Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Raven22]

Strange they don't come with ammo pouches? Nice to hear the army is getting the right gear, sort of?

It's nothing new. The SR-25 has been on issue for >5 years and there is still no issued ammunition pouch. As everyone just used non-issued pouches this was never a problem until the rule came in that no non-issued ammunition pouches were able to be used. What then? The only way to solve the problem was to have individual units buy commercial pouches and issue them out via the Q-store. Voila, issued pouches.

I'm given to understand the latest version of TBAS includes a 7.62mm magazine shingle pouch.

 

[pur3blood22]

hey just wondering about the army reserve as a rifleman im 18 and planning to join but am worried that i might not be allowed as i had asthma when i was younger, i am fit anough and havent used a puffer or any sort of asthma medication for a few years now i can easily run about 5km's without even weasing or coughing, would i still be able to join?

thank you for any replies

 

[lopez]

If it isn't a problem at all some people have been known to simply not mention it. That didn't sit well with me. So they do further testing on you if they think it could be a problem. Its a test which involves a respirator that makes you breath in some fine harmless particles that can trigger an asthma attack if you have it. You have to be bale to last a certain amount of time and percentage of particles to air...

 

[rand0m]

Not sure if this has been discussed, will the army be aquiring any sort of amphibious assault vehicles such as the USMC AAV's to increase capability with the new amphibious fleet? Will the LCM1E be the only method of delivering from ship to shore via sea? I'd figured AAV's would be standard equip on an LHD (as seen from the US & Spanish) but there's been no mention.

 

[Raven22]

There is a 'requirement' for a vehicle similar to an AAV, but it is unfunded and will never happen. There's not enough money for a vehicle for so specific a role.

As an unpaid announcement, the Army website went 'live' recently Homepage - Australian Army. Surprisingly for a government website, it is actually quite good. In particular, it has some documents that have previously been for internal distribution only.

In particular, the the Army Objective Force 2030 Primer (http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/~/media/Files/Our%20future/Publications/Army%20AOF%202030.ashx) may be of interest to those who care how the Army is being adapted to meet government guidance. It is the usual wordy wank that staff officers turn out, but there is still some useful info in there.

For example, the following justification for another manoeuvre brigade:

The Army is currently moving towards a force rotation cycle in which each of its three brigades is required to deploy forces for 12 months of a 36-month cycle. Currently, this equates to two battlegroup-sized organisations from the ready brigade deploying for between five to eight months each. However, the requirements of strategic guidance as outlined above are more onerous than the current operational tempo and thus there is a requirement for additional forces. The guidance from Defence White Paper 2009 outlined in paragraph 1.3 points to the requirement for the AOF 2030 to be postured to deploy and sustain a brigade-sized force engaged in combat operations for a prolonged period of time while simultaneously deploying a battlegroup-sized force and maintaining other forces for contingencies. The deployment of concurrent task force and battlegroup-sized elements could potentially ‘crash’ the force generation cycle and inhibit the ability of the AOF 2030 to provide forces for follow-on rotations. In addition, maintaining a brigade in theatre would require 12-month deployments. This is a significant source of concern given that current operational and human factors indicate that six to eight-month tours are optimal, although even deployments of this duration can place excessive stress on selected elements of the combat force. Reports suggest a direct correlation between psychological distress and the duration of deployment.

Despite the factors described above, all of which will enhance the combat effectiveness of the AOF 2030, additional regular personnel will still be required to sustainably meet strategic guidance out to 2030. While reinforcement and supplementation of the current forces is necessary, the likelihood of the Defence White Paper 2009 tasks occurring simultaneously weighed against the cost of resourcing the capabilities required, may necessitate a risk mitigation approach to force structure design. The initial priority will be to remediate the hollowness within the enabling forces required to support multiple operational theatres. Further combat elements and additional enabling forces should then be raised to provide sustainable force rotation and generation. The precise number of additional regular forces required will vary with the exact force structure adopted; however, initial analysis indicates that the requirement will comprise anywhere between an additional fully enabled battalion and a brigade-sized organisation.

