Modernizing America's Nukes?

[Quiller]

Russia has been working on modernizing and upgrading their strategic missile forces... the Bulava and Topol-M prime examples. Now they announce a successful launch of their newest... which is, as has been suggested, a modified/upgraded Topol-M rather than a completely new class of missile.

And Bulava has had its fits and starts... and whether or not it is sufficiently reliable, even now, to be considered a credible strategic threat remains. Topol-M seems to have performed well.

So the question proposed: should the US spend money to develop an advanced missile delivery system to maintain parity.... or... are the older Minuteman-III missiles still, sufficiently, state-of-the-art vis-a-vis Russia's newest efforts.

And/or... even if the Minuteman III is not necessarily as advanced as Russia's latest... does it even matter so long as the west can still reliably deliver nuclear warheads with old technology?

The Peacekeeper was the most advanced strategic ICBM the world has seen... and America stopped its deployment to abide by treaty.

But with China's re-emergence for regional dominance, plus an undeniable "chill in the air" with Russia... should the west modernize it's missile delivery systems or not?

 

[StobieWan]

Russia has been working on modernizing and upgrading their strategic missile forces... the Bulava and Topol-M prime examples. Now they announce a successful launch of their newest... which is, as has been suggested, a modified/upgraded Topol-M rather than a completely new class of missile.

And Bulava has had its fits and starts... and whether or not it is sufficiently reliable, even now, to be considered a credible strategic threat remains. Topol-M seems to have performed well.

So the question proposed: should the US spend money to develop an advanced missile delivery system to maintain parity.... or... are the older Minuteman-III missiles still, sufficiently, state-of-the-art vis-a-vis Russia's newest efforts.

And/or... even if the Minuteman III is not necessarily as advanced as Russia's latest... does it even matter so long as the west can still reliably deliver nuclear warheads with old technology?

The Peacekeeper was the most advanced strategic ICBM the world has seen... and America stopped its deployment to abide by treaty.

But with China's re-emergence for regional dominance, plus an undeniable "chill in the air" with Russia... should the west modernize it's missile delivery systems or not?

A number of Peacekeeper warheads were transferred to Minuteman missiles in 2007 to provide more advanced capabilities to Minuteman III.

MX Missiles Deactivated, Minutemen at the Ready (updated)

 

[Beatmaster]

A number of Peacekeeper warheads were transferred to Minuteman missiles in 2007 to provide more advanced capabilities to Minuteman III.

MX Missiles Deactivated, Minutemen at the Ready (updated)

Just a side question, what are the current most up to date missiles that the US and Russia have both on their: Mobile, Silo and Sub based systems?

And how far are those missiles in their cycle in terms of being up to date?
I am not sure but most designs date back from early 80's??? and they are just being upgraded right? or are those missiles being build completely new?
Just asking as i do not have a clue whats out there in terms of ICBM's and delivery systems on the 3 major categories: Silo, Sub and Mobiles.
Also it has been said that Russia seem to have the better rockets for their missiles and arguably bigger missiles, while the US suppose to have smaller ones but more accurate? or are this just myths?

 

[kato]

Just a side question, what are the current most up to date missiles that the US and Russia have both on their: Mobile, Silo and Sub based systems?

USA:
Mobile: None.
Silo: LGM-30G Minuteman III (1970, with various SLEPs replacing guidance, propulsion, warhead, reentry vehicle ca 2005-2009)
Sub: UGM-133 Trident II/D5 (1990, no upgrades)

Russia:
Mobile: RS-24 Yars (2010)
Silo: RS-12M2 Topol-M (1998)
Sub, approved: RSM-56 Bulava (2011, afaik no units deployed yet)
Sub, in service: R-29RMU Sineva (2007)

Only missile under development in either country for service in one of the three types is the R-29RMU2 Layner, ostensibly intended as an anti-ABM saturation version of the Sineva.

 

[Quiller]

Tyt

Just a side question, what are the current most up to date missiles that the US and Russia have both on their: Mobile, Silo and Sub based systems?

