Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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John Newman

The Bunker Group
Got a copy myself, had it since my late teens. As an aside I got to meet the NA Draftsman who did the line drawings in the book and bought a set of 1/96 scale plans for HMAS Vendetta from him. Stuffed if I can remember his name though.
Yes it is a great book, published in 1977, when I said I had it for over 25 years I think it's closer to 35!

Bought it at "Boat Books" at Crows Nest (I think the shop is still there), I was only a teen too and it cost me an absolute bomb, considering I was still a humble apprentice back then.

Don't know if its still available, but I'd certainly recommend it to anyone interested in RAN history right from the days before there was such a thing as the RAN right up to the time it was published, some amazing photos of ships going back into the 1800's too.

Its the sort of publication that deserves an update, yes of course there is the "internet" to do all your research, but nothing like having it in one place right in your hands.

I don't know if Ross Gillett will ever do an update (yes I'm sure some of us know the unfortunate traffic incident he was involved in back nearly 10 years ago, but thats another story).

EDIT:

Just did a google search, some copies available second hand:

http://www.bookfinder.com/search/?a...%2C%20anthony&title=warships%20of%20australia
 
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John Newman

The Bunker Group
It’s an interesting exercise converting these ships to equivalents today. Taking into account that back in the 1950s and 60s technology was advancing far faster today and equipment stayed in service for less time (as frontline assets at least) and the purpose of why the ships were ordered. Here is a possible 1968 fleet update to today’s technology:

1 x Invincible class CVL
3 x Arleigh Burke class (Flight IIA) DDG
3 x Kidd class DDG
4+2 x Type 23 FF
2+2 x Scorpene class SS
6 x Sandown class MCM
18+2 x Armidale class PB
1 x Ocean class LPH
1 x Lewis & Clark class AKE
1 x Henry J. Kaiser class AO

Reserve and Training Ships:

2 x Charles F. Adams class DDG
3 x Type 21 FF

Aircraft:

10 x Sea Harrier shad hacker fighter
16 x Merlin ASW helicopter
24 x Seahawk ASW helicopter

Somehow I don’t see how the RAN even with the current shipbuilding will get close to this.
Abe,

When I did the 1968 list it was only "Destroyer / Frigates" because of that discussion going on.

What I didn't include was:

* 1 x CV – Melbourne - (with her brand new compliment of Skyhawks and Trackers and of course the Wessex too).
* 1 x LPH – Sydney - (yes I know she was converted to a “Fast Troop Transport”, but the LPH tag sort of fits if compared to a US LPH or British Commando Carrier!)
* 2 x Oberon SS – with 2 more by 1969 and final two in 1977
* 2 x T Class RN subs - Still in OZ till the next two Oberons arrived in '69.
* 6 x Ton Class Minesweepers
* 18 x Attack Class Patrol Boats - final 2 in the following year
* 1 x Fleet Oiler – Supply
* 1 x Destroyer Tender – Stalwart - “Building 215” as she was known because of the time she spent tied up at Garden Island!

Plus all the other minor RAN ships too.

If you look at the world back in '68, especially our part of the world and the Southern Hemisphere, even India and China at that time, the RAN was a pretty powerful force.

Not quiet the same now is it?


Cheers.
 

Richo99

Active Member
I believe I addressed that when I stated in my reply that I "stand corrected". I checked and realised that HMAS Sydney did in fact retire several months before HMAS Perth formally commissioned so did not hesitate to admit to my error.
Absolutely, and I appreciate that- my little rant wasnt directed at you.

As to your comment on the usefulness of the Qs in 1968 vs that of the ANZACs today it could be argued that Qs were more representative of the required capability of that time than the unmodernised ANZACs are today. Than again if you were suggesting that the RAN would have been better off with a pair of ANZACs in service in 1968 rather than 4 Type 15 conversions I would have to agree although for the life of me I can't see how it could have been achieved.
No not suggesting that, but it would have be an impressive feat wouldnt it?
 

old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Looking at the fleet in retrospect, lets look at ADF manning in the 1980,s.
Population of Australia at about 16 million.
ARMY 32000, 26000 reserves.

