NZDF General discussion thread

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Seeing you fellas are talking about naval helicopters ....

And seeing DWP is talking about either upgrading or replacing the Seasprites ....

On the assumption that upgrades and/or further Seasprite purchases will be ruled out (eg due to their comparative operating costs, the availability of spare parts etc) .... are we looking at the NFH-90 v MH-60R?

If NFH-90, would an issue be the integration of the helo combat systems with the RNZN ANZAC's combat systems? I believe the NFH-90 is being delivered to the Dutch and French navies. How much of an issue would the difference in the RNZN ANZAC's combat systems compared to the Dutch and French Frigates be - would NZ have to wear additional development costs?

The MH-60R may be easier to integrate, especially as seeing the RAN are now acquiring them.

Or how about another option rather than the above two instead - the AW159 Lynx Wildcat (Future Lynx) being developed for the RN? Smaller than a NFH-90 but packs a leathal ISR/EW and weapon fit. Some commonalites with the AW109LUH perhaps in terms of manufacturer support.

And as a spin-off, if a future DWP recommends RNZAF/NZArmy acquire a "battlefield reconnaisance and support" helo for close air support for the Army (esp. seeing that a fast-air type isn't likely), there is a "land" variant of the AW159 available .... Perfect for deployment in support of a busy NZ Army these days (alongside the AW109LUH in a mooted C&C role & the NH-90 troop transporter)? Would give the NZDF/RNZAF some credibility again with its coalition partners. ;)

AW159 | AgustaWestland
http://www.agustawestland.com/sites/default/files/brochures_new_product/AW159.pdf
http://www.agustawestland.com/system/files/brochures_new_product/LX090415_AW159_LoRes.pdf

I wonder if this type is a possibility with Defence planners?

Finally if anyone here wants to spend a few hours (or days) mixing and matching platforms with systems, take a gander at this helicopter handbook. (And please report back your findings) :D
http://www.groundsystems-index.com/images/2008homegsi/MHH08.pdf
 

treehuggingaj

New Member
Before you get all keen on throwing offensive weapons on the OPVs, IIRC they are built to civilian specs not naval combat specs. Even though I suggested in the RNZN thread a while back that a possible force mix could be 5 OPVs + 2 - 3 frigates, the OPVs would need to be built to milspec. Secondly the RNZN has crewing issues with problems crewing the vessels it has now, so that issue has to be addressed. Thirdly IMHO the NH90 would not be a viable option for the RNZN because it would not be consistent with RNZN operational requirements or needs.
Hey Bro,

I wasn't suggesting turning the OPV's into a frigate. I was just throwing the idea around that if they had some defensive systems and the NZDF got more choppers with better ASW capabilties, they are more than a Customs vessel. More offensive choppers means all helo capable ships can embark a chopper if the need arises. RE your piracy post, I agree that in their current fit out they are great for anti piracy ops. I never thought of them doing that! And when I first read their specs, I thought it was great they had the capability to take a platoon and their gear. Great for South pacific jobs. The only limitation is the amount of troops (5, IIRC) can go in the back of the Sprite. Might be OK when combined with a boat assault force however. Or use them as AFS while the boarding party assaults by boat.

^^ If, in the unlikely event this happens, it leaves 4 sprites back in NZ. Thats 3 for surge ops, assuming one in in deep level maintenance. Not sustainable. So, as any direct threat to NZ will more than likely come from Subs, I reckon they should get a full Squadron on ASW choppers.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Seeing you fellas are talking about naval helicopters ....

And seeing DWP is talking about either upgrading or replacing the Seasprites ....

On the assumption that upgrades and/or further Seasprite purchases will be ruled out (eg due to their comparative operating costs, the availability of spare parts etc) .... are we looking at the NFH-90 v MH-60R?

If NFH-90, would an issue be the integration of the helo combat systems with the RNZN ANZAC's combat systems? I believe the NFH-90 is being delivered to the Dutch and French navies. How much of an issue would the difference in the RNZN ANZAC's combat systems compared to the Dutch and French Frigates be - would NZ have to wear additional development costs?

The MH-60R may be easier to integrate, especially as seeing the RAN are now acquiring them.

Or how about another option rather than the above two instead - the AW159 Lynx Wildcat (Future Lynx) being developed for the RN? Smaller than a NFH-90 but packs a leathal ISR/EW and weapon fit. Some commonalites with the AW109LUH perhaps in terms of manufacturer support.

And as a spin-off, if a future DWP recommends RNZAF/NZArmy acquire a "battlefield reconnaisance and support" helo for close air support for the Army (esp. seeing that a fast-air type isn't likely), there is a "land" variant of the AW159 available .... Perfect for deployment in support of a busy NZ Army these days (alongside the AW109LUH in a mooted C&C role & the NH-90 troop transporter)? Would give the NZDF/RNZAF some credibility again with its coalition partners. ;)

AW159 | AgustaWestland
http://www.agustawestland.com/sites/default/files/brochures_new_product/AW159.pdf
http://www.agustawestland.com/system/files/brochures_new_product/LX090415_AW159_LoRes.pdf

I wonder if this type is a possibility with Defence planners?

Finally if anyone here wants to spend a few hours (or days) mixing and matching platforms with systems, take a gander at this helicopter handbook. (And please report back your findings) :D
http://www.groundsystems-index.com/images/2008homegsi/MHH08.pdf
Thanks mate I'll go and have a read. The MHH08 looks really good.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Hey Bro,

I wasn't suggesting turning the OPV's into a frigate. I was just throwing the idea around that if they had some defensive systems and the NZDF got more choppers with better ASW capabilties, they are more than a Customs vessel. More offensive choppers means all helo capable ships can embark a chopper if the need arises. RE your piracy post, I agree that in their current fit out they are great for anti piracy ops. I never thought of them doing that! And when I first read their specs, I thought it was great they had the capability to take a platoon and their gear. Great for South pacific jobs. The only limitation is the amount of troops (5, IIRC) can go in the back of the Sprite. Might be OK when combined with a boat assault force however. Or use them as AFS while the boarding party assaults by boat.

