Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[StevoJH]

With regards to comparing an engine removal hatch with the VLS aboard the Virginia class submarines, would I be incorrect in thinking that the Virginia class VLS is outside the pressure hull?

That puts it in a completely different situation to the proposed engine hatch.

 

[Todjaeger]

I believe the Australians weren't/aren't prepared to be a mother country submarine builder, the spares problems reveal it. Its hard to sell submarines and export them when you aren't even prepared to stock up on spares for yourself. Therefore I believe it would be wise to buy or license build a sub from another country. At the moment I prefer the German Type 214.

AFAIK Australia has not/had not attempted to export the Collins-class to anyone, which means that there has been no attempt to 'sell' them as it was put. Part of the issue with people suggesting a European conventional sub design for the RAN is that the RAN subs operate quite differently and in a different environment from European subs.

Suggesting a sub like the Type 212 or Type 214, which have a surfaced displacement of roughly half the surfaced displacement of a Collins-class does sort of seem to miss the point that what the RAN wants/needs to do with their subs is different from what Europe designs their subs to do. As has been mentioned here, repeatedly, is the that the countries which operate conventional subs in a manner and environment most similar to that of the RAN are Canada (well, sort of operate...) and Japan. Both countries having large, ocean-going fleet subs.

As for the issue of stocking up on spares, how is buying a foreign built sub, or licensed production of a foreign design (hey is that not what the Collins-class is, a Swedish designed Type 471 which then Australia had to fix with help from the US...) going to help that issue? Especially if Gov't chooses not to purchase appropriate spares? Subs are large scale pieces of kit, unfortunately they are so complex and different even between variants of the same design that there is realistically no globaly supply chain that Australia could attempt to plug themselves into for logistical support, like can be done with US sourced aircraft like the SHornets, C-130, C-17, etc.

Also, sheer size of some of the components means that repair or replacement work is going to be long, complex and involved. If there is an engine failure, either the appropriate parts need to be brought into the proper machinery spaces through the various hatches to effect repairs, or the hull needs to be cut open to get the parts in or take the engine itself out. Even if all the needed parts are available, sitting in a warehouse right next to the dock, unless the issue is minor and only requires some parts and tools which one person can carry into the sub themselves, significant time is going to be required to effect repairs.

What really seems needed is for Australia to develope the critical mass in terms of numbers (units and personnel) and funding to sustain submarine construction, repair and modification. To that end, a number of people have suggested partnering with Japanese and/or Canadian allies since they have similar requirements for conventional submarines. An export order to Canada for the "Collins II" submarine, even they were sold Gov't to Gov't at cost, would be beneficial. Doing so would reduce the per sub development cost since there would be more units to amortize the development costs across the entire sub build. Also by increasing the number of subs built (assuming built in Oz) the yard and lines are kept open longer, providing sustainment work for the upskilled personnel.

However all of this requires funding an a commitment from Gov't, when often Gov't seems to make decisions based off what is good politically for whichever party is in power, as opposed to what is actually for Australia.

-Cheers

 

[StingrayOZ]

The origional plan was to build 8.. again politics got in the way. Moving allthe subs 2
Nowhere in wa from the place they had been for35 years didnt help retention either.

While subsdo often go on missions, training to avoid surface assets helps both sub crew and surface crew and happens even for the usn. This used to be a relatively easy jaunt from syd tojarvis bay, a week. However collins seems to do less of this xaand more long range missions, which can take ages from wa to say the pacific.

 

[hairyman]

It appears to me that the Nation we should be working with to produce a new non-nuclear submarine, is Japan. They have similar needs for their submarines, unlike the Europeans, and also use American gear. And we have a history with the Japanese. After all, did'nt some of their subs visit Sydney in the Second World War?

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

After my Collins engine gaffe a few pages back I got out the book in question from my local library to read up on the Hedemora engines again, along with the justification for their choice which may be useful in this current discussion.

I remember the Hedemora V18 diesels are something like 7 meters long and weighing about 20 tons. I'd have to get the book out again.