NAVY 23000

Airforce 16000

Todays population, over 20 Mîllion

ARMY 29000

Navy ?

Airforce?
 

Gordon Branch

New Member
From the 2012-2013 Budget Paper (ww w.defence.gov.au/budget/12-13/pbs/2012-2013_Defence_PBS_complete.pdf)

The current raw figures are: (1st figure 2011-2012 Actual, 2nd figure 2012-2013 Planned)

ADF Permanent Force
Navy 14,111 14,260
Army 29,608 30,270
Air Force 14,163 14,106
Total Permanent Force 57,882 58,636

Active Reserve Force
Navy 2,100 2,100
Army 15,700 16,000
Air Force 2,390 2,400
Active Reserve Force 20,190 20,500

High Readiness Reserve
Navy – –
Army 550 550
Air Force 510 600
High Readiness Reserve Force 1,060 1,150

Total Reserves 21,250 21,650

Total ADF 79,132 80,286

As another indicator, the Australian Defence Budget is the 13th largest in the world in pure dollar terms. (e n.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures"]List of countries by military expenditures - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)

An observation: IF Australia increased its Defence Budget to the world average of 2.5% of GDP it would require a 39% increase over the current budget or an extra $10 billion dollars p.a. This would then make the Australia Defence Budget the 11th largest in the world. (Based on the wikipedia value)
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Looking at the fleet in retrospect, lets look at ADF manning in the 1980,s.
Population of Australia at about 16 million.
ARMY 32000, 26000 reserves.

NAVY 23000

Airforce 16000

Todays population, over 20 Mîllion

ARMY 29000

Navy ?

Airforce?
I'm not sure where you got the Navy figure of 23,000?
IIRC the RAN peaked in the early 1990's at just over 16,000.

Ive been trying to find the exact number but thebest I could find was a graph in the ADF section of wiki (not worth linking)
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
I'm not sure where you got the Navy figure of 23,000?
IIRC the RAN peaked in the early 1990's at just over 16,000.

Ive been trying to find the exact number but thebest I could find was a graph in the ADF section of wiki (not worth linking)
Have to agree with you that the figure of 23,000 is wrong.

Going back to my trusty "Warships of Australia" book, it has some figures for manpower levels at various times.

For example in period around 1976 there were approx 17,000 full time, but added to that was, for example in 1976 - 5,120 reserves (1,020 with training obligations and 4,100 without).

That totals around 22,000. So the figure above that old faithful has quoted would have to include reserves, and even then it wouldn't have been 23,000.

Going back to the Warships of Australia reference for a minute, a snapshot of manpower levels were:
* 1914 - 3,800
* 1919 - 5,250
* 1932 - 3,117
* 1945 - 39,650 (peak manpower level)
* 1954 - 13,441
* 1966 - 14,633
* 1969 - 16,638
* 1972 - 16,890
* 1975 - 16,743

Cheers.
 

old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
sorry for the fudged
figures,was working from memory.
Point is, our population has increased significantly, and actual numbers of ADF personel have gotten smaller with that growth in population, I just find it ironic.

Also, the number of of actual combat soldiers in todays army have increased significantly, so where have the Army lost solders to, we now have 1 more infantry Battalion and a Commando Regt than we did in 1985, and 3000 less soldiers?
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
sorry for the fudged
figures,was working from memory.
Point is, our population has increased significantly, and actual numbers of ADF personel have gotten smaller with that growth in population, I just find it ironic.

Also, the number of of actual combat soldiers in todays army have increased significantly, so where have the Army lost solders to, we now have 1 more infantry Battalion and a Commando Regt than we did in 1985, and 3000 less soldiers?
Not going to disagree with the need for more, but I suppose what is relevant in comparing "then and now" is the crewing needs, for example, the destroyer and frigates.