^^ If, in the unlikely event this happens, it leaves 4 sprites back in NZ. Thats 3 for surge ops, assuming one in in deep level maintenance. Not sustainable. So, as any direct threat to NZ will more than likely come from Subs, I reckon they should get a full Squadron on ASW choppers.
Most boardings are done by RHIBs so the helo is really only recon and maybe fire support in case needed. It's usually safer and easier to do a boarding from a RHIB or a couple of RHIBs than from a helo. You are just able to get more boots on deck a lot quicker. Also if boarding from a helo you have to worry about masts and other extraneous things that are hazardous to flying and the safety of those boarding from the helo.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Not quite topic but something for a laugh.
[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFrKzbgwgQs&feature=player_embedded"]Top Gun Spoof by 3D-Aviation. Boeing 787 vs. Airbus A380 - YouTube[/nomedia]
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
DomPost senior journalist Vernon Small reports on the NZPRT patrolling in the "uneasy" north-east part of the Bamiyan province where the people are predominantly Pashtun (as opposed to the mainly Hazara people of the province, who from most accounts appear to be comfortable with the ISAF presence guaranteeing the peace). The LAVIII's are featured in the accompanying video. Looks like the troops (well the ones interviewed) are happy to have the LAV's deployed.

NZ SAS Afghanistan Vernon Small | Stuff.co.nz

Note the reference to China extracting the coal and Do Abe's wealth increasing. Leaving aside yet another example of China doing well when the West guarantee the peace, I wonder what the future holds in this area in terms of extracting resources versus an area where insurgents can spill over from the neighbouring province? At the most basic level presumably the NZDF can look forward to potential tensions but then again would China buy off some of the tribes/warlords to protect its interests? Either prospect presumably wouldn't bode well for NZ which prides itself on being above corruption. I wonder if at the other end of the scale if the Hazarans find their neigbouring "enemy" tribes become flush with money and all that entails not boding well for them. Just some random thoughts - would be interested to hear what someone better attuned to the situation thinks.
 

Cadredave

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
DomPost senior journalist Vernon Small reports on the NZPRT patrolling in the "uneasy" north-east part of the Bamiyan province where the people are predominantly Pashtun (as opposed to the mainly Hazara people of the province, who from most accounts appear to be comfortable with the ISAF presence guaranteeing the peace). The LAVIII's are featured in the accompanying video. Looks like the troops (well the ones interviewed) are happy to have the LAV's deployed.

NZ SAS Afghanistan Vernon Small | Stuff.co.nz

Note the reference to China extracting the coal and Do Abe's wealth increasing. Leaving aside yet another example of China doing well when the West guarantee the peace, I wonder what the future holds in this area in terms of extracting resources versus an area where insurgents can spill over from the neighbouring province? At the most basic level presumably the NZDF can look forward to potential tensions but then again would China buy off some of the tribes/warlords to protect its interests? Either prospect presumably wouldn't bode well for NZ which prides itself on being above corruption. I wonder if at the other end of the scale if the Hazarans find their neigbouring "enemy" tribes become flush with money and all that entails not boding well for them. Just some random thoughts - would be interested to hear what someone better attuned to the situation thinks.
Hi Reece,
First of he (reporter) got it wrong in Do Abe the population there are Tajik not Pashtun they hate anyone including the Chinese, China is paying local contractors to provide for their protection and they are paying some serious coin to rebuild the local infrastructure. Has it helped short answer no when the SAS went in to the neighbouring province and delt with the local warlords for Tim ODonnel death all the tajik contractors took leave for the funerals then came back and attacked the chinese coal & roading projects for a bit of utu, it dont matter who you pay off up there blood bonds count.

The Hazarans are following a policy of educating all there people as they understand more than anyone that education will bring about a better life than what they currently have . Money talks in bamiyan and if your educated then you have access to some serious USAid or NGO coin now unlike in Do Abe where the coal mines are owned by individuals warlords who dont share.

End of the day you cant use the west perceptions of democracy & good governace for Afghanistan the closest country I can use to compare to Afghnistan is Paua New Guinea, tribal primitive and utterly corrupt without the fighting.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
MoD Evaluation Report No. 9/2011Maintenance of the Seasprite Helicopter

See: Evaluation report 9/2011 - Contents [Ministry of Defence NZ]

The MoD's Evaluation Division have undertaken a review of the maintenance and support arrangements for the NZDF’s Seasprite helicopter. In essence the report identifies a number of issues within the RNZAF that needs improvement and also advises to better coordinate its relationship with SAFE Air NZ (who also have a unique relationship with Kaman in terms of being a primary subcontractor). The support arrangement for the Seasprite is noted as being complex, for example "Kaman has not formally approved any Maintenance Repair and Overhaul organisations for the Seasprite" meaning that NZDF/SAFE are beholden to Kaman more than in comparision to other aircraft types/manufacturers.

The other main aspect reported on is the increasing unavailability of the Seasprite due to complex maintenance issues, which are exasperated by NZ now being the lead Super Seasprite (G model) operator & thus Kaman may not have recorded or off the shelf solutions to problems being encountered, thus additional delays are being caused whilst Kaman initiates a response/remedy.

Also noted is the lack of airframes for the NZG Outputs required of NZDF, personnel/posting issues (and time at sea), and the increased pressure to keep machines flying resulting in deferred maintenance and the vicious cycle being generated of thus increased time spent in maintenance (when the airframes get into the maintenance cycle) fixing many/complex/never before encountered problems.

