Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[justsomeaussie]

Why? None of them explain why we need 12 submarines.

Wow, you've got to be the speediest reader I've ever met. A simple search in "Under the Sea Air Gap: Australia’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Challenge" finds some interesting analysis but I'm unsure how much you want to be spoon fed.

 

[t68]

Regarding the fuel debate yes the majors are pulling out of Australia as we are small fish compared to overseas. But we have enough black gold sitting in the Tanami Desert to sustain Australia itself for a hundred years not to mention a recent find in SA which could possibly rival Saudi Arabia oil field.

I work for a major transport company who deals in a lot of fuel at one stage they were thinking of setting up the own cracker to make and distribute their own fuel and we are talking in excess of 20 million liters per month. But yes we are slowly losing our capacity to refine it.

 

[t68]

Project Paladin provided force protection for all trucks deployed by the ADF in theatre including the Mack trucks used by 1 Armd Regt as Abrams fuellers. If a higher mobility, protected tank fueller was needed for the mission then one could be acquired rapidly and wouldn’t hold up a deployment.

We do have the survival enhancement kits for the unimogs and Mack trucks how good they are I don’t know as they were not in service when I was in. I am sure a few would have found their way across to those how need them.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Wow, you've got to be the speediest reader I've ever met.

What you think you are telling people here that these reports exist? The Kokoda ASW Challenge report was published two years ago. I’ve had plenty of time to read it since…

A simple search in "Under the Sea Air Gap: Australia’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Challenge" finds some interesting analysis but I'm unsure how much you want to be spoon fed.

Well that’s better than suggesting the partner Kokoda report specifically about the FSM project that says words to the effect of “no one knows in public what missions RAN submarines are used for”. But the report in question obviously makes the argument that we need more submarines for ASW. Which is at odds with the Rudd White Paper which says we need more submarines for strike. Yet submarines do not have monopoly of these roles. And within much of the waters of our region not be the best choice for ASW.

I’m still waiting for the actual argument that we need six additional submarines to provide a specific capability to secure global trade? If it is ASW then operational experience would indicate that additional MPA aircraft would be better suited. Rather than an inherently limited enemy submarine interdiction capability (via our submarines).

Submarines are an important part of the ASW strategy yes but having 12 attack submarines and 8 MPA aircraft is not the ASW force ratio. At the end of the Cold War the USN, the world’s most capable ASW force, had 100 fast attack submarines and 300 Orion MPA in service. The JMSDF, the world’s second most capable ASW force, had 18 attack submarines and 100 Orions in service. So if ASW is your argument then shouldn’t we plan on building six FSMs and acquiring 20-30 P-8 MPA?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Regarding the fuel debate yes the majors are pulling out of Australia as we are small fish compared to overseas. But we have enough black gold sitting in the Tanami Desert to sustain Australia itself for a hundred years not to mention a recent find in SA which could possibly rival Saudi Arabia oil field.

There’s a big difference between commercial push and pulls and their effect on Australian fuel supplies and actual interdiction by military operations or instability. Australia is well placed geographically to survive naval interdiction. If the straits of Malacca, South China Sea is closed for some reason then this will actually mean a huge increase in the amount of crude oil sailing to and from (or past) Australia. As the trade routes from the Persian Gulf to China and Japan will either go through eastern Indonesia or all the way around Australia to reach these objectives. This will have a nasty impact on supplies via reduced throughput of the shipping fleet but it will not interdict Australian access to crude.

The real problem for Australian access to oil is conflict in the Persian Gulf. Submarines aren’t going to help you much there but armoured fighting vehicles certainly will.

 

[Volkodav]

What you think you are telling people here that these reports exist? The Kokoda ASW Challenge report was published two years ago. I’ve had plenty of time to read it since…



Well that’s better than suggesting the partner Kokoda report specifically about the FSM project that says words to the effect of “no one knows in public what missions RAN submarines are used for”. But the report in question obviously makes the argument that we need more submarines for ASW. Which is at odds with the Rudd White Paper which says we need more submarines for strike. Yet submarines do not have monopoly of these roles. And within much of the waters of our region not be the best choice for ASW.

I’m still waiting for the actual argument that we need six additional submarines to provide a specific capability to secure global trade? If it is ASW then operational experience would indicate that additional MPA aircraft would be better suited. Rather than an inherently limited enemy submarine interdiction capability (via our submarines).

Submarines are an important part of the ASW strategy yes but having 12 attack submarines and 8 MPA aircraft is not the ASW force ratio. At the end of the Cold War the USN, the world’s most capable ASW force, had 100 fast attack submarines and 300 Orion MPA in service. The JMSDF, the world’s second most capable ASW force, had 18 attack submarines and 100 Orions in service. So if ASW is your argument then shouldn’t we plan on building six FSMs and acquiring 20-30 P-8 MPA?

