Rebuilding a smaller mid sized Navy

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
The choice is between MANY smaller vessels (obviously with shorter endurance and range) versus FEWER larger vessels (with better endurance and longer range).

A compromise would be for more of the former and less of the latter - what would that percentage of each be? Other questions arise; how small is small? How large is large? Where to base the ships? Are the bases in the right places?

Does a country like Canada, with it's global-sized coastline need many (far more in comparison) smaller vessels (many in number albeit less range and endurance), or a few (fewer) large vessels (that have long range and excellent endurance)?
The many/smaller vs. fewer/larger vessel question is not quite as straight forward as some seem to think with respect to RCN needs. There are of course the Atlantic and Pacific coasts which require assets and patrolling and have usable ports. However, there is also the Hudson Bay area, various northern islands, Arctic approaches, etc. Depending on the time of year, there might be a few usable ports, or there might not be.

Having a large number of small vessels set aside to patrol this area, when the closest port gets iced in during the winter, does not really work all that well. Similarly, if the vessels are small and have a correspondingly shorter endurance, having them transit to/from bases in northern Atlantic or Pacific coasts is not a very viable option either, since so much of their fuel, stores, etc would be depleted in transit, leaving little (or nothing depending on conditions and patrol area) time on station.

Some of the smaller vessels could work to patrol local areas off the East and West coasts, but anything further out or up north is going to require a bit more.

-Cheers
 

My2Cents

Active Member
The many/smaller vs. fewer/larger vessel question is not quite as straight forward as some seem to think with respect to RCN needs. There are of course the Atlantic and Pacific coasts which require assets and patrolling and have usable ports. However, there is also the Hudson Bay area, various northern islands, Arctic approaches, etc. Depending on the time of year, there might be a few usable ports, or there might not be.

Having a large number of small vessels set aside to patrol this area, when the closest port gets iced in during the winter, does not really work all that well. Similarly, if the vessels are small and have a correspondingly shorter endurance, having them transit to/from bases in northern Atlantic or Pacific coasts is not a very viable option either, since so much of their fuel, stores, etc would be depleted in transit, leaving little (or nothing depending on conditions and patrol area) time on station.

Some of the smaller vessels could work to patrol local areas off the East and West coasts, but anything further out or up north is going to require a bit more.
Seakeeping is also much better for larger vessels than small. Seakeeping is critical for operations given some of the routine sea states off the Canadian coast in winter.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Seakeeping is also much better for larger vessels than small. Seakeeping is critical for operations given some of the routine sea states off the Canadian coast in winter.
Indeed, which is one of the reasons why the Kingston-class MCDV which were intended for MCM, patrolling and training have not been seeing as much service as appears to have originally been anticipated. While approaching 1,000 ton displacement, the vessels themselves are still only ~55 m IIRC, making them a rather rough ride in the "calm and gentle" North Atlantic, North Pacific and Arctic Oceans...

-Cheers
 

Future Fleet

New Member
From what I read of the CCG site, as well as the relevant Canadian acts, there appears to be virtually no provision for the CCG to perform law enforcement duties. The CCG does appear to be tasked with providing support/transport for other Canadian agencies (like the RCMP...) which can then perform their respective roles....

.....If a particular nation has its navy or a national police force tasked with performing EEZ patrolling, and/or other constabulary roles, that is fine. What matters is whether or not the allocation of assets, budgetary funding and personnel is appropriate for the roles required by Gov't, and if the roles mandated by Gov't are appropriate and realistic for a given nation's security situation.

-Cheers
Government to consider arming coast guard vessels - Nova Scotia - CBC News

It appears the Canadian government is considering arming the CCG. Reading between the lines (and a senate report) and its pretty clear imo that the CCG will soon have the constabulary responsibilities that the USCG does.

If they will be officially tasked with a constabulary role then they need an OPV. The PV85 will do the job nicely as it should be able to patrol within all of Canada's 200nm EEZ south of the ice. The helicopter pad should be reinforced / resized to handle Cyclone and Cormorant helicopters. (On a side note the CCG is going to need a new helicopter soon to replace the BO 105 and I think the AW 159 would fit perfectly in the hanger of the PV85 and would be a nice complement to the Cormorants performing SAR and the like. In general the CCG would probably not need a 6000 kg helicopter elsewhere as the BO 105 is only 2500 kg but the range and capacity of the 159 make it a good fit for a PV85.)