(Meethinks from my reading between the lines, that NZG and Defence better sort this out before a Seasprite falls out of the sky due to unforseen situations arising).

To do this (as it's not noted in this report - the report concentrates on fixing the issues from a support perspective, which is fair enough & largely do-able but IMO not going to provide an everlasting solution ultimately), perhaps other options being considered elsewhere is increasing the airframes (to ensure maintaining the availability v maintenance balance, to reduce the flight hours to manage corrosion) or IMO the better option of retiring the Seasprites early and replacing them with a type in service with allied nations with a good support and upgrade path ahead, to leverage efficiencies and economies of scale etc. (It's also interesting the report, naturally, doesn't enter into VfM report territory whereby the VfM authors were critical of the Seapsrites operating costs compared to contemporary allied examples. So in essence both reports could ultimately see change as a result of different aspects studied)?

(Meethinks then a proven platform eg like the ADF's aquisition MH-60R may be sensible, rather than seek a yet-to-proven new type eg NFH-90 which doesn't have a service history yet. Just a thought, Defence will know better than me the available options etc).

Finally some interesting bits from the report:

Page 10 - 10
There are a number of significant issues that affect the state of the Seasprite fleet. These include:
a. only a small number of this aircraft have been produced. The five New Zealand aircraft are unique in a number of significant areas;
b. the arrival of the Protector ships, which has increased the number of ships able to operate Seasprites;
c. lengthy lead times for the supply of spares and engineering support from the manufacturer, Kaman;
d. the New Zealand aircraft are the only fully operational Seasprites and as a consequence have become the Seasprite fleet leaders;
e. the inability of the RNZAF to cope with the expanding time frames of Phase servicing as the aircraft have aged; and
f. some failures and inefficiencies in NZDF training and processes.

Page 18 - 1.7
The United States Navy operated earlier versions of the Seasprite but these were withdrawn from service in 2001, shortly after New Zealand acquired its aircraft. The SH-2G Seasprites purchased by New Zealand, Australia, Egypt and Poland are enhanced versions (known only by Kaman as “Super Seasprites”) of the last Seasprite version built for the United States Navy, also called the SH-2G Seasprite.2 There was sufficient commonality that, until 2010, the NZDF was able to utilise the United States Navy SH-2G simulator for flying training. However, that simulator has now been decommissioned.

1.13 The Inspectors General noted that other defence forces utilise significantly higher ratios of aircraft to ships. For example the Australian planning for its replacement maritime helicopter project indicates a ratio of three aircraft per expected embarked flight. The Royal Navy uses a ratio of 3.4 to 1. The comparable New Zealand ratio is 1.67 to 1. This suggested that the NZDF’s expectations for availability of the Seasprite force are unrealistic.

(Meethinks: this is also a typical NZ problem - another example of a small amount of airframes due to acquisition budget constraints, resulting in accelerated wear and tear and/or periodic unavailability eg think C-130, P-3, 2x ANZAC Frigates, Project Protector etc).

2.3 The New Zealand Seasprite fleet has flown more hours since manufacture or re-manufacture than any previous or current Seasprite fleet. The RNZAF also believes that its aircraft have been more extensively used at sea than by other operators. The New Zealand Seasprites are now nine years old. A consequence of the aircraft’s age and high usage is that new maintenance issues are arising that are beyond the experience of both Kaman and the Seasprite operator community. There is a need for the RNZAF to develop, in partnership with Kaman and SAFE, new solutions.

(Meethinks: I think they mean Super Seasprite - G model? Before a ex-USN person reading this statement takes offence, re: earlier Seasprite LAMPS models)!

2.33 The involvement of Kaman can cause significant delays. Increasingly, repairs are being required for areas where Kaman has not seen damage before and therefore does not have prepared repair documentation. In such circumstances it is not unusual to wait weeks for development of authorised repair regime, or for Kaman’s approval of a proposed solution.

2.34 A similar situation arises where the nature of the damage requires the purchase of parts not previously used. The RNZAF is finding that in such circumstances, Kaman often has no stocks, and no operator has previously ordered that item. This leads to delays whilst Kaman arranges for the manufacture of items long out of production.

2.35 As an example of the delays that can occur in obtaining a never-before ordered item, Kaman has told the RNZAF that there is a six month lead time for the production of a structural beam. This leaves the RNZAF with two choices:
a. halt the Phase service and delay the completion of that service; or
b. remove the same part from the next Seasprite inducted into Phase service (assuming the component is serviceable) and take the cost and time penalty of performing the removal and replacement work twice (once on each aircraft).

2.42 In 2009, Kaman advised the RNZAF that the Seasprites should receive a DLM every seven years. This appears to have coincided with the start of a combined DLM and upgrade programme developed by Kaman for the Egyptian Seasprites. The NZDF declined to adopt the programme due to the high cost (in the order of US$9 million per aircraft plus transportation costs to and from Kaman).

2.43 SAFE told us that the Egyptian DLM and upgrade was taking about ten months. However:
a. The Egyptian aircraft are understood to have an average total of 1,000 hours on each airframe – the slightly younger NZ aircraft average over twice that.11
b. The Egyptian aircraft are land based with significantly less salt water exposure than the New Zealand Seasprites.

2.46 The RNZAF regards corrosion as a significant factor in the problems currently faced by the Seasprite.

2.54 Servicing of main rotor blades has been one area of difficulty for the RNZAF. The rotor blades on the NZ Seasprites are a laminated construction made of carbon fibre. This was a feature designed for the Australian Seasprite and adopted by New Zealand. Other operators of the Seasprite, present and past, use conventionally constructed metal rotor blades.

