17 posts, alienated much of the population and then banned. That is some sort of record.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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t68
Well-Known Member
Dam missed it would have been nice to see what he wrote. But I reckon your right alexsa would have to be a record for this thread.
Getting back to things RAN. On the new Collins, will further automation, smart crewing, more capable systems reduce the crewing demands? Isn't the crew of a Collins much larger now than it was originally intended (nearly 60 odd), compared to European submarines which usually have compliments less than 40 odd. I would imagine while significant improvements in propulsion and storage can be made, more gains could be made by reducing the crewing requirements.
But is it even possible to do this? Do long range submarines always require more crew?
But is it even possible to do this? Do long range submarines always require more crew?
The difference in crew numbers between the Collins and Euro boats, ie the growth, is recent attempts to make them more habitable for long missions like adding a medic on board.
Collins is pretty much at the lower end of crew that automation can provide. Well you can go lower with concepts like the Swedish single shift (at night the submarine turns off and parks on the sea bed while the crew sleep) or not having any on-board maintenance like the original Soviet Alfa design (the only enlisted man on board was the cook).
The key thing for SEA 1000 is the number of crew shifts. With calls to move to a three shift submarine to increase the crew up to around 70-80. The idea being to alleviate crew stress and make the boats more capable on long cruises. The counter intuitive idea is that a larger crew boat could very well be easier to sustain personnel wise.
Collins is pretty much at the lower end of crew that automation can provide. Well you can go lower with concepts like the Swedish single shift (at night the submarine turns off and parks on the sea bed while the crew sleep) or not having any on-board maintenance like the original Soviet Alfa design (the only enlisted man on board was the cook).
The key thing for SEA 1000 is the number of crew shifts. With calls to move to a three shift submarine to increase the crew up to around 70-80. The idea being to alleviate crew stress and make the boats more capable on long cruises. The counter intuitive idea is that a larger crew boat could very well be easier to sustain personnel wise.
There has been a surprising amount of commentary in the AFR in support of the Virginia class SSN option in recent days.
This has been dismissed by our political leadership on the basis that it would result in 2500 less jobs in SA. It is a pity that they were unable to make this case on the basis of capability requirements.
Regards,
Massive
This has been dismissed by our political leadership on the basis that it would result in 2500 less jobs in SA. It is a pity that they were unable to make this case on the basis of capability requirements.
Regards,
Massive
the road runner
Active Member
The RAN would also have to add a lot more submariners to crew a Virginia SSN.
Think they have a crew of 130(plus) ? This is one thing i find funny when the press always do a write up of SSN for Australia. They always talk about how we cannot crew the boats we have ,then go on to talk about purchasing SSN that are more labour intensive.
Think they have a crew of 130(plus) ? This is one thing i find funny when the press always do a write up of SSN for Australia. They always talk about how we cannot crew the boats we have ,then go on to talk about purchasing SSN that are more labour intensive.
Thanks Road Runner,
I always find the arguments that we 'cannot crew' a given number of boats/ships etc a cop out. We could if the government and RAN were to:
1. spend the money - not just on numbers andremuneration but also on ensuring conditions were attractive, and
2. be more flexible in how the workforce was recruited, managed and deployed.
The current system appears to be far too inflexible and requires significant modernisation.
Just my opinion.
Regards,
Massive
The crewing issue for SSNs is a major stumbling block (amongst many) and while gross numbers would be a problem so to would be skills development. How many reactor watch qualified personnel does the RAN have? You can't just walk two crews off a Collins and have them crew a Virginia. Nulcear submarines require a huge investment in re-training and skills development that would take decades. That is even without building the boats, acquiring LEU (or HEU in the face of the NPT) and sustaining them.