Going back to the late 60's early 70's period again that has been in discussion, the destroyer/frigate fleet and the size of the crew it took to man them was:

* 3 x DDG - 333 crew = 999
* 3 x DD - 320 crew = 960
* 6 x DE - 250 crew = 1500

Total of 3459 crew for 12 ships


Today (and the published figures I found vary on the size of crew for the FFG's):
* 4 x FFG - 184-221= 736-884
* 8 x FFH - 174 = 1392

Total ranges between 2128-2276 crew for 12 ships

Thats a difference of 1331-1138 less, so lets say that its approx 1200 less crew that is required to man the same amount of ships of today that are obviously far more "automated" than the ships of the past.

And rolling forward a few years to the 3 AWD's, the crewing figures are:

* 186 + 16 aircrew = 202, (there is accommodation for 234 on each ship too). So that 606 in total for the 3 AWD's compared to 999 for the 3 DDG's.

So its quiet clear that the ships of today require significantly less crew than the ships of the past.

Cheers.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
sorry for the fudged
figures,was working from memory.
Point is, our population has increased significantly, and actual numbers of ADF personel have gotten smaller with that growth in population, I just find it ironic.

Also, the number of of actual combat soldiers in todays army have increased significantly, so where have the Army lost solders to, we now have 1 more infantry Battalion and a Commando Regt than we did in 1985, and 3000 less soldiers?
Big cuts have been made in the area of sustainment, i.e. the soldiers, sailors and uniformed public servants who used to do much of the deep level maintenance on the equipment have been replaced by private contractors at increased cost.

This has had a flow on effect to the technical areas within the ADF with narrower career paths and fewer opportunities for skilled techos within defence. Narrower scope for the ADFs schools, less in-depth training and skilling for the techos. More time in the difficult / dirty jobs civies can’t/wont do, for a smaller pool of people with fewer plumb postings to encourage retention.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Not going to disagree with the need for more, but I suppose what is relevant in comparing "then and now" is the crewing needs, for example, the destroyer and frigates.

Going back to the late 60's early 70's period again that has been in discussion, the destroyer/frigate fleet and the size of the crew it took to man them was:

* 3 x DDG - 333 crew = 999
* 3 x DD - 320 crew = 960
* 6 x DE - 250 crew = 1500

Total of 3459 crew for 12 ships


Today (and the published figures I found vary on the size of crew for the FFG's):
* 4 x FFG - 184-221= 736-884
* 8 x FFH - 174 = 1392

Total ranges between 2128-2276 crew for 12 ships

Thats a difference of 1331-1138 less, so lets say that its approx 1200 less crew that is required to man the same amount of ships of today that are obviously far more "automated" than the ships of the past.

And rolling forward a few years to the 3 AWD's, the crewing figures are:

* 186 + 16 aircrew = 202, (there is accommodation for 234 on each ship too). So that 606 in total for the 3 AWD's compared to 999 for the 3 DDG's.

So its quiet clear that the ships of today require significantly less crew than the ships of the past.

Cheers.
Don't forget 1300 for a CVL, another 417 for a destroyer tender / heavy maintenance ship and 544 for a fast troop transport three capabilities the RAN has sorely lacked for a couple of decades. The LHDs will go some way to improving the situation how ever our support and high end combat capabilities are still worse than they were in the past, even more so when compared to the current regional threat spectrum.
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
Don't forget 1300 for a CVL, another 417 for a destroyer tender / heavy maintenance ship and 544 for a fast troop transport three capabilities the RAN has sorely lacked for a couple of decades. The LHDs will go some way to improving the situation how ever our support and high end combat capabilities are still worse than they were in the past, even more so when compared to the current regional threat spectrum.
No I hadn't forgotten all of that, was just trying to compare "apples with apples" when it came to crewing of 12 destroyer/frigates in both the late 60's / early 70's and today.

Interesting to see how many less crew is required today to operate the same amount of hulls in the water.

But yes, 1300 crew/aircrew for Melbourne, that was a big part of the manpower requirement.

And talking of the Fleet Air Arm, back in the early 70's they were operating Skyhawk, Macchi, Tracker, HS-748's, UH-1's, Wessex, Scout, Kiowa and even a couple of C47's!!

That's nine different types and quiet a lot of fixed wing aircraft too!

I wonder what was the size of the manpower assigned to the FAA and what it is today?
 