3.1 The world-wide Seasprite fleet is small. Kaman does not hold large stocks of spares for the aircraft. When an item is not available from Kaman stock, Kaman arranges for manufacture of the quantity ordered. This is an expensive and time-consuming process, as the quantities required may be less than an economic order quantity. Many items may no longer be in production and the original manufacturer may not be willing to restart production.

3.2 Long lead times for the supply of spares from Kaman have been common. Lead times progressively worsened as the NZDF drew down Kaman’s spares holdings. Between 2006 and 2008, the NZDF completed some large spares and rotable buys to improve its own holdings.

3.3 Recently, the availability of spares has improved. Kaman has opened access to the spares package that it is selling on behalf of the Australians. This has led to a more acceptable level of service for some parts, but the improvement may be temporary. Much will depend on the progress of Kaman’s endeavours to sell the ex-Australian helicopters.

3.13 The value of Seasprite stocks exceeds $30 million for consumables and $60 million for rotables. The consumable holdings are a disproportionate 25% by value of the entire NZDF consumable inventory.13 This is a consequence of the large holdings, and the high cost of spares compared to other aircraft types currently in service. Kaman is also one of the top five NZDF spares suppliers ($12.5 million in 2009-2010). The true cost of spares procured from Kaman will be greater than that figure because it does not include spares purchased by SAFE directly.

4.3 Postings to a ship are not attractive to RNZAF personnel due to lengthy absences from Auckland. As a result, No 6 Squadron has an unusually high (in the RNZAF) directed posting rate – in excess of 50%. Sea service, which can involve six to eight months absence from Auckland in a year, is one reason why maintenance personnel are reluctant to apply for postings to No 6 Squadron.
* * * * * *

CD - just saw your reply above, thanks, that's very illuminating (good to have someone in the know like you comment)!
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
See: Evaluation report 9/2011 - Contents [Ministry of Defence NZ]

The MoD's Evaluation Division have undertaken a review of the maintenance and support arrangements for the NZDF’s Seasprite helicopter. In essence the report identifies a number of issues within the RNZAF that needs improvement and also advises to better coordinate its relationship with SAFE Air NZ (who also have a unique relationship with Kaman in terms of being a primary subcontractor). The support arrangement for the Seasprite is noted as being complex, for example "Kaman has not formally approved any Maintenance Repair and Overhaul organisations for the Seasprite" meaning that NZDF/SAFE are beholden to Kaman more than in comparision to other aircraft types/manufacturers.

The other main aspect reported on is the increasing unavailability of the Seasprite due to complex maintenance issues, which are exasperated by NZ now being the lead Super Seasprite (G model) operator & thus Kaman may not have recorded or off the shelf solutions to problems being encountered, thus additional delays are being caused whilst Kaman initiates a response/remedy.

Also noted is the lack of airframes for the NZG Outputs required of NZDF, personnel/posting issues (and time at sea), and the increased pressure to keep machines flying resulting in deferred maintenance and the vicious cycle being generated of thus increased time spent in maintenance (when the airframes get into the maintenance cycle) fixing many/complex/never before encountered problems.

(Meethinks from my reading between the lines, that NZG and Defence better sort this out before a Seasprite falls out of the sky due to unforseen situations arising).

To do this (as it's not noted in this report - the report concentrates on fixing the issues from a support perspective, which is fair enough & largely do-able but IMO not going to provide an everlasting solution ultimately), perhaps other options being considered elsewhere is increasing the airframes (to ensure maintaining the availability v maintenance balance, to reduce the flight hours to manage corrosion) or IMO the better option of retiring the Seasprites early and replacing them with a type in service with allied nations with a good support and upgrade path ahead, to leverage efficiencies and economies of scale etc. (It's also interesting the report, naturally, doesn't enter into VfM report territory whereby the VfM authors were critical of the Seapsrites operating costs compared to contemporary allied examples. So in essence both reports could ultimately see change as a result of different aspects studied)?

(Meethinks then a proven platform eg like the ADF's aquisition MH-60R may be sensible, rather than seek a yet-to-proven new type eg NFH-90 which doesn't have a service history yet. Just a thought, Defence will know better than me the available options etc).

Finally some interesting bits from the report:



* * * * * *

CD - just saw your reply above, thanks, that's very illuminating (good to have someone in the know like you comment)!
A very interesting read and I'll without reservation withdraw my earlier comments on MH60R suitability for RNZN. After reading above methinks that MH60R would be most sensible option for shipboard ops with say 10 aircraft instead of 5. I would also think that NZG should try and tack buy on end of ADF buy for RAN if at all possible. Ideally if NZG bought MRH60R should be to same specs as RAN aircraft for obvious reasons. Just my thoughts.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
A very interesting read and I'll without reservation withdraw my earlier comments on MH60R suitability for RNZN. After reading above methinks that MH60R would be most sensible option for shipboard ops with say 10 aircraft instead of 5. I would also think that NZG should try and tack buy on end of ADF buy for RAN if at all possible. Ideally if NZG bought MRH60R should be to same specs as RAN aircraft for obvious reasons. Just my thoughts.
One thing which IMO is needed is an actual determination, both for current and future projected deployment use of naval helicopters.

I say this because, while I think there would be a benefit to both the NZDF and ADF for there to be ten MH-60R 'Romeos' flying with the Kiwi roundel, there would be a significant cost for them (purchase and ongoing) as well as issue with the NZDF being able to fully utilize them.

People, please feel free to jump in and comment if I start to sound like a broken recording, repeating the same things over and over again or otherwise start to go off the rails...

