Here's a laugh, he talks about how a QEC + F35B + MASC will not give us a full strike capability, but calls Ark Royal (the 'through deck cruiser' Ark Royal) a strike carrier.
Here's a laugh, he talks about how a QEC + F35B + MASC will not give us a full strike capability, but calls Ark Royal (the 'through deck cruiser' Ark Royal) a strike carrier.
The Royal Navy's only strike carrier as discarded along with the Harriers and when the campaign in Libya came about . . . (talk about expensive basing etc)
Generally I would support the view of incompetence over conspiracy, however having met a few politicians even with a defence interest, the level of knowledge around the F35, at the time was very low. Even when explained a few times, they didn't get the difference between the: a, b & c.From the NAO report on the reversion:
"The October 2010 decision was based on immature data and a number
of flawed assumptions, partly because the Department decided not to involve
commercial and industrial partners in the process."
In short, from that, someone pulled it out of their bottom.
For a decision to have been made that rapidly, the circle of decision makers must have been small. I doubt we can ascribe conspiracy to this as conspiracies are rarely so well orchestrated.
^^^^^^ This, this a thousand times. It would have been a capability offered 70% of the year with no guarantees of appropriate levels of funding.If this was a conspiracy to shaft the RN, then the decision would never have been reversed.
The additional range in the F-35C is there to enable it to have enough endurance to recover safely. Further STOVL carriers can operate closer to enemy shores because of their freedom of movement compared to a conventional carrier. All of which indicates that the difference in range does not provide an increase in strike radius for the F-35C. For example if the sea based USN and USMC were flying F-35s in ODS the USMC F-35Bs would have had more radius into Iraq than the USN F-35Cs.Range helps the RN as well - that extra reach keeps the carrier in a bigger area of ocean and makes it that harder to prosecute as a target so I'm sure taking C would have suited the RN as well.
Maybe for land basing but not for seabasing which is the primary role of the F-35B or F-35C. Considering the various enablers available by FMS from the USN then a fully funded CATOBAR carrier would be better. But that decision was to have been made 10-15 years ago – if not in 1982-83 – and the HMG is not funding the UK Forces for this kind of full golf bag carrier capability.F35C was better for the *country* if it could have been afforded - longer range, bigger payload, larger weapons bays, all services would have benefited from the choice of aircraft. The overall package however was markedly worse, with one carrier being on tap, much later in the day.
The ‘conspiracy’ was to provide a ‘reason’ to cut the carriers and Harrier from the force now and until the CVF and F-35 are ready. If there was no change from F-35B to F-35C one couldn’t make the argument that there was no continuity between the current force and the new one. So therefore you couldn’t make a ‘logical’ argument that the current carrier and Harrier force could be disbanded.If this was a conspiracy to shaft the RN, then the decision would never have been reversed.
I'm arguing there was no conspiracy - a small group of people made a decision based on poor quality information and some out of date assumptions, then reversed themselves a bit later once the figures landed.
Sadly not unique to Sharkey, this interesting quote about the top RNAS WW1 ace Raymond Collishaw and his "Black Flight" (I think only 5 pilots, all Canadian).I think you’ll find with Sharkey his hatred of the RAF is very personal and comes down to the very shabby way he and his squadron pilots were treated by them after the end of the Falklands War. Also the way the RAF went overdrive in its media campaign about what a role they played in the Falklands whereas the RN’s was played down.
Keeping out to sea a bit and being restricted to flying from land bases, is a completely different ball game, as Libya demonstrated. I think the recognition that the politicians would have swapped all the Tornados for a few Harriers, has pretty much guaranteed both CVFs future.Range helps the RN as well - that extra reach keeps the carrier in a bigger area of ocean and makes it that harder to prosecute as a target so I'm sure taking C would have suited the RN as well.
F35C was better for the *country* if it could have been afforded - longer range, bigger payload, larger weapons bays, all services would have benefited from the choice of aircraft. The overall package however was markedly worse, with one carrier being on tap, much later in the day.
If this was a conspiracy to shaft the RN, then the decision would never have been reversed.
