I found the focus of this recent article in APDR Magazine quiet interesting.
THE SENATE AND SEA 1000 ON A POINT OF ORDER | Australian Defence News & Articles | Asia Pacific Defence Reporter
Like a lot of others here, I am very interested in seeing the final outcome of SEA 1000, but have so little knowledge that any comment I make will be totally uneducated and appear to be stupid.
So I am very interested to get the opinions of GF and others who are far more in the know than me.
Firstly is the article accurate? Is it balanced? Or is it just the author’s opinion, the old saying “opinions are like a-holes, everybody’s got one!” comes to mind.
Getting back to the article, rather than focusing on this or that submarine design to be the solution, the focus was more on the fact that the combat systems, weapons, sensors and other weapons systems are being “locked” in at a very early stage and what impact those decisions will have on the final design chosen.
It’s a bit of a long read (see link above), but I’ll quote some of the interesting paragraphs, in italic, below:
The idea of selecting a submarine combat system and wrapping a pressure hull around it is a seriously flawed approach. It is not what happened in the case of the AWD. In the AWD project the Aegis system was selected and the ship was down-selected to one that already had Aegis fitted.
This path makes no sense in the context of the USN’s submarine combat system suite because it is only fitted to USN nuclear powered submarines - the only thing that thus far been explicitly ruled out for Australia’s future submarines.
If Defence were to select the US Combat System in 2013, the first of the four submarine options under consideration - an existing submarine design available off-the-shelf, modified only to meet Australia’s regulatory requirements – by simple definition would be eliminated.
Option two - an existing off-the-shelf design modified to incorporate Australia’s specific requirements, including in relation to combat systems and weapons – would also be eliminated on account of the comment above about the increasing interdependence between sub-systems of the USN submarine combat system and weight, space and power issues discussed below. It won’t fit!
Option three – an evolved design that enhances the capabilities of existing off-the-shelf designs, including the Collins Class or an entirely new developmental submarine – is even questionable. The 3400 tonne Collins Class submarine already struggles with respect to the weight, space and power requirements of the US system that has been shoehorned into it. It is not unreasonable, for example, to presume that the power load requirements of a total US combat system would be of the order 100 KWs greater than the power requirements of a combat system optimised for conventional submarines and would thus substantially impact on the submarine’s indiscretion ratio and radius of action.
There is risk that option four - an entirely new developmental submarine – at or around 4000 tonnes - would also fail to muster the puff necessary to operate a full USN submarine combat system.
So if all of the above is accurate (based on locking in the full USN submarine combat, sensor, weapon systems, etc), why even bother to have options 1 and 2 at all? Which leaves options 3 and 4.
Option 4, to me at least in size of the boat, points to a submarine that is probably not unlike the current Japanese boat. And even then, based on the claims in the article, a boat of that size would still struggle to generate enough power to run the full combat, weapon and sensor systems.
It seems, according to the article, the only guaranteed way to power all components of the combat system is to have it come complete with USN nuclear powered submarine.
Which as we all know isn’t going to happen unless there is a massive change of policy by the Government to include nuclear as an option.
Anyway, have a read and give me your opinions.