And how far are those missiles in their cycle in terms of being up to date?
I am not sure but most designs date back from early 80's??? and they are just being upgraded right? or are those missiles being build completely new?
Just asking as i do not have a clue whats out there in terms of ICBM's and delivery systems on the 3 major categories: Silo, Sub and Mobiles.
Also it has been said that Russia seem to have the better rockets for their missiles and arguably bigger missiles, while the US suppose to have smaller ones but more accurate? or are this just myths?

Minuteman III upgrades have kept that missile delivery system fairly current I believe. The Russian Topol-M is physically a slightly bigger, heavier missile but seems to, perhaps, rival the M-III's performance without surpassing it.

The S-24 Yar is either a highly-modified Topol-M or perhaps newer missile that is perhaps more survivable due to its mobile status and ability therefore to hide better. Maybe.

That the Minuteman III is still in service and is still a valid, current deterrent is a testament to the engineering that went into the Minuteman series to begin with.

The US Peacekeeper missile was, probably for its brief moment, the sina qua non of ICBM design. It was retired in line with START 2.

 

[Beatmaster]

thx guys

 

[Feanor]

USA:
Mobile: None.
Silo: LGM-30G Minuteman III (1970, with various SLEPs replacing guidance, propulsion, warhead, reentry vehicle ca 2005-2009)
Sub: UGM-133 Trident II/D5 (1990, no upgrades)

Russia:
Mobile: RS-24 Yars (2010)
Silo: RS-12M2 Topol-M (1998)
Sub, approved: RSM-56 Bulava (2011, afaik no units deployed yet)
Sub, in service: R-29RMU Sineva (2007)

Only missile under development in either country for service in one of the three types is the R-29RMU2 Layner, ostensibly intended as an anti-ABM saturation version of the Sineva.

Avangard is under development, supposedly either a further development of the Topol-M/Yars, or a land-based version of the Bulava. There is also a heavy liquid-fueled ICBM under development right now, but it's future is fairly uncertain. It will be a long time before we see it in service.

 

[Quiller]

Avangard is under development, supposedly either a further development of the Topol-M/Yars, or a land-based version of the Bulava. There is also a heavy liquid-fueled ICBM under development right now, but it's future is fairly uncertain. It will be a long time before we see it in service.

I have seen statements that this is a silo-based version of the Yars... but regardless, the chief designer for Russia's nuclear missiles/warheads Solomonov was quoted as saying the idea of a "bus" vehicle capable of maneuvering to disperse individual warheads (MIRV) was outdated and was surpassed. He provides no further details. However, the entire purpose of MIRV is to defeat ABM systems.. to salt a given descending cone volume with nuclear warheads that single-warhead ABM's cannot deal with.

The MIRV bus onboard propellant restricts the dispersal pattern to within a few hundred kilometers. Is Solomonov suggesting each warhead is truly invidivually targetable with their own on-board propellant system that could scatter independent warheads several hundred to a thousand kilometers? i guess this is what is called MARV, or Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle. Again, the primary purpose of such dispersal is to defeat ABM systems, not really wreak more blast/radiation damage per se. I think the Trident II relies on some sort of MARV warhead... but not sure of details of course.

Since the US has not extensive ABM system to counter a Russian salvo... these advances, if genuine, aren't especially more threatening at this time it would seem.

 

[Landis]

B-61/83gravity bombs? Today, really?

I am surprised that gravity bombs even exist today in our nuclear arsenal. I would think that the vulnerability to the bomber, stealth or not, would dictate a standoff weapon to have long replaced this, such as the SRAM-2 or the SRAM-T. The Russians still have their nuclear standoff weapons... (other than cruise missiles that I know we also have)

Honestly, not to mention the vulnerability of the airfield it is on, having to overfly a target to nuke it seems archaic today in the face of S-400 SAM systems, stealthy aircraft or not.