I would be surprised if it actually came through this upgrade both fleets are very tired. Im not sure the money will be their especially with the Navy being quite keen to downsides Marines(with the good old fashioned talk of removing Marines completely)Interesting that the USMC are now looking to retain their AV-8Bs until 2030 as the F/A-18C/D are in more urgent need of replacement. According to Flight Global:
US Marine Corps studying Harrier enhancements
they are looking at a raft of upgrades to keep the aircraft viable into the future including new weapons (including AMRAAM) and possibly a new radar. Reading this I couldn't help but think of the RAF/RAN harrier fleet and how its capability and service life could have been improved to a similar degree.
I suppose part of the reason the USMC can look at life extending their Harriers is the fact they have the ex UK machines to cannibalize, so it could be argued that they may not be able to do the life extension had the UK not sold them theirs but just the same some form of extension should be possible.
Its too bad the RAF never developed the F3 based Tornado 2000 as this would have permitted the retention of the Harrier and retirement of the GR Tornados.
The loss of the RNAS, along with some of the RN's more forward thinking and certainly aviation focused officers was huge. They were left with the battleship officers, who became the battleship admirals. By 1939 we had fallen so far behind the USN & IJN....when we had been so far ahead in 1918. Yes some of this was the RAF getting more money, much of it was a lack of pull/aviation doctrine from the RN. People often go on about how good RN armoured decks were as against USN carriers...was it our Maginot line...?On the RAF vs RN discussion, a lecturer of mine (ex RN nuc engineer) described it in this manner:
The RAF were very aware that both the army and navy wanted to strangle them at birth so concentrated a significant amount of effort skilling their officers in staff work to better equip them as a service to sell their story to government. This was initially to ensure their survival but later was put to good effect in enabling them to secure funding for what they saw as necessary to carry out the duties and functions dictated by government. The trouble is there was not enough funding and as the RAF was better at getting what they needed the other services missed out.
IMO, between the wars, the army and navy didn't really help themselves by expending so much effort trying to justify the retention of horse cavalry and battleships to the detriment of new technology.
In a way it is too bad the RAF didn't get their 50 F-111Ks in the late 60s (well mid 70s once debugged). This likely would have short circuited UK involvement in the Tornado and drastically changed RAF and RN FAA force structures going forward. No Tornados likely would mean more Harriers and Jaguars, which would both likely be individually more capable, i.e. radars and more powerful engines to supplement the F-111 force.I think the impact of the loss of the RNAS, along with some of the RN's more forward thinking and certainly aviation focused officers was huge. They were left with the battleship officers, who became the battleship admirals. By 1939 we had fallen so far behind the USN & IJN. Yes some of this was the RAF getting more money, much of it was a lack of pull/aviation doctrine from the RN. People often go on about how good RN armoured decks were as against USN carriers...was it our Maginot line...?
In a similar way the organisational impact of the CVA01 cancellation, must have hit every level/careers etc. the whole doctrine of the RN was removed, almost overnight. The future must have seemed nuclear subs almost to the exclusion of all else.....and then Falklands/end of the Cold War change the game again.
I do think the RN has an inferiority/victim complex regarding the RAF and just accepts they will always get the best...but the RN certainly reserve the right to sulk about it.
However the boot is certainly on the other foot now, Libya has destroyed the RAFs credibility on coverage and they have to many Typhoon and Tornados (I bet the regret saving them now) to justify a split buy of F35A in the current climate. Once the carriers are at sea and doing all the work......it will become harder to build a case, particularly as the Army has its Apaches.
I wouldn't say it's destroyed it, it's had an impact with the publicised articles about how expensive it was tanking Tornados for strike missions from RAF Marham just to chuck some Storm Shadows and then head back, but then when basing rights had been sorted out (or somesuch) and they with Typhoons were based in Italy then that counted for something.However the boot is certainly on the other foot now, Libya has destroyed the RAFs credibility on coverage and they have to many Typhoon and Tornados (I bet the regret saving them now) to justify a split buy of F35A in the current climate. Once the carriers are at sea and doing all the work......it will become harder to build a case, particularly as the Army also has its Apaches.