Georgian Armed Forces

[Feanor]

Since the 2008 war Georgia has been having trouble acquiring weapons abroad. In particular Israel has refused to sell weapons to Georgia, under Russian pressure, and US military aid to Georgia has decreased. The result has been some impressive tinkering of their own.

Didgori 1 and 2 are two variants of a small armored car. It's rated, allegedly, to withstand 7.62X54R ammunition, or to survive a 6-8kg mine blast. The two variants are armed with miniguns ot 12.7 Utes heavy machineguns.

Didgori - Army Technology

[ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Didgori_Armoured_Personnel_Carrier"]Didgori Armoured Personnel Carrier - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/ame]

Army Guide - Didgori, Reconnaissance Vehicle

http://www.mod.gov.ge/files/axmuqkeunbgeo.pdf

Another interesting variant is the Lazika, which is a modification of the BMP-1/2 chassis with an unmanned combat module. It removes one of the wheels from the tracks to improve the turning radius. The vehicle is rated to withstand 14.5mm impacts, but from what distance, and what angles, is unclear. Weapon-wise, it carries a 23mm auto-cannon, and a 7.62 coaxial machinegun.

bmpd -

Ð“Ñ€ÑƒÐ·Ñ–Ñ Ð¿Ñ€ÐµÐ·ÐµÐ½Ñ‚ÑƒÐ²Ð°Ð»Ð° влаÑну БМП "Lazika" - УкраїнÑький мілітарний портал - УкраїнÑький мілітарний портал

Thoughts, opinions? Is it viable for Georgia to independently produce/remanufacture their stock of light armored vehicles independently?

 

[Klaus]

Do they still have enough BMPs to build up a force capable of withstanding a Russian attack? They could turn to Ukraine again and order tanks and armored vehicles from them.

 

[Feanor]

Do they still have enough BMPs to build up a force capable of withstanding a Russian attack? They could turn to Ukraine again and order tanks and armored vehicles from them.

That's a good question. But used BMP-1/2 are easily acquired on the open market, not just from Ukraine.

 

[Feanor]

A Georgian MLRS based on transplating the Grad BM-21 onto a Kraz chassis, with an armored cabin. There may or may not be a new automatic FCS. The crew is supposed to be 5 men.

Gur Khan attacks!: "

These vehicles show interesting trends. Mostly imported components with local assembly, and some local input. These are important steps on the way to self sufficiency, but at the same time they also highlight how far away Georgia is from self-sufficiency. Also it's notable that the Didgori light armored car is the only one that's been produced in appreciable quantities. Given their small defense budget, and lack of export opportunities, it doesn't seem likely that they'll be able to reach an appreciable level of self-sufficiency.

EDIT: A few more photos.

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/175550.html?view=1836222#t1836222

 

[CheeZe]

How do Georgian T72s stack against Russia's T72s, T80s, and T90s? I read that the Israelis had helped the Georgians upgrade their inventory of T72s.

Also, I'm guessing that the Gur Khan MLRS system fires rockets smaller than HIMARS or the M270? What's the range?

 

[Feanor]

How do Georgian T72s stack against Russia's T72s, T80s, and T90s? I read that the Israelis had helped the Georgians upgrade their inventory of T72s.

Also, I'm guessing that the Gur Khan MLRS system fires rockets smaller than HIMARS or the M270? What's the range?

The MLRS is not called Gur Khan. That's the name of the Russian blog. The MLRS is a modified Grad BM-21 on a new chassis possibly with a new FCS.

Georgian T-72s compared favorably with Russian T-72Bs, but are probably on par with the T-72BM variants currently used in Chechnya. There are no T-80s in South MD. The T-90As should be superior.

 

[CheeZe]

Ah, my mistake with the name.

Would the Georgians be working with neighboring states (the Israelis, Ukraine, etc) on these or future developments?

 

[Feanor]

Ah, my mistake with the name.

Would the Georgians be working with neighboring states (the Israelis, Ukraine, etc) on these or future developments?

I doubt Israelis, as they recently stopped selling weapons to Georgia. They're clearly working with Ukraine, the Kraz chassis is produced in Ukraine.

The Didgori involves importing Ford pickup chassis, so US companies may be involved in the development on some level.