The Virgina option for the RAN strikes me as being quite similar in concept to the F-22 option for the RAAF, nice to have but not available and, to be honest, lacking in some key capabilities that the ADF needs. We need something with very long range, a low discretion rate, capable ot deploying SOF and above all be able to complement our allies by doing things they can't, i.e. silent running. The Virginias are without a doubt very quiet for a nuc but not in comparision with a modern DE, it only makes sense, everything yopu can do to make a nuc quiet you can also do with an DE, the difference is an electric motor running on batteries is quieter than a reactor producing steam to drive a turbine to drive the shaft.
On the crewing side the issue the RAN has is its failure to retain senior technical sailors, there are plenty of jouniors and trainees, this problem is there is a lack of supervisors and mentors to makesure the work gets done right. An example of the concerns seen currently is what happens in the airline industry when experienced staff are made redundant and are replaced by cheaper jounior staff, aeroplanes crash and people die.
The key difference is the senior staff are leaving for more money and better conditions and the people managing the capability would rather hold a boat back than send it out without enough competent senior people on board. The catch 22 is that if the boats dont go out then the new guys don't build experience. A larger crew, providing a greater depth of technicl knowledge and a critical mass of personel so as not to over work and piss off the people you can't do without.
The key difference is the senior staff are leaving for more money and better conditions and the people managing the capability would rather hold a boat back than send it out without enough competent senior people on board. The catch 22 is that if the boats dont go out then the new guys don't build experience. A larger crew, providing a greater depth of technicl knowledge and a critical mass of personel so as not to over work and piss off the people you can't do without.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #9,833
Ahem, no comment....
Couple of guesses... both incorrect. It is the attaching foundation for a forward RAS station.
StevoJH
The Bunker Group
I guess the test will be how long she spends tied up alongside before her next visit to the open ocean.
Why would it be that ? does not make sense when the original design has a RAS station in it ? There has been reports that the RAS station has been removed on the Canberra class, so does not make sense that they would delete that from the original design to ad it to a totally impractical area of the ship ?
Blas de Lezo
Member
This is the same position at JCI
http://i52.tinypic.com/16jm2c.jpg
It could be the BAE´s way of fitting the same?!
Gordon Branch
New Member
Could it be that even though the outgoing RAS Station has been deleted from the Canberra Class, the incoming RAS Station is at the front of the island? (Sorry I do not know the correct terminology for these positions)
justsomeaussie
Member
Here is the official line in subs as of today
Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence Materiel – Submarine Institute of Australia, 6th Biennial Conference
VADM Raymond Griggs, Chief of Navy.
Senior officers of the Australian Defence Force.
Representatives of other military forces.
Ladies and Gentlemen.
58 sailors in a steel hull 78 metres long, 8 metres wide, hundreds of feet below the surface of the ocean for weeks at a time.
That’s why we are here today.
Those sailors rely on us to deliver to them the capability they need to do their job.
It’s an important job.
Submarines are our most important strategic defence asset.
So we must get it right.
The Future Submarine Project will be the biggest and most complex defence project Australia has ever embarked upon.
It will involve thousands of workers and hundreds of companies.
It will involve Federal and State Governments, Defence and industry, universities and technical colleges working together.
By the time all 12 are built – we will need to replace the first.
That means it’s not like other defence projects.
We are not just building 12 submarines – we are building an industry.
One that could potentially last for a century or more.
This is a big and expensive task. Before we embark on it there are a number of questions we have to answer.
First, why do we need submarines?
Second, why should they be built in Australia?
And third, how we are going to do it?
That’s what I want to talk to you about today.
1. Why do we need submarines?
This is a question everyone in this room knows the answer to.
But it is a question that must be asked and answered. We are talking about a lot of taxpayer’s money. Potentially tens of billions of dollars.
If we are going to invest that sort of money in new submarines we need to explain why we need them and why they are so important.
Australia is an island.
Our geography – the vast territorial sea that surrounds us – is our best defensive asset.
Any country that seeks to attack us has to cross the sea. Submarines make that very difficult.
Submarines are like underwater snipers. Once they dive they are very difficult to detect and very deadly.
They do more than this, but it is their most important role.
Finding them requires an enormous amount of resources.