I suppose an argument could be made that submarines are useful and in demand assets and that 12 would enable us to better undertake more of them simultaneously. Choke point ASW in SEA, ASW training on both coasts, SF training and insertion, "paint trials", international deployments and exercises. 12 hulls would permit the forward deployment and sustainment of a couple (2-3) of boats in FBE and Darwin.

I am not saying any of this justifies 12 hulls just that there are many possible advantages. It just comes down to the opportunity cost, I.e what else we will need to do without.

 

[protoplasm]

Trade offs

I suppose an argument could be made that submarines are useful and in demand assets and that 12 would enable us to better undertake more of them simultaneously. Choke point ASW in SEA, ASW training on both coasts, SF training and insertion, "paint trials", international deployments and exercises. 12 hulls would permit the forward deployment and sustainment of a couple (2-3) of boats in FBE and Darwin.

I am not saying any of this justifies 12 hulls just that there are many possible advantages. It just comes down to the opportunity cost, I.e what else we will need to do without.

That's actually the biggest question. We'll always be able to find a use for 12 submarines, there will always be missions for them to fulfil, and it's highly likely that the future subs will do very well. The question is what capability is being reduced/forgone completely as a result of tipping money into the future sub bucket.

 

[Raven22]

I've been to Afghanistan and have spoken with the BM drivers who were Abrams crew commanders and all would agree that Afghansitan is great tank country but all knew that Australia simply doesn't have the supply chain to be able support them. That's mostly due to the fact that we don't have any armoured fuel trucks short of a battle mog.

Refuelling a helo and refuelling a fuel guzzling tank is what kept major tank deployments out of Afghanistan.

What rot. The reason the Abrams never went to Afghanistan is because there was never a need for it. Or, at least a need that was worth the opportunity and political cost. Resupply of fuel was never a warstopper. Uparmoured TTFs would have been fine in resupplying the Abrams in theatre (it was how everything else was resupplied). You'd have to build a few more to do it, but that would only take a few months (they are essentially built to order).

Afghanistan is actually pretty terrible tank country. They are useful down in Kandahar and Helmand where it is flat (and, perhaps not coincidentally, where the US, Canadian and Danish tanks were), but from Uruzgan on up not so much. They might be useful for knocking down some dudes quala in the green zone, but we weren't doing that. For everything else an ASLAV was good enough.

Settle down mate. It was you who needed to bring up "reading them at work" as if other people here arent in similar roles.

That was exactly my point. You aren't the only one that has access to things that aren't in the public domain.

You claim about what have subs done for us is immediately counted by your own argument of another battalion. What exactly would another battalion have done for national security?

My use of another brigade (not battalion) was only an example of an unfulfilled requirement. However, I'll answer your question. Another Brigade over the last ten years would have given the Army the ability to conduct all the governments requirements. There have been times over the last ten+ years where the government has asked the Army to do things that they haven't been able to do because there was simply not enough soldiers to do it. That is bad. That is entirely what the ADF is for - providing options for government.

Now, would an extra brigade be helpful in a naval war with China? Not so much. But equally, how useful have the Collins been over the last decade of deployments abroad? Also, not so much. The ADF must be balanced, and simply advocating 12 subs no matter what because some dude wrote a capability requirement for it isn't particularly helpful.

What I meant was that is not as if Defence publishes any strategy especially sub strategy online and that a Defence think tank who's written dozens of papers about it would be a good start for people unfamiliar. Papers written by professional analysts in consultation with Navy and Governemnts and unclassified for release.

So, someone in the navy has written a requirement stating that 12 subs is good therefore it must come to pass? I could find literally hundreds of papers from within defence and outside stating the absolute need for all sorts of capabilities. Double the fast jet fleet? An extra LHD or AWD? More P8s and KC-30s? More helicopters for the Army? More tanks? Take your pick.

I don't disagree that subs are useful. I don't disagree that we should be buying new ones. I don't even necessarily disagree that we should be buying 12 of them. What I do disagree with is the notion that discussion about whether we should be buying 12 of them is not on because there is a 'requirement' for 12 of them. Which was my original point.

 

[Raven22]

We do have the survival enhancement kits for the unimogs and Mack trucks how good they are I don’t know as they were not in service when I was in. I am sure a few would have found their way across to those how need them.

