That means in a close in turning fight that even a 1980s Mig-29 has a good chance against it with its superior helmet mounted sight and R-73 missile.
@ destructivetouch, you are taking like a fanboy because air warfare is not about platforms alone. In fact, there are so many deficiencies with your posts, it is hard to know where to begin but I shall try to point out the 8 most obvous points:-
1. The USAF alone has around 185 F-22s (with an operational inventory of about 150 F-22s), they will also continue to operate up to 176 upgraded F-15Cs (AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA radar), 217 upgraded F-15Es (AN/APG-82(V)1 AESA radar) and over 300 A-10Cs. The USN will continue to operate around 515 Super Hornets and 114 Growlers. Therefore, the range of aircraft operated by the US will operate within a powerful force construct without peer in the world. Given that the F-22s will operate in concert with other assets that include AWAC support, strike packages with SEAD capabilities, and other EW capabilities - you are crazy to declare that MiG-29 (see Greg Goebel's article on the
MiG-29) has a good chance against F-22s (see Greg Goebel's article on the
F-22).
2. I've given some numbers but numbers don't tell the whole story - you'll also need to look at specialist tools and other force multipliers. For example, it has been estimated that North Korea operates 655 combat aircraft (including MiG-29s) but they are not a match for S. Korea's 451 combat aircraft (mainly teen series fighters). North Korean airpower, the equivalent to six US wing equivalents in size, corresponds to only two F-16 wing equivalents in estimated net capability. North Korean doctrine, military readiness and morale are also key factors in determining actual military performance. Don't get me wrong, I'm very fond of the MiG-29 and I think it brings a lot to the table at a fantastic price point but would hesitate to call it a F-22 killer.
various sources said:
The MiG-29's Long and Ongoing Production Run
In August 2011, RSK MiG started to wind down production of its "classic" MiG-29 design, as it completed a final batch of the aircraft for Myanmar and worked on the modernisation to the MiG-29s for the India Air Force. In 2012, the company's plants in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod and Lukhovitsy will shift to producing the newer MiG-29K/KUB/M1/M2/35 unified platform. In 2011, 11 MiG-29K/KUB were delivered to the Indian navy, with the remaining aircraft from a 16-aircraft launch order to be handed over later. A follow-on contract for 29 more aircraft for India was signed in 2011, with these to be delivered from 2012 onwards. In 2012, the Russian Navy placed an order for 20 MiG-29K fighters and 4 MiG-29KUB two-seaters, for operational service on the Russian Navy's ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV.
3. Before you make a greater fool of yourself, you might want to consider reading this article called: "
FACT versus FICTION: The Truth about Australia’s New Air Combat Capability", as a backgrounder.
FACT versus FICTION
It has been incorrect for some 20 years to equate WVR potential with platform agility alone...
The classic case study here comes from 1993 and concerns the (British) RAF’s Tornado F-3 air defence fighter. By the standards of the late-20th century the F-3 was a mediocre performer, handicapped by its modest agility and poor acceleration. Despite the high quality of RAF pilots, the F-3 regularly sustained a loss rate of around 3:1 in exercises against the West’s best fighter of that era, the USAF’s F-15. The turnaround came during an exercise at Mountain Home Air Force Base in the United States when, for the first time, the F-3s were fitted with Link 16 data links. The shift was dramatic. Overnight, the F-3 became an F-15 killer, reversing the loss ratio to 3:1 in its favour. Situational awareness, not manoeuvrability, was the key.
4. In the context of an intelligent discussion on VLO and air warfare - you must understand that D + 1 and D + nn days of war are going to be conducted differently and to understand the F-22 program you must understand this basic conceptual point. This approach enhances the survivability of sympathetic platforms and will obviously bring some changes to the way of war. As I said before, there are three different ways of thinking about air superiority:-
(i) one, control of space;
(ii) two, control of time; and
(iii) finally, control of geography or a combination of those three.
5. Depending on intent and tasking, the USAF/USN can seek to attain air superiority over a specific area. The attainment of air superiority should not be an end in itself. Please note that all fights occur at systems level but even for air forces with tertiary capabilities, they are not equal. you have to think in terms of a systems fight (i.e. everything that a notional air force can bring to the table) and not just focus on a platform. All modern air forces fight as a system. Other factors to consider include:
(i) training;
(ii) number of first line combat aircraft;
(iii) technology (AESA radar, SAR, ESM, ground sensors & UAVs for ISR and so on);
(iv) platforms (radar, targeting pods & other tools like ground control radar, SIGINT, EW & AWAC support, if any); and
(v) the level of C4I systems integration.
And lack of transmit in terms of data links is very good for stealth, but bad for usefulness because it means that with its super radar and ability to fly deep into enemy territory in most countries unseen it wont be able to share the information about the targets it sees...
6. A platform — that is, an aircraft — does not equate to an effective capability. It’s the total system that matters and at a systems level, the USAF/USN combinaton is without peer. For example, if the Battle of Britain were refought today with the Luftwaffe flying Hurricanes and Spitfires and the Royal Air Force (RAF) flying Bf-109s, the result would still be the same. This is because the RAF’s excellent early warning radar network, superior leadership and the RAF pilots were fighting over their own air space, pre-warned on the heading and size of the Luftwaffe formation. The key thing to remember is tactics must suit the plane and not the other way round.
7. You need to understand that different aircraft play different roles in air warfare due to their different characteristics. My objection with your MiG-29 example is that there is little or no evidence that the Russians have been able to develop an effective 'kill chain' counter. There is simply no "magic bullet" solution to address VLO fighter aircraft and an effective adversary's response must arise at a systems level. If you read the various threads in this forum, you would know the following:-
(i) engagement of a VLO target requires more than simple radar detection. To engage, the adversary needs detection, tracking, acquisition and engagement. If a VLO target manages to break ANY one of these aspects of an engagement, it will more likely than not result in an unsuccessful engagement. Detection, tracking, acquisition and engagement is otherwise known as the 'kill chain'. VLO design is not about making the target invulnerable or totally undetectable. The goal is to allow the VLO platform, like the F-22, have the capability to employ it's weapon systems before an opposition can target it; and
(ii) as said by gf0012-aust in other threads, the future is in co-operative battlespace managers which can run primary or hand off where appropriate. This means the F-22s in US service will work with support from AWACs, Rivet, Compass and so on. The F-22s will not work alone, in fact, they will work with F-35s too to provide advanced ISR, communications and computational capabilities (though there are some issues that need to be worked out). Since 1982, it's been demonstrated that air warfare is not about the platform alone and every tertiary air force demonstrates that awareness.
8. The Russians want to differentiate their aircraft so that they can employ different tactics but other air forces don't have to play their game. It is important to remember that different aircraft have different strengths and weaknesses — so different users will use different tactics. If I may use an analogy. Imagine that you are a bicycle owner and you argue that the bicycle has lower fuel consumption than a Ducati bike. The bicycle always wins in lower fuel consumption as it has no engine. The approach that you have taken on comparing the the F-22 with the MiG-29 is like the bicycle owner, where you argue context does not matter, when it clearly does.
Rhetorical Question: Which MiG-29 operator is a peer threat to the USAF/USN?
You don't even demonstrate a basic understanding of the air power issues involved and your approach to air warfare is comical, dated and wrong. Please go read the relevant threads at DT before coming back to me.