Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[justsomeaussie]

So you are suggesting that the operation could have been conducted without the command and logistics support provided by a LHA and a Tico? Strange because I was under the impression that the shock of our inability to conduct such an unopposed operation with out support from the US was pretty much the reason why the LHD and AWD projects finally got traction.

In relation to your snipe, are you saying those ships were not there? Because unless that is what you are saying, and you can prove it, your argument that a catamaran ferry is all we will ever need is pretty much disproven by facts

Since Wikipedia is on reference start here:

Operation Astute - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For an example of how we deployed into East Timor by alternate means and then support by Kanimbla.

But this is getting side tracked. I'm not questioning the use of LHDs in this role in because they would be perfect for it; HADR and stabilisation operations.

I'm questioning the real world scenario where will we need to use the LHDs to perform a hot landing within a AWD envelope.

It's as I said before people focus on the platform first and then try to twist capability out of them instead of looking to see what capability we'll need and then designing a fleet around that.

 

[STURM]

and their two broken subs would of been charging at us.

If I recall correctly, an RNZN Leander detected a TNI-AL Type 209 shadowing the INTEFET convoy. It would be interesting to know whether it was the Chakra or the Nanggala and whether her sister was at sea at that time - the Indonesians have never revealed details on the activities of their 2 subs during this period.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I'm questioning the real world scenario where will we need to use the LHDs to perform a hot landing within a AWD envelope.

It doesn't have to be a hot landing. If we want any US assets (cruisers, destroyers, subs, amphibious, carriers) to help us, we have to provide adequate screening for them. The screening requirements were set by the US, not just to our local threat. Of course we could have tried it without US support, but we wouldn't have gotten any real traction. What nation would join us if the US wasn't on board?

The US plays in a global game. It sets its requirements. Giving exceptions to Australia doesn't make working with its allies easy globally. If they went in without screening, then every other nation in Africa, middle east, europe, asia would have been demanding US deploy assets in a similar situation, alliances could be placed at risk. Gateway to global instability.

While an Australian ship in Australian or international waters is unlikely to be attacked, the US is in a very different situation. So even in a peaceful straightforward mission, there requirements are just very different from ours, they can lose ships tied up in a friendly port. Any time a US ship sails, there may be half a dozen assets from other nations following, collecting intel, ready to make a surprise gesture (chinese submarine surfacing in/near US carrier groups etc. Heck if its North Korean they might just make a suicidal gesture.

This is why we have to be capable and independent of the US. Not to act without them, but to act with them, even on our door step. The US can't act on its own morally, but can't act with us because of the global implications. They aren't a mercenary force we can just call and have them turn up, even if we are directly threatend.

It's as I said before people focus on the platform first and then try to twist capability out of them instead of looking to see what capability we'll need and then designing a fleet around that.

Its more complicated than that. This is why we need PAC-3 (not really SM-3, but we are upgradable to that), SM-6, TLAM and wizbang AWD's. Not to fight off indonesia, but to be able to work with US forces to be part of the larger picture. Eg. Any time you deploy/train around Korea (or Japan or anywhere in Asia now) with US forces, your at risk of having a very serious missile head your way. Whats the alternative? Tear up our relationship with the US?

There is no real reason why we can't afford 4 AWD's and 3 LHD's. I do agree a lot of people get caught up on platforms (on forums on in some countries procurement). We need this platform and it solves all our problems (F-111/SU-30/F-22?). But I don't think the RAN/ADF is heading that way. The AWD isn't a deathstar fortress, its a very capable ship for a mid level navy. We have already purchased 3, and have an option for a 4th. We have already purchased 2 LHD's, and could easily option a 3rd from the supplier (possibly partly funded out of euro aid).

But its driven by what we want to do rather than just the platform. Which is why we got F-100's rather than Burkes (part of a bigger discussion).

 

[Abraham Gubler]

If I recall correctly, an RNZN Leander detected a TNI-AL Type 209 shadowing the INTEFET convoy. It would be interesting to know whether it was the Chakra or the Nanggala and whether her sister was at sea at that time - the Indonesians have never revealed details on the activities of their 2 subs during this period.

