker and concentrate their force to overwhelm slower enemy tanks and avoid being countered by enemy counter measures. But in close terrain this speed advantage can not be exploited and the lack of armour makes them very vulnerable to attack by short range weapons.
 

Feanor

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Wheeled light tanks like Centauro, Rooikat and Stryker MGS can actually be more lethal than main battle tanks in open terrain combat. This is because they can move much quicker and concentrate their force to overwhelm slower enemy tanks and avoid being countered by enemy counter measures. But in close terrain this speed advantage can not be exploited and the lack of armour makes them very vulnerable to attack by short range weapons.
Would they really be more lethal then MBTs? The level of protection is laughable in comparison. Maybe they'd be better against light armor, but against other MBTs, I have to wonder. How well would a unit of Stryker MGS do against a T-72B btln in a head on encounter, even in open terrain?

Also, a fairly simple example, across the front even a fairly old T-72B is nearly impervious to RPGs and SMAWs. Newer MBTs even more so. Even in open terrain, can vehicles like the Centauro replace an MBT, for mechanized assaults against a prepared defense?

They also serve the french well in Africa. But Africa is a special place. The enemy is usually very low tech as well as bad trained/organised/led. And the transport networks are often very rough, too. Nevertheless the French units based in surrounding countries arrived in Mali in a very good time.
Here's my question, how much of an improvement in tactical mobility to tracks vs wheels offer for light and medium armor? There was a discussion of transitioning IFVs to wheeled chassis in Russia, due to a misunderstanding of some public statements, and a lot of military and ex-military officers raised questions about moving to wheeled chassis, comparing the MT-LB and BTR series vehicles. Granted it wasn't a fair comparison, since the MT-LB isn't a true APC, but rather an armored tractor of sorts (designed for towing arty, originally), and since the appropriate comparison would be to the BMP-1/2/3. Anyways, do units like the Centauro or Stryker MGS sacrifice mobility in poor terrain, because they're wheeled?

If confronted with the possibility of a more sophisticated enemy the French also deploy tanks like they have done in Lebanon.
So does this mean that units like the AMX-10RC have a very narrow niche? Again, one of the contexts for my original question was some discussion of replacing MBTs in Motor-Rifle brigades, with light tanks on wheeled and tracked chassis, unified with the basic vehicle chassis for the brigade.
 

Abraham Gubler

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Would they really be more lethal then MBTs? The level of protection is laughable in comparison. Maybe they'd be better against light armor, but against other MBTs, I have to wonder. How well would a unit of Stryker MGS do against a T-72B btln in a head on encounter, even in open terrain?
They’d be far more lethal because fighting one on one went out of fashion after Achilles killed Hector and dragged his corpse around the walls of Troy behind his chariot. The rapid mobility gun system concentrates force and engages the heavier main battle tanks 10-1 (or numbers to that effect). So in the Stryker MGS vs T-72B battle the Stykers would use their mobility advantage in open terrain to either concentrate and overwhelm the T-72s battalion to company or fall back until they can concentrate.
 

Feanor

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They’d be far more lethal because fighting one on one went out of fashion after Achilles killed Hector and dragged his corpse around the walls of Troy behind his chariot. The rapid mobility gun system concentrates force and engages the heavier main battle tanks 10-1 (or numbers to that effect). So in the Stryker MGS vs T-72B battle the Stykers would use their mobility advantage in open terrain to either concentrate and overwhelm the T-72s battalion to company or fall back until they can concentrate.
But if you're looking at replacing MBTs with APC-based guns on a 1 for 1 basis, it wouldn't work quite so well, because a motor-rifle brigade is supposed to act independently...

The question then becomes, can you concentrate those numbers. 10 motor-rifle brigades providing assets to deal with one tank btln, isn't likely to work well. Especially if it's a situation where a single, or a couple, MRBs are advancing ahead of the main force. I do know that the textbook answer would be tac-air, but not all countries have the same availability of those assets as the US.
 

Abraham Gubler

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But if you're looking at replacing MBTs with APC-based guns on a 1 for 1 basis, it wouldn't work quite so well, because a motor-rifle brigade is supposed to act independently...
A motor what now? If the force employment of a certain unit is infantry support then it isn’t going to be fighting tanks except in self defence. But the Russian Army is certainly not the only real or potential user of wheeled tanks and while their experimentation may be why some people are getting involved in this discussion it has nothing to do with my input.