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Marc 1

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Big cuts have been made in the area of sustainment, i.e. the soldiers, sailors and uniformed public servants who used to do much of the deep level maintenance on the equipment have been replaced by private contractors at increased cost.

This has had a flow on effect to the technical areas within the ADF with narrower career paths and fewer opportunities for skilled techos within defence. Narrower scope for the ADFs schools, less in-depth training and skilling for the techos. More time in the difficult / dirty jobs civies can’t/wont do, for a smaller pool of people with fewer plumb postings to encourage retention.
Ding! got it in one. Yes a civvy can do the ordering of toilet paper for a hell of a lot less that an equivalent army ranked position. however that is offset by the retention issues created by NOT having a 'desk job' posting available to de-stress, to drop the tempo and spend time with family etc. I think the short term gains by the civillianisation of former uniformed positions in these desk jobs were not properly looked at from a long term perspective.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Ding! got it in one. Yes a civvy can do the ordering of toilet paper for a hell of a lot less that an equivalent army ranked position. however that is offset by the retention issues created by NOT having a 'desk job' posting available to de-stress, to drop the tempo and spend time with family etc. I think the short term gains by the civillianisation of former uniformed positions in these desk jobs were not properly looked at from a long term perspective.
Cadre staff jobs in reserve units based in southern capital cities used to be a good circuit breaker to retain stressed senior solidiers with pi$$ed off families (in particular those from 1 BDE) by saving their marriages and passifying teenage kids.
 
If anyone is getting upset at so called “confrontational” posts on this forum it is frankly because a lot of expressed opinions are unformed and based on a hugely inaccurate perception of current and historical capability. The armchair provides a very different perspective than the bridge wing chair. I know which one I trust.
As a personal preference, I don't like the splitting up of comments as it feels aggressive in a format that lacks tone and social cues. However I am going to do so in order to clarify my position and what I wrote and not as a hostile retort.

LOL of course the current fleet is more capable but that is thanks to technological development. The 1960s fleet was far more capable if you adjust for technology. Your claims otherwise simply display an ignorance of comparative and historical naval capability.
If you inferred that I seriously compared vessels of two eras and almost 50 years apart, then you are mistaken and I perhaps did not do an adequate job of explaining myself. I can only assume that this ridiculous meaning was taken deliberately in order to mock.

Cold War so the USN and RN were at full strength and the RAN only had a minor supporting role?
This was a gross misrepresentation of what I said.
I said that the two eras budgets were difficult to compare when in one Australia was considered to be a part of a military stand-off between two superpowers and in the other Australia was/is considered to be in a fairly benign threat environment with few immediate threats to national security.

How can the context of the 1960s with the Indonesian Confrontation and the threat (real or imagined) of the Soviet Union and communism not be relevant to public investment in the military? This is the reason that during the 1960s the defence budget as a percentage of GDP was 50% higher than it is today.
I don't think that a current government could sell a 50% increase in defence budget without a similar perceived threat to Australia, and I don't think that using China as that threat is working with the Australian public.

Just a shame then that the River class DE was primarily an anti-submarine ship… Their sonar and Ikara was still a formidable ASW capability in the 1980s.
If you read what I said and not assume, I didn't criticise the capability of the Rivers of 1968, but they didn't have Ikara in 1968 (or SeaCat) but got them in their mid/late-70s modernisations, and by 1987 the ships were still capable A/S vessels but VERY vulnerable, despite the CLOS SeaCat. Great for patrolling in benign environments, not so great if you wanted to deploy them somewhere where they would be at risk from Exocet-generation of ASMs.
Was there thought given to replacing the SeaCat with a CIWS? I can't remember the general discourse at the time.
I do have to apologise to HMAS Yarra and her crews though, she slipped my mind and I momentarily forgot that she existed.

I did criticise the Daring destroyers. I referred to them, affectionately I assure you, as "gun boats". I also criticised the three converted Q-class frigates and Anzac. I'm not sure to what extent these last four were in or out of service in 1968.
Vendetta may have provided sterling work on the gun line in Vietnam, but the technology world had moved past them (probably in the 8 years they spent being built!) by the late-60s and faced with ASMs and Russian nuclear submarines, their late-40s/early-50s gear was dated and the three Darings didn't have their radars and FCS modernised until the 1970s. I'm willing to be corrected but I don't think their A/S gear was modernised at all during their service. They should have been given a FRAM-like modernisation.