From memory it was tooling around south of Timor and they tracked it with their Seasprite until it went home.

 

[STURM]

From memory it was tooling around south of Timor and they tracked it with their Seasprite until it went home.

Did some Googleing and found out it was HMAS Canterbury that detected the sub.

Revealed: When Australia was forced onto war footing

Has the RAN ever publically announced the names of the Collin's that were deployed in support of Operation Astute?

 

[alexsa]

Well I would argue that the type 45 has a more modern, versatile and capable platform. It has greater growth magins as well as being significantly more effecient due to its all electric propulsion. The design has space and weight reserved for additional vls, harpoons, two phalanx etc. It can also hanger and operate a much larger helo than the F-100. Oh by the way the type 45 was eliminated from Australian consideration as it was seen as too developmental and therefore high risk, personally I would love to have seen a type 45 with AEGIS and either SPY 1 or 3. it would delivered the better platform with greater growth potential while retaining the advantages of FMS for the combat system.

Thanks, saved me saying it.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

You want to read “Strength Through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role In Operation Stabilise” By David Stevens, Working Paper No. 20 Sea Power Centre – Australia. It can be downloaded on the internet and is a pretty thorough guide to the naval ops of INTERFET. It doesn’t mention the RAN submarines but there were apparently Farncomb and Waller. One north of Timor, one south.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

So you are suggesting that the operation could have been conducted without the command and logistics support provided by a LHA and a Tico? Strange because I was under the impression that the shock of our inability to conduct such an unopposed operation with out support from the US was pretty much the reason why the LHD and AWD projects finally got traction.

The two are not connected. The first USN LHA didn’t arrive until two weeks after the amphibious landing at Dili. It provided a significant boost at a necessary time but was not crucial to operations. The AEGIS cruiser provided an important air defence and air coordination asset particularly the ability to see aircraft approaching while back light against the Timor landscape but since no air strikes no crucial need (in hindsight).

INTERFET deployment and sustainment suffered immensely by the ‘Defence of Australia’ reductions in deployable logistics capability. But the key bottlenecks were less in shipping and more in terminal capacity. But the benign nature of the deployment (no active resistance from the TNI and no means by the Militias to disrupt sea and air lift) meant that the ADF could muddle through. Obviously if we had our own LHD and AEGIS ships things would have happened much quicker and with much less risk. Which is why their capabilities were specified for the force recapitalisation in the 2000s.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

This is why we need PAC-3 (not really SM-3, but we are upgradable to that), SM-6, TLAM and wizbang AWD's. Not to fight off indonesia, but to be able to work with US forces to be part of the larger picture. Eg. Any time you deploy/train around Korea (or Japan or anywhere in Asia now) with US forces, your at risk of having a very serious missile head your way. Whats the alternative? Tear up our relationship with the US?

We don’t need SM6 or TLAM to work with the USN we need them when we can’t work with the USN (when assets are spread thin). SM6 and TLAM provide a limited replication of aircraft carrier capability: over the horizon air defence and anti-airfield strikes (shaping of enemy anti ship capability). We would be better off putting that money into acquiring a light carrier and 24 F-35Bs for the Navy. Of course the $1-2 billion it costs to buy those missiles is about a quarter the cost of the carrier and air wing but youse gets whats you pay for.

PAC III or SBMSE provides a terminal BMD capability but since there aren’t any ballistic missile threats to shipping (yet) they are simply an option. If the threat arrives we can upgrade to the countermeasure. Though if we want to use AEGIS to provide a BMD bubble to a deployed force ashore we would need the extra reach of SM3 to do so.

The big problem space for Australian strategic futures is what if there is a dispersed threat to the global trade system across the Suez to Yokosuka arc? This is not necessarily directly China it could be something a lot smaller but if say the US is occupied in the Persian Gulf who’s going to step up?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Thanks, saved me saying it.