This makes submarines a very real deterrent to any country thinking about harming us. That’s why we need submarines.
They don’t and can’t do this on their own. They are a part of a layered approach to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare.
But you can’t properly defend an island continent, or its trade routes, without them.
They are integral to the defence and security of Australia.
Our geography also helps shape the sort of submarine we need.
To do this job submarines need to do more than just sit off the coast of Sydney or Perth. To be effective they need to be able to travel long distances and stay there.
They need to be able to undertake extended clandestine patrols over the full distance of our strategic approaches and in operational areas.
To do this, a submarine needs to be large.
That’s why we currently operate the Collins class, one of the largest conventional submarines in the world.
If we expect the replacement to the Collins to do similar work, we will require another large submarine.
A large submarine to defend Australia is an expensive enterprise, but an important one. There are no shortcuts.
2. Why should they be built in Australia?
If we need submarines, the next questions are how many and what sort.
The answer to the first question is found in the 2009 White Paper. The answer to the second is currently underway. That work is being led by the General Manager Submarines David Gould and Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt with the help of many people in this room
I will talk a little more about that in a moment.
The next question is who builds them. More particularly should we build them here? To my mind, this is an easy question.
The first and most obvious reason we should do as much of this project here as possible is this is a multi billion dollar project – potentially the same size as the National Broadband Network.
It will create thousands of jobs and work for hundreds of Australian companies.
More than this it will create a new Australian industry.
This is not just an ordinary defence project. Most acquisition projects involve the purchase of equipment over a relatively short period of time – and then we maintain that equipment here in Australia.
This is different. It will take decades to build 12 submarines, and by the time the last is built the first will need to be replaced. It’s not a short project. It will go on and on. It will create an industry that could last for a century or more. That industry should be here.
That industry also has flow on benefits. It will build skills useful for other industries and technology that can be applied elsewhere.
It will also build the capabilities and skills of our universities and our technical colleges.
There are also important strategic reasons why we should do as much of this work here as we can.
Given their strategic importance it is important we have an indigenous capability that can design, develop, build and maintain submarines.
That is not something we can or should do on our own. We will need to draw heavily on the skills and expertise of our allies and partners. But we also can’t, and shouldn’t, outsource the whole task to them.
Submarines are not mass produced. Even the world’s largest submarine builder, the United States, builds on average around one to two submarines a year.
Building submarines requires intense collaboration between the designers, builders and ultimate users and maintainers. It is very difficult to do this if the project is based overseas.
US and UK experience shows that the best way to build submarines is to slowly evolve their design – to build in batches of three or four. This means obsolete equipment can be replaced and capability upgrades made progressively when equipment has been designed, produced, tested and is ready to install.
If we want a design and construction system that can evolve the design of our future submarines to meet our specific needs, it makes sense for that work to happen here.
3. How are we going to do it?
The next question is how are we going to do this. This is a project that will occur over many decades but in the next 12 months we will make four important decisions.
Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan
First we will make a series of decisions to ensure we have the skills we need to build the future submarine in Australia.
In December last year, I announced the development of a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan.
It will determine the type of skills, the size and the profile of the workforce required as well as the capacity and capability of the Australian shipbuilding industry to successfully deliver the Future Submarine.
I will receive this plan in December and its recommendations will feed into the development of the 2013 White Paper.
Land Based Test Site
The second decision the Government will make involves the establishment of a Land Based Test Site.
The design, construction, setting to work and operation of a submarine is an incredibly complex task. Success relies on reducing risk wherever possible.
One of the key ways to do this is with a land based test site. It is arguable that many of the emergent problems with the Collins Class would have been identified by a land based test facility.
In November last year, Babcocks were contracted to carry out a feasibility study into the development of a Submarine Propulsion Energy, Support & Integration Facility.
This report is still being reviewed by Defence but I can confirm that it makes it clear that such a facility is essential.
The propulsion, energy and drive-train system is a key part of any submarine and a land based test site will enable this system to be developed, tested and proved before it is installed into the submarine.
