Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[wrs]

Wasted? The Seasprites was a balls-up no doubt about it and anyone involved in that should never have a position to purchase anything for our forces ever again, but yeah imagine if we had invested in your oft-stated "platforms" of choice namely: Huey II, upgraded Caribou operations, KC-747 refuellers and whatever other off the top of your head acquisitions you dream would have "made a difference"...

We'd have a 70's era defence force that was decisively outmatched by every regional power within South East Asia and one that couldn't go anywhere or do anything beyond Operation Anode (Solomans) level ops.

That'd be a tremendous investment in our Countries DEFENCE wouldn't it?

How about reading the whole report, and if you find any faults, please detail line by line.
It was published by the Senate.
As for your comments, I have no idea of the thrust of same..
The report is damming and shows what a disgrace the mangement of our projects has been.
Pretty simple.
regards

 

[Volkodav]

So what happens to the already completed systems? Do they remain in their 2012 mod state because by the time they are in service there will be further updates/improvements.

If we're really lucky, Aegis/SPY 1 will still be in service with the USN by the time Sydney commissions.:mad

Or, logically, are we contracted in to the ongoing US upgrade schedule and the mods are made before fitting?

Well most of the CS is FMS and as such tied into the USN and what isn't has been specifically designed to permit easy integration through the Australian CS rather than having to rely on the US to integrate it with AEGIS.

On the platform side CM, obsolescence and maintenance of procured equipment are all being managed.

I don't know if you have had any exposure to Lean or the theory of constraints but slowing the program will have a benifial effect on cost and efficiency, the down side is this is happening, not because it is the smart thing to do but because our current political class are brain dead, headline driven peanuts who paint them selves into corners and lack the moral authority to admit they are wrong.

 

[gf0012-aust]

It might not all be DMOs fault, but a lot of it is. I've nearly come to blows with a rep from DMO due to his incompetence. A lot of DMO personnel forget that their job is to support the warfighter. Apparently a project can deliver zero capability but still be highly successful, because the Powerpoint slide said do.

That is my frustration though - DMO cannot singularly impact upon the delay or change to a project - any variation to scope or change requires direction from CDG, the respective service - or if both one of the internal ADO reviews - or central agency input - and they can and have changed direction. C17's, Choules and Growlers being good examples of where decisions get hijacked. (C-17s being a good outcome)

DMO doesn't have the mandate or authority to change direction once cabinet blesses the money. DMO acts at the direction of the capability manager - and that could be single service, joint, vcdf (in spite of the fact that they have no money bucket per se_ or CIOG

My frustration lies with the fact that all in the decision loop need to understand that its about supporting the warfighter - but that an inability to give the service what they want is not defined by DMO - but by the capability manager.

At any point, at any slippage level - all parties are engaged in delivery, but ther services have to make a case to the capability manager who then directs or guides DMO on what to do if change is needed. IF cabinet has already handed over money, then the chance to change anything in the current climate is about -100

there is just as much frustration amongst operational uniforms who think that their uniform D's in the Divs such as CDG, CIOG, are letting them down. It' actually euphemistically called "Stockholm syndrome" internally.

 

[ASSAIL]

there is just as much frustration amongst operational uniforms who think that their uniform D's in the Divs such as CDG, CIOG, are letting them down. It' actually euphemistically called "Stockholm syndrome" internally

My understanding of "Stockholm Syndrome" is that its traumatic bonding- such as battered wife syndrome or hostage's like of their captors.
That being so, I think the entire ADF should be feeling this towards Australia's current political defence guardians.

John Cantwell told it how it is in March Lack of respect cuts both ways with minister

 

[gf0012-aust]

My understanding of "Stockholm Syndrome" is that its traumatic bonding- such as battered wife syndrome or hostage's like of their captors.
That being so, I think the entire ADF should be feeling this towards Australia's current political defence guardians.

John Cantwell told it how it is in March Lack of respect cuts both ways with minister

Seen that article when it first came out. Its interesting when you look at Labor put Faulkner in the job that some were initially concerned as Faulkner had been quite enthusiastic about putting the boot into the ADO during senate estimates etc... - he was probably one of the more highly regarded snr cabinet members as he was effective and he treated people and the organisation with respect.

Personally, and reinforced by the current crop on both sides of Govt, I reckon there's an argument to be had which bans Lawyers from public office.