 

[Methos]

Georgia is having trouble buying weapons after the EU found them guilty for having shot first in their war against Russia and South-Ossetia.
Their indigenous developments are not really a reason to get euphoric. Their Lazika IFV is more or less on par with the first model of the Bradley, in terms of armour (14.5 mm resistant) and firepower (23 x 152 mm APDS is roughly equal to 25 x 137 mm APDS) unless they fitted some nice computer stuff. This means that fighting BMP-2s and BMP-3s is more or less a suicide commando.
The Didgori's might be a good development having the increased need for armoured cars after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in mind, but it is still not on the technical level of modern European, South-African or U.S. systems.

 

[Feanor]

Georgia is having trouble buying weapons after the EU found them guilty for having shot first in their war against Russia and South-Ossetia.
Their indigenous developments are not really a reason to get euphoric. Their Lazika IFV is more or less on par with the first model of the Bradley, in terms of armour (14.5 mm resistant) and firepower (23 x 152 mm APDS is roughly equal to 25 x 137 mm APDS) unless they fitted some nice computer stuff. This means that fighting BMP-2s and BMP-3s is more or less a suicide commando.
The Didgori's might be a good development having the increased need for armoured cars after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in mind, but it is still not on the technical level of modern European, South-African or U.S. systems.

With thermals and a modern FCS the Lazika would have a considerably more accurate gun then a BMP-2. And 23mm is more then enough to turn a BMP-2 into Swiss cheese. A much more interesting question is whether they can produce them in sufficient numbers.

Certainly a BMP-3 would have major advantages over the Lazika.

 

[Methos]

There are only very few good 23 x 152 rounds available. The Soviet Union (and Russia) never developed real subcaliber rounds for it, as it was used solely as anti-air gun.

The BMP-1/2 armour is having an maximum armour thickness of 40.2 mm, so to assure a high kill-probabilty the used rounds should be capable to penetrate this amount of armour. Turret front is only 30 - 35 mm.

I wasn't capable of finding any information of the Georgian ammunition, but here are datas from some other manufacturers.
The Polish Burmar group has developed an APDS round which can penetrate a spaced target conisting of a 10 mm later at 45°, 60 mm space and a 20 mm steel plate at 45° [the range is not given]. The LOS steel thickness of this array will be 42.4 mm - German 20 mm APDS can penetrate 44 mm at 1,000 m, U.S. 25 mm APDS will penetrate 50 mm at 1,300 m. Mesko, part of the Burmar group, also has an APDS in their catalouges which is called APDS (EUROP) (so it is probably a joint venture) - this is said to penetrate 60 mm at 100 m (which is again very similiar to German 20 mm APDS and U.S. 25 mm APDS).
The Bulgarian Arsenal produces only API-T (with a penetration of 20 mm at 1,300 m) and FAPDS (which should be slightly inferior to normal APDS), so not very good subcaliber ammunition. The Bulgarian company Kintex also produces only APDS and FSAPDS rounds, but gives no armour piercing performance.
Mercar (a Belgian company) has developed an APFSDS round, no performance details were given, but 50 - 60 mm at 1,500 mm should be realistic.

In best case Georgia is producing or importing 23 mm APFSDS, which would enable them to fight the Russian BMPs at up to 2,000 m range, but if they have only APDS the kill probability at 1,500 m is already pretty low, since then only the turret is in danger, while the glacis should be immune. At the same time the BMP-1 will be capable to penetrate the Lazika at all ranges (but it's effective range is about 1,000 m and the accuracy behind 700 m is according to literature very low) and the BMP-2 will probably penetrate the armour of the Lazika at ranges greater than 2,000 m.

With thermals and a modern FCS the Lazika would have a considerably more accurate gun then a BMP-2.

Does it have thermals or a modern FCS? It seems that there is no modern FCS, at least it would lack the most recognizable features (though nothing speaks against stabilization of the RWS). The RWS has an optics block which has two openings. One of these will be the daylight sight/camera, the other could be a rather small thermal sight, like used on other RWS. But it could also be something else, e.g. some German RWS have three optics (daysight camera, thermal imager and passive image intensifier).

Regarding the usefullness of a thermal sight on the Lazika:
During the Cold War both German and American studies showed that in Middle Europe (West and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia), the most probable battlefield for a hot war, most engagements of land forces would happen at ranges below 1,500 - 2,000 m. Georgia, South-Ossetia and Abchasia, the most probable battlefield in the next armed conflict in which Georgia will participate, has an even more mountainous terrain - the short range of the old IR sights on the BMPs (max ~1,200 m iirc.) shouldn't be such a drawback as in Gulf War or Operation Iraqi Freedom.