 

[rand0m]

Just pondering how the decision with the Tiger/ARH came about, I don't intend on covering previous discussions nor bringing up a Apache vs Tiger thread. With the AH-1/AH-1Z having vast operational history, having US based systems & weapons, already being used on LHD's, an off the shelf purchase why did we go ahead with the comparably new to the block Eurocopter Tiger? I'm not arguing right/wrong but trying to gauge an understanding the advantages the Tiger had for us to buy them. Was it a lack or reconnaissance role? Did it have something to do with the lessons learnt using old airframes (ie; Sea-sprite)? Was the Cobra series perceived as too much of an "attack" helicopter?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Just pondering how the decision with the Tiger/ARH came about, I don't intend on covering previous discussions nor bringing up a Apache vs Tiger thread.

Well in the end the tender decision was between the Apache and the Tiger and I don’t think you’d find anyone, anywhere (outside of Eurocopter) who didn’t wish the Apache had been brought because it would be in operational service by now. The only thing the Tiger offered over the Apache was lower through life service costs. Eurocopter later had to retract all their figures and negotiate a higher, roughly the same as Apache, through life service contract.

With the AH-1/AH-1Z having vast operational history, having US based systems & weapons, already being used on LHD's, an off the shelf purchase why did we go ahead with the comparably new to the block Eurocopter Tiger?

The AH-1Z was NOT an off the shelf helicopter. AH-1W was and the USMC had offered all of their rebuilt AH-1Ws to Australia in the early 1990s for a song but was turned down by the Government. But the AH-1W was not a contender for AIR 87. The AH-1Z kind of looks the same and shares the name but that’s the only commonality it has with the older Cobra helos.

I'm not arguing right/wrong but trying to gauge an understanding the advantages the Tiger had for us to buy them. Was it a lack or reconnaissance role? Did it have something to do with the lessons learnt using old airframes (ie; Sea-sprite)? Was the Cobra series perceived as too much of an "attack" helicopter?

None of the above. It was cost, being seen as the most advanced technology and very poor risk assessments by Defence and the Government.

 

[rand0m]

Well in the end the tender decision was between the Apache and the Tiger and I don’t think you’d find anyone, anywhere (outside of Eurocopter) who didn’t wish the Apache had been brought because it would be in operational service by now. The only thing the Tiger offered over the Apache was lower through life service costs. Eurocopter later had to retract all their figures and negotiate a higher, roughly the same as Apache, through life service contract.



The AH-1Z was NOT an off the shelf helicopter. AH-1W was and the USMC had offered all of their rebuilt AH-1Ws to Australia in the early 1990s for a song but was turned down by the Government. But the AH-1W was not a contender for AIR 87. The AH-1Z kind of looks the same and shares the name but that’s the only commonality it has with the older Cobra helos.



None of the above. It was cost, being seen as the most advanced technology and very poor risk assessments by Defence and the Government.

An excellent reply once again. Whilst you're on the ball, I can't seem to find any information on the replacement of the RBS-70 systems or anything related to air defence from a ground (Army) perspective, is there anything being looked at? Are there any upcoming projects?

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

...I can't seem to find any information on the replacement of the RBS-70 systems or anything related to air defence from a ground (Army) perspective, is there anything being looked at? Are there any upcoming projects?

Land 19 Phase 7B is a GBAD project.
The previous Phases encompassed RBS-70 simulators (2B), RBS-70 life extension (5A) and upgrade of existing and purchase of additional RBS-70 systems (6) to BOLIDE missile standard.

Unfortunately, the DCP project description doesn't give much info on what Defence/Army is thinking/looking at as it says the project "will enhance or replace the existing GBAD system", that is the RBS-70.
"Enhance" I would think means RBS-70NG (given Army already uses the BOLIDE missiles, it would only need the NG pedestal sights), or perhaps a few Giraffe AMB radar systems similar to the one Australia is using for C-RAM in Afghanistan (which I think is a lease).
Your guess as to what "replacement" might mean is as good as mine! Although I don't get the impression that Army is any more ambitious than another SHORAD or C-RAM system.

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

During the recent floods Army deployed Kiowas as a part of its response. Has such LUH roles been factored into Air 9000 Ph.7? Or is it purely training?
There are many good roles for such LUH in Army/Navy service where the deployment of Black Hawk/MRH-90 would be over-kill, including in support to operations such as Timor Leste.
Will extra aircraft be acquired to replace the Kiowas of 173 Sqn in the surveillance role?

 

[t68]

Taken from the RAAF tread

Wrong thread for it, but if we've got this money spare, then a guided rocket artillery system would be far more use IMHO for amphibious operations, than a LARA or a jet CAS aircraft, provided one can figure out how to operate it from a ship...