During the design phase the RAN wanted as high a power generating output as possible in order to minimise the amount of time that the class would require snorkelling to recharge.
Kockums proposed that the engines be turbo-charged rather than super-charged due to its greater efficiency, but no submarine engines were turbo-charged. The bid team approached MTU who said they weren't prepared to adapt one of their designs to turbo-charging because with wave action there are variations in pressure that puts great stress on the turbine. It seems MTU was developing a turbo-charged submarine engine, but that they were behind Hedemora and it wouldn't be ready in time.

Hedemora had a lot of experience with turbo-charging and said they could do it, showing a V12 version snorkelling under simulated conditions without issues.
Other advantages were it was able to continue operating with disabled components, modular construction so the crankshaft could be removed without cutting open the hull, and three Hedemora engines abreast could make the required generating output over 4 MTU engines in two banks.

The book states that many of the early reliability problems with the engine have come about from salt water contamination of the fuel, which corroded the Bosch fuel pumps and injectors and when they begin to fail the vibrations caused put stresses on other components, and the rates at which the pumps and injectors failed exhausted stocks.
It turns out, that the open oceans are saltier (!!) and rougher (!!) than the Baltic, so the Swedes weren't as worried about the issue as they should have been and relied on gravity separation for the fuel.
Also, it turns out that Australia doesn't just specialise in dangerous snakes and spiders but also in diesel fuel inhabiting bacteria that excrete corrosive products. It seems they don't have these in Sweden either.

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

It appears to me that the Nation we should be working with to produce a new non-nuclear submarine, is Japan.

As a "peace-loving nation" they also have very strict arms export rules that make it very difficult to buy or develop anything that may be used by non-Japanese armed forces.

Not to get all droll or controversial, but given the last decade Japan might have reason to think Australia would fail Principle Number Three. If they were going to get humourless about such things.

The quote is a self-description from the link, in case anyone thinks I was trying to be funny.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Also, it turns out that Australia doesn't just specialise in dangerous snakes and spiders but also in diesel fuel inhabiting bacteria that excrete corrosive products. It seems they don't have these in Sweden either.

The spanish had the same problem. I visited a facility in Navarre a few years back where they said the inside of a stainless steel tank was chewed out within 9 months.

they had to inject the spanish version of "Nulon" to stop the corrosive action.

 

[Bonza]

AFAIK Australia has not/had not attempted to export the Collins-class to anyone, which means that there has been no attempt to 'sell' them as it was put. Part of the issue with people suggesting a European conventional sub design for the RAN is that the RAN subs operate quite differently and in a different environment from European subs.

Suggesting a sub like the Type 212 or Type 214, which have a surfaced displacement of roughly half the surfaced displacement of a Collins-class does sort of seem to miss the point that what the RAN wants/needs to do with their subs is different from what Europe designs their subs to do. As has been mentioned here, repeatedly, is the that the countries which operate conventional subs in a manner and environment most similar to that of the RAN are Canada (well, sort of operate...) and Japan. Both countries having large, ocean-going fleet subs.

As for the issue of stocking up on spares, how is buying a foreign built sub, or licensed production of a foreign design (hey is that not what the Collins-class is, a Swedish designed Type 471 which then Australia had to fix with help from the US...) going to help that issue? Especially if Gov't chooses not to purchase appropriate spares? Subs are large scale pieces of kit, unfortunately they are so complex and different even between variants of the same design that there is realistically no globaly supply chain that Australia could attempt to plug themselves into for logistical support, like can be done with US sourced aircraft like the SHornets, C-130, C-17, etc.

Also, sheer size of some of the components means that repair or replacement work is going to be long, complex and involved. If there is an engine failure, either the appropriate parts need to be brought into the proper machinery spaces through the various hatches to effect repairs, or the hull needs to be cut open to get the parts in or take the engine itself out. Even if all the needed parts are available, sitting in a warehouse right next to the dock, unless the issue is minor and only requires some parts and tools which one person can carry into the sub themselves, significant time is going to be required to effect repairs.