/cheek off

 

[Volkodav]

Seen that article when it first came out. Its interesting when you look at Labor put Faulkner in the job that some were initially concerned as Faulkner had been quite enthusiastic about putting the boot into the ADO during senate estimates etc... - he was probably one of the more highly regarded snr cabinet members as he was effective and he treated people and the organisation with respect.

Personally, and reinforced by the current crop on both sides of Govt, I reckon there's an argument to be had which bans Lawyers from public office.

/cheek off

And school teachers as well please!

I suspect the problem may be due to certain professions allowing individuals to be removed from reality and rarely having to deal with adults on an equal standing or without some edge or advantage.

 

[wrs]

That is my frustration though - DMO cannot singularly impact upon the delay or change to a project - any variation to scope or change requires direction from CDG, the respective service - or if both one of the internal ADO reviews - or central agency input - and they can and have changed direction. C17's, Choules and Growlers being good examples of where decisions get hijacked. (C-17s being a good outcome)

DMO doesn't have the mandate or authority to change direction once cabinet blesses the money. DMO acts at the direction of the capability manager - and that could be single service, joint, vcdf (in spite of the fact that they have no money bucket per se_ or CIOG

My frustration lies with the fact that all in the decision loop need to understand that its about supporting the warfighter - but that an inability to give the service what they want is not defined by DMO - but by the capability manager.

At any point, at any slippage level - all parties are engaged in delivery, but ther services have to make a case to the capability manager who then directs or guides DMO on what to do if change is needed. IF cabinet has already handed over money, then the chance to change anything in the current climate is about -100

there is just as much frustration amongst operational uniforms who think that their uniform D's in the Divs such as CDG, CIOG, are letting them down. It' actually euphemistically called "Stockholm syndrome" internally.

Try shooting the messenger, why not.Read the Report.
In addition, can anyone tell me why we need 22,000 public servants(not including subcontractors) to administer 55,000 odd in uniform.
Private enterprise would be gone tomorrow, if they follwed that model.
It gets even better, despite the failures detailed in the Senate Report, why do we need 7,500 employees in DMO, costing us $1.3 billion a year to produce failure after failure.
Imagine if that was actually spent on something concrete, like equipment and running costs.
For those of you who lament spending in the correct places, read the systemic failures noted in the Senate Report.
Read all 360 pages, enlightening.
Senate Committees – Parliament of Australia
Yes we can blame Politicians, however the truth is the funds given to Defence are basically wasted. They have not been used wisely.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Try shooting the messenger, why not.Read the Report.
In addition, can anyone tell me why we need 22,000 public servants(not including subcontractors) to administer 55,000 odd in uniform.
Private enterprise would be gone tomorrow, if they follwed that model.
It gets even better, despite the failures detailed in the Senate Report, why do we need 7,500 employees in DMO, costing us $1.3 billion a year to produce failure after failure.
Imagine if that was actually spent on something concrete, like equipment and running costs.
For those of you who lament spending in the correct places, read the systemic failures noted in the Senate Report.
Read all 360 pages, enlightening.
Senate Committees – Parliament of Australia
Yes we can blame Politicians, however the truth is the funds given to Defence are basically wasted. They have not been used wisely.

seriously? do you understand anything about the Kinnaird process and what the governance constraints are?

if the senate doesn't understand that its the gate reviews and central agency checks that are slowing down the process then they shouldn't be there as they have no idea what the problem is in the first place.

you obviously don't understand that at any stage of a project there are at least 3 different agencies and divisions involved that are all informed and have to bless any changes.

you can copy and paste as much as you like but its pretty damn clear to me that if you don't understand and still trot out this stuff as evidence then you are just trolling.

get a clue and stop pretending to understand when you've got no ferking idea about how it works in the first place.

if you're such an expert on governance then explain to everyone in here how some major programs and assets got purchased without going through the services, dmo, cdg and ciog? - where was the senate who now seem to be another group of independent experts.

for the last time from me - DMO, CDG or CIOG cannot singularly cause project failure, Govt at every major level has oversight, .the Services have veto, as do Central Agencies etc...

The reason why there is a multiple phase process is that its how government controls the money it hands over
The reason why projects have scope creep is because either the specific service involved, CDG or the capability manager approve it - the program and project manager cannot increase capability without approval - guess who gives approval?

but I guess you knew that....

if you want to be fascinated by reports it pays to understand the process first - that way you can work out whether the report has value or what was driving it.

Its funny that the Senator that had some of the most visible disagreements with ADO at Estimates acknowledged in front of the staff that he didn't appreciate the magnitude and difficulties that Def Projects face. We're not buying cans of vegemite

 

[ADMk2]

Welcome to the crazy world of Ares Blog and ELP's own "Perplexed"...