My input however is based on US Army and Australian Army experimentation over the past 30 odd years which has demonstrated that armoured and armoured cavalry units equipped with light weight rapid mobility gun systems are in open terrain more lethal than conventional main battle tanks. Inflicting extremely high positive loss destroy ratios on conventional forces. However these units suffer the reverse when drawn into close terrain (urban and forest areas) and can even suffer negative loss destroy ratios against non-mechanised and even insurgent forces under these circumstances.

The key to the high lethality of the light weight rapid mobility gun systems being their far higher march mobility allowing for concentration of force and controlling the engagement geometry (ie battle range).
 

Volkodav

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A motor what now? If the force employment of a certain unit is infantry support then it isn’t going to be fighting tanks except in self defence. But the Russian Army is certainly not the only real or potential user of wheeled tanks and while their experimentation may be why some people are getting involved in this discussion it has nothing to do with my input.

My input however is based on US Army and Australian Army experimentation over the past 30 odd years which has demonstrated that armoured and armoured cavalry units equipped with light weight rapid mobility gun systems are in open terrain more lethal than conventional main battle tanks. Inflicting extremely high positive loss destroy ratios on conventional forces. However these units suffer the reverse when drawn into close terrain (urban and forest areas) and can even suffer negative loss destroy ratios against non-mechanised and even insurgent forces under these circumstances.

The key to the high lethality of the light weight rapid mobility gun systems being their far higher march mobility allowing for concentration of force and controlling the engagement geometry (ie battle range).
So basically wheeled CAV and mounted infantry for open terrain while embedding tanks and Armoured engineers in infantry for MOUT.
 

Feanor

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A motor what now?
Mech infantry brigade, packing lots of SP artillery, armor, and organic AA.

If the force employment of a certain unit is infantry support then it isn’t going to be fighting tanks except in self defence.
Prime example, in 2008 during the Georgian war, MBT companies were split up among Motor-Rifle Btlns. One such mixed formation ran into Georgian mech infantry with MBTs. They managed to engage the Georgian T-72s quite successfully, despite being actually outnumbered, and out classed (the Russian tanks were T-62Ms). My question is this, are you saying that in a similar situation a unit using wheeled SP guns would have had to retreat?

But the Russian Army is certainly not the only real or potential user of wheeled tanks and while their experimentation may be why some people are getting involved in this discussion it has nothing to do with my input
I suppose you could replace motor-rifle brigade with Stryker brigade. For these purposes they're nearly identical.

My input however is based on US Army and Australian Army experimentation over the past 30 odd years which has demonstrated that armoured and armoured cavalry units equipped with light weight rapid mobility gun systems are in open terrain more lethal than conventional main battle tanks. Inflicting extremely high positive loss destroy ratios on conventional forces. However these units suffer the reverse when drawn into close terrain (urban and forest areas) and can even suffer negative loss destroy ratios against non-mechanised and even insurgent forces under these circumstances.

The key to the high lethality of the light weight rapid mobility gun systems being their far higher march mobility allowing for concentration of force and controlling the engagement geometry (ie battle range).
So my question to you then is this, if there are 1-3 Stryker brigades advancing, in relatively open terrain, and encounter an enemy mechanized unit, with an MBT btln in it. Those Strykers would need to fall back, until they can muster a 10:1 advantage in MGS to MBT ratio? That doesn't sound right. Would that indeed be their MPCOA?

Another question, are Stryker MGS, and similar vehicles, split among infantry units, to provide direct support, or are they solely used as a maneuver element?
 

Abraham Gubler

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My question is this, are you saying that in a similar situation a unit using wheeled SP guns would have had to retreat?
Ahh no. I think you seriously misunderstand what I was saying.

I suppose you could replace motor-rifle brigade with Stryker brigade. For these purposes they're nearly identical.
Sure and the Stryker brigade with a battalion of MGS in open terrain would thump a Russian MRB equipped with legacy equipment.

So my question to you then is this, if there are 1-3 Stryker brigades advancing, in relatively open terrain, and encounter an enemy mechanized unit, with an MBT btln in it. Those Strykers would need to fall back, until they can muster a 10:1 advantage in MGS to MBT ratio? That doesn't sound right. Would that indeed be their MPCOA?
10 to 1 was just something I said to indicate how much better the wheeled MGS unit can concentrate. That you are dwelling on it indicates a fundamental lack of understanding in mechanised warfare. One Stryker brigade with enough room to move vs one MRB with legacy Soviet/Russian equipment will result in a win to the Strykers.

Another question, are Stryker MGS, and similar vehicles, split among infantry units, to provide direct support, or are they solely used as a maneuver element?
Under the current focus of the Stryker BCT for medium intensity COIN they are for infantry support but trained for mechanised manoeuvre operations the MGS becomes the centrepiece of the combat team.