What really seems needed is for Australia to develope the critical mass in terms of numbers (units and personnel) and funding to sustain submarine construction, repair and modification. To that end, a number of people have suggested partnering with Japanese and/or Canadian allies since they have similar requirements for conventional submarines. An export order to Canada for the "Collins II" submarine, even they were sold Gov't to Gov't at cost, would be beneficial. Doing so would reduce the per sub development cost since there would be more units to amortize the development costs across the entire sub build. Also by increasing the number of subs built (assuming built in Oz) the yard and lines are kept open longer, providing sustainment work for the upskilled personnel.

However all of this requires funding an a commitment from Gov't, when often Gov't seems to make decisions based off what is good politically for whichever party is in power, as opposed to what is actually for Australia.

-Cheers

Seconding all of this. Why someone would bring up export is beyond me, Australia as far as I know has never expressed any interest in exporting submarines, has anyone seen anything saying otherwise? And the Type 214 is shy of the Collins by over 1000 tons, doesn't that suggest a significant difference in requirements? To say nothing of the fact that the Collins began its life as a relatively small European diesel-electric and it was its upscaling and modification to meet RAN requirements that caused so many of its initial problems, why on earth would Australia want to repeat that particular scenario?

There's a few things being said in this thread that don't make a great deal of sense when taken in the context of the Collins' history and Australia's requirements for a submarine...

 

[icelord]

As a "peace-loving nation" they also have very strict arms export rules that make it very difficult to buy or develop anything that may be used by non-Japanese armed forces.

Not to get all droll or controversial, but given the last decade Japan might have reason to think Australia would fail Principle Number Three. If they were going to get humourless about such things.

The quote is a self-description from the link, in case anyone thinks I was trying to be funny.

Not to mention the outcry from the RSL and Defence Association when the goverment mentioned closer training and excercises with Japan following our support for them in Afghanistan where our Diggers protected their engineers. If we declared a working group on a submarine, the political storm would make it sound like building one with china, Russia and Indonesia the easiest option...

Japan have been waiting on a stable government to look to remove the pacificist policy, or reduce it to allow more strategic thinking with nations other then the US(namely Aus). This could work, and you are right japan hold the same set of requirments that we do, and are even further away from a nuke sub then we are(if thats possible under ALP Govt.)

The issues at current are its Peace driven policy(with a "helicopter Destroyer"with 4 helo landing spots, its self determination to keep a majority of construction in japan, and our WW2 vets having this almost racist view towards japanese people to this day.
I can in some ways understand their mindset, if i went through the shit the Japanese Imperial Army did to me id forever hate them, but the japan moved on from this in 1945, and yet we punish them harder then the germans holocaust, which is a subject for another time in any case.

As much as working with the JSDF would be good for us, its a long way off for now.

 

[Sea Toby]

From WikiL
Type 214
displacement: 1.7k tones surface, 1.9k tonnes submerged
dimensions: 65m x 6.3m, 213 ft x 20 ft 8 in
complement: 27
range surface: 19.3k km, 12k nm @ 8 knots
range snorkel: n/a
range submerged: 780 km. 420 nm @ 4 knots
Collins
displacement: 3.0k tonnes surface, 3.3k tonnes submerged
dimensions: 77m x 8m, 254 ft x 26 ft
complement: 42 but now 58
range surface: 20k km, 13k nm @ 10 knots
range snorkel: 17k km, 9k nm @ 10 knots
range submerged: 890 km, 480 nm @ 4 knots

Value for your money. Spend $9 to $10 billion abroad or spend $36 to $40 billion in Australia for 12 new submarines. While Collins has more range overall, the Type 214 for a third of the price isn't awful. Notice half of the Collins crew for a Type 214.

If the Australian government held the view that submarines were vital there would be six crews for six submarines come hell or high water. I am not so upset a few subs aren't operable, but I am upset there aren't six crews for six subs.