It's pointless asking him about Kinnaird, projects, costing or reality. All of it is completely foreign to him.

You should ask him why we don't run Huey II's instead of MRH-90's. Why we don't have Turbo Caribou's instead of C-27J's and why we aren't running KC-747's handbuilt by Carlo Kopp or something.

It's hilarious...

 

[Abraham Gubler]

And school teachers as well please!

Faulkner was a school teacher... But high school back in the day when it was actually about education.

 

[Bonza]

Been banned a couple of times already I see wrs? Or is it BystanderAgain, or Worklaw, or RichPerplexed... either way you're out of here. And instead of coming back under yet another name, have a think about it and understand that it would be a waste of your time, and ours. No one's interested in indulging you - perhaps you'd have better luck elsewhere.

 

[Volkodav]

Faulkner was a school teacher... But high school back in the day when it was actually about education.

I was thinking Meg Lees actually; she was a PE teacher believe it or not. I suppose it was a bit of a sweeping statement as I have known some pretty good teachers over the years its just many of those who enter politics leave a lot to be desired, maybe because most come through the teachers union, the defender of mediocrity and incompetence in the education system.

 

[Raven22]

That is my frustration though - DMO cannot singularly impact upon the delay or change to a project - any variation to scope or change requires direction from CDG, the respective service - or if both one of the internal ADO reviews - or central agency input - and they can and have changed direction. C17's, Choules and Growlers being good examples of where decisions get hijacked. (C-17s being a good outcome)

DMO doesn't have the mandate or authority to change direction once cabinet blesses the money. DMO acts at the direction of the capability manager - and that could be single service, joint, vcdf (in spite of the fact that they have no money bucket per se_ or CIOG

My frustration lies with the fact that all in the decision loop need to understand that its about supporting the warfighter - but that an inability to give the service what they want is not defined by DMO - but by the capability manager.

At any point, at any slippage level - all parties are engaged in delivery, but ther services have to make a case to the capability manager who then directs or guides DMO on what to do if change is needed. IF cabinet has already handed over money, then the chance to change anything in the current climate is about -100

there is just as much frustration amongst operational uniforms who think that their uniform D's in the Divs such as CDG, CIOG, are letting them down. It' actually euphemistically called "Stockholm syndrome" internally.

As I said though, I've seen elements of DMO work so incompetently that if they were part of the ADF the people involved would be sacked and their career ended. A lot of the internal processes I've seen are geared more to making the powerpoint presentations to higher seem good instead of actually delivering capability. Not all the blame lies outside of DMO.

John Cantwell told it how it is in March Lack of respect cuts both ways with minister

John Cantwell has a book coming out soon. I'm reliably informed the last part of it is quite interesting.

 

[Volkodav]

As I said though, I've seen elements of DMO work so incompetently that if they were part of the ADF the people involved would be sacked and their career ended. A lot of the internal processes I've seen are geared more to making the powerpoint presentations to higher seem good instead of actually delivering capability. Not all the blame lies outside of DMO.

Ive seen both sides, the competent dedicated professional do their job to the best of their ability as well the seat warmer who is determined not to rock the boat before their next assignment is lined up. This includes a serving officer with a couple of decades experience refusing to sign off the very processes his role was created to sign off becuase there wasn't a tech reg telling him how to do it.

I note there is now a DMO shoulder patch that the uniforms wear, I assume to let their comrades know they have been corrupted. (sorry gf)

 

[gf0012-aust]

As I said though, I've seen elements of DMO work so incompetently that if they were part of the ADF the people involved would be sacked and their career ended. A lot of the internal processes I've seen are geared more to making the powerpoint presentations to higher seem good instead of actually delivering capability. Not all the blame lies outside of DMO.

Indeed, have seen it myself. but I've also seen LTCOLs working for the capability manager who are obviously in a career posting opportunity but who have no investment in the job. The services go to them to make a case for project change and they carry the printed line - at which point DMO can only say no as we take direction from the Capability Manager (be it CDG, CIOG, VCDF etc...) - DMO cannot make changes to scope without approval and direction from the CM - and at that point, if money has come over, Govt has also to bless the change. Hence my frustration when people blame DMO, CDG as single entities and by association obstruction and/incompetency when they couldn't have changed things even if they wanted to. Hence the broader frustration in the ADO community when Govt wants a bright and shiny and breaks all the governance rules so as to get it across the line.