Up armoured macks and unimogs are actually better protected than ASLAVs. I saw both an uparmoured HRV and an uparmoured TTF (both macks) get hit with pretty sizable IEDs and the crew walk away unhurt. The fuel cell on the TTF didn't even rupture (which was a very good thing - 12 000L of ignited diesel flowing down the street would have been very untidy).

 

[justsomeaussie]

Regarding the Abrams in Afghanistan, all I can offer is anecdotal of what I was informed by the Abrams crew commanders in country. That in their opinion Abrams would be been very useful in terms of fire support if we could of secured the fuel supply chain for them. But sure they might of been pulling the wool over my eyes, but when you are told by the experts themselves I'm not sure what else we are supposed to go off.

Funnily enough Australia doesn't just work in Urzugan.

 

[Raven22]

Regarding the Abrams in Afghanistan, all I can offer is anecdotal of what I was informed by the Abrams crew commanders in country. That in their opinion Abrams would be been very useful in terms of fire support if we could of secured the fuel supply chain for them. But sure they might of been pulling the wool over my eyes, but when you are told by the experts themselves I'm not sure what else we are supposed to go off.

Funnily enough Australia doesn't just work in Urzugan.

Well you could form an opinion off all the papers written about tanks in Afghanistan by CO's off the tank Regiment and people like that. You'll find it on the DSN next to the paper about submarines.

At one point I was the dude in charge of all the armour of a battlegroup in Afghanistan, with responsibilities to work out how to sustain patrols of dozens of vehicles for weeks at a time, so I'm comfortable with my own opinion.

While we mighty be operating in more places than Uruzgan, I don't think you'll find too many conventional Australian combat soldiers in Helmand, Kandahar or Kabul.

 

[ASSAIL]

I’m still waiting for the actual argument that we need six additional submarines to provide a specific capability to secure global trade? If it is ASW then operational experience would indicate that additional MPA aircraft would be better suited. Rather than an inherently limited enemy submarine interdiction capability (via our submarines).

Submarines are an important part of the ASW strategy yes but having 12 attack submarines and 8 MPA aircraft is not the ASW force ratio. At the end of the Cold War the USN, the world’s most capable ASW force, had 100 fast attack submarines and 300 Orion MPA in service. The JMSDF, the world’s second most capable ASW force, had 18 attack submarines and 100 Orions in service. So if ASW is your argument then shouldn’t we plan on building six FSMs and acquiring 20-30 P-8 MPA?

The memory is dim but in our heyday as an ASW navy there were 6 x Oberons about 20 P3's? and a CVS with 4 to 6 S2's embarked.
Thats a fairly good chunk of ASW capability plus the embarked Wessex/Seaking ASW helos.
So your final sentence would be about the right ratio considering advances in both submarines and airborne ASW including the capability provided by the MH 60's.

Extra s/m's would have little to do with ASW as their reason for purchase.

 

[seatmarbella]

I think Australia can save a lot of money going for ots submarines, just build 1 or 2 slowly to retain skills, and continue skills with the maintenance of the subs, each certain years. The budget announced or commented for the 12 subs programs is so big, it is like 10 or 20 times spanish program for the 12 subs vs 4 spanish subs. I suppose numbers are calculated for something priced like the Collins experience and its priced maintenance. But an ots solution, with most of the subs built overseas, brings, compared to announced budget, brings a great saving in the cost of each unit, and in the cost of modern more typical maintenance.
And having a production facility doing along years 1 or 2 or 3 subs out of the 12, slowly and doing things without time or economic pressure for the yards, plus maintenances, it is enough to retain skills that could be multiplied in emergency times.

And the point to save so much money is what to do with it, wheter a 4th awd, another Camberrra, or instead another Camberra to buy the 2nd Queen Elisabeth aircraft carrrier that England can sell to special ally. Or more Asw assets.


If Australia goes the route of doing all 12 subs in Australia, with an evolved Collins design or some similar in size idea to Collins, then the price of the program will go very much high.


And in respect of endurance and autonomy of subs, if ots solution reaches to 80% of what Australia plans for subs, the 20 % that is not reached, for me it would not justify practically go the so much more expensive program, maybe it would suppose a small change of doctrine, but, newer generation subs have better endurance and autonomy than before.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

And in respect of endurance and autonomy of subs, if ots solution reaches to 80% of what Australia plans for subs, the 20 % that is not reached, for me it would not justify practically go the so much more expensive program, maybe it would suppose a small change of doctrine, but, newer generation subs have better endurance and autonomy than before.

Well 80% is being generous to the off the shelf submarines. But even if they could meet 80% of the endurance that does not mean 80% of the capability. The requirement for endurance is a line in the sand below which the submarine is effectively useless. Without the ability to deploy from their base into the operational patrol areas the only use of such a submarine for the RAN is as a training target for ASW assets. In which case we wouldn’t need 12. Only three units would be enough to meet this need and also provide a retention of basic submarine skills until a useful submarine is acquired at a later date.