I think it’s been said a few times here in this thread that the drive down to detail of the AWD options case what was a good idea at first was turned to mush. The decision space for ‘evolved’ or developmental vs off the shelf should have been made at the first case. By 2004 at the latest. If OTS then the program could have started four years earlier and considered DDG 51 vs F100. If developmental or evolved was selected then current generation vehicle systems like the Type 45 and similar US concepts (DDG 51 hull with DDG 1000 propulsion) could have been prepared and assessed over the 2004-2007 period before a decision was made. In the end we just spent four years thinking about things and designing a ship that will never be built before we actually started work which neatly dovetailed with the deskilling of the naval shipbuilding workforce caused by the end of Anzac program.

 

[Volkodav]

I think it’s been said a few times here in this thread that the drive down to detail of the AWD options case what was a good idea at first was turned to mush. The decision space for ‘evolved’ or developmental vs off the shelf should have been made at the first case. By 2004 at the latest. If OTS then the program could have started four years earlier and considered DDG 51 vs F100. If developmental or evolved was selected then current generation vehicle systems like the Type 45 and similar US concepts (DDG 51 hull with DDG 1000 propulsion) could have been prepared and assessed over the 2004-2007 period before a decision was made. In the end we just spent four years thinking about things and designing a ship that will never be built before we actually started work which neatly dovetailed with the deskilling of the naval shipbuilding workforce caused by the end of Anzac program.

If the Flight IIA Burke had been ordered in the mid to late 90s to replace the DDGs we could have followed them with a new more developmental design to replace (instead of upgrading) the FFGs, despeced the ANZACs to be patrol frigates and built OPVs instead of PBs.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

If the Flight IIA Burke had been ordered in the mid to late 90s to replace the DDGs we could have followed them with a new more developmental design to replace (instead of upgrading) the FFGs, despeced the ANZACs to be patrol frigates and built OPVs instead of PBs.

But in the mid to late 90s the Navy was constrained to replacing the DDG with an Anzac derivative hull. The Govts. would have had a fit if anytime between 1971 and 99 you rocked up and asked for the kind of money needed to build an AEGIS destroyer. It was the 91 FSR plan to replace the FFGs one for one with the Anzac DDG (ie 6). Systems configurations looked at a range of options like the Kidd class NTDS mission system up to the SPY-1F. None of these could be made to work on such a small hull as the Anzac (even lengthened) to meet Navy standards. Eventually East Timor happened and the Howard Govt. changed its perception of Defence from wasted money to wise investment.

 

[MickB]

despeced the ANZACs to be patrol frigates and built OPVs instead of PBs.

Is a despeced ANZAC still a viable option, or will they be too worn out by the time they are replaced.

 

[Todjaeger]

Is a despeced ANZAC still a viable option, or will they be too worn out by the time they are replaced.

If I understood Volk correctly, he was talking about an ANZAC-class FFH, but without some of the fancier kit which they were fitted 'for, but not with' and are just now finally being fitted out with.

Things like Harpoon AShM, ESSM, and the more advanced radar panels and illuminators from CEA.

Since the RAN did not get some of the higher end kit it could have at the time, the ANZAC-class needed to be upgraded to provide a useful capability.

-Cheers

 

[JPiper]

What If USA does not support us.

What if the USA does not support us in that they have conflicting interests. They could agree with our adversary and not give us support. In that case tthe MAJOR may be right in that we may need a larger navy. This has happened in the suez crisis in that the USA did not support Britian and France. This is just my thoughts and I am not qupting from elsewhere














QUOTE=t68;261954]Of course I can't tell you against whom, it's called hedging your bets. No its not capability at any expense I did say in the original post it was extremely expencive and no one would do it and my personal opinion.

It's not to far from when we had a mix of mix ofAdelaide class and river class ships and a aircraft carrier. Bams will take the place of the current Anzac working with the Light carrier in ASW task group, hobarts will be the AWD piquet and the Absalons will be our all rounders doing everything from anti-piracy to working with SOG or it can be placed with a company of infantry of the coast ready to assist Australian nationals in operations similar to Operation Morris Dance.