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLC9OM0ocfQ"]Defence plans Collins class replacement - YouTube[/nomedia]

While the Type 214 is the latest German export sub, the Type 212 is their latest sub built for the German Navy.

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8QKbeS-flM"]Type 212 Most Advanced Submarine.mp4 - YouTube[/nomedia]

 

[gf0012-aust]

Seconding all of this. Why someone would bring up export is beyond me, Australia as far as I know has never expressed any interest in exporting submarines, has anyone seen anything saying otherwise?

Personal experience story.

I was contracting to an east coast company in 2000. We were approached by the Taiwanese as they had done business with them before supplying neutral density cable (there's a hint).

The company supporting the installation of the cable had also done similar work for a few allies and close friends.

So, the taiwanese approached us to sound out getting them in front of the Minister because they wanted to export them as a turnkey + using this companies acoustic mods. They also tried to get us to act as brokers in getting parts for their Mirages from any old stock remaining (Pakistan had acquired the best of it though and we never could have done that kind of job without jeopardising reputation etc....

They had also considered asking the Indians to partner up in a 209 build as they saw India acting as a counterbalance to PLAN aspirations. That one came to nought as well.

So australia didn't seek to export but we sure as heck were approached indirectly.

 

[alexsa]

From WikiL
Type 214
dis: 1.7 tones surf, 1.9 tonnes sub
dim......... view that submarines were vital there would be six crews for six submarines come hell or high water.

Defence plans Collins class replacement - YouTube

The stats are nice but they do not deal with battery capacity at a given speed and effective reach. Nor do they deal with space for systems, weapons and growth.

I suspect this is considerably more complex than you envisage.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

If the new submarine was to be an off the shelf European design there would be no need to buy more than four so acquisition savings would be much higher. Also sustainment savings per unit would be even higher because these boats would only be used for ASW training of the surface fleet. Because quite simply they could not carry out the core peacetime and wartime patrol missions required of a RAN submarine. Sure they could defend the Australian coastline from an invasion but since said invasion is about as likely as a civil war between League and AFL supporters it really shouldn’t be driving defence capability.

All these “ideas” for a European OTS submarine are predicated on some pretty crazy capability band aids to meet the RAN’s needs. Like forward basing, submarine tenders, refuelling during the mission and so on. All of which destroy the submarines number one capability: stealth. So while on paper a European OTS submarine might be able to carry out a RAN patrol mission it would do so without the surprise and survivability submarines derive from the other guys not knowing where the hell they are. Which makes their mission pointless because they won’t be able to gather intel and won’t survive against the ASW effort.

Quite simply it is a house of cards argument. That the RAN hasn’t yet being able to convince the Government of this indicates the extremes to which the Government is pushing efficiency dividends to try and save money rather than structural savings and the lack of effective communication from the DoD to the Govt. (which is a two way street for responsibility). Add in the various media pundits hunting headlines and the vendors hunting huge fees from European submarine builders and of course a fair swag of forum fools and you get the current debate.

 

[MrConservative]

As a "peace-loving nation" they also have very strict arms export rules that make it very difficult to buy or develop anything that may be used by non-Japanese armed forces.

Not to get all droll or controversial, but given the last decade Japan might have reason to think Australia would fail Principle Number Three. If they were going to get humourless about such things.

The quote is a self-description from the link, in case anyone thinks I was trying to be funny.

Look closely at paragraph 7 in MODA policy page link. You will see the exception clause relating to technology transfer with the United States due to the US-Japan Security agreement. This gives a template for a technology transfer agreement with Australia which also has its own recognised mutual security agreement with Japan.

If there was mutual benefit to do so - it is my opinion that under the emerging dynamic and flexible approach to Japanese defence policy espoused by revised 12/2010 National Defense Program Guidelines and PM Noda's defence outlook, a formal technology transfer agreement between AusGov and JGov is very doable within the constitutional, policy and administrative law architecture of Japan. The local Doves might try an Article 81 Judicial Review, but the “exception precedent” neatly sidesteps the handwringing over the Article 9 - 3 Principles paradigm.