If we need to suppress a significant land based maneuver force in a littoral environment to facilitate our forces landing, than the Tigers and limited NGS capability we are currently planning et al aren't going to be much use.

RAAF probably won't be close enough to provide persistence and a LARA is going to be worse than useless in such a role and F-35B is completely out of the equation...

But I am fairly sure that I read a few weeks ago that AusGov is set to take away the funding for the SPG, how comparable $ wise would an SPG and an M270 MLRS be for long term asset for the ADF.

EO I would imagine would be cheaper for the SPG but the MLRS has a variety of EO, would the MRLS get around the problem of integrating AFADTS in others words is it already compatible?

 

[Volkodav]

During the recent floods Army deployed Kiowas as a part of its response. Has such LUH roles been factored into Air 9000 Ph.7? Or is it purely training?
There are many good roles for such LUH in Army/Navy service where the deployment of Black Hawk/MRH-90 would be over-kill, including in support to operations such as Timor Leste.
Will extra aircraft be acquired to replace the Kiowas of 173 Sqn in the surveillance role?

There isn't the money or a stated requirement but the Lynx Wildcat looks like it would be a good fit in both the Australian Army and the RAN FAA to carry out the roles that everything else we have (or will have) are too large or too small for. In the Army case it would be ideal for deploying in small detachments as required to fill a variety of roles such as scouting, casualty evacuation, SAR, personnel transport, light attack etc.

 

[ADMk2]

Taken from the RAAF tread

But I am fairly sure that I read a few weeks ago that AusGov is set to take away the funding for the SPG, how comparable $ wise would an SPG and an M270 MLRS be for long term asset for the ADF.

EO I would imagine would be cheaper for the SPG but the MLRS has a variety of EO, would the MRLS get around the problem of integrating AFADTS in others words is it already compatible?

I wasn't referring to MLRS because that would encounter the same issue as an SPG or a light gun would, ie: the platform has to be landed on the mainland before it can be employed and if the force you wish to suppress is preventing you from landing...

What we require if we are going to have any pretence of a capability to conduct opposed amphibious landings is a fire support capability greater than a handful of 127mm guns and a couple of Tigers can provide.

If we need to land a force and we have any degree of opposition whatsoever than we need a fire support capability that can operate at extended ranges (ie: over the horizon) yet we can't afford additional fixed wing or rotary wing capability financially or within available space to carry said amphibious force.

It seems to me that to suppress a maneuver force that can be dispersed for relative self-protection reasons, yet can concentrate quicker than we can land AND we can't have aircraft supporting us unless within range of RAAF or allied assets, then we need a gun or missile system to perform such a supression role.

The discussion was in relation to what might be a better investment than a LARA aircraft assuming the cash was available for it.

My thoughts are, a naval variant of MLRS, with area (standard MLRS capability), point (GMLRS) and extended range capability (ATACMS) would neatly resolve this issue.

 

[t68]

Well since additional aircraft are ruled out of the question and or it is beyond the range for the RAAF to support, I imagine you are talking about an updated version of the Landing Ship Medium Rocket able to make ocean going voyages in support of a task force with a combination of MLRS and 76mm or 127mm gun.

If the funds were their using a modified Frank S Besson class LSV to provide mobility for the M270 MLRS to provide fire support then once troops have secured a beach head the M270 could be moved on to land and the LSV can moved into its traditional role of moving material directly onto the beach .

http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/06/100653608.jpg
http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/06/100652701.jpg
Frank S Besson Class - Naval Technology

 

[ADMk2]

Well since additional aircraft are ruled out of the question and or it is beyond the range for the RAAF to support, I imagine you are talking about an updated version of the Landing Ship Medium Rocket able to make ocean going voyages in support of a task force with a combination of MLRS and 76mm or 127mm gun.

If the funds were their using a modified Frank S Besson class LSV to provide mobility for the M270 MLRS to provide fire support then once troops have secured a beach head the M270 could be moved on to land and the LSV can moved into its traditional role of moving material directly onto the beach .

http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/06/100653608.jpg
http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/06/100652701.jpg
Frank S Besson Class - Naval Technology

MLRS is the sort of capability I had in mind, though HIMARS would likely be cheaper, yet provide similar capability.

Interestingly, the Israeli's are developing a maritime variant of their Jumper missile system (very similar application to the intended US - NLOS-LS).

IAI to Show Maritime Application for Jumper Missile at IMDEX | Missiles & Bombs News at DefenceTalk

Something like that might well do the job too...