Melbourne was a valuable and effective ASW carrier, however I'm a bit more suspicious of the fleet air defence capabilities. Although adequate against MPA threats, I don't think its A-4s would have been very effective in the air defence role against ASM-equipped aggressors. Maybe contemporary experience in exercises doesn't back this up, but I can't help thinking that a subsonic attack aircraft fitted with rear-aspect-only AIM-9B with a range of 5km doesn't make it easy for the A-4s to get into a firing position. Which leaves almost all the air defence duties to the DDGs.

Well in 1968 there were 3 Charles F. Adams class DDGs, 3 Daring class DDs, 4 River class Des and in reserve 4 Rapid class FFs. That is 3 + 3 + 4 + 4 = 14. Reserve category is the same as today’s “reduced readiness” where the ship is extant and the Navy has crew for it but they are on shore duties or part time service.
The thrust of my post was that the RAN of 1968 had some modern escorts (3 x DDGs plus 4 x DEs, sorry Yarra) but some others of questionable (3 x Darings) or marginal (Anzac and the 3 x Q-class) utility.
The whole thing was in response to a comparison of the RAN of 1968 to that of today/tomorrow. My argument is that despite not having a light CV and a "loss" of escort hulls, the RAN will be more capable with 11 hulls (3 x AWD plus 8 x mod Anzacs) in 2018 or so than the RAN was in 1968.

Finally, I'm not upset at being called "uninformed" and I am willing to lose Internet Face™ by not engaging in an argument further and conceding totally to my ignorance.
 

Abraham Gubler

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
As a personal preference, I don't like the splitting up of comments as it feels aggressive in a format that lacks tone and social cues. However I am going to do so in order to clarify my position and what I wrote and not as a hostile retort.
Well no one else in the internet seems to have a problem with it. Especially since it is simply responding paragraph to paragraph. Since each of these (if written well) addresses a single issue it makes it much easier for everyone involved (you, me, that guy) to read these forums and understand what is going on.

If you inferred that I seriously compared vessels of two eras and almost 50 years apart, then you are mistaken and I perhaps did not do an adequate job of explaining myself. I can only assume that this ridiculous meaning was taken deliberately in order to mock.
No I stated you have no idea what the comparative capability of our fleet in 1968 was compared to today or even 2018 when the current ship building program is complete. In a response to a post by John Newman above I have made an effort to ‘recast’ the 1968 fleet with comparable ships of today. It is a fleet far more powerful than we have now.

This was a gross misrepresentation of what I said.
I said that the two eras budgets were difficult to compare when in one Australia was considered to be a part of a military stand-off between two superpowers and in the other Australia was/is considered to be in a fairly benign threat environment with few immediate threats to national security.

How can the context of the 1960s with the Indonesian Confrontation and the threat (real or imagined) of the Soviet Union and communism not be relevant to public investment in the military? This is the reason that during the 1960s the defence budget as a percentage of GDP was 50% higher than it is today.
I don't think that a current government could sell a 50% increase in defence budget without a similar perceived threat to Australia, and I don't think that using China as that threat is working with the Australian public.
And that is all totally wrong. You’ve made the mistake of thinking the financing and politics of 1968 were similar to those today. The reality of the situation was that defence funding in 1968 was actually quite level with what it had been since the end of WWII. The government had increased funding in response to the Confrontation and VietNam War but these were quite marginal in overall funding terms and hadn’t resulted in a single force structure increase for the Navy. They were mostly for the Army and the Air Force’s army support units. The only thing the Navy got was retention of the fighter force and 10 new Skyhawks which was before the 1962-64 changes programmed for deletion (but not the carrier).

Further in terms of defence funding using percentage of GDP doesn’t take into account the nature of the economy and longer term trends. Most industrialised countries were spending much higher percentages of GDP on defence in the 60s than they do now. Our GDPs are much bigger now than then because of the huge growth in the service economy. Which has been brought about by more advanced banking.

