The necessity for offensive support and shaping fires is even greater than usual amphibious operations because of our doctrine. Which is amphibious manoeuvre or as the Americans call it sea basing.My point is that whilst such a battlegroup, will be a reasonably capable medium weight force, it has to get ashore before it can begin to operate.
All that firepower is useless until it gets onto land and the existing NGS and Tigers aren't going to suffice if there is any sort of armed opposition to landing at all, let alone any sort of peer force.
Hence my point about the need for greater suppressive fire capability during the landings.
We won’t be establishing beach heads and shore based logistics (so much for any forward airfields!) but rather deploying ashore combat teams who will motor around the battlefield doing their thing and periodically meeting up with deployed logistics for resupply who will then (the logistics) return to the amphib ships offshore. The intent is to reduce the exposed force ashore and maximise the combat power of the force as their will be no need to allocate forces to defend vulnerable logistics bases.
The problem of all this is in order to manoeuvre you need to stop the enemy manoeuvring. Otherwise they will fix you to a location and without resupply you will be attrited away. In order to stop the enemy manoeuvring you need artillery and air support (ie offensive support or joint fires or whatever the buzzword is next week). So in ADDITION to supressing enemy counter landing capabilities (which can be as little as a mortar team or two) we need to also be stoping their free manoeuvre on the battlefield just to be able to sustain our own force.
The best and easiest way to do this by far is a light carrier with a squadron of F-35Bs as part of the joint force but failing that we need to find alternatives. Which will mean lots of tanking for F-35As and boosting artillery and NGS capability and maybe even off the wall ideas like the Navy Leagues LHD based OV-10s.