The 25mm gun is a little small and should be beefed up to a 40mm. A Stern launching ramp would be an asset. A missile / torpedo package similar to the Knud Rasmussen OPV would be ideal if we were going to go the direction of the USCG although the added weight may mean the PV85 may have to be increased in size slightly or forgo the ice strengthened hull. This would only make sense if the CCG is placed under the Navy's domain as the USCG is.

The PV85 design could also replace the 4 existing CCG Scientific and Oceanographic vessels that are due for replacement. Having OPVs, Scientific and Oceanographic vessels all using the same design should bring down building and maintenance costs.

Also, on this line of thinking the APS ships could be cancelled and replaced with 3 heavy ice breakers with a pc-1 rating. Heavy ice breakers would be able to remain in the Arctic most of the year adding to sovereignty credibility much more effectively than the slush breakers. Now that the Government is considering arming CCG vessels and the senate is reviewing a role change the Navy need not waste time and money retraining sailors to patrol waters the CCG already navigates.

Perhaps the government will decide in the end to keep the CCG performing the roles they have traditionally held but this is an excellent opportunity ensure Canadian waters are properly patrolled and free the navy from EEZ patrols.
 
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Belesari

New Member
Labor split on nuclear submarines

If the US is finally interested in exporting some of their Virginia's, we would be crazy to not buy some. 4-6 SSNs would be a great asset to defence, Arctic patrol, and task force deployment.
Would make sense i think they currently cost what less around 1 bil maybe even less? Not sure how well they would do in the arctic can they surface and such without causing damage to the skin?
 

KiwiRob

Well-Known Member
Would make sense i think they currently cost what less around 1 bil maybe even less? Not sure how well they would do in the arctic can they surface and such without causing damage to the skin?
Not sure about Virginia but Astute can surface through ice.
 

My2Cents

Active Member
Not sure about Virginia but Astute can surface through ice.
I imagine the capability to surface through ice has been a standard requirement for all new designs since the Skate first did it in 1958. There was no other way to communicate with a sub under the ice cap back then, and what they developed since is not much better because of a very low baud rate and is receive only for the submarine.
 

Future Fleet

New Member
Would make sense i think they currently cost what less around 1 bil maybe even less? Not sure how well they would do in the arctic can they surface and such without causing damage to the skin?
Don't think they are that cheap, I imagine they'll come in closer to 1.5 to 2 billion. The Aussies are wisely reconsidering the SSN route since a SSK with their requirements would cost more and do less.
 

colay

New Member
The latest Virginia builds are budgeted at $2B apiece AFAIK.
Add edit : IIRC the earlier boats cost more and the $2B commitment would allow the Navy to get Congress to fund 2 X Virginias per year.
 

ManteoRed

New Member
Don't think they are that cheap, I imagine they'll come in closer to 1.5 to 2 billion. The Aussies are wisely reconsidering the SSN route since a SSK with their requirements would cost more and do less.
Believe the latest numbers are coming in right around 1.9 to 2.0b per. They're doing that 2 for 4 in 12 thing and everything I've seen about them in the news seems to be championing them as coming in ahead of schedule and under budget. As a model for defense acquisition so seems they're meeting those numbers.

At first I thought this would be a no brainer for Australia, since they were talking about 36 billion for the Collins replacement budget. Just basic back of bar room napkin math shows you could buy 4-5 and still have billions left over to build up a local nuclear trained maintenance group. Any serious maintenance send em back to the US.

But as I read more, seems the problem for Australia might be the crewing requirements. Already having crew shortages, moving up to a Virginia would mean a significantly larger crew for a single ship.
 

Future Fleet

New Member
Believe the latest numbers are coming in right around 1.9 to 2.0b per. They're doing that 2 for 4 in 12 thing and everything I've seen about them in the news seems to be championing them as coming in ahead of schedule and under budget. As a model for defense acquisition so seems they're meeting those numbers.

At first I thought this would be a no brainer for Australia, since they were talking about 36 billion for the Collins replacement budget. Just basic back of bar room napkin math shows you could buy 4-5 and still have billions left over to build up a local nuclear trained maintenance group. Any serious maintenance send em back to the US.

But as I read more, seems the problem for Australia might be the crewing requirements. Already having crew shortages, moving up to a Virginia would mean a significantly larger crew for a single ship.
That seems to be the case and the Collin's crew requirements are just under 60, I believe it is less than half that of a Virginia but almost the same as the Barracuda class. I don't think the Aussies would want a Barracuda as it has only 4 torpedo tubes and no vertical launch.

The US seems to prefer larger crews and rely less on automation than the British or especially the French.
 