Some assumptions you seem to have generated need to be jettisoned.

1. That Stryker MGS type vehicles need to have 10:1 advantage to win.
2. That Stryker MGS type vehicles have to retreat to win.

What I meant was that the faster speed of movement of the Stryker and similar enables them to concentrate to overwhelm older main battle tanks. For example a lead tank company of an advancing legacy tank battalion would be hit by an entire battalion of MGS type vehicles resulting in destruction of the tank company. And if for example an MGS type company was to run into an advancing battalion this company could just fall back before being engaged and concentrate with the rest of its brigade to destroy the advancing battalion.

In one US experiment a brigade of RDF/LT (13.2 tonne vehicle armed with a rapid fire 75mm gun) supported by a battalion of Chinook helicopters was able to comfortable defeat an entire GSFG tank division (T-64s) in south western Germany terrain because of the rapid mobility of the RDF/LTs lifted by helicopters.
 

Feanor

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Sure and the Stryker brigade with a battalion of MGS in open terrain would thump a Russian MRB equipped with legacy equipment.
See, that's what I thought too...

10 to 1 was just something I said to indicate how much better the wheeled MGS unit can concentrate. That you are dwelling on it indicates a fundamental lack of understanding in mechanised warfare. One Stryker brigade with enough room to move vs one MRB with legacy Soviet/Russian equipment will result in a win to the Strykers.

Under the current focus of the Stryker BCT for medium intensity COIN they are for infantry support but trained for mechanised manoeuvre operations the MGS becomes the centrepiece of the combat team.
So essentially they fill the exact same role as MBTs do in the legacy MRBde set up. Ok, this makes more sense.

What I do know seems to imply that Stryker MGS are organic to a rifle-company rather then a separate unit. Does this mean they would detach for the purposes of playing as a maneuver element and form a composite unit, or would an entire rifle company be the maneuver element? In which case they would only have 3 actual MGS to act in the anti-armor role...

I've found FM3-21.31 on the Stryker BCT, but don't have time to read the whole thing right now, so I'll look at it tomorrow.

Some assumptions you seem to have generated need to be jettisoned.

1. That Stryker MGS type vehicles need to have 10:1 advantage to win.
2. That Stryker MGS type vehicles have to retreat to win.
It appears I misunderstood what you said. Those weren't assumptions, I actually found it rather incredible that you appeared to be saying those things.

What I meant was that the faster speed of movement of the Stryker and similar enables them to concentrate to overwhelm older main battle tanks. For example a lead tank company of an advancing legacy tank battalion would be hit by an entire battalion of MGS type vehicles resulting in destruction of the tank company. And if for example an MGS type company was to run into an advancing battalion this company could just fall back before being engaged and concentrate with the rest of its brigade to destroy the advancing battalion.
Would this work similarly against modern MBTs, just less effectively, or would the Strykers behave differently? Also, against legacy tanks it's not unfair to assume that the Strykers will see them first, and using speed, have contempt of engagement. But against more modern MBTs will this still be the case?

Finally I'm not sure I agree with your assumption that the tanks will be moving without a recon screen in front. While this is the case far too often with Russia, it stems from poor planning and training (especially on the higher officer level) rather them doctrine or concept of employment. If the Strykers encounter a recon screen, riding similar light vehicles (BTR-80/82 recon variants, or a western equivalent), they won't be able to know whether enemy tanks are behind them, or mech-infantry, or nothing at all. Would the engage the recon screen? Fall back?

Also the Stryker MGS' themselves, will they be on point in the brigade, in an advance?

In one US experiment a brigade of RDF/LT (13.2 tonne vehicle armed with a rapid fire 75mm gun) supported by a battalion of Chinook helicopters was able to comfortable defeat an entire GSFG tank division (T-64s) in south western Germany terrain because of the rapid mobility of the RDF/LTs lifted by helicopters.
Sure, but with vertical insertion you can also negate terrain features like rivers, buildings, etc. and of course the helos can provide recon capability. I'm also assuming the experiment ignored division AA assets, to allow those Chinooks to fly around freely (or were they dodging around the engagement envelopes of the SA-6s and SA-8s?). So while the experiment is very interesting, and does showcase the significance of mobility vs protection, it has limitations when considered here.

Another question, would this work similarly if we were talking about a tracked medium or light SP gun system? Sprut-SD comes to mind as the most relevant real world example, but the BMP-3 and BMD-4 both provide capabilities that aren't far off (with the 100mm main guns+30mm autocannon combinations). I'm not aware of western vehicles of the sort.

