Eh, if you have to develop the technology first maybe. And a launcher too.
I could have my figures wrong because I'm just going from memory and it was some time ago that I worked it out and am not at the computer those documents are on.
While I'm all in favour of such capability it isn't really in line with what the Govt. says they want the submarines and spysats for in the white paper. The low profile 'strategic sting' type capability. A carrier would significantly boost our naval sea control and amphibious deployment capability but wouldn't really provide a low profile strategic sting.
absolutely,
One good thing about buying IMINT spy sats is there is no shortage of vendors and since they are inherently polar orbits the Russians provide low cost, low risk launching.
And for intelligence gathering an ideal solution for Australia (partnership). But as a tactical targeting platform (requiring larger numbers of units in space to provide coverage) for submarines with a handful of cruise missiles it’s a very high cost enabler.
Careful now abe, first you use the C word, next thing the F35B is a strategic must and all that other good stuff that brings the looneys out of the woodworks.
I agree. Given a massive boost to the naval budget a carrier to boost sea control and amphibious deployment capability would certainly be nice to have. However, for the reasons you have stated together with the state of the economy and the fear that the ADF budget would be dominated by all that is required for a sustainable and effective carrier force it will almost certainly not be given serious consideration. I am sure the Government will see submarines as a much 'safer' option. The RAN will be doing well if it can get its present projected program up and running. The LHDs and AWDs will present a huge challenge and I will be delighted if the proposed future frigate and submarine programs get through unscathed.
Personally hoping the OCV survives, I would love to be working on that project.
we aren't going to be using commercials for a TADL path though...
We don’t have to spend any more on defence to afford a carrier (which BTW has nothing to do with my strategic sting argument) we just need to have better productivity in defence. We spend over $26 billion on defence and much of that is soaked up the huge civilian workforce (over 20,000) and many inefficient uniform personnel who stay on in service after 20 years because they can even though they’re not needed. There is probably at least $5 billion in savings to be made via major personnel restructuring. Which over 10 years is another $50 billion to be spent on capability as well as making everyone else’s lives much better because of the disappearance of all the make work jobs implemented to validate the massive over staffing.
The incredible irony was that in the 1980s the Government spent over half a billion buying Seahawk ASW helicopters (each with their own highly expensive acoustic processor) and modifying three frigates to operate them to replace the Sea King ASW helicopter and Tracker ASW aircraft. The Sea Kings didn’t need replacement as they were only 5-10 years old but they were too big to fit in the frigate hangars. It probably would have been cheaper and quicker just to build a helicopter carrier for the Sea Kings (not to mention Sea Harriers) to replace HMAS Melbourne to provide the fleet its sea going ASW aircraft. But the Seahawk reverse validated the wasteful Australian Frigate Program and enabled the Government to declare that the previous Government (boo hiss) had not brought the frigates with appropriate helicopters. Even though it was the Government before the previous Government that had approved the frigate without the required helicopters in the first place. Plus of course these helicopters had a different mission which was the whole reason we were buying these types of ships (the frigates in the first place). And this helicopter capability (anti surface operations0 will not be in the fleet until 50 years later when the MH-60R comes into service...
There is an idea within the Army that they need some AAVs but no formal capability proposal. The only realistic source for such vehicles is the USMC who have a program underway after the EFV was cancelled. Without an amphibian our combat teams will be lifted to shore by LCMs in their conventional land only vehicles. The current user of amphibians in the army is the beachmaster teams of 10 FSB who use LARCVs. Army brought a huge number of LARCVs back in the early 60s when they knew a thing or two about water based logistics. Only a fraction of them are still in service with plenty in reserve and they could be kept running for years. Lockheed have been pushing their Gibbs amphibian as a LARC replacement.
Block obsolescence is a problem for any navy that is too small to maintain an ongoing design and building program. One of the real benefits of a 12 submarine force would be that construction/deliveries should be able to be managed so that the program is truly ongoing, continuing up until the commencement of a new program to replace these 12. Of course that would require proper long term planning which in turn would rely on the ongoing support of both major political parties as we can presume that a change (or three) of government would be likely over such a long period.