 

[Quiller]

I am surprised that gravity bombs even exist today in our nuclear arsenal. I would think that the vulnerability to the bomber, stealth or not, would dictate a standoff weapon to have long replaced this, such as the SRAM-2 or the SRAM-T. The Russians still have their nuclear standoff weapons... (other than cruise missiles that I know we also have)

Honestly, not to mention the vulnerability of the airfield it is on, having to overfly a target to nuke it seems archaic today in the face of S-400 SAM systems, stealthy aircraft or not.

We were talking about developing new warheads for new ballistic missile devliery systems. The question posed: is the US falling behind the technology curve by failing to develop modern ballistic missile delivery systems. The US phased out the PEACEKEEPER to accomplish joint reductions in delivery systems and warheads with the Soviet Union. But now that Russia continues to modify and develop delivery systems (if not warheads, and who knows?) and no other nation is a signatory to the START treaties, it would appear to leave the US more vulnerable to a possible (if, okay, unlikely) first strike.

 

[Landis]

We were talking about developing new warheads for new ballistic missile devliery systems. The question posed: is the US falling behind the technology curve by failing to develop modern ballistic missile delivery systems. The US phased out the PEACEKEEPER to accomplish joint reductions in delivery systems and warheads with the Soviet Union. But now that Russia continues to modify and develop delivery systems (if not warheads, and who knows?) and no other nation is a signatory to the START treaties, it would appear to leave the US more vulnerable to a possible (if, okay, unlikely) first strike.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead program is suppose to take the latest in design technology to produce a new warhead, but as I mentioned on another thread, this administration isn't going to allow it to proceed.

I am only an Armchair General opinion, but I suspect we have a strategic force that is still in fact second to none, but it may not stay that way 20 years out unless we spend some money on some new designs.

 

[Quiller]

Avangard is under development, supposedly either a further development of the Topol-M/Yars, or a land-based version of the Bulava. There is also a heavy liquid-fueled ICBM under development right now, but it's future is fairly uncertain. It will be a long time before we see it in service.

The Russians have announced a few more details (or claims if you will) about their plans for the replacement for the Satan heavy ballistic missile. I note in this very blog (Defense Talk) they are talking about a massive warhead weight of four tons. Going back to earlier references of a MARV type warhead bus, certainly more throw would be needed to boost a cluster of warheads each made heavier with independent on-board propellants to scatter the warheads further afield to defeat ABM efforts. That at least seems a reasonable conclusion from the latest reports.

It will be interesting to evaluate how many warheads and how many missiles the Russians will build and field, and if this is going to violate START or other disarmament treaties.

Another question is whether or not adhereing to START is even logical given the accelerated development of ICBM's now by China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and others who are not part of the treaty.

A clear-thinking person's first response would be "Of course adhere to START, since the US and Russia can probably bomb each other and everybody else out of existence three times over. Wo what if other people are building missiles too?"

The answer lies in the "Counterforce problem." It was Counterforce that spurred the development of the US Peacekeeper ICBM's. Counterforce addresses the issues of first strike. If an adversary launches a first strike, how many missiles survive for a retaliatory attack? This is a critical problem, because the entire nuclear war strategy hinges on it. People used to not launch nukes against one another because of "Mutually Assured Destruction," aka MAD. But for MAD to work, the adversary has to believe enough of your missiles survive to deliver a crippling retaliatory blow.

However, if a first strike can pretty much decimate the opposing missile force, then it might become more attractive because MAD would no longer pertain.

Where am I going with this? The START limits were designed to keep the Counterforce problem in relative balance. In other words... both sides begin reducing numbers of missiles and warheads together, but maintaining the reality of Counterforce. By third parties introducing new quantities of missiles and warheads, Counterforce parity is effectively reduced or eliminated altogether.

This is because a first strike by one adversary could leave the receiving country at the mercy of a full on strike by a second adversary. Moreover even in this digital world it still takes some time to reprogram an ICBM for different targeting -- in a credible two-or-more adversary world, disarmament by only two of the ultimate players could be disasterous because MAD won't be any kind of restraint.