Regardless of the submarine design option that is ultimately chosen, this will significantly reduce the risk of delay and cost blowouts, poor availability and increased operating and sustainment costs, loss of capability and most importantly, the risk of a catastrophic accident caused by the power and energy systems.
The report outlines a number of options.
It also recommends locating the facility close to where people with the necessary expertise and skills are located and where the main users of the facility are located.
In the next 12 months we will make decisions about the form, function and location of the land based test site.
Combat, sensors and weapons systems
The third decision is the combat, sensors and weapons systems the future submarine will have.
This is a critical decision. It is crucial to interoperability with our allies and partners.
It makes sense to make this decision early as we did with AWD.
In the AWD project the early decision on the combat systems meant the combat system team could start the development of sub-systems before the ship design was determined and before construction started.
It meant the detailed design of equipment such as compartment arrangements, equipment foundations, main cable routes, and the fundamental space, weight, cooling, power and other services requirements could be determined.
Trying to design platform and combat systems simultaneously is very difficult, and typically results in increased risk and schedule delays.
Initial pass
Fourth, and most significantly, the Government will make an initial pass decision on the future submarine project.
In May, the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and I announced the approval of $214 million for detailed design studies, modelling, analysis and scientific and technological studies focussed on four options.
This work is proceeding well. It will confirm a set of critical requirements for things such as stealth, range, habitability and interoperability.
Based on this work, more detailed work will occur on fewer options.
One option that is not on the table is a nuclear powered submarine.
The United States has never exported or leased a naval nuclear reactor.
Acquiring nuclear powered submarines would therefore involve outsourcing the construction, maintenance and sustainment of the submarines to another country.
The submarines would have to be built overseas, they would have to be fuelled, docked, defueled and disposed of overseas.
That means tens of billions of dollars for acquisition and sustainment over decades that could be invested in Australia, spent overseas.
If we want a design and construction system that can evolve the design of our future submarines to meet our specific needs, it makes sense for that work to happen here.
3. How are we going to do it?
The next question is how are we going to do this. This is a project that will occur over many decades but in the next 12 months we will make four important decisions.
Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan
First we will make a series of decisions to ensure we have the skills we need to build the future submarine in Australia.
In December last year, I announced the development of a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan.
It will determine the type of skills, the size and the profile of the workforce required as well as the capacity and capability of the Australian shipbuilding industry to successfully deliver the Future Submarine.
I will receive this plan in December and its recommendations will feed into the development of the 2013 White Paper.
Land Based Test Site
The second decision the Government will make involves the establishment of a Land Based Test Site.
The design, construction, setting to work and operation of a submarine is an incredibly complex task. Success relies on reducing risk wherever possible.
One of the key ways to do this is with a land based test site. It is arguable that many of the emergent problems with the Collins Class would have been identified by a land based test facility.
In November last year, Babcocks were contracted to carry out a feasibility study into the development of a Submarine Propulsion Energy, Support & Integration Facility.
This report is still being reviewed by Defence but I can confirm that it makes it clear that such a facility is essential.
The propulsion, energy and drive-train system is a key part of any submarine and a land based test site will enable this system to be developed, tested and proved before it is installed into the submarine.
Regardless of the submarine design option that is ultimately chosen, this will significantly reduce the risk of delay and cost blowouts, poor availability and increased operating and sustainment costs, loss of capability and most importantly, the risk of a catastrophic accident caused by the power and energy systems.
The report outlines a number of options.
It also recommends locating the facility close to where people with the necessary expertise and skills are located and where the main users of the facility are located.
In the next 12 months we will make decisions about the form, function and location of the land based test site.
Combat, sensors and weapons systems
The third decision is the combat, sensors and weapons systems the future submarine will have.
This is a critical decision. It is crucial to interoperability with our allies and partners.
It makes sense to make this decision early as we did with AWD.
In the AWD project the early decision on the combat systems meant the combat system team could start the development of sub-systems before the ship design was determined and before construction started.