In regards to the number of ships in the fleet it will fill out a two ocean fleet, 3x LHD, 4XAWD,3xBAMS and the Absalons on the east coast the rest of the numbers on the west and it will have the numbers to cover contingencies either in unexpected brake down or vessel incapacited by red forces action. The fundamental job of the RAN is to flex its muscle to gain and to maintain sea control fundamentally to where it is operating.

The RaN having a fleet as flexible and in numbers means the RAAF has the means to exploit its advantages in whatever ways it sees fit.[/QUOTE]

mate you have some errors within the layout of the post. I don't know if you are quoting from elsewhere or not

please edit and fix

 

[MickB]

I should have explained myself more clearly I was thinking that the current ANZACs could be despeced down to patrol frigates as they are replaced by ANZAC 2.

Reduce armament, remove gas turbines, reduce manning and these could become long range patrol craft.

Or will they be to old and worn out by this time to have a useful life.

 

[ngatimozart]

See Choules has returned to sea duties today. The Aus DOD flicked out a media release earlier. Defence News and Media » HMAS Choules returns to sea

 

[ngatimozart]

I should have explained myself more clearly I was thinking that the current ANZACs could be despeced down to patrol frigates as they are replaced by ANZAC 2.

Reduce armament, remove gas turbines, reduce manning and these could become long range patrol craft.

Or will they be to old and worn out by this time to have a useful life.

IMHO they'll be munted, worn out, stuffed. I think their replacement is around what, 10 - 18 years away and by that time they'll have done something like 25 years. Be a total waste of time and money. Better off starting with a new hull.

 

[JPiper]

QUOTE=t68;261954]Of course I can't tell you against whom, it's called hedging your bets. No its not capability at any expense I did say in the original post it was extremely expencive and no one would do it and my personal opinion.

It's not to far from when we had a mix of mix ofAdelaide class and river class ships and a aircraft carrier. Bams will take the place of the current Anzac working with the Light carrier in ASW task group, hobarts will be the AWD piquet and the Absalons will be our all rounders doing everything from anti-piracy to working with SOG or it can be placed with a company of infantry of the coast ready to assist Australian nationals in operations similar to Operation Morris Dance.

In regards to the number of ships in the fleet it will fill out a two ocean fleet, 3x LHD, 4XAWD,3xBAMS and the Absalons on the east coast the rest of the numbers on the west and it will have the numbers to cover contingencies either in unexpected brake down or vessel incapacited by red forces action. The fundamental job of the RAN is to flex its muscle to gain and to maintain sea control fundamentally to where it is operating.

The RaN having a fleet as flexible and in numbers means the RAAF has the means to exploit its advantages in whatever ways it sees fit.[/quote]

 

[JPiper]

Of course I can't tell you against whom, it's called hedging your bets. No its not capability at any expense I did say in the original post it was extremely expencive and no one would do it and my personal opinion.

It's not to far from when we had a mix of mix ofAdelaide class and river class ships and a aircraft carrier. Bams will take the place of the current Anzac working with the Light carrier in ASW task group, hobarts will be the AWD piquet and the Absalons will be our all rounders doing everything from anti-piracy to working with SOG or it can be placed with a company of infantry of the coast ready to assist Australian nationals in operations similar to Operation Morris Dance.

In regards to the number of ships in the fleet it will fill out a two ocean fleet, 3x LHD, 4XAWD,3xBAMS and the Absalons on the east coast the rest of the numbers on the west and it will have the numbers to cover contingencies either in unexpected brake down or vessel incapacited by red forces action. The fundamental job of the RAN is to flex its muscle to gain and to maintain sea control fundamentally to where it is operating.

The RaN having a fleet as flexible and in numbers means the RAAF has the means to exploit its advantages in whatever ways it sees fit.

mate I have fixed your quote from T68, now you just need to edit this post and add your own comments