In real terms expenditure on defence has skyrocketed since the 1960s. In 2010 we spent $26.5 billion on defence which adjusted for inflation is 2.5 times higher than in 1970 ($2.7 billion vs $1.1 billion). Yet would anyone think that comparatively we have a military force 2.5 times more powerful than in 1970? We’ve gone backwards in every measure of military effectiveness despite spending 2.5 times more. The problem isn’t government funding but government productivity.

If you read what I said and not assume, I didn't criticise the capability of the Rivers of 1968, but they didn't have Ikara in 1968 (or SeaCat) but got them in their mid/late-70s modernisations, and by 1987 the ships were still capable A/S vessels but VERY vulnerable, despite the CLOS SeaCat. Great for patrolling in benign environments, not so great if you wanted to deploy them somewhere where they would be at risk from Exocet-generation of ASMs.
Was there thought given to replacing the SeaCat with a CIWS? I can't remember the general discourse at the time.
I do have to apologise to HMAS Yarra and her crews though, she slipped my mind and I momentarily forgot that she existed.
Again as has been pointed out by far more informed posters you don’t understand what this ship was for. As an ASW ship it was designed to operate under the umbrella of air protection provided by other assets.

I did criticise the Daring destroyers. I referred to them, affectionately I assure you, as "gun boats". I also criticised the three converted Q-class frigates and Anzac. I'm not sure to what extent these last four were in or out of service in 1968.
Vendetta may have provided sterling work on the gun line in Vietnam, but the technology world had moved past them (probably in the 8 years they spent being built!) by the late-60s and faced with ASMs and Russian nuclear submarines, their late-40s/early-50s gear was dated and the three Darings didn't have their radars and FCS modernised until the 1970s. I'm willing to be corrected but I don't think their A/S gear was modernised at all during their service. They should have been given a FRAM-like modernisation.
Well there were given a FRAM like modernisation and their ASW gear was upgraded in their 1970 rebuild and they were fitted with state of the art ASW gear when built (for their class). The Navy wanted to fit them with Ikara at this time but as per usual the Government didn’t provide the money. And again you don’t understand what the Daring was built for. Far from being a gunboat it was an anti aircraft ship. Those six 4.5” guns and their radars were there to destroy any aircraft that came close. Which remained a very effective capability until the end of their service, though of course of much shorter range than anti-aircraft missiles. If the RN had a Daring or two in the San Carlos waters in the Falklands they would have shot down a lot of Argentine attack aircraft and saved some of their ships from destruction. But considering at the time of 1968 there were far more naval warships in commission relying upon gun batteries than missiles for air defence.

Melbourne was a valuable and effective ASW carrier, however I'm a bit more suspicious of the fleet air defence capabilities. Although adequate against MPA threats, I don't think its A-4s would have been very effective in the air defence role against ASM-equipped aggressors. Maybe contemporary experience in exercises doesn't back this up, but I can't help thinking that a subsonic attack aircraft fitted with rear-aspect-only AIM-9B with a range of 5km doesn't make it easy for the A-4s to get into a firing position. Which leaves almost all the air defence duties to the DDGs.
Do you make all this crap up yourself? It has no bearing on how these aircraft were to be used and what their role is.

EDIT: And do you know how many fire and forget ASM equipped aircraft were in operation in 1968? There was the Swedish Lansen with RB04, BADGER-G with AS-5 and BLINDER-B with AS-5. The Skyhawk could intercept the BADGER and Lansen thanks to GCI from HMAS Melbourne. It could also intercept and defeat older command guidance ASM equipped aircraft like BADGER-B with AS-1.

The thrust of my post was that the RAN of 1968 had some modern escorts (3 x DDGs plus 4 x DEs, sorry Yarra) but some others of questionable (3 x Darings) or marginal (Anzac and the 3 x Q-class) utility.
The whole thing was in response to a comparison of the RAN of 1968 to that of today/tomorrow. My argument is that despite not having a light CV and a "loss" of escort hulls, the RAN will be more capable with 11 hulls (3 x AWD plus 8 x mod Anzacs) in 2018 or so than the RAN was in 1968.
And it is wrong because you have no understanding of how these ships operated at the time. You’ve written them off because of your ignorance.