It meant the detailed design of equipment such as compartment arrangements, equipment foundations, main cable routes, and the fundamental space, weight, cooling, power and other services requirements could be determined.
Trying to design platform and combat systems simultaneously is very difficult, and typically results in increased risk and schedule delays.
Initial pass
Fourth, and most significantly, the Government will make an initial pass decision on the future submarine project.
In May, the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and I announced the approval of $214 million for detailed design studies, modelling, analysis and scientific and technological studies focussed on four options.
This work is proceeding well. It will confirm a set of critical requirements for things such as stealth, range, habitability and interoperability.
Based on this work, more detailed work will occur on fewer options.
One option that is not on the table is a nuclear powered submarine.
The United States has never exported or leased a naval nuclear reactor.
Acquiring nuclear powered submarines would therefore involve outsourcing the construction, maintenance and sustainment of the submarines to another country.
The submarines would have to be built overseas, they would have to be fuelled, docked, defueled and disposed of overseas.
That means tens of billions of dollars for acquisition and sustainment over decades that could be invested in Australia, spent overseas.
Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence Materiel – Submarine Institute of Australia, 6th Biennial Conference
VADM Raymond Griggs, Chief of Navy.
Senior officers of the Australian Defence Force.
Representatives of other military forces.
Ladies and Gentlemen.
58 sailors in a steel hull 78 metres long, 8 metres wide, hundreds of feet below the surface of the ocean for weeks at a time.
That’s why we are here today.
Those sailors rely on us to deliver to them the capability they need to do their job.
It’s an important job.
Submarines are our most important strategic defence asset.
So we must get it right.
The Future Submarine Project will be the biggest and most complex defence project Australia has ever embarked upon.
It will involve thousands of workers and hundreds of companies.
It will involve Federal and State Governments, Defence and industry, universities and technical colleges working together.
By the time all 12 are built – we will need to replace the first.
That means it’s not like other defence projects.
We are not just building 12 submarines – we are building an industry.
One that could potentially last for a century or more.
This is a big and expensive task. Before we embark on it there are a number of questions we have to answer.
First, why do we need submarines?
Second, why should they be built in Australia?
And third, how we are going to do it?
That’s what I want to talk to you about today.
1. Why do we need submarines?
This is a question everyone in this room knows the answer to.
But it is a question that must be asked and answered. We are talking about a lot of taxpayer’s money. Potentially tens of billions of dollars.
If we are going to invest that sort of money in new submarines we need to explain why we need them and why they are so important.
Australia is an island.
Our geography – the vast territorial sea that surrounds us – is our best defensive asset.
Any country that seeks to attack us has to cross the sea. Submarines make that very difficult.
Submarines are like underwater snipers. Once they dive they are very difficult to detect and very deadly.
They do more than this, but it is their most important role.
Finding them requires an enormous amount of resources.
This makes submarines a very real deterrent to any country thinking about harming us. That’s why we need submarines.
They don’t and can’t do this on their own. They are a part of a layered approach to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare.
But you can’t properly defend an island continent, or its trade routes, without them.
They are integral to the defence and security of Australia.
Our geography also helps shape the sort of submarine we need.
To do this job submarines need to do more than just sit off the coast of Sydney or Perth. To be effective they need to be able to travel long distances and stay there.
They need to be able to undertake extended clandestine patrols over the full distance of our strategic approaches and in operational areas.
To do this, a submarine needs to be large.
That’s why we currently operate the Collins class, one of the largest conventional submarines in the world.
If we expect the replacement to the Collins to do similar work, we will require another large submarine.
A large submarine to defend Australia is an expensive enterprise, but an important one. There are no shortcuts.
2. Why should they be built in Australia?
If we need submarines, the next questions are how many and what sort.
The answer to the first question is found in the 2009 White Paper. The answer to the second is currently underway. That work is being led by the General Manager Submarines David Gould and Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt with the help of many people in this room
I will talk a little more about that in a moment.