 

[Feanor]

BMP-1s are no longer in combat service. Only as trainers. I'm also questioning the likely engagement ranges you're citing. In the 2008 war, most of the fighting was fairly close quarters. However your post is interesting and informative. I agree that the Lazika has serious drawbacks. I think the bigger issue is whether they can acquire necessary numbers.

 

[Methos]

I'm also questioning the likely engagement ranges you're citing. In the 2008 war, most of the fighting was fairly close quarters. However your post is interesting and informative.

In the late 1960s both Germany and the U.S. did studies for the probability of combat engagements in Middle Europe, because they were working on the MBT-70 which should have a maximum firing range of 3,000 m with the Shillelagh missile. Both studies came to the conclusion that actually the missile armament was unnecessary for fighting in Middle Europe.
The results of the German study were published in the German Der Spiegel magazine in 1969:
About 75% of all engagements would happen in the range from 0 - 2,000 m, 16% of all engagments would happen in 2,000 - 3,000 m distance and in only 6% of all
enagegements the gunners/commanders would see the enemy at a distance of 4,000 m. Therefore the 152 mm XM150's capability to fire the Shillelagh missile was considered as too little advantage over the Rh 120 tank gun, that it would have made sense adopting the MBT-70 or later the Leopard 2FK (projected Leopard 2 with XM150 tank gun). The numbers have lost some of it's validity as modern tanks carry far superior sights and FCS equipment, OTOH IFVs should carry similiar or inferior sights/FCS than the MBT-70/Leopard 1.
German terrain includes the Alps, the Harz and a number of smaller mountain ranges. Still the Northern German plain is pretty large and there long-range egagements should be more probable.

 

[Feanor]

What percentage of the engagements were under 1000m?

 

[kato]

What percentage of the engagements were under 1000m?

Wasn't published. The article mostly referenced the uselessness of Shillelagh in comparison to a then-2,000m-ranged 120mm gun. The article can be found here btw (in German).

Offhand the 1500-2000 meter zone was the one primarily concerned about for an L7 successor, as the only assets that could really reach there reliably were the handful SS11-armed RakJPz of the divisions. The zone below 1500 meters was well covered.

 

[Feanor]

Wasn't published. The article mostly referenced the uselessness of Shillelagh in comparison to a then-2,000m-ranged 120mm gun. The article can be found here btw (in German).

Offhand the 1500-2000 meter zone was the one primarily concerned about for an L7 successor, as the only assets that could really reach there reliably were the handful SS11-armed RakJPz of the divisions. The zone below 1500 meters was well covered.

Well my point, or rather suggestion, is that most of the fighting is done under 1000m, meaning that the improved performance of the 2A42 at 2000m compared to the 23mm the Georgians are using is a moot point.

 

[Methos]

I think that most of the fighting in Georgia happend under 1,000 m is still possible, but I doubt that most of the engagements between armoured forces will happen at a range below 1,000 m. The country has lots of mountains, but this does not mean that engagmenets in the range of 1,500 - 2,000 m do not happen. If that would be true, then most countries would have some very stupid procurement systems (buying ATGMs with ranges of 2,000 - 4,000 m). These countries would include Georgia, Switzerland and Austria - the latter two countries having more mountains and less plains than Georgia. Maybe some 40 - 60% of all engagements between armoured forces happen in the range from 0 to 1,000 m distance, but there should still be a significant amount of engagements which should happen at ranges greater than 1,000 m.

 

[Feanor]

Here's some photos of a new Georgian UAV.

It allegedly has a ceiling of 3000m, speed of 60-160km/h, and flight time of up to 8 hours. It has a video, photo camera, IR and thermals.

bmpd -

More photos here: http://vz.ru/photoreport/573826/

These are impressive stats for their first UAV ever. Given their previous tech being remanufactured from foreign gear, I wonder what served as the basis for this design.

 

[Feanor]

So a little more info. The new Georgian minister of defense decided to massively reduce the size of the Georgian Army. This is to be expected given that western military aid has been scaled back, and any hopes of militarily reclaiming the breakaway republics are gone.

bmpd -

He talks about a small and mobile army, directed a fighting extremists and terrorists. Essentially this would mean that Russia is no longer regarded as an opponent that Georgia is capable of fighting. He also said that there needs to be more control from the civilian government over the military.