I've had a few meetings where a new DO (MAJ/LTCOL) had to be pulled aside and chatted to by the next snr rank because they came in and decided that the Proj was their next tree in the paddock.

incompetency exists all down the line - but the power to change and influence only really happens at CA or Ministerial level.

2 politically driven purchases have worked out in the last 20 years - unfort you don't see Govt lining up to look at the rest of their handiwork

 

[ASSAIL]

Indeed, have seen it myself. but I've also seen LTCOLs working for the capability manager who are obviously in a career posting opportunity but who have no investment in the job.

Those competent, warfighting officers are continually used by their posting directorates to fill operational roles and their instinct is to be dismissive of administrative "procedure".

Unfortunately, in peacetime, their careers usually get stalled at 1 star level or just below because they don't play the system.

Those who have been found wanting as warriors usually seek the comfort of Russell with all its inuendo and influence garnering and end up being promoted to multiple stars.

I know this is outrageous generalisation but how many times has this sad fact played out in times of conflict? Those in leadership roles in defence forces throughout history don't last beyond the first encounters.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Those competent, warfighting officers are continually used by their posting directorates to fill operational roles and their instinct is to be dismissive of administrative "procedure".

Don't get me wrong, its only a small few, I've had the privilege of working with some spectacular officers - in fact the current ones I deal with are certainly on the ball, know their jobs and don't muck around.

But we've all seen the damage that politics and an irresponsible media does to public perceptions of capability.

Collins is the outstanding example of a platform that is still 15 years down the track regarded as a game changer, and is highly regarded by a couple of navies that drive nukes. However forever and a day the general public regards them as duds.

My frustration at the inability of those who know to actually counter that rubbish is palpable - but what I really resent is the fact that the current opposition have wilfully turned it into a political football to a level where the general public and the broader media have turned it into a circus - and now dismiss australian industry by association. That I find particularly reprehensible - and the opposition defence shadows should hang their collective heads in shame for feeding the perception.

Collins are more than capable of taking on and dealing with boats built much later - including some that the general public and broadsheet hacks assume would have it all over them.

 

[Volkodav]

Collins are more than capable of taking on and dealing with boats built much later - including some that the general public and broadsheet hacks assume would have it all over them.

To my knowledge the only class of submarine that has delivered a higher level of availability is the RN Vanguard Class SSBNs. By availability I mean number of submarines available for deployment vs total in the class. Considering that from 2006/7 until recently there was at least one (and often two) submarines laid up in pre FCD in addition to the one in FCD (due to cost and crewing issues) this is a pretty good record. If you want more submarines at sea you need more hulls and more crews as well as the commitment to adequately fund maintenance and training.

 

[hauritz]

Collins is the outstanding example of a platform that is still 15 years down the track regarded as a game changer, and is highly regarded by a couple of navies that drive nukes. However forever and a day the general public regards them as duds.

Unfortunately it is all about public perception.

Personally I would like to see them use Collins design as the basis for SEA 1000 ... but I doubt any political party would have the courage to do so.

The way I see it is that an updated version of the Collins' class is probably a no riskier option than modifying an existing European design. In fact probably less risky.

The navy is aware of the short comings of the Collins class and should know how to address those problems. To go back to the drawing board with any new design would effectively be throwing away 20 years of hard earned experience with the Collins class.

 

[RobWilliams]

The navy is aware of the short comings of the Collins class and should know how to address those problems. To go back to the drawing board with any new design would effectively be throwing away 20 years of hard earned experience with the Collins class.

Definitely.

The amount of experience of operational experience the RAN gained from the Collins class is nothing to be sniffed at.

I'd be highly skeptical if it was put forward that the RAN couldn't produce a better sub tailored to their requirements than adapting a Scorpene or whatever. Considering the success the Collins has had at RIMPAC up against Los Angeles class SSNs, i'm sure that a development of the Collins could be a particularly powerful platform.

Although I have heard talk of her developing a leak and having to return to Australia?

Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian

The commander of Australia's contingent, Commodore Stuart Mayer, told The Australian the Farncomb also performed very well against US Los Angelese-class boats submerged off Hawaii.

"She's winning a lot more than she's losing," Commodore Mayer said.

He said the commanders of the nuclear-powered LA-class submarines were very keen to test their skills against Australia's Collins-class conventional submarine which was very quiet and agile and which could operate in shallower water than bigger US boats.

I'm sorry to say that it looks as though this'll most probably be driven by financial constraints rather than operational requirements.