Japanese administrative law and public policy per defence matters presents both restraints and opportunities. A future Aust-Japan agreement tying in at both the G2G and B2B project partnership level is in my view possible.

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

Look closely at paragraph 7 in MODA policy page link. You will see the exception clause relating to technology transfer with the United States due to the US-Japan Security agreement. This gives a template for a technology transfer agreement with Australia which also has its own recognised mutual security agreement with Japan.

Paragraph 7 says that the transfer of arms technology is considered the same as the arms themselves, with the exception being the US. From the wording, this exception is in place to enable joint development projects that use US and Japanese technology.
I suppose there is scope for the US to act as intermediary on a joint design, but I would imagine there would be legal safeguards in their agreement about passing the technology on to a third party. It would be odd if there wasn't.

There has been a thawing in Japan's attitude towards military co-operation on civil and non-proliferation issues, but I'm not sure that it has been enough for that last step to an arms transfer agreement. The only step that Japan has taken in this regard is the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement that deals specifically with logistical support in disaster relief and peace-keeping operations. That wouldn't and couldn't be extended to military co-operation in submarine (an offensive weapon) design.

I think the fact that the ACSA with Australia was the first such military-military co-operation agreement after the US says a lot about the relationship, but an arms agreement is IMO politically a step too far for a Japanese government. The agreement with the US would be seen domestically as a requirement of national (self) defence, an agreement with Australia could be seen as the thin edge of the "militaristic" wedge. It would take a Japanese government to really want it in order to make it happen. How much would they want it?

Looking at a joint submarine design from another angle, there would be other questions regarding whether it is desirable. If you look at Japanese weapons systems, there seems to be a large proportion of Japanese developed content (probably because of the Three Principles policy regarding arms technology transfer) and a preference for domestic development.
I'm going to ignore completely any quality aspect (I don't think that is in any way a profitable or worthwhile debate) and focus on cost. The Japanese seem to be willing to absorb huge development costs for domestic design and development of military components and systems. Acquisition costs don't really convey the full design, development, construction and implementation costs of a system and its components.

It is possible that a jointly developed SSK (almost typed SSN! :roll2) would cost more than a unique Australian Collins-replacement design. You could argue that the Australian version doesn't need to use the same systems as the Japanese version, with cheaper US or Euro systems used. Then I'm not certain where the cost savings and benefits of a joint design is going to come from.

 

[MrConservative]

I think the fact that the ACSA with Australia was the first such military-military co-operation agreement after the US says a lot about the relationship, but an arms agreement is IMO politically a step too far for a Japanese government.

The agreement with the US would be seen domestically as a requirement of national (self) defence, an agreement with Australia could be seen as the thin edge of the "militaristic" wedge. It would take a Japanese government to really want it in order to make it happen. How much would they want it?

Yes. A full wide scope JV development between JP and Aust would be unable to pass first base politically in Japan at present (and would not make sense $$$ wise for Aust at this stage as you correctly pointed out in your post), but tech transfer at the subset level within agreed parameters would get home if the mutual advantage presents itself - this because of the gravitas and maturity that has evolved within the relationship. Looking through the Japanese lense here - Australia informally is already Japans defacto second partner when it comes to Defence. That is quite a substantive position to be in.

The Japanese see Australia positively as a very good global citizen and recognise their close security relationship with the US. So I do not see a JP-Aust "exception" agreement per Para 7 as an overt militaristic development that would raise enough local ire to sink a JV project that was "comfortably" scoped. In fact on the strategic political management side of the equation, the Japanese Government with its aim of and steady progress towards defence "normalcy" - would see an agreement with Australia as the logical next step - even if it were only a symbolic gesture well within political comfort zones.

So maybe not a full monty JV building a new SSK together but a TechTrans agreement to work on and share project subsets - (SSK propulsion systems for example as they relate to the thread topic) that are scoped beyond dual use permits. The NDP Guidelines 12/2010 show that Japan is quite keen to head further down the JV route with somebody.