 

[RobWilliams]

And the point to save so much money is what to do with it, wheter a 4th awd, another Camberrra, or instead another Camberra to buy the 2nd Queen Elisabeth aircraft carrrier that England can sell to special ally. Or more Asw assets.

Wouldn't get too hung up on this option, special ally or not you're not getting your hands on either of them

 

[weegee]

Wouldn't get too hung up on this option, special ally or not you're not getting your hands on either of them

No way we could crew one anyway!!!!!! then buy the jets to fly off them as well. We are talking about a ship nearly 2 and a bit times the size as a Canberra people? This will NEVER happen. If we couldn't afford to convert a 3rd Canberra class into a fixed wing carrier we certainly wouldn't do it for a QE Class. nfloorl:

 

[Abraham Gubler]

No way we could crew one anyway!!!!!! then buy the jets to fly off them as well. We are talking about a ship nearly 2 and a bit times the size as a Canberra people? This will NEVER happen.

Actually Australia could afford to buy and the RAN could man a QE class strike carrier. It is not outside the means of Australia to pay for such because we currently spend so little on defence as a proportion of Government spend and much of what we spend is highly inefficient (very high administration costs). We currently spend just under half on Defence from what we did in 1970 as a proportion of Government spending. If Defence spending was at those levels it would be $64 billion per annum. Which would be more than the UK.

Obviously if HMS Queen Elizabeth or similar was gifted to Australia overnight there would be problems in crewing it but the lead time for a build should be more than sufficient to increase the personnel establishment of the Navy. You would probably find having a carrier coming into the fleet and a strike fighter force would significantly increase recruiting.

If we couldn't afford to convert a 3rd Canberra class into a fixed wing carrier we certainly wouldn't do it for a QE Class. nfloorl:

A Canberra class LHD would make a terrible aircraft carrier. But the cost of a purpose built light fleet carrier of similar size and 24 F-35Bs to make an air wing would not be so extreme as to make such a suggestion ludicrous. Would certainly provide a lot more extra reach and strength to the ADF than submarines 07-12.

 

[weegee]

Actually Australia could afford to buy and the RAN could man a QE class strike carrier. It is not outside the means of Australia to pay for such because we currently spend so little on defence as a proportion of Government spend and much of what we spend is highly inefficient (very high administration costs). We currently spend just under half on Defence from what we did in 1970 as a proportion of Government spending. If Defence spending was at those levels it would be $64 billion per annum. Which would be more than the UK.

True true I just meant in the current situation that the ADF is in with all of our insightful politicians holding the purse strings it is never going to happen. If a conflict kicked off on our door step well that is another story and the defence budget would increase VERY quickly, and as you say Ab we can afford a larger defence budget it just takes some pollies who are not afraid to push the limits.

A Canberra class LHD would make a terrible aircraft carrier. But the cost of a purpose built light fleet carrier of similar size and 24 F-35Bs to make an air wing would not be so extreme as to make such a suggestion ludicrous. Would certainly provide a lot more extra reach and strength to the ADF than submarines 07-12.

Before I say anything I do not wish to start the whole RAN carrier buy thing again but I agree they would not be a perfect dedicated carrier but if we went the same route as the Spanish where a 3rd LHD could be a light carrier or standby carrier if required with say 12 F35B's etc? Realistically is the RAN ever going to have a dedicated carrier ever again? i doubt it without some pollies that seriously want one but what if we had something that looks a bit like a carrier and can launch fixed wing planes if required? it might be easier to get past the purse string holders

 

[King Wally]

If the government thought there was a need I think we could afford a light carrier but we would need to juggle and offset elsewhere to do it.

For example drop the future sub numbers and order something akin to a modified LHD with vastly extra aviation fuel and ammo storage etc (or just order a custom purpose built light carrier without the well dock etc). Then reduce the planned F-35A numbers for the RAAF down to say 50 in order to swap across to include say 25 F-35B's as part of a new Naval Air Wing.

I wont get into the argument for if we need a carrier as I probably don't think we do but budget wise I think you could juggle it if you had the time to prepare and you were willing to rob peter to pay paul regarding other planned procurement assets.

 

[hauritz]

I am really not sure what we would do with an aircraft carrier. It seems like a lot of money tied up in a single asset which we probably don't even have a role for.

I wouldn't be against the idea of buying a squadron of F-35Bs at some point and letting them do some cross decking with the LHDs. They might be useful for supporting amphib operations.