At present, there are five RNZN ships which can take one or more helicopters. As we all should already know, these are the two frigates, the two OPVs and Canterbury. However, the two OPVs cannot support combat operations from naval helicopters, as the OPVs lack a helicopter magazine in the hangar. I am not certain if that was a design oversight, a deliberate choice in the tender, or a limitation imposed by the level of programme funding... Between that, and the fact that they are OPVs which means much of the more advanced shipboard electronics and datalinks are usually absent, the combat and more advanced surveillance functions of the MH-60R would not be used when deployed aboard the OPVs. Also, there is the potential issue of the MH-60R 'fitting' into the OPV hangar. As the RAN has apparently already found out, the NFH-90 just barely fit into an ANZAC hangar, with the fit tight enough to make shipboard support functions problematical. The MH-60R might face the same sort of issue aboard the smaller OPVs.

Canterbury might have a similar issue with respect to a hangar magazine, as well as the comms facilities to make use of the surveillance capabilities of a 'Romeo'. And this concern just involves the current makeup of the RNZN.

Whatever path gets chosen, consideration also needs to be given for the RNZN of the future, whatever that will be. Many of us here have advocated for a return to a three or better, four frigate navy, in order to properly meet needed training, maintenance and deployment requirements, as well as having some capability in 'reserve'. There is also the replacement for the Endeavour, which likely should have at least a helipad and tent, if not a full hangar. This would allow Endeavour to conduct heli-assisted RAS, as well as act as a helicopter ferry to deployments.

The other issue which really, really needs to be addressed, is Gov't again being such a skinflint that the minimum amount of funding is allocated to a programme or project, with such a broad range of requirements. Naturally resulting in something which is barely adequate for the task(s) and typically unsuited for situations or operations outside of what the tender covered. All the while Gov't collectively patting themselves on the back about how much 'tin' they saved the taxpayer because they were able to get capability xyz for some amount, instead of getting something more capable which would have the flexibility to be re-purposed if needed.

-Cheers
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
One thing which IMO is needed is an actual determination, both for current and future projected deployment use of naval helicopters.

I say this because, while I think there would be a benefit to both the NZDF and ADF for there to be ten MH-60R 'Romeos' flying with the Kiwi roundel, there would be a significant cost for them (purchase and ongoing) as well as issue with the NZDF being able to fully utilize them.
Totally agree. As the report reminds us the original brief was for 5 a/c, of which to embark 3 upon the 3 Frigates the RNZN operated when the SH-2G was acquired in 2001, a 4th helicopter in NZ for training, SAR, and other local tasks. The 5th helicopter would be undergoing extended maintenance. (See report pg 18 para 1.9).
That gives the ratio of 1.67 a/c to 1 embarked flight. Compared with the RAN's ratio of 3 to 1, if NZDF were to match that then in 2001 it should have acquired 9 SH-2G's to allow 3 embarked flights .... however on the other hand it appears again from the report that there wasn't an expectation to have 3 Frigates at sea concurrently - 2 Frigates would be more likely and in that case perhaps one could argue that 6 SH-2G's would be the absolute minimum number required. If so, then definitely the acquistion was 1 short if the NZDF were funded sufficiently to follow the ADF ratio.

If the Govt (or the Treasury etc) back around the early 2000's was relying on only 2 Frigates being operational (not 3) at one time to justify the 5 a/c, then further justified the 5 a/c (by not acquiring a 6th airframe) when the then change in Govt announced it would not replace the 3rd Frigate when she decomissioned in 2005, surely this arguement would be shot down by the fact that the intended 3rd Frigate replacement was supposed to be a large multi-purpose patrol vessel/MRV capable of carrying a helicopter. In other words the RNZN was (and did) expect to continue to operate 3 helo capable vessels (2 Frigates and 1 MRV aka sealift ship, Canterbury) & it would be more likely that in this instance all 3 vessels could be at sea at once. So clearly, back in the early-mid 2000's as Project Protector commenced, the NZDF were at least 1 SH-2G short (as many of us here commented upon in recent years).

Then as the report goes on to say the 2 helo capable OPV's were acquired (but with no increase in a/c numbers). But quite remarkably for some reason the report says the (NZG) expectation was to still only maintain the 3 embarked flights - 1 Frigate, 1 on Canterbury and 1 OPV. This is just nonsense (NZG - not report authors) as we've just witnessed (in 2011) both Frigates at sea together recently on exercise in Australian & SEA waters, and both OPV's at sea together. There's clearly not enough airframes and the big mystery is why wasn't this addressed during Project Protector? (Rhetorical question I suppose, as the answer was the last administration had their head in the sand when it came to realities. It looks like this administration will address this issue but at a glacial pace along with everything else).

At present, there are five RNZN ships which can take one or more helicopters. As we all should already know, these are the two frigates, the two OPVs and Canterbury. However, the two OPVs cannot support combat operations from naval helicopters, as the OPVs lack a helicopter magazine in the hangar. I am not certain if that was a design oversight, a deliberate choice in the tender, or a limitation imposed by the level of programme funding... Between that, and the fact that they are OPVs which means much of the more advanced shipboard electronics and datalinks are usually absent, the combat and more advanced surveillance functions of the MH-60R would not be used when deployed aboard the OPVs. Also, there is the potential issue of the MH-60R 'fitting' into the OPV hangar. As the RAN has apparently already found out, the NFH-90 just barely fit into an ANZAC hangar, with the fit tight enough to make shipboard support functions problematical. The MH-60R might face the same sort of issue aboard the smaller OPVs.

Canterbury might have a similar issue with respect to a hangar magazine, as well as the comms facilities to make use of the surveillance capabilities of a 'Romeo'. And this concern just involves the current makeup of the RNZN.
The OPV (and Canterbury) hangers was designed to be the same size (and replicate) the ANZAC Frigates, according to the last administration & Defence. So if a Seahawk or "Romeo" can fit in a RAN ANZAC hanger, which the Seahawk does, then it will fit in the RNZN OPV and Canterbury in theory.