The growing Japan - Australia defence relationship is going to be really interesting to watch over the next 15 years. A Para 7 exception might not happen, but the relationship will be more synergetic. Especially if / when Article 9 is tweaked to give greater clarity and provide less mixed policy and interpretation messages.

Cheers MrC

 

[gf0012-aust]

The Japanese see Australia positively as a very good global citizen and recognise their close security relationship with the US. So I do not see a JP-Aust "exception" agreement per Para 7 as an overt militaristic development that would raise enough local ire to sink a JV project that was "comfortably" scoped. In fact on the strategic political management side of the equation, the Japanese Government with its aim of and steady progress towards defence "normalcy" - would see an agreement with Australia as the logical next step - even if it were only a symbolic gesture well within political comfort zones.

The japanese are actually quite keen to up the ante with australia.

 

[MrConservative]

The japanese are actually quite keen to up the ante with australia.

I am pleased you said that.

I did not want to go too far out on a limb and say that it was my "hunch" that the Japanese National Defence Guidelines from December 2010 were (to a certain degree) framed with Australia in mind (as well as a certain aircraft contest).

 

[StevoJH]

It is possible that a jointly developed SSK (almost typed SSN! :roll2) would cost more than a unique Australian Collins-replacement design. You could argue that the Australian version doesn't need to use the same systems as the Japanese version, with cheaper US or Euro systems used. Then I'm not certain where the cost savings and benefits of a joint design is going to come from.

First of all, Collins is an SSG rather then an SSK.

Second of all, why wouldn't Collins II require top of the line systems? As far as I'm aware from publicly available data, the combat system fitted to the Collins class is a varient of the CCS Mk.II (as fitted to LA class, Ohio class & Virginia class?) with modifications to 'speak' to the sensors fitted to Collins.

Thirdly, the cost savings and benefits of a joint design come from designing a single platform and (hopefully) systems integration, rather then paying for the development of two separate platforms and system.

 

[rip]

Yes. A full wide scope JV development between JP and Aust would be unable to pass first base politically in Japan at present (and would not make sense $$$ wise for Aust at this stage as you correctly pointed out in your post), but tech transfer at the subset level within agreed parameters would get home if the mutual advantage presents itself - this because of the gravitas and maturity that has evolved within the relationship. Looking through the Japanese lense here - Australia informally is already Japans defacto second partner when it comes to Defence. That is quite a substantive position to be in.

The Japanese see Australia positively as a very good global citizen and recognise their close security relationship with the US. So I do not see a JP-Aust "exception" agreement per Para 7 as an overt militaristic development that would raise enough local ire to sink a JV project that was "comfortably" scoped. In fact on the strategic political management side of the equation, the Japanese Government with its aim of and steady progress towards defence "normalcy" - would see an agreement with Australia as the logical next step - even if it were only a symbolic gesture well within political comfort zones.

So maybe not a full monty JV building a new SSK together but a TechTrans agreement to work on and share project subsets - (SSK propulsion systems for example as they relate to the thread topic) that are scoped beyond dual use permits. The NDP Guidelines 12/2010 show that Japan is quite keen to head further down the JV route with somebody.

The growing Japan - Australia defence relationship is going to be really interesting to watch over the next 15 years. A Para 7 exception might not happen, but the relationship will be more synergetic. Especially if / when Article 9 is tweaked to give greater clarity and provide less mixed policy and interpretation messages.

Cheers MrC

I do not see that Japan will strike any big close defense deals with Australia or anybody else and not because it doesn’t make good sense or that both countries are not in general alignment. The country that Japan needs to have a far better defense cooperation with is South Korea and until they can bridge that gap I do not see them making any major military alliances. This is not the thread to explore that problem. You do not need to be a genius to know that those two countries need each other and need to cooperate with each other military for the benefit of both of their's safety but so far the bad history between them has defeated the pursuit of their real best interests. Until Japan and South Korea can take the steps necessary to put their tragic past behind them, no other deals can be struck when the most obvious one is missing. It is a physiological bearer not an intellectual one.