British army Mission Command and German Aufstragtaktik

[STURM]

Currently reading a book writtten by a former British army CGS. The author mentions that Mission Command type orders were introduced in the 1980's. Are there any major differences with the British army's Mission Command and the German Aufstragtaktik, first introduced in WW1 and widel practised in WW2? Are similiar Mission Command type orders a standard part of the doctrine of all NATO armies?

 

[Waylander]

Without contributing much to the question at hand the right word is Auftragstaktik and not Aufstragtaktik.

At least the Dutch and Danish practice a similar kind of Auftragstaktik like we do.

 

[STURM]

Without contributing much to the question at hand the right word is Auftragstaktik and not Aufstragtaktik.

At least the Dutch and Danish practice a similar kind of Auftragstaktik like we do.

Thanks . I've always had problems with my German.

I just find it strange that Mission Command/Auftragstaktik was introduced by the Brits only in the 80's. Then again, it may not be that surprising given that it was never part of their doctrine. In the book 'Not mentioned In Despatches' by Spencer Fitz-Gibbon [which I haven't bought but have read the review] the author is of the opinion that the lack of Auftragstaktik and reliance on outdated, unflexible mission type orders by the Brits, almost led to disaster at Goose Green. No surprises thtough that Auftragstaktik is still practised by the German army.

 

[riksavage]

Thanks . I've always had problems with my German.

I just find it strange that Mission Command/Auftragstaktik was introduced by the Brits only in the 80's. Then again, it may not be that surprising given that it was never part of their doctrine. In the book 'Not mentioned In Despatches' by Spencer Fitz-Gibbon [which I haven't bought but have read the review] the author is of the opinion that the lack of Auftragstaktik and reliance on outdated, unflexible mission type orders by the Brits, almost led to disaster at Goose Green. No surprises thtough that Auftragstaktik is still practised by the German army.

Lack of flexibility at Goose Green had more to do with Col. H Jones obsessive micro management style. His orders were extremely detailed and complex with six complex phases, which left some in his O Group confused. Once the rounds started flying however individual company/platoon/section commanders responded accordingly and were pretty flexible in dealing with a much larger defending force.

You also have to remember Goose Green was a diversionary raid (it could have been isolated and left alone - zero strategic value in the drive to Stanley) and no one anticipated there would be 1200 Argentine combatants and assorted bottle washers at the settlement. The Para's ability to adapt on the ground to a larger enemy than briefed is a testament to individual leadership and flexibility, not rigidity and blinked fixation with an original plan given prior to crossing the start-line.

Officers did later openly confess (with hindsight) they should have brought along the Scorpions/Scimitars and place an additional battalion in reserve. But at the end of the day UK casualties were relatively low considering the ratio of attacker to defender, plus the battle had a huge physiological impact on the Argentines will to win.

Listen to the audio book 'Forgotten Voices of the Falklands War' available on Amazon - the interviews with the Company Commanders who took part include some very telling observations about H Jones management style - autocratic to say the least. The reason he was killed is because he felt one of is Company OC's was not advancing at a rate acceptable in his eyes hence he opted to lead from the front.

 

[riksavage]

repeated post by accident, content deleted.

 

[STURM]

Lack of flexibility at Goose Green had more to do with Col. H Jones obsessive micro management style. His orders were extremely detailed and complex with six complex phases, which left some in his O Group confused.

So the question to be asked is whether H. Jone's style of command was endemic to the British officers as whole during that period, as a result of their training? In 'Kill Rommel' by Michael Asher, the author offered the opinion that the British officers corps on the eve of WW2 was the most orthodox and unflexible of any generation. The 'Life and Death Of An Unusual Hero' by John Wilsey has a detailed account of the complex planning for Goose Green, it makes one wonder how the Germans or Israelis would have approached the task.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1382085/General-fights-to-clear-the-name-of-Col-H.html

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHcNcnd8Ap0"]‪Goose Green & H Jones, Falklands War 1982‬‏ - YouTube[/nomedia]

 

[riksavage]

So the question to be asked is whether H. Jone's style of command was endemic to the British officers as whole during that period, as a