My2Cents

Active Member
Believe the latest numbers are coming in right around 1.9 to 2.0b per. They're doing that 2 for 4 in 12 thing and everything I've seen about them in the news seems to be championing them as coming in ahead of schedule and under budget. As a model for defense acquisition so seems they're meeting those numbers.

At first I thought this would be a no brainer for Australia, since they were talking about 36 billion for the Collins replacement budget. Just basic back of bar room napkin math shows you could buy 4-5 and still have billions left over to build up a local nuclear trained maintenance group. Any serious maintenance send em back to the US.
I am curious, why is it necessary to create an entire nuclear industry to support SSNs? Why wouldn’t it be possible to have a contract with the US for maintenance and disposal of the nuclear plant? After all, they aren’t going to need to be refueled for 33 years.

The big issues here is probably technology transfer (Australia does not want nuclear technology) and a desire for the submarines to be constructed IN Australia.
But as I read more, seems the problem for Australia might be the crewing requirements. Already having crew shortages, moving up to a Virginia would mean a significantly larger crew for a single ship.
One of the problems with the Collins class is supposed to be that the crew is too small for the workload, which required the crew to be increased from 42 to 58. The subs are claimed to have limited habitability standards before the increase, and now are worse. The service has been getting what should be an adequate number of recruits for the crews, but they refuse to re-up because they hate the boats. Lack of sufficient experienced sailors in the crew then just makes things worse the next time around.

The Virginia’s have larger crews in part from a lower workload per crewman, and much greater habitability, which could lead to more experienced crew being retained and easy the shortage. The speed and endurance advantages from nuclear power could also reduce the number of submarines required. Is it enough to make-up the difference?

Only a study of the issues will tell.
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
That seems to be the case and the Collin's crew requirements are just under 60, I believe it is less than half that of a Virginia but almost the same as the Barracuda class. I don't think the Aussies would want a Barracuda as it has only 4 torpedo tubes and no vertical launch.

The US seems to prefer larger crews and rely less on automation than the British or especially the French.
Australia isn't considering nuclear submarines at all, for reasons that have been explained over and over again in the RAN thread. Please don't use claims to the contrary to bolster your position, as such claims are faulty. Cheers mate.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I am curious, why is it necessary to create an entire nuclear industry to support SSNs? Why wouldn’t it be possible to have a contract with the US for maintenance and disposal of the nuclear plant? After all, they aren’t going to need to be refueled for 33 years.
Not to re-open the whole RAN SSN can of worms, but there would need to be some rather significant infrastructure in place in order for a nation to support operating nuclear-powered vessels, even if the powerplant is designed to be a non-refueled powerplant.

The appropriate docking and repair facilities need to be equipped to handle working with a nuclear powered vessel. This includes detecting, containing and repairing any possible damage and/or leaks to the powerplant. Facilities need to exist to clean/decon the interior and exterior of the sub, and then safely contain the resulting hazmat waste. A few other things potentially become involved as well.

Having some form of nuclear industry means that more/most of the required infrastructure is likely to be in place or available. Despite what some people seem to think, the Virginia-class SSN's are not just a "turn key" operation just requiring properly trained personnel. The personnel will be able to run the SSN's for a period of time, but will sooner or later run into something which requires the appropriate infrastructure repair, clean up, etc.

Again, this is not nation specific, any nation operating a vessel with a nuclear powerplant is going to need to have facilities with the proper capabilities to safely and effectively sustain nuclear operations, be they CVN, SSN, etc.

-Cheers
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
One of the problems with the Collins class is supposed to be that the crew is too small for the workload, which required the crew to be increased from 42 to 58. The subs are claimed to have limited habitability standards before the increase, and now are worse. The service has been getting what should be an adequate number of recruits for the crews, but they refuse to re-up because they hate the boats. Lack of sufficient experienced sailors in the crew then just makes things worse the next time around.
Crews are not extending due to the posting requirements to be on the west coast - its got little to do with "hating" or the capability of the boats.

CMDR Sub Sqdn knows that all too well.
 

Sea Toby

New Member
Crews are not extending due to the posting requirements to be on the west coast - its got little to do with "hating" or the capability of the boats.

CMDR Sub Sqdn knows that all too well.
With submariners facing a career only on the west coast, then Australia needs submarines based on both coasts so they won't spend their entire career there. But there is also no doubt west coast based submarines are more vital for potential war fighting operations than east coast based submarines. There is a reason why they are based on the west coast.

The question remains though whether the Australian taxpayers want more tax relief than east coast based submariners.
 
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