In terms of retaining the Seasprite (and undertaking a MLU around 2015 as per DWP), there are some advantages to keeping them.

Firstly in terms of the MoD report the CDF stated "Many of the report’s recommendations are already in the process of being implemented. A number are more complex and will take time to investigate before informed action can be taken". So we can assume this means solutions to the "engineering issues" are being addressed whilst the "supply issues" are being assessed (with SAFE & Kaman etc). Ditto "personnel issues" (although it appears to me that there isn't enough technical staff & there's no indication that this should be addressed, simply training, posting cycles and administration arrangements between shore and sea areas. One thing I don't understand is why personnel leave after 3 years - to be extended to 4 years - do they move to another squadron like no3 Huey/NH-90? This doesn't make sense for an organisation to train people and let them go so soon. Perhaps it was a sweeping comment in the report and some personnel stay longer and/or if promoted etc)?

The second advantage is that the Seasprite is now a known platform, procedures & training regimes have been put into place, and a range of personnel have experience with the platform from aircrew to maintainers etc. In other words, no upheavels mean business as usual and the platform is certified etc. The Seasprite has been (and is) a good helo for the RNZN, it works and has provided valuable service from Frigates operating around NZ, down to Antarctica, north to SEA and westwards into the Gulf i.e. in hot and cold conditions! (Even the interim SH-2F's were useful in ET in 1999 tracking Indonesian surface vessels according to the historical account of NZDF in ET).

The third advantage is, the Seasprite in some respects is ideal for use on the OPV's and Canterbury. Whilst these class of vessel may not be warships with the appropriate weapon magazines fitted and comms/sensors etc, at least these vessels get a good survellience and utility helo to extend the awareness of the vessels in the EEZ patrol, CT & PSI (proliferation security initiative) role. In other words I'd rather the NZG allow the NZDF have the Seasprite than say a Squirel or even AW109 etc, with a lesser sensor suite.

The 4th advantage is, there have been murmurs the NZG is considering acquiring the ex-ADF Seasprites (dirt cheap from Kaman) meaning NZDF will have attrition airframes and spares, but also additional airframes for the new vessels recently (and to be) commissioned.

On the other hand clearly there are disadvantages with retaining the Seasprites.

As the report notes, NZ is the lead operator for an a/c type that is no longer in service with the USN and there are not many examples flying (and the last simulator has been decomissioned). There is severe risk here for the NZG/NZDF. Then there are the corrosion issues ...

The other disadvantage is the ADF experience whereby $1B was pumped into their fleet which never entered service. Why would the NZG think NZ would not end up in the same predicament when clearly Kaman don't give a rats arse? What I mean is if the NZG enter into a MLU around 2015 what's to say there won't be similar issues integrating new technology into a small airframe and which has not been attempted before? Also presumably the ex-ADF airframes will need some expenditure to remove some ADF specific systems that NZDF won't require?

The real concern I have is even if a basic MLU is successful (at which point the SH-2G is approx 15 years old, then from previous experience the NZG will expect at least another 15 years life out of them (2030-2031). They have to be kidding if they think they will last that long when already there are issues with getting support from Kaman. But knowing NZG's and Treasury that will be the expectation.

So I say, sure perhaps upgrade them at the MLU point and possibly acquire additional airframes, but only as an interim measure until say 2020 (but a 5 year MLU life? That's not normal for NZ) & replace with a new type around 2020.

Or better still acquire a new type in 2015 for the Frigates (but consider keeping the Seasprites flying off the OPV's i.e. a two-tier fleet ... but that will have support/training overhead headaches for a small defence force with limited personnel and resources).

Or much better still, bite the bullet at 2015 and replace the Seasprite entirely with a new type. Now whilst the "Romeo" appears attractive in many ways (eg compatibility with ADF/USN in terms of support/training & has upgrade path which NZ can leverage off etc), the Treasury will squeal like pigs being roasted alive at the cost to buy the 10-15 or so airframes (or by then RNZN will have 7 helo capable ships, if the RAN ratio was followed then NZ would need 21 Romeos), so here's a thought, would it be possible to operate a "mixed" Romeo fleet? Eg say 6 Romeos purchased for the 2 Frigates (2 in use, 2 for training/standby, 2 in phase maintenance) with the full sensor/weapon integration fit out a la RAN but also another 6-8 or so or more Romeos "fitted for but not with" the full sensor/weapon suite, which would never be needed for the OPV, Canterbury and replacement JSS & LWSS (apart from the search radar & data links for networked SA etc)? The clear advantage here is the one type to simplify support and training etc, and the one type to allow interoperability with the ADF. I'm saying this in recognition that the sensors etc, are the items that blow out the costs of a/c (and ships etc). The other advantage is, the FFBNW types could be upgraded (i.e. modules acquired and plugged in) if for whatever reason occurred that justified them eg purchase of additional future Frigates (or OPV sensors upgraded in the future, which has been signalled etc). I have no idea if this is realistic in terms of bringing costs down but I do hope Defence is investigating this possibility. :)
 

chis73

Active Member
Rather than considering a Romeo buy, I would suggest additional NH90s (say 4) for the Endeavour replacement (& Canterbury?) - their primary need is for VERTREP, so the bigger the helo the better. These NH90s could perhaps be navalised TTH models (with auto folding rotor & tail, deck harpoon, but no radar or ASW kit) rather than the full NFH model, to reduce cost. I believe the Italian Navy (Marina Militare) has TTH models like this on order. NZDF's primary concern is to keep the number of helo types in service down to no more than three (AW109, Seasprite & NH90). We already have a 10-ton class helo, I can't see NZDF getting another in the same class.

