where?
Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Additional ship to be purchased for humanitarian and disaster relief capability
they mention the Windermere but i read it as the third ship being entirely different
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Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Additional ship to be purchased for humanitarian and disaster relief capability
they mention the Windermere but i read it as the third ship being entirely different
I watched the Choules commissioning ceremony speech on channel 2/24 news TV, it was said a couple of times, so he didnt mis-speak, it is going to be based on the Windermere, it may be a different builder and ship, but similar specs and capability and delivered in 2012, so we will find out more very soon
it hasnt been uploaded yet http://video.defence.gov.au/#fe8056e5-6fae-4bad-8460-5e059171316a,0,DateAdded
so I dont know where it would be available to see today
it hasnt been uploaded yet http://video.defence.gov.au/#fe8056e5-6fae-4bad-8460-5e059171316a,0,DateAdded
so I dont know where it would be available to see today
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Channel 10 ran a puff piece on saying farewell to the seakings - and promptly showed footage of an army blackhawk (not even a seahawk!) crunching a ship.
morons...
morons...
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Channel 9 did show the right thing, the Sea Kings flying over Sydney Harbour.
Pitty the Navy couldn't find a way to keep them going a bit longer till the MRH90's were "actually" in service as their replacement.
Would have been nice to see Choules with a Sea King, or two, flying off the back for a while!!
We have the same but as this referred to Lloyds it is more likely Lloyds Class 100A1............... as in class notation. The first "100" relating to seagoing service, the nex albabetic A refers to accepted in accordacne with LR rules and the "1" realtes to rule requirements as Indicated earlier.
DNV use a different system where 1A1 is "1" relates to rule requirements, The the next alphabetic "A" to hull type, the next number to machinery etc
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
They likely could have been kept in service a bit longer... Having said that though, AFAIK they were at the point where what was required to keep them in service vastly outweighed the actual value of their service.
Not unlike why the F-14D Tomcat was retired from USN service which IIRC required something like 31 hours of maintenance per flight hour. At some point, someone in a position of authority needs to decide whether the operational risks and maintenance costs associated with operating helicopters which could be older than their pilots is really worthwhile or not. Given that other Sea King operators of similar vintage had started or already replaced their Sea Kings with newer helicopters, that would suggest that the costs were more than the service was worth.
-Cheers
Hell if the DoD can convince the government to remove naval auxillries from the nav act ............ good on them. it means the civilain regulator will not get involved in survey and certification and manning. Believe me when I say this woule be ther prefered option.Thanks for that, certainly a can of wormsappreciate the reply, evern though at best it is all hypothetical
By that I mean the potential Australian situation, not your reply lol
The draw back for Class is that the customer and flag are the same and you find that the may grant exemtions an extensions that fall outside class rules leading to concners about seaworthiness.
Hopefully with lessons learned, they will be "Available" at short notice if the need should arise ? I don't recall seeing anything with regards to their disposal as yet, but it would not be the first time I had missed something, or just skimmed over
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Yes the Government did announce, back in September, what they are doing with them, see link below:Hopefully with lessons learned, they will be "Available" at short notice if the need should arise ? I don't recall seeing anything with regards to their disposal as yet, but it would not be the first time I had missed something, or just skimmed over
Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence Materiel – Navy Sea King helicopters for sale
Basically, one airframe, Shark 07 will be kept by the FAA Museum.
The remaining 5 complete (maybe read that as flyable?) airframes, plus 3 spare airframes, simulator, spares, etc, are being offered for sale.
Maybe India or some Sth American country that operates Westland Sea Kings might pick them up, if they are at the right price of course.
Anyway, my point was just that it might have made sense to keep them in service till the MRH90's were finally ready.
From what I've had heard the Sea Kings, despite their age, were running well and the maintenance was good, after all the problems of ealier years which partly led to their replacement.
Oh well, hope we don't have another "natural" distaster to cope with here in Oz or the region in the new year and comming months!!
On the other hand..................if the LPA's had been in class (like Choules) and had complied with the Continuous Survey (Hull) inspection regimes, whether that be Lloyds, ABS, DNV etc, they would have never been allowed to reach the state of decay that they did.
Sometimes the extra diligence to inspection required by CLASS can thwart the govt of the days unwillingness to release appropriate funding whether that be for renewal or repair,
I understand they were in class but to modifed rules. Tobruk certainly was in Class, ................... it comes down to the authority you give class or if you listen to them. for civilian regulated vessel the flag state will require compliance with survey and inspection requirements, this give class quite a bit of pull with the owner/operator. If the owner/operators is also the flag it has the potential to bypass this safeguard.
In this sense the RFA model makes sense.
Anixtu
New Member
An interesting situation has arisen with the RFA's single hulled tankers. Lloyds were no longer willing to issue Certificates of Class for SHTs. The Lloyds survey and inspection routine remains, but they now issue a "class equivalent certificate" instead and I think, but I haven't seen the details, that the MCA now classes them as "Government Ships" as opposed to Class VII(T), a designation that I am not aware of having existed previously under the MCA regime. The alternative would have been that they become legally warships and entirely the responsibility of whatever system the RN uses in place of Flag and Class regulations. That latter option would have screwed up civilian manning as time spent on a "warship" is not legally "sea time" to a Merchant seaman and there is no existing system of administration for civilians to man a warship (contractor's sea trials excepted).