The next question is who builds them. More particularly should we build them here? To my mind, this is an easy question.
The first and most obvious reason we should do as much of this project here as possible is this is a multi billion dollar project – potentially the same size as the National Broadband Network.
It will create thousands of jobs and work for hundreds of Australian companies.
More than this it will create a new Australian industry.
This is not just an ordinary defence project. Most acquisition projects involve the purchase of equipment over a relatively short period of time – and then we maintain that equipment here in Australia.
This is different. It will take decades to build 12 submarines, and by the time the last is built the first will need to be replaced. It’s not a short project. It will go on and on. It will create an industry that could last for a century or more. That industry should be here.
That industry also has flow on benefits. It will build skills useful for other industries and technology that can be applied elsewhere.
It will also build the capabilities and skills of our universities and our technical colleges.
There are also important strategic reasons why we should do as much of this work here as we can.
Given their strategic importance it is important we have an indigenous capability that can design, develop, build and maintain submarines.
That is not something we can or should do on our own. We will need to draw heavily on the skills and expertise of our allies and partners. But we also can’t, and shouldn’t, outsource the whole task to them.
Submarines are not mass produced. Even the world’s largest submarine builder, the United States, builds on average around one to two submarines a year.
Building submarines requires intense collaboration between the designers, builders and ultimate users and maintainers. It is very difficult to do this if the project is based overseas.
US and UK experience shows that the best way to build submarines is to slowly evolve their design – to build in batches of three or four. This means obsolete equipment can be replaced and capability upgrades made progressively when equipment has been designed, produced, tested and is ready to install.
If we want a design and construction system that can evolve the design of our future submarines to meet our specific needs, it makes sense for that work to happen here.
3. How are we going to do it?
The next question is how are we going to do this. This is a project that will occur over many decades but in the next 12 months we will make four important decisions.
Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan
First we will make a series of decisions to ensure we have the skills we need to build the future submarine in Australia.
In December last year, I announced the development of a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan.
It will determine the type of skills, the size and the profile of the workforce required as well as the capacity and capability of the Australian shipbuilding industry to successfully deliver the Future Submarine.
I will receive this plan in December and its recommendations will feed into the development of the 2013 White Paper.
Land Based Test Site
The second decision the Government will make involves the establishment of a Land Based Test Site.
The design, construction, setting to work and operation of a submarine is an incredibly complex task. Success relies on reducing risk wherever possible.
One of the key ways to do this is with a land based test site. It is arguable that many of the emergent problems with the Collins Class would have been identified by a land based test facility.
In November last year, Babcocks were contracted to carry out a feasibility study into the development of a Submarine Propulsion Energy, Support & Integration Facility.
This report is still being reviewed by Defence but I can confirm that it makes it clear that such a facility is essential.
The propulsion, energy and drive-train system is a key part of any submarine and a land based test site will enable this system to be developed, tested and proved before it is installed into the submarine.
Regardless of the submarine design option that is ultimately chosen, this will significantly reduce the risk of delay and cost blowouts, poor availability and increased operating and sustainment costs, loss of capability and most importantly, the risk of a catastrophic accident caused by the power and energy systems.
The report outlines a number of options.
It also recommends locating the facility close to where people with the necessary expertise and skills are located and where the main users of the facility are located.
In the next 12 months we will make decisions about the form, function and location of the land based test site.
Combat, sensors and weapons systems
The third decision is the combat, sensors and weapons systems the future submarine will have.
This is a critical decision. It is crucial to interoperability with our allies and partners.
It makes sense to make this decision early as we did with AWD.
In the AWD project the early decision on the combat systems meant the combat system team could start the development of sub-systems before the ship design was determined and before construction started.
It meant the detailed design of equipment such as compartment arrangements, equipment foundations, main cable routes, and the fundamental space, weight, cooling, power and other services requirements could be determined.
Trying to design platform and combat systems simultaneously is very difficult, and typically results in increased risk and schedule delays.