 

[Quiller]

Let me add I'm not suggesting another arms race between the US and the Russians is the answer. But ignoring how missile stocks and warheads from OTHER players can alter MAD is as senseless as it is dangerous. Perhaps the answer lies in getting the other guys to join in the treaty.... or create some new internaitonal treaty regime that brings more folks into it -- maybe not the complete rogue states, but countries such as Israel, India, and Pakistan at least have demonstrated nation state stability and restraint.

It would seem Russia would have a stake in this, despite their nationalistic resurgence under Putin. A nuclear Iran may lead to a nuclear Turkey and/or Saudi Arabia. Such events may not be immediate strategic game changers for Russia or the US, but they would be significant shifts in the equation.

 

[USAF77]

Thoughtful post. But its a stretch to call Pakistan a "stable country that has shown restraint". Most of all since nobody seems to know who actually is running it. I wont get into a nationalistic debate, just do a search on The Kahn network. Musharraf Defends Pardon of Top Nuclear Scientist | Global Security Newswire | NTI Pakistan has worked closely with China, Iran, and North Korea with its program

I myself dont see how you can bring regimes into a legitimate treaty discussion when they originally acquired the weapons in violation of INTL Treaties and Law.

Let me add I'm not suggesting another arms race between the US and the Russians is the answer. But ignoring how missile stocks and warheads from OTHER players can alter MAD is as senseless as it is dangerous. Perhaps the answer lies in getting the other guys to join in the treaty.... or create some new internaitonal treaty regime that brings more folks into it -- maybe not the complete rogue states, but countries such as Israel, India, and Pakistan at least have demonstrated nation state stability and restraint.

It would seem Russia would have a stake in this, despite their nationalistic resurgence under Putin. A nuclear Iran may lead to a nuclear Turkey and/or Saudi Arabia. Such events may not be immediate strategic game changers for Russia or the US, but they would be significant shifts in the equation.

 

[Rimasta]

The Russians and the Chinese are both developing their own ABM systems apparently in response to advances in U.S. ABM systems. Could these reduce the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO delivery options further if there had been a however unlikely a still possible, first strike? What are the possible strategic ramifications of 1)Advances and in ABM systems & 2)increasingly effective delivery systems and the introduction of more delivery systems from new national players?

I ask the experts but it would seem modernization and eventual replacement of current U.S. delivery systems would seem prudent in order to maintain a credible deterrence.

 

[Masquerader]

The Los Alamos National Laboratory is working on design of a brand new thermonuclear warhead to be carried aboard the UGM-133 Trident II SLBM and replace the W76 and W88 warheads. There is a new ICBM under development by Northrop Grumman for the US Air Force, the LGM-35 Sentinel (aka LGM-182), which will carry the same W87 warhead as the older Minuteman III ICBM. However, the Sentinel's development has suffered cost overruns primarily due to rising costs in command and control systems and ICBM silo infrastructure.

Link:

https://discover.lanl.gov/publications/national-security-science/2021-summer/w93/

LGM-35 Sentinel - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[KRAKATOA]

Looking at the world stage a modernization of US nuclear arsenal seems badly timed. Not because there's no nuclear threat but because the current arsenal more than suffices for MAD. On the other hand any full scale conventional war with a near-peer (not counting Russia in this category anymore) or significant alliance will requires a large industrial base. Which the west no longer possesses.

 

[Todjaeger]

Looking at the world stage a modernization of US nuclear arsenal seems badly timed. Not because there's no nuclear threat but because the current arsenal more than suffices for MAD. On the other hand any full scale conventional war with a near-peer (not counting Russia in this category anymore) or significant alliance will requires a large industrial base. Which the west no longer possesses.

Perhaps, but then again perhaps not. Some consideration needs to be given to the state of current US nuclear warheads, not just the number in inventory. I do not know for a fact, but I would strongly expect that, just like many conventional munitions, various components of US nuclear ordnance will have 'shelf lives' after which the ordnance might still function as designed and intended OTOH it also might not. Part of any US nuclear warhead modernization programme would likely include either an inspection and refurbishment or remanufacture programme to ensure that the US still has functional warheads. It would do the US nuclear deterrence little good if potential target nations had strong reason to suspect that US warheads would likely produce fizzles rather than the intended fission reactions.