Basically, without aircraft and if we intend to land amphibious forces with any pretense of remaining free from attack, we need a system capable of rapidly suppressing an enemy force whilst we do so and until and in support of us getting our land force capability into action.

We will have few to no persistent fixed wing aircraft and very few 127mm guns and Tiger helicopters available to provide this role, even if such an operation is within the range of RAAF's assets.

The 127mm guns we do have are slow firing, short ranged, lack precision munitions and they will more than likely number no more than 2-3 tubes in total in any sort of battlespace we operate in without allies.

So we need something more or we should openly admit our 27,000 ton vessels are intended for Coalition Ops or HADR ops only.

 

[Waylander]

Going with modern 127mm guns like the Oto-Melara 64/LW or the new american one (of which I forgot the name) on the ANZACs (and their replacements) and the Hobarts may be a much easier and cheaper way to improve the land attack/fire support capabilities of the RAN. The right ammo (Volcano) goes a long way in adding range and precisions against a multitude of targets and the ROF is quite good, too.

Should be much easier to integrate and can also easier get carried over to new ships once the ANZACs get replaced.

 

[winnyfield]

During the recent floods Army deployed Kiowas as a part of its response. Has such LUH roles been factored into Air 9000 Ph.7? Or is it purely training?
There are many good roles for such LUH in Army/Navy service where the deployment of Black Hawk/MRH-90 would be over-kill, including in support to operations such as Timor Leste.
Will extra aircraft be acquired to replace the Kiowas of 173 Sqn in the surveillance role?

The light utility requirement hasnt been explicitly stated but all the leading contenders; EC-135, Bell 429 and A109, have made light utility capability as part their pitches.

 

[ADMk2]

Going with modern 127mm guns like the Oto-Melara 64/LW or the new american one (of which I forgot the name) on the ANZACs (and their replacements) and the Hobarts may be a much easier and cheaper way to improve the land attack/fire support capabilities of the RAN. The right ammo (Volcano) goes a long way in adding range and precisions against a multitude of targets and the ROF is quite good, too.

Should be much easier to integrate and can also easier get carried over to new ships once the ANZACs get replaced.

We've got the latest 127mm guns for the AWD's, Mk 45 Mod 4's. The problem is that there will only be 3 of them in-service. In any sort of deployment there will be 1 of them at best... The remaining tubes will be ANZAC Class frigates with Mk 45 Mod 2's that are a 30+ year design that haven't improved in firepower, lethality or accuracy in that time. That will be the situation until the late 2030's when the future frigates come into service.

The guns we chose for the ANZAC's in the mid 80's are EXACTLY the same in lethality, range and firepower as the guns on the few ANZAC's that are actually at sea today...

They may a good general purpose gun but they weren't designed to provide sufficient firepower for the type of amphibious operations we seem now to be envisaging. We're going to "unify the littoral domain" and "seemlessly exploit the maritime maneuver space" with these "amphibious assault ships" afterall. Unless anyone objects to us doing so that is, in which case we'll be exploiting the "maritime maneuver space" alright. Exploiting it the hell out of there the way things are going. I can barely imagine the Royal Commission of enquiry we'd have if one of these things actually got sunk...

The current and planned future guns are intended for surface combatants that will be busy fighting the naval battle. How much will a naval commander be willing to place his frigates and destroyers on "the gunline" should there be ANY sort of submarine, surface action or aerial threat whatsoever?

Now if all that isn't sufficient, even the AWD's will still lack ANY sort of PGM and the Mod 4's, despite being an improvement over the Mod 2's remain relatively short-ranged and slow firing. In reality our NGS capability hasn't improved since Vietnam and if anything it's got far worse, given the relative importance of precise guided munitions in every aspect of warfare nowadays, except apparently naval gunnery support...

The best fire support we will be able to provide in support of our amphibious landing will be the 2-4 gun tubes from the deployed naval force, firing un-guided munitions at a rate of about 20 rounds per minute at best.

On top of this, by the RAN's own simulations, we will have 6-8 deployable Tiger ARH's per taskforce. What the sortie rate of Tigers from LHD's will be, is anyone's guess, but this video I think, gives some acknowledgement to RAN's expectations (2x Tigers at any one time...)

Canberra Class - Royal Australian Navy

These short ranged guns with unguided munitions (assuming the ships aren't fighting anyone else) and a pair of Tigers are available to support landings is the best that is planned for at present...