It would seem that the end is nigh for Seasprite (you would think that if Kaman believed it had a future they would be doing their darnedest to keep their existing customers happy).

I think a 5-ton class helo is the most appropriate naval helo option for NZDF. It's small enough to operate from the OPVs and cheaper to run than a 10-ton Romeo. It definitely needs to be a proper naval helo though (ie definitely not an AW109)

AW159 Lynx Wildcat is the most promising of the replacement options, but it is still a few years away from operational service, and a sizeable portion of it's potential customer base of Lynx users has largely upsized to the NH90. I don't think we should look at buying AW159 until at least 2018-2020. We could look at also getting some Army models as Huey replacements (the 6? operational NH90s are just not going to be enough, and too expensive for many jobs, while AW109 is just too small).

I don't think the original Lynx / Super Lynx would be a sensible option by 2015. Panther / Dauphin is another unlikely option I suppose. Both are near the end of their run, and would just continue the kind of support issues we are currently seeing.

So the question is, can Seasprite hold out to 2018? If the answer is no, look to lease Lynx / Panther/Seahawk in the interim - much like we did with the SH-2F.

Chis73
 
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recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Agreed, the Navy requires two different operational types (at the very least), with the advent of the sealift vessel (and forthcoming replacement support vessels).

I wonder how set in stone is the requirement for the NZDF to operate only three types? I'd imagine if there is such a requirement, then as usual Defence will be made to make something work, which ultimately won't (and conveniently be flogged in the media and by the politicians whilst not acknowledging Defence were simply carrying out what was tasked of them to do - fit a square box into a round hole by the powers that be).

The "three type" scenario only (just) works for the NZDF prior to 2007 (Canterbury commissioning).

(Incidentally the ADF went through a similar exercise to rationalise their types a few years ago .... but then found it wasn't possible to achieve the aims asked of them. Thankfully for the ADF common sense prevailed and their pollies backtracked .... but possibly only after their hand was forced eg Seasprite cost blowout & MRH-90 delays etc. That said it doesn't appear to be fully plain sailing yet, they appear to be having issues with getting sign-off on the smaller type replacements etc).

The Defence Reviews shows up the "two-type" scenario expected of the RNZAF/Army isn't optimal (AW109 & NH-90). Something in-between is needed there (let alone something larger that I feel NZDF requires eg CH-47F).

For the RNZN they still need the traditional Frigate helicopter but now they also require something much less advanced for the support vessels, as you identify above.

Although not signalled in the DWP for acquisition, could a potential inbetween type for RNZAF/Army also be suitable for the RNZN support vessels? That is, something in the 5-6 ton range as you suggest? (Incidentally apart from a hypothetical new in-between type there is already an example there - the Seasprite, if additional airframes are aquired. I also recall Kaman advertising in NZ only 3-4 years ago suggesting the Seasprite in a sea/land support role).

Or would Govt want to keep it simple and spend more on additional NH-90 TTH's for the support vessels? This might have some appeal in terms of not introducing another type (eg an in-between type) with the associated overhead costs (and at the end of the day for Defence it is still a positive outcome) .... despite perhaps Defence actually requiring an in-between type to provide its services optimally.

So that's probably the scenario/dilema for the support vessel type.

Which leaves the Frigate type to sort - Seasprite upgrade or replacement? Whatever path is chosen, I'm now of the thinking the OPV's should get exactly the same type as the Frigates for commonality, training and backup etc (and that is the delineation point, not the entire Protector fleet as a whole v the Frigates that I was suggesting before). Putting aside a Seasprite upgrade (which is possible), if it happened to be something like a Romeo or future Lynx Wildcat etc then whilst the OPV's won't utilise the full capabilities of these advanced helos, for maintainers, pilots etc there are efficiencies using the same type for the small NZDF. Again perhaps 2-3 examples of the overall package of 6-8 may be FFBNW ideal for the OPV's and the shore based training role. After all when embarked on an OPV & when undertaking basic pilot/crew training/conversion at base they won't need dipping sonar, missiles and other associated high end fit out - simply the airframe and some sensors (and MG) for operating safely at sea etc. Interesting times ahead for Defence.
 

htbrst

Active Member
Excellent couple of post's recce.k1!

With the recent decommissioning of the SH-2 simulator - does that mean it could be on the market ? Such a purchase could reduce the hours required on the fleet.

Also, I wonder if there are any USN SH-2G's sitting in storage ready for purchase to reduce to spares - I don't think they had too many hours prior to retirement
 

wrs

Banned Member
Excellent couple of post's recce.k1!

With the recent decommissioning of the SH-2 simulator - does that mean it could be on the market ? Such a purchase could reduce the hours required on the fleet.

Also, I wonder if there are any USN SH-2G's sitting in storage ready for purchase to reduce to spares - I don't think they had too many hours prior to retirement
Has every one forgotten about the perfectly servicible SH-2H machines that the RAN ditched and are now in a warehouse somewhwere?
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Has every one forgotten about the perfectly servicible SH-2H machines that the RAN ditched and are now in a warehouse somewhwere?
Nope but there are significant differences between the two. For example the RNZN Seasprites have composite blades whereas the ex-RAN are metal. If RNZN / RNZAF were to buy the ex RAN aircraft then to all intents and purpose would be adding another type to mix. IMHO not worth the effort given that the RNZAF already having problems sourcing spares ex Kaman now. If we were to pursue the Seasprite path we would end up in same position in a similar or sooner time frame.

@htbrst IIRC SH-2G(NZ) is NZ specific aircraft.