If the Kurganets-25 is completed, there will likely be a light tank/self-prop gun of ~125mm caliber on that chassis as well.
 

Waylander

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Well, I remember Eckherl talking of US Heavy units eating medium units alive in maneuvers.

The problem I see with the assumption of medium units making easy prey of heavy formations center around two main points.

The first is that the recon and C4i assets of the medium unit are superior so that they can detect and track the enemy main force and operate faster and with more cohesion and reaction time.

That only works against 3rd and 2nd class enemies. There is no reason for a modern heavy unit not to have the same recon and C4i capabilities as a medium unit. The digital network concept for ground combat units first widespread use having been the IVIS on the M1A2s speaks volumes.

The second point is the assumption of lots of room for maneuvers in favourable terrain. There are lots of terrain features which may hinder movement for all kinds of vehicles and channel them into certain areas and/or which restrict the movement of wheeled vehicles making it harder for the medium force to come to grips or disengage with the heavy unit.

Specific tactical or strategic objectives are also an important factor. Some areas just need to get attacked for one reason or the other and this also restricts the freedom of maneuver for a medium force.

Last but not least one has to think about units not operating alone and two single units fighting it out on the open plain is a rather academic scenario. A Russian MotRifleDiv on the inner german border wouldn't have operated alone with ample time and maneuver space for an enemy unit to dismantle it. Units to it's flanks and rear may very well restrict the available space for maneuver alot and could put some serious pressure onto ans unit trying to get into the flanks or rear of said MotRifleDiv. I find the idea of doing multiple air assault runs in chinooks around a division in what was probably the most unfriendly area for rotary wing assets ever rather unrealistic.

In the end I also think that given a lower quality enemy and/or lots of freedom for maneuver a medium unit may very well inflict serious damage on a heavy unit. But I also think that given qualitative and technological parity a medium unit will suffer alot from a heavy unit and is completely overmatched if it has to cope with restricted room for maneuver.
 

DJ_Lethal

Banned Member
light tanks can only be classified as infantry support.why?
1. they cant battle another tank without getting destroyed easily
2.their always the first to be deployed when a unit needs help.
3.their also called APC(armored personnel carrier)
4.their mostly used against enemy infantry
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
light tanks can only be classified as infantry support.why?
1. they cant battle another tank without getting destroyed easily
2.their always the first to be deployed when a unit needs help.
3.their also called APC(armored personnel carrier)
4.their mostly used against enemy infantry
All of these are either situational or incorrect. You might want to read a bit more about the topic before you go making assertions like that, far better to take the time to inform yourself.
 

Cadredave

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
3.their also called APC(armored personnel carrier)
I think you need to understand the fundamental difference between a APC/Lt Tank there roles and capabilities.

1. M113 is an APC Battlefield taxi no more no less its job is to drop the Infantry short, on, or through the objective its job is not to engage AFV.

2. M8 was to fulfil the role of a true Lt tank unfortunately it never made it into production.

Posting the same response over will not endear you to those on here who do this for a living this site is not MP.net do some basic research to help you.
 

DJ_Lethal

Banned Member
I think you need to understand the fundamental difference between a APC/Lt Tank there roles and capabilities.

1. M113 is an APC Battlefield taxi no more no less its job is to drop the Infantry short, on, or through the objective its job is not to engage AFV.

2. M8 was to fulfil the role of a true Lt tank unfortunately it never made it into production.

Posting the same response over will not endear you to those on here who do this for a living this site is not MP.net do some basic research to help you.
light tank APC same shit different designs

All of these are either situational or incorrect. You might want to read a bit more about the topic before you go making assertions like that, far better to take the time to inform yourself.
I would love to but even if i try to my mind would only take like 1% of what i read so yeah
 

Cadredave

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
light tank APC same shit different designs
They are not the same shit different designs they do totally different jobs (roles) you do understand that one carries Infantry and the other supports them depending on the doctrine involved?
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
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light tank APC same shit different designs
a light tank and APC have glaringly different mission sets designed around the platform capability - they're not even remotely close to what an MBT is tasked to do


I would love to but even if i try to my mind would only take like 1% of what i read so yeah
which is a shame because its apparent that not only have you not read the Forum Rules, but you also haven't seemed to pick up the fact that the Blue Tag of Def Professional indicates that the person tagged as such has a verifiable background

You don't understand basic concepts and then elect to be rude for effect

It would pay to listen to those who have the experience rather than publicly show that you are clueless abut the subject and then demonstrate the cardinal sin of being a knob to back up your lack of understanding and manners.

People are prepared to help those who want to learn, they're less keen to help people who are arrogant and clueless
 
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