I say this in the full knowledge that our budgetary situation at present won't allow for anything better, but honestly this is a disgrace. We should call a spade a spade for once, instead of calling a spade a bulldozer as we appear to be doing with our amphibious capability...

 

[south]

We've got the latest 127mm guns for the AWD's, Mk 45 Mod 4's. The problem is that there will only be 3 of them in-service. In any sort of deployment there will be 1 of them at best... The remaining tubes will be ANZAC Class frigates with Mk 45 Mod 2's that are a 30+ year design that haven't improved in firepower, lethality or accuracy in that time. That will be the situation until the late 2030's when the future frigates come into service.

The guns we chose for the ANZAC's in the mid 80's are EXACTLY the same in lethality, range and firepower as the guns on the few ANZAC's that are actually at sea today...

They may a good general purpose gun but they weren't designed to provide sufficient firepower for the type of amphibious operations we seem now to be envisaging. We're going to "unify the littoral domain" and "seemlessly exploit the maritime maneuver space" with these "amphibious assault ships" afterall. Unless anyone objects to us doing so that is, in which case we'll be exploiting the "maritime maneuver space" alright. Exploiting it the hell out of there the way things are going. I can barely imagine the Royal Commission of enquiry we'd have if one of these things actually got sunk...

The current and planned future guns are intended for surface combatants that will be busy fighting the naval battle. How much will a naval commander be willing to place his frigates and destroyers on "the gunline" should there be ANY sort of submarine, surface action or aerial threat whatsoever?

Now if all that isn't sufficient, even the AWD's will still lack ANY sort of PGM and the Mod 4's, despite being an improvement over the Mod 2's remain relatively short-ranged and slow firing. In reality our NGS capability hasn't improved since Vietnam and if anything it's got far worse, given the relative importance of precise guided munitions in every aspect of warfare nowadays, except apparently naval gunnery support...

The best fire support we will be able to provide in support of our amphibious landing will be the 2-4 gun tubes from the deployed naval force, firing un-guided munitions at a rate of about 20 rounds per minute at best.

On top of this, by the RAN's own simulations, we will have 6-8 deployable Tiger ARH's per taskforce. What the sortie rate of Tigers from LHD's will be, is anyone's guess, but this video I think, gives some acknowledgement to RAN's expectations (2x Tigers at any one time...)

Canberra Class - Royal Australian Navy

These short ranged guns with unguided munitions (assuming the ships aren't fighting anyone else) and a pair of Tigers are available to support landings is the best that is planned for at present...

I say this in the full knowledge that our budgetary situation at present won't allow for anything better, but honestly this is a disgrace. We should call a spade a spade for once, instead of calling a spade a bulldozer as we appear to be doing with our amphibious capability...

AD - I suspect you hit the nail on your head earlier when you suggested that

So we need something more or we should openly admit our 27,000 ton vessels are intended for Coalition Ops or HADR ops only.

To put my view succinctly - if someone has the capabilities to have a dispersed force yet concentrate them sufficiently rapidly as to oppose a landing where M1A1, 155mm Arty, Javelin, Tiger, NGF support etc are not enough firepower then we probably should have been bombing them for longer or we need to call in the USMC/USN...

At 300NM with the A330 and 6 Jets it will be relatively easy for the RAAF to sustain jets on station for a long time with 4-6x500lb class weapons per jet. The tanker will contribute significantly to increasing endurance.

 

[ADMk2]

To put my view succinctly - if someone has the capabilities to have a dispersed force yet concentrate them sufficiently rapidly as to oppose a landing where M1A1, 155mm Arty, Javelin, Tiger, NGF support etc are not enough firepower then we probably should have been bombing them for longer or we need to call in the USMC/USN...

My point is that whilst such a battlegroup, will be a reasonably capable medium weight force, it has to get ashore before it can begin to operate.

All that firepower is useless until it gets onto land and the existing NGS and Tigers aren't going to suffice if there is any sort of armed opposition to landing at all, let alone any sort of peer force.

Hence my point about the need for greater suppressive fire capability during the landings.

At 300NM with the A330 and 6 Jets it will be relatively easy for the RAAF to sustain jets on station for a long time with 4-6x500lb class weapons per jet. The tanker will contribute significantly to increasing endurance.

That would be quite reasonable, so long as our operations are within 300nm of a secure base from RAAF to operate from...