Initial pass
Fourth, and most significantly, the Government will make an initial pass decision on the future submarine project.
In May, the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and I announced the approval of $214 million for detailed design studies, modelling, analysis and scientific and technological studies focussed on four options.
This work is proceeding well. It will confirm a set of critical requirements for things such as stealth, range, habitability and interoperability.
Based on this work, more detailed work will occur on fewer options.
One option that is not on the table is a nuclear powered submarine.
The United States has never exported or leased a naval nuclear reactor.
Acquiring nuclear powered submarines would therefore involve outsourcing the construction, maintenance and sustainment of the submarines to another country.
The submarines would have to be built overseas, they would have to be fuelled, docked, defueled and disposed of overseas.
That means tens of billions of dollars for acquisition and sustainment over decades that could be invested in Australia, spent overseas.
If we want a design and construction system that can evolve the design of our future submarines to meet our specific needs, it makes sense for that work to happen here.
3. How are we going to do it?
The next question is how are we going to do this. This is a project that will occur over many decades but in the next 12 months we will make four important decisions.
Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan
First we will make a series of decisions to ensure we have the skills we need to build the future submarine in Australia.
In December last year, I announced the development of a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan.
It will determine the type of skills, the size and the profile of the workforce required as well as the capacity and capability of the Australian shipbuilding industry to successfully deliver the Future Submarine.
I will receive this plan in December and its recommendations will feed into the development of the 2013 White Paper.
Land Based Test Site
The second decision the Government will make involves the establishment of a Land Based Test Site.
The design, construction, setting to work and operation of a submarine is an incredibly complex task. Success relies on reducing risk wherever possible.
One of the key ways to do this is with a land based test site. It is arguable that many of the emergent problems with the Collins Class would have been identified by a land based test facility.
In November last year, Babcocks were contracted to carry out a feasibility study into the development of a Submarine Propulsion Energy, Support & Integration Facility.
This report is still being reviewed by Defence but I can confirm that it makes it clear that such a facility is essential.
The propulsion, energy and drive-train system is a key part of any submarine and a land based test site will enable this system to be developed, tested and proved before it is installed into the submarine.
Regardless of the submarine design option that is ultimately chosen, this will significantly reduce the risk of delay and cost blowouts, poor availability and increased operating and sustainment costs, loss of capability and most importantly, the risk of a catastrophic accident caused by the power and energy systems.
The report outlines a number of options.
It also recommends locating the facility close to where people with the necessary expertise and skills are located and where the main users of the facility are located.
In the next 12 months we will make decisions about the form, function and location of the land based test site.
Combat, sensors and weapons systems
The third decision is the combat, sensors and weapons systems the future submarine will have.
This is a critical decision. It is crucial to interoperability with our allies and partners.
It makes sense to make this decision early as we did with AWD.
In the AWD project the early decision on the combat systems meant the combat system team could start the development of sub-systems before the ship design was determined and before construction started.
It meant the detailed design of equipment such as compartment arrangements, equipment foundations, main cable routes, and the fundamental space, weight, cooling, power and other services requirements could be determined.
Trying to design platform and combat systems simultaneously is very difficult, and typically results in increased risk and schedule delays.
Initial pass
Fourth, and most significantly, the Government will make an initial pass decision on the future submarine project.
In May, the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and I announced the approval of $214 million for detailed design studies, modelling, analysis and scientific and technological studies focussed on four options.
This work is proceeding well. It will confirm a set of critical requirements for things such as stealth, range, habitability and interoperability.
Based on this work, more detailed work will occur on fewer options.
One option that is not on the table is a nuclear powered submarine.
The United States has never exported or leased a naval nuclear reactor.
Acquiring nuclear powered submarines would therefore involve outsourcing the construction, maintenance and sustainment of the submarines to another country.
The submarines would have to be built overseas, they would have to be fuelled, docked, defueled and disposed of overseas.
That means tens of billions of dollars for acquisition and sustainment over decades that could be invested in Australia, spent overseas.
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