Addition: This is the Seasprite story as per Stuff / Sunday Star Times today: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/5519106/Navy-battles-rust-on-helicopters
 
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recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Also, I wonder if there are any USN SH-2G's sitting in storage ready for purchase to reduce to spares - I don't think they had too many hours prior to retirement
Apparently 24x SH-2G's were built for the USN (from Wiki) and 16 were operational from 1993 to 2001 (from naval-technology).

Although the MoD report says:

Twelve were built for the USN between 1997 and 2001 – six were new and six were rebuilds. Ten of these aircraft were acquired by Kaman and rebuilt as part of the Egyptian, Polish and Australian fleets, one was lost, and one is still owned by the USN. (source: Kaman production list and USN records.)

Whatever the true situation is, there are at least some options out there in terms of parts.

What do you think about the other parts of the MoD report? For example on the engineering support side the suggestion of a closer working relationship with SAFE Air?

Wouldn't that make strategic sense to firm this relationship up? After all they are also involved in supporting other aircraft maintenance and upgrade projects.

May also be useful to build-up for when the NH-90's come along etc?

Should the Seasprite maintenance shift to Ohakea where the specialised hangers and workshops are being built? And where there already is a critical mass of helo technicians etc?

Should Govt build extra workshop accomodation at some or all 3 main airbases for private contractor support? To entice the likes of Safe, Hawker Pacific, LM etc, to setup. Be great for those retiring from the RNZAF to take up civilian employment close on hand (and also help retain & pass on institutional knowledge etc ... and also help provide a Reserve Pool of maintainers should operational tasks require some form of backup for the regulars on base etc)?
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Whatever the true situation is, there are at least some options out there in terms of parts.

What do you think about the other parts of the MoD report? For example on the engineering support side the suggestion of a closer working relationship with SAFE Air?

Wouldn't that make strategic sense to firm this relationship up? After all they are also involved in supporting other aircraft maintenance and upgrade projects.

May also be useful to build-up for when the NH-90's come along etc?

Should Govt build extra workshop accomodation at some or all 3 main airbases for private contractor support? To entice the likes of Safe, Hawker Pacific, LM etc, to setup. Be great for those retiring from the RNZAF to take up civilian employment close on hand (and also help retain & pass on institutional knowledge etc ... and also help provide a Reserve Pool of maintainers should operational tasks require some form of backup for the regulars on base etc)?
I think that what you have listed above would be a very wise course of action. After all Safe Air had a relationship with No 1RD when it was alive at Woodbourne. As identified in the report corrosion skills, that were taught and utilised at 4TTS and 1RD, were lost in the subsequent restructurings and now have to be relearned and bought back into the training. Although I am no techie, considering the environment that the RNZAF operates in and where NZ is situated, one would think that corrosion, especially salt water corrosion would be a basic skill that was nurtured and kept very current.

Building on that relationship I think that it could be attractive for others to maybe move to or setup at Woodbourne. The area has attractions other than the aviation side that would be conducive to attracting personnel. For example the vineyards, the Marlborough Sounds for diving fishing, sailing, boating etc. It is not far to Wellington nor for that matter Christchurch. Omaka, which is IIRC about 8km from Woodbourne, arguably has one of the best WWI flying aviation collections in the world. Housing is reasonably affordable as well.

If it keeps retired service techies in the business and there is a strong relationship between Safe Air, the RNZAF, and any other aviation companies who set up at Woodbourne, the skills and the knowledge that the long timers have within the trades, won't be lost and can be passed on to the young ones coming through. That way you get the best of both worlds. Techies getting out and being able to work in the same, or a very similar, environment and not having to leave the district. Plus their knowledge is being passed on so the RNZAF doesn't lose them totally.
Should the Seasprite maintenance shift to Ohakea where the specialised hangers and workshops are being built? And where there already is a critical mass of helo technicians etc?
Not sure. I think maybe for major checks short of MLUs but you still need the complete skill set and knowledge on 6 Sqn at Whenuapai. That is another problem and a really big question. Is is economically, operationally, technically and fiscally responsible to actually do a MLU upon an aircraft that is proving difficult to support; is obvious that there are not enough for what is now being required nor what will be required in the future; and is not possible to obtain extra aircraft of the same type?

IMHO the answer is no and that NZDF needs to look for a replacement as has been suggested somewhere in between the size of the NH90 and the A109. Something that will fill the role that the Seasprite does now but that the RNZAF doesn't end up being the lead operator of nor end up being an orphan. Secondly, I think it needs to be an aircraft that also can fill the roll of a light - medium attack, a la AW159, which can do both land and marine roles in the one airframe, being modular. However as Recce stated earlier in this topic, the AW159 Wildcat is not operational yet and we don't want to end up being the lead operator. I think that he has the right idea of leasing, say Super Lynxs or similar, until the Wildcat came online and the bugs had been worked out by the lead operators.

With regard to numbers, considering that at present the RNZN has 5 flight decks that all could be operational at the same time, then a minimum of 10 aircraft - 8 flyable and 2 spares. However, as I have mentioned on the RNZAF thread, we do have a need for some form of CAS and the Wildcat could fit the bill. My idea is that whatever is used would have to be marinised so that it can operate at sea, as well as on land, giving it greater utilisation and flexibility. In that case the number of aircraft required would have to be closer to 20 all up. I had looked at the Eurocopter Tiger (US$39 - 42 million) they are not much cheaper than F16s (US$44 million) so not much chance there. IIRC the Wildcat is US$26.4 million per unit.
 

Lucasnz

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I don't think this has been raised, but one of the reasons for the buying the Sea Sprite over the Lynx (Besides Australia) is the greater lift capability Sea Sprite offered. With the NH90 offering better lift the suggestion to acquire the Wildcat is the best option going forward.

Back to the travels.
 
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