Finally, I'm not upset at being called "uninformed" and I am willing to lose Internet Face™ by not engaging in an argument further and conceding totally to my ignorance.
Well if this is your attitude no wonder you’re going to have a bad ‘internet face’ day. This forum isn’t about posturing and ego it’s about contribution of ideas, knowledge and understanding. From what you’ve written above you clearly have a Tom Clancy Level™ of defence capability understanding. You know the names of some of the equipment and some basics and then think you can backwards analysis everything to write off things you have no idea about. Its text book Armchair Admiralship.
 
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hairyman

Active Member
By 2020 our fleet will consist of 13 frigate/destroyers. When the two Aussie built Perrys are retired, what will replace them? Will we build an extra 2 Anzac II's? I would like to see a class of Frigate that is superior to the planned Anzac II's built to replace the Perrys. Four or five would be a sensible number. :eek:nfloorl:
 

Abraham Gubler

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
By 2020 our fleet will consist of 13 frigate/destroyers. When the two Aussie built Perrys are retired, what will replace them? Will we build an extra 2 Anzac II's? I would like to see a class of Frigate that is superior to the planned Anzac II's built to replace the Perrys. Four or five would be a sensible number. :eek:nfloorl:
Melbourne's life is set to expire in 2019 and Newcastle in 2021. Either ship will be lucky to remain in commission this long as the crewing demands of the AWDs will see the FFGs decommission to provide these crews.

There is no such thing as the “Anzac II” but there is the SEA 5000 Next Generation Combatant (NGC). This ship will be built around the AUSPAR radar, strike length VLS and large hangar/mission bays. AUSPAR will be comparable to SPY-1 in range but being an AESA would be far more flexible. They could even be fitted with the AEGIS combat system to run AUSPAR. I would expect the NGC to probably be bigger than the AWD.
 

the road runner

Active Member
We’ve gone backwards in every measure of military effectiveness despite spending 2.5 times more. The problem isn’t government funding but government productivity.
From a Taxpayers point of view that is a very disappointing comment to hear Abe.
I would have assumed that our Navy was far more powerful than in the 60s.:(
 

Abraham Gubler

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
From a Taxpayers point of view that is a very disappointing comment to hear Abe.
Loss of productivity is not just a defence problem but rampart in health and education. Though both defence and health can easily claim far greater absolute capability thanks to huge qualitative improvements quality of education has plummeted in return for higher quantities.

I would have assumed that our Navy was far more powerful than in the 60s.:(
In absolute terms the Navy is far more powerful now than it was in the 60s thanks to improvements in technology but if you adjust for technological improvements it’s a significant loss. The Army and Air Force haven’t moved too much in terms of capability but the Army’s ability to sustain and deploy its capability is far lower. The Army’s overall capability also takes a major hit from the far older workforce it has today than in 1970. This is a hidden loss that inflates Army manpower with a much larger number of field grade officers and SNCOs who don’t contribute to capability. Of course there has been no improvement in comparative capability as one would expect from spending well over twice as much on defence.

It’s an interesting exercise converting these ships to equivalents today. Taking into account that back in the 1950s and 60s technology was advancing far faster today and equipment stayed in service for less time (as frontline assets at least) and the purpose of why the ships were ordered. Here is a possible 1968 fleet update to today’s technology:

1 x Invincible class CVL
3 x Arleigh Burke class (Flight IIA) DDG
3 x Kidd class DDG
4+2 x Type 23 FF
2+2 x Scorpene class SS
6 x Sandown class MCM
18+2 x Armidale class PB
1 x Ocean class LPH
1 x Lewis & Clark class AKE
1 x Henry J. Kaiser class AO

Reserve and Training Ships:

2 x Charles F. Adams class DDG
3 x Type 21 FF

Aircraft:

10 x Sea Harrier shad hacker fighter
16 x Merlin ASW helicopter
24 x Seahawk ASW helicopter

Somehow I don’t see how the RAN even with the current shipbuilding will get close to this.
 
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