Indicative of the hoops the RFA has to jump through to avoid spending money on new ships!
Indicative of the hoops the RFA has to jump through to avoid spending money on new ships!
Tee_Centre_10
Member
Given the ideal situation would be to keep them in service until the MRH90s are ready, which is probably not too far away, maybe the airframes have run out of hours until a major inspection was required and a cost/benefit analysis came out against inspecting and overhauling the Sea Kings just to keep them for a few more operational hours.
Or they may have made a decision to retire the Sea Kings and allow the squadron to focus on the service entry of the MRH90s instead of splitting the squadron between maintaining the existing Sea King capability and transitioning to the MRH90.
Given the few operational missions the Sea Kings undertake that cannot be done by Seahawk/Blackhawk/Chinook, they may have decided the disruption to operations, maintenance and training wasn't worth maintaining the capability.
Unlike the LPHs, it isn't as if there aren't other helicopters in the ADF that can be utilised instead.
Or they may have made a decision to retire the Sea Kings and allow the squadron to focus on the service entry of the MRH90s instead of splitting the squadron between maintaining the existing Sea King capability and transitioning to the MRH90.
Given the few operational missions the Sea Kings undertake that cannot be done by Seahawk/Blackhawk/Chinook, they may have decided the disruption to operations, maintenance and training wasn't worth maintaining the capability.
Unlike the LPHs, it isn't as if there aren't other helicopters in the ADF that can be utilised instead.
ROFL! +1 on that:rotfl
Mind you perhaps you have forgotten the extensive debate on if choules should fly the red, blue, or white ensign for the trip to Oz!
You're right but; if you operate ships in the highly regulated international marine environment these issues require important consideration.
International labour organization (ILO) re seafarers, marine pollution regs (MARPOL), national unions eg Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) and of course class considerations all combine to make the introduction of a fleet train vessel (ie not a fighting ship) a regulatory minefield.
Luckily the Army can concentrate on more profession of arms matters most of the time.
OpinionNoted
Banned Member
Anybody got a video link showing the commisioning ceremony of hmas choules?
Coles' Review is very damning, he couldn't find anyone in charge and couldn't find anyone qualified to be in charge. He questioned whether there is a strategic rationale for operations.
Appears to me Australia needs to hire either a US or British submariner admiral to take charge of their submarine service. None of the admirals have sufficient submarine engineering knowledge. The submarine service require a Rickover type person in charge. And maybe more than one senior submariner engineer is needed.
No wonder there are so many problems with the Collins class. No Scotty, no operational submarines. On top of insufficient leadership, a third of the submarine crews have less than two years of service. Not enough experienced trained crews either.
I shall await the second part of his review. Much more is wrong than what is in the first review.
No offense, but putting an american or brit in charge of the sub service will do squat.
Having read the classified report, which also doesn;t cover off some of the fundamental issues.
subs were a political problem child from day one and both sides of politics have not provided the sustainment and support needed to keep the fleet active. a uniform cannot take it up to the govt and go for the chin, in the US we've seen a few recent examples where 2/3 stars have gone on permanent gardening leave for speaking out - its no different here
I'm not going to go over the entire history of the sub problem, but have lived this on and off through various jobs over the last 12 years.
The rickover model worked at the start of the cold war and under a very very different political climate - it would not work here or in the US today.
this is another glossed over report which ignores the fundamental issue that until there is a degree of bipartisanship the the subs will continue to be political footballs irrespective of whoever is in Govt.
The uniforms aren't the problem from the perspective of "taking charge". They serve the govt and they act at the direction of the govt. some retire in protest, but the others try to make a fist of it.
This is no different to US Dept of Commerce report done on sub building capability in both the US and UK and which was consistent in the message about good governance driving the behaviour of the services and of industry.
A well run submarine service don't get these ticks:
Key Findings
Phase 1 of the report identifies a range of key issues that need to be addressed:
Poor submarine availability caused by a crew shortfall, lack of spares and unreliable equipment;
A lack of cohesion in strategic leadership;
Department of Finance and Deregulation, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), Navy and Industry not working collectively as an “Enterprise”;
A lack of clarity around accountability, authority and responsibility;
Submarine knowledge thinly spread;
Lack of robustness of Navy’s contribution to manning and sustainment;
No long term strategic plan for efficient use of assets;
DMO seeking direct involvement at the tactical level;
A performance-based ethos not being embedded in ASC;
No long term strategic plan for efficient asset utilisation; and
Unclear requirement and unrealistic goals.
It doesn't appear to me there is any leadership sorting out the problems. Something is horribly wrong when the DMO is involved with tactics. I read this Coles review grading the RAN submarine service at a very low number out of ten, say as low as one...
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