The Syrian army is quite familiar with fighting guerillas, that is most of what they have been doing since the 1973 war with Israel.
The problem is that the majority of the troops are Sunni Arab with Alawite (Shia) officers. As a result very few of the units are trusted in the current conflict. Most of the fighting is being done with non-Sunni units and Alawite militia. Moral is poor and dropping, estimated on defections to the rebel cause run as high as 60,000.
If Assad had the power to end the conflict quickly he would have done so. Up until recently the great powers would not have been able to intervene in time to stop it, and would probably accept it as a fait accompli. No point in invading if the people you would be try to save are already dead.
A point you also need to consider here is that the revolutionaries see this as a do-or-die conflict. If their side loses Assad will kill not only them but their families and relatives as well. Look up the Hama massacres of 1981 and 1982. That is SOP for the Assads.
The low estimate Hezbollah troops in Syria is now over 2000, with some estimtes over 6000, and they are deployed as combat units, not advisors or trainers. Hezbollah spearheaded the recent operations. Iran is rumored to be preparing to send up to 4000 al-Qud troops.
"The problem is that the majority of the troops are Sunni Arab with Alawite (Shia) officers. As a result very few of the units are trusted in the current conflict. Most of the fighting is being done with non-Sunni units and Alawite militia. Moral is poor and dropping, estimated on defections to the rebel cause run as high as 60,000."
I agree with your first point. But still, their morale is quite high. Take it from the perspective of a soldier fighting for his loved ones and his family. Besides, the Syrian army is fighting not only in Aleppo and Homs, but in numerous rebel-controlled areas all over Syria. Not all suni units are expected to defect.
"If Assad had the power to end the conflict quickly he would have done so. Up until recently the great powers would not have been able to intervene in time to stop it, and would probably accept it as a fait accompli. No point in invading if the people you would be try to save are already dead."
I disagree there. He had the power to end the conflict, and still has, but the main problem is Russia's stake in Syria. Syria is just another nation under Russian influence, and the Syrian civil war can be somewhat compared to a proxy war between the Ruskies and the Yanks. Assad can't take an independent decision to end the conflict without consulting the Russians, lest lose Russian support. It is evident, in the cases of the city of Al Qusayr and the Baba Amr neighborhood, that the Syrian army can wrap things up quickly. Al Qusayr, which had 10-20,000 rebels holed up over there for 2 years, was decimated in a week by the Syrian army. Baba Amr suffered the same fate.
"The low estimate Hezbollah troops in Syria is now over 2000, with some estimtes over 6000, and they are deployed as combat units, not advisors or trainers. Hezbollah spearheaded the recent operations. Iran is rumored to be preparing to send up to 4000 al-Qud troops."
I disagree there. These estimates on the media come from suni activists, and it is only logical that they want to exaggerate Hezbollah numbers so as to start a sectarian war and rally more support for their cause. Even so, Hezbollah units are nowhere near the experience of the Syrian spec ops units which were fighting in Al Qusayr. They can't substitute for the Syrian soldiers. The only reason Hezbollah intervened is because Al Qusayr happens to be near Hezbollah weapons storages and if these are compromised they're screwed. And concerning Iran, it's quite likely they might send soldiers, but this will be faced by a severe response from the West, which will most likely be in the form of sanctions.
"A point you also need to consider here is that the revolutionaries see this as a do-or-die conflict. If their side loses Assad will kill not only them but their families and relatives as well. Look up the Hama massacres of 1981 and 1982. That is SOP for the Assads."
The revolutionaries don't care about it. The number of actual Syrians on the side of rebels has become negligible compared to the number of jihadists and mercenaries.