Need for new battlefield/tactical nuclear weapons

[Quiller]

The United States has treaties with Russia (via for former USSR and after) that limit or restrict the development and deployment of battlefield or "tactical" nuclear weapons and similarly limits the development and deployment of missiles capable of fielding them.

Russia has failed to adhere to this treaty and has fielded non-nuclear short range and intermediate range missiles which, while they do not now publicly carry nuclear weapons, are certainly capable of ready transisiton.

But beyond that.. there are several Nuclear nations that adhere to no such treaty at all. Some of these nations might be construed to be allies of the west, some might be construed to be indedpendent, and some might be enemies of western nations. These obviously include China, India, Pakistan, and Israel. We know North Korea is working on developing nuclear warheads and the means to deliver them, and western intelligence agencies believe Iran is following this lead.

We also know that both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have voiced concerns that if their neighbors develop such weapons... so must they.

The idea of clamping down nuclear proliferation, while laudable, is not particularly tenable at this point. Were a nation such as the United States or other western European nations (e.g. France and Britain) to unilaterally renounce and dispose of their nuclear arsenals.... the idea that everyone else would willingly disarm is bizarre in the extreme. First of all, it does not fit with human nature, nor the history of the planet.

Therefore... the hard reality must be that the West cannot abandon their nuclear arsenals out of blind faith... sad to say, instead we need to press forward with research and development to modernize nuclear weapon stocks and develop advanced battlefield delivery systems. Yes this seems counterintuitive to survival logic... but it is NOT counterintuitive to human behavior and nature.

No good deed in history has gone unpunished. The Punic Wars, the Scot's deference to the English King, Chamberlain's bow to Hitler. None accomplished their noble ends, and only ended in more death and destruction.

 

[PCShogun]

Battlefield and Tactical nuclear weapons have the least utility and present the greatest issues regarding security. Typically, they are overkill for the targets they would be used against, and have great potential for escalating the conflict beyond the use of small scale weapons. As these weapons would be in the field and under the control of lower ranking troops who, in a panic situation, are likely to use the weapon, it opens up the bottle of the nuclear genie much more easily.

Tactically, they have little use. Most targets that these would be deployed against are not hardened, and could be destroyed by conventional weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons, like the sixty kilometer Nasr (or Hatf IX) missile that Pakistan has flight tested, are not very helpful in stopping tank offensives or against fast-moving targets, and they are clearly excessive for blowing up railheads and bridges - even if they were within reach. Why risk crossing this momentous threshold with hard-to-defend and hard-to-control short-range delivery systems when more survivable and controllable longer-range nuclear forces are available for use in extreme circumstances?

Still, about 4,500 of these war-fighting weapons, mostly bombs and short-range missile warheads, are stored in Europe and in western Russia. They are not a subject of the strategic nuclear arms talks announced in Moscow. In fact, they are not part of any arms control treaty or negotiation. The Russians have at least eight times as many of these weapons as the United States has deployed in Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons do play an important role in Russian military doctrine. For instance, the Russians are working to fit tactical nuclear warheads onto submarine-launched cruise missiles.

The U.S. tactical weapons, mostly B-61 thermonuclear bombs, are controlled by the Air force. The number of deployed Russian weapons is estimated at 2,050, with an additional 5,390 in deep storage. Deployed U.S. weapons are said to number "less than 500.'' As Russia and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, the relative clout of tactical nukes rises. The existing imbalance in tactical nukes "will become more apparent".

 

[Quiller]

Battlefield and Tactical nuclear weapons have the least utility and present the greatest issues regarding security. Typically, they are overkill for the targets they would be used against, and have great potential for escalating the conflict beyond the use of small scale weapons. As these weapons would be in the field and under the control of lower ranking troops who, in a panic situation, are likely to use the weapon, it opens up the bottle of the nuclear genie much more easily.

Tactically, they have little use. Most targets that these would be deployed against are not hardened, and could be destroyed by conventional weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons, like the sixty kilometer Nasr (or Hatf IX) missile that Pakistan has flight tested, are not very helpful in stopping tank offensives or against fast-moving targets, and they are clearly excessive for blowing up railheads and bridges - even if they were within reach. Why risk crossing this momentous threshold with hard-to-defend and hard-to-control short-range delivery systems when more survivable and controllable longer-range nuclear forces are available for use in extreme circumstances?

Still, about 4,500 of these war-fighting weapons, mostly bombs and short-range missile warheads, are stored in Europe and in western Russia. They are not a subject of the strategic nuclear arms talks announced in Moscow. In fact, they are not part of any arms control treaty or negotiation. The Russians have at least eight times as many of these weapons as the United States has deployed in Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons do play an important role in Russian military doctrine. For instance, the Russians are working to fit tactical nuclear warheads onto submarine-launched cruise missiles.

The U.S. tactical weapons, mostly B-61 thermonuclear bombs, are controlled by the Air force. The number of deployed Russian weapons is estimated at 2,050, with an additional 5,390 in deep storage. Deployed U.S. weapons are said to number "less than 500.'' As Russia and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, the relative clout of tactical nukes rises. The existing imbalance in tactical nukes "will become more apparent".

I agree with your comments. The missing point is, for the US, "tactical" nuclear weapons are not really "tactical." They are strategic chess pieces to offset percieved military advantages of nations with emerging nuclear weapons stocks. And when I refer to "tactical" I'm not referring to very short range weapons, more like "theater" weapons which have standoff capability, representing a medium range nuclear deterrent. One problem is, a nation possessing or developing short and medium range nuclear weapons might get the notion their use of such weapons against a regional target... perhaps even western military targets in their vicinity... would NOT trigger an ICBM response from such a western nation. The logic runs, use of an ICBM would be so heinous in today's modern age for such a regional attack, therefore a nation facing a "small, limited" nuclear attack from an enemy would be hobbled by its own policies.

The counter logic would if the US or Great Britain had modern MRBM or Theater ballistic missiles available, a smaller more directed response could occur. The concept is deterrence ultimately, not actual use. And theater weapons would not necessarily be under the direct control of junior troops, since they could be fielded back toward the command level regions of the theater.

Predicting the tactical and strategic thought processes of anyone possessing nuclear weapons isn't easy and highly speculative, I concede.

 

[PCShogun]

I see, I had misunderstood the meaning of what you considered "Tactical".

The problems with short and medium ranged theater weapons are still nearly the same; Escalation.

If you shoot a 1KT nuclear artillery shell at me, I will shoot two or three back at you to show my resolve. You respond by targeting a base with a 10KT warhead MRBM, so I launch two back at you. Once the process starts, it is almost inevitable to proceed to the forgone conclusion. Strategic arms are tightly controlled whereas battlefield systems have much less control as more hands are in the pot by nature of its design. A Sergeant cannot launch an ICBM, he can, however, pull the lanyard on a 155 howitzer armed with a nuclear shell.

As far as a deterrent goes, just tell your enemy we will skip over the escalation process and respond with what we have. You fire a nuclear artillery shell; we will respond with an ICBM targeted to remove 8 of your best cities. That is a pretty good deterrent.

 

[kato]

The U.S. tactical weapons, mostly B-61 thermonuclear bombs, are controlled by the Air force.

A B-61 is a tactic-strategic weapon whose tactical application died with the Cold War. Even back then it was effectively intended to be used as a strategic weapon only. With a range envelope well in excess of 1,000 miles, at least on European aircraft.

while they do not now publicly carry nuclear weapons, are certainly capable of ready transisiton.

And of course you do realize it would take about the same time to introduce a nuclear warhead for say ATACMS? Or for that matter modify one of the SRBM models used in the THAAD and NMD tests to carry a warhead.

 

[Quiller]

I see, I had misunderstood the meaning of what you considered "Tactical".

The problems with short and medium ranged theater weapons are still nearly the same; Escalation.

If you shoot a 1KT nuclear artillery shell at me, I will shoot two or three back at you to show my resolve. You respond by targeting a base with a 10KT warhead MRBM, so I launch two back at you. Once the process starts, it is almost inevitable to proceed to the forgone conclusion. Strategic arms are tightly controlled whereas battlefield systems have much less control as more hands are in the pot by nature of its design. A Sergeant cannot launch an ICBM, he can, however, pull the lanyard on a 155 howitzer armed with a nuclear shell.

As far as a deterrent goes, just tell your enemy we will skip over the escalation process and respond with what we have. You fire a nuclear artillery shell; we will respond with an ICBM targeted to remove 8 of your best cities. That is a pretty good deterrent.

It would be a swell deterrent -- if your enemy believed it. My final thoughts in my last post were to suggest that, a limited nuclear attack against a regional ally or regional western military outpost, would NOT trigger an ICBM response by the US. Absent a nuclear attack on the American homeland, meaning North America or Hawaii, I don't believe the US maintains the resolve to respond with ICBMs.

So, if a non-NATO ally -- say Saudi Arabia -- was hit with a small nuclear weapon, I highly doubt the United States would launch any ICBM in response. I believe many nations also doubt the US would do so, which negates any deterrent factor the ICBMs have. The only strategic deterrent western ICBMs have is versus only two nations capable of targeting the American mainland, which no doubt US missile targeting matrices reflect.

And there is a secondary element in play. Absent this deterrent effect, a regional power's use of limited nuclear weapons would likely paralyze completely whatever nation was targeted (other than Israel.) So, for instance, were Saudi Arabia hit with a single weapon, even if the actual physical damage wasn't large, the shock value would probably dictate immediate capitulation before non-nuclear military forces could effectively respond. It is this effect that might persuade a nation to launch a small strike.

 

[Quiller]

A B-61 is a tactic-strategic weapon whose tactical application died with the Cold War. Even back then it was effectively intended to be used as a strategic weapon only. With a range envelope well in excess of 1,000 miles, at least on European aircraft.


And of course you do realize it would take about the same time to introduce a nuclear warhead for say ATACMS? Or for that matter modify one of the SRBM models used in the THAAD and NMD tests to carry a warhead.

Yes perhaps, but the difference is the US is unlikely to transition nuclear weapons to existing short/medium range missile platforms in advance. It would be "in response," which in a regional battlefield scenario would be woefully late.

And this really isn't about Russia. Nor China. It is about regional conflicts involving regional nations either nuclear capable or nuclear emerging. It is really more about strategic extortion policy than anything else. North Korea cannot really engage in such blackmail, because they have not evidenced genuine nuclear capability in warhead development. They have, certainly, apparently reliable regional/theater delivery systems, but still cannot reliably arm these.

It would also be theoretically possible to re-arm western cruise missiles with nuclear warheads to fill the gap I suppose. But again, absent policy shifts, would not likely undertake to do so until after an event.

 

[PCShogun]

I believe what you mention, IS already happening. India has nukes, Pakistan has nukes, therefore Iran must have a nuke. If Iran has a nuke, then Saudi Arabia and Turkey must have a nuke. Its the new arms race of Middle East and Asia.

I believe it will continue until someone sets one off. Hopefully once that happens the rest of the world can sit back and say, "Wow, they really do work, we better not use these ever again." The user will be come demonized in the world and the end result will be economic death, rather than nuclear armageddon. Problem again is escalation. If both sides have these weapons, it will not be a one sided exchange.

Even if North Korea deploys a working nuke, and a delivery platform, the use of even one such warhead will spell the end of that nation, due to the alliances South Korea has. Not sure that even China would defend them in the event of a nuclear attack initiated by Kim . I believe that a nuclear weapon, without the economic and military capability to survive the political aftermath of its use, would simply spell the doom of ANY nation foolish enough to use one.

The U.S. could do it, China, and Russia also. India might make it. Not sure about Pakistan. Israel would crumble as would Iran. but even if they survived the economic and political aftermath of first use, the damage would be as terrible as the use of the weapon itself to those nations.

 

[kato]

Yes perhaps, but the difference is the US is unlikely to transition nuclear weapons to existing short/medium range missile platforms in advance. It would be "in response," which in a regional battlefield scenario would be woefully late.

You seem to assume that a nuclear attack on Western interests would be met at an equal level, one nuke for another, one type of system for another.
It wouldn't; the response would always be a strategic or tactic-strategic strike using available long-range delivery systems. At least with the USA and France. And that's official policy.

 

[Quiller]

You seem to assume that a nuclear attack on Western interests would be met at an equal level, one nuke for another, one type of system for another.
It wouldn't; the response would always be a strategic or tactic-strategic strike using available long-range delivery systems. At least with the USA and France. And that's official policy.

I don't assume what you suggest at all. What I am saying is, the US will not use American based nuclear ICBMs... one, two, or a dozen... if an enemy nuclear strike from a regional (not Russia or China) nation hits a western interest. There might be a response, but it would not be nuclear.

What I have been assuming... and perhaps I am completely off base, is that MRBM's in theater would be a greater deterrent for those second/third-world countries than American ICBMs. Perhaps there is no genuine deterrent anymore.

I cannot speak to the French situation at all -- and their undergoing major political shifts so I don't really think anyone can define future French policy just now.

 

[PCShogun]

I would bet that in the world political arena, a nuke, is a nuke, is a nuke. You throw a 1KT artillery shell and yes, you are going to get a response. Throw that artillery shell into an allied city, and you can bet the response will be powerful and I do not doubt a city buster thrown from a minute Man III would be beyond the realm of possibility.

Likely it would come in the form of a Cruise Missile or two like the BGM-109A Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Nuclear (TLAM-A) with a variable yield W80 nuclear warhead.

 

[kato]

What I have been assuming... and perhaps I am completely off base, is that MRBM's in theater would be a greater deterrent for those second/third-world countries than American ICBMs.

Why would they be? It doesn't matter where the missile is stationed. It'll hit in under 30 minutes, with enough accuracy to ensure destruction of any target.

 

[Quiller]

Why would they be? It doesn't matter where the missile is stationed. It'll hit in under 30 minutes, with enough accuracy to ensure destruction of any target.

Only because the American public would have great difficulty with a salvo of ICBMs fired from the US mainland. Why? It is completely psychological. America's ICBM force still is entrenched in American minds as cold war weapons, to be used ONLY for the doomsday scenario of a massive nuclear attack on American cities. Despite the so-called end of the Cold War (although the freeze seems to be returning) Americans maintain the mindset that launching nukes from the American continent is an end-of-days event ONLY justified if we are attacked first by salvos into the United States.

So American political and military policy makers will not launch those nukes absent that fait accompli event. An Iranian nuke hitting Riyadh is NOT going to move the American public the same way as missiles heading toward New York. It just won't.

Our history is full of such events. Despite all the political/military backroom arrangements, America didn't enter WW1 until German U-boats sunk passenger ships enroute to the US, inflaming the American public. Despite two years of blistering war in Europe, the US did not formally enter the war until Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. The American public didn't support the Spanish-American War until the Maine blew up in Cuba. It doesn't matter that the explosion on the Maine may not have even been from hostile action, or that WR Hearst used it to inflame the public. It doesn't matter that the US was giving Britain lend-lease destroyers to fight the German Navy before the US entered the war. What mattered was the PERCEPTION America itself was under attack. That remains the key to our national psyche.

Yes, Americans tolerate insertion of the US military into low-intensity conflict for periods of time. But that is not the same thing. Those fights are "over there" and not "here." The justification for such a conflict may be legitimate, false, for human rights (e.g. Libya) and so forth. But these don't reach out and touch the American sensibility as do direct attacks on the mainland.

When the Al Queda wing in Afghanistan was pinned as the source of the Trade Center Twin Tower attacks, many Americans (not all) were WILLING to turn the country into a vast sea of glass fused from a nuclear barrage. That sentiment was voiced out loud in many quarters. That did not happen, nor should it have. Bit that is the psyche. It can be debated, it can be marginalized, it can be divided up, but it cannot really be refuted from a historical perspective.

That is not to say Americans would embrace, modernly, launching nuclear MRBM in theater necessarily, but the populace accepts "localized combat" realities. This isn't necessarily about military response, strategy or tactics. It is about political will and what would be somewhat acceptable to the American public. That still has significant influence in strategic decision making.

So militarily a nuke is a nuke is a nuke. But psychologically, some roses have more thorns than others.

 

[Quiller]

I would bet that in the world political arena, a nuke, is a nuke, is a nuke. You throw a 1KT artillery shell and yes, you are going to get a response. Throw that artillery shell into an allied city, and you can bet the response will be powerful and I do not doubt a city buster thrown from a minute Man III would be beyond the realm of possibility.

Likely it would come in the form of a Cruise Missile or two like the BGM-109A Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Nuclear (TLAM-A) with a variable yield W80 nuclear warhead.

Please see my reply to Kato if you don't mind. Plus, I do not believe any nuclear-armed cruise missiles are currently in any hot-zone theater at present. And the Tomohawk is a woefully inadequate delivery system these days. For the reasons expressed in my response to Kato I doubt any US ICBM or SLBM would be used. No, not beyond the realm of possibility... but highly unlikely.

And by the way, you keep referring to 1K artillery shells. I don't think anybody is actively fielding nuclear artillery shells at present. Most are missile delivery systems. If you know of any regional nation with a stock of nuclear artillery shells, I would like to know which one is doing that. I don't think any regional power has yet achieved the necessary miniaturization to even do that yet.

The US did and abandoned them. Russia and China have the capability but I don't think they've kept stocks of those either. Israel may have the capability, but not the interest.

 

[My2Cents]

The principle problem with tactical nuclear missiles is that their short range forces them to be stationed too close to the front, making them too vulnerable to being overrun and captured by the enemy. But if you keep them far enough back to minimize this risk their short range leaves them with few worthwhile targets.

The next problem is national policy and command and control. Once you place the nuclear warheads in the hands of the missile battery, unless you have extremely effective ‘permissive action links (PALs), much of your nuclear policy, in the form of launch decisions, ends up being dictated by the local theatre and battery commanders, not the central government and military command. This can be especially bad if one of those commanders is a radical (religious, nationalist, or both) who sees his nuke about to be captured by the other side, and decides to use it rather than lose it, despite any “No first use” policy the government might have. The solution here is usually to keep the warheads locked in one of several centrally located high security bunkers until a target is determined, at which point a single warhead is sent to arm a missile. The time delays inherent to this process obviously preclude most tactical battlefield applications.

 

[Quiller]

The principle problem with tactical nuclear missiles is that their short range forces them to be stationed too close to the front, making them too vulnerable to being overrun and captured by the enemy. But if you keep them far enough back to minimize this risk their short range leaves them with few worthwhile targets.

The next problem is national policy and command and control. Once you place the nuclear warheads in the hands of the missile battery, unless you have extremely effective ‘permissive action links (PALs), much of your nuclear policy, in the form of launch decisions, ends up being dictated by the local theatre and battery commanders, not the central government and military command. This can be especially bad if one of those commanders is a radical (religious, nationalist, or both) who sees his nuke about to be captured by the other side, and decides to use it rather than lose it, despite any “No first use” policy the government might have. The solution here is usually to keep the warheads locked in one of several centrally located high security bunkers until a target is determined, at which point a single warhead is sent to arm a missile. The time delays inherent to this process obviously preclude most tactical battlefield applications.

Excellent points. However... the time delays you refer to are only created by policy issues. Links even with Pentagon planners nowadays should be virtually instantaneous by sat link. This isn't WW2.

Second... when I "tactical" I should have avoided that term. I meant MRBM, meaning medium range balllistic missiles or sub-launched/ship-lauched cruise missiles in theater. Those aboard submarines and ships aren't likely to be overrun by anybody. And land-based MRBMs can reach their target, once launched, in 10 to fifteen minutes in theater.

And finally... again... keep in mind THESE ARE DETERRENT WEAPONS to discourage regional states -- read third world nations -- from thinking they can get away with launching a nuke at a neighboring country or a western military base stationed in a neighboring country. (Please read why our ICBM fleet is NOT a deterrent to these htird-world governments.)

Based on your comments re: the risk of in-theater weapons, perhaps the best choice is to keep these as SLBMs or equip surface Navay combatants with cruise missiles or MRBMs.

 

[Landis]

Excellent points. However... the time delays you refer to are only created by policy issues. Links even with Pentagon planners nowadays should be virtually instantaneous by sat link. This isn't WW2.

Second... when I "tactical" I should have avoided that term. I meant MRBM, meaning medium range balllistic missiles or sub-launched/ship-lauched cruise missiles in theater. Those aboard submarines and ships aren't likely to be overrun by anybody. And land-based MRBMs can reach their target, once launched, in 10 to fifteen minutes in theater.

And finally... again... keep in mind THESE ARE DETERRENT WEAPONS to discourage regional states -- read third world nations -- from thinking they can get away with launching a nuke at a neighboring country or a western military base stationed in a neighboring country. (Please read why our ICBM fleet is NOT a deterrent to these htird-world governments.)

Based on your comments re: the risk of in-theater weapons, perhaps the best choice is to keep these as SLBMs or equip surface Navay combatants with cruise missiles or MRBMs.

How realistic is the B-61 as a regional weapon? With defensive weapons like the S-400 being deployed, why a gravity bomb? If you wish to deter a regional threat it has to be a realistic deterrent, with a reasonable chance of success. But a non-stealth aircraft, even a fighter, to deliver a gravity bomb seems archaic, and even suicidal. Long term even a stealth aircraft would benefit from a standoff range weapon.

We should have proceeded with SRAM-T when we had that program still warmed up, but for some reason we gave up the only real standoff nuclear strike weapon that could possibly have survived in even a future threat defensive environment. As a result, the Russians have much more modern tactical weapons than we do. The TU-22M Backfire can fire the AS-16 (KH-15) Kickback with it's 200kt warhead, which is similar to the now retired US SRAM AGM-69, only faster and longer ranged.

 

[Quiller]

I think you've missed the point of this post. It inquires whether or not the US needs to create NEW theater nuclear weapons, based on ballistic missile or cruise missile technology. Nobody here is talking about "gravity bombs."

The original premise is regional powers (read Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Red China in some respects, and Israel) who have nuclear weapons might consider using them in a regional conflict without fear the US would respond with our strategic nuclear weapons. Why? Because doubts the US has the national will to actually use a Mintueman III to hit, say, Iran even if it launched a nuke against Israel.

So, should the US be prepared to respond more "in kind" with theater ballistic missile which could be launched from submarines, surface ships, or from mobile pre-positioned land based TELS? It is intended as a deterrent, not actual use.

Anyway... the question wasn't about fielding B61 warheads... it was about the advisability of DEVELOPING newer compact nuclear warheads for the US arsenal and developing theater ballistic missile delivery systems.

 

[My2Cents]

I think you've missed the point of this post. It inquires whether or not the US needs to create NEW theater nuclear weapons, based on ballistic missile or cruise missile technology. Nobody here is talking about "gravity bombs."

The original premise is regional powers (read Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Red China in some respects, and Israel) who have nuclear weapons might consider using them in a regional conflict without fear the US would respond with our strategic nuclear weapons. Why? Because doubts the US has the national will to actually use a Mintueman III to hit, say, Iran even if it launched a nuke against Israel.

So, should the US be prepared to respond more "in kind" with theater ballistic missile which could be launched from submarines, surface ships, or from mobile pre-positioned land based TELS? It is intended as a deterrent, not actual use.

Anyway... the question wasn't about fielding B61 warheads... it was about the advisability of DEVELOPING newer compact nuclear warheads for the US arsenal and developing theater ballistic missile delivery systems.

Well, given that the Minuteman missiles would have to go over the pole and Russia, yes that is a bad idea. But the SLBMs don’t, so there is your solution.

A major problem with limited range theater ballistic missiles is that there are an increasing number of systems out there that claim to be able to intercept them, like the S-400 and S-500. The faster ICBM is more difficult to intercept, and the larger throw weight allows for a greater number of countermeasures to be carried with a single warhead. They also would be launched from too far away for the launch to be detected by the target country and their defenses alerted.

 

[Landis]

I think you've missed the point of this post. It inquires whether or not the US needs to create NEW theater nuclear weapons, based on ballistic missile or cruise missile technology. Nobody here is talking about "gravity bombs."

The original premise is regional powers (read Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Red China in some respects, and Israel) who have nuclear weapons might consider using them in a regional conflict without fear the US would respond with our strategic nuclear weapons. Why? Because doubts the US has the national will to actually use a Mintueman III to hit, say, Iran even if it launched a nuke against Israel.

So, should the US be prepared to respond more "in kind" with theater ballistic missile which could be launched from submarines, surface ships, or from mobile pre-positioned land based TELS? It is intended as a deterrent, not actual use.

Anyway... the question wasn't about fielding B61 warheads... it was about the advisability of DEVELOPING newer compact nuclear warheads for the US arsenal and developing theater ballistic missile delivery systems.

I don't argue your premise, because with only gravity bombs as a 'regional' deterrent we definitely DO need a new system of some sort. I don't think deterrence as a concept is supported with outdated delivery systems. That is my perhaps not to obvious point. Submarine based vertical launched cruise missiles are quite ideal from a launcher standpoint, being stealthy and unknown of their location prior to launch at any given time, but the vulnerability of the slow cruise missile en route to it's target is an issue, unless the missile itself is stealthy.

Unfortunately the current administration has promised with the passing of the latest strategic arms treaty not to field, test or develop any new nuclear weapons or capabilities so this is perhaps a moot point until a new administration is in office. And until then Russia is left with a huge inventory of tactical weapons, and missiles that are dual use, so the 'regional' balance of tactical weapons is rather lobsided. So gravity bombs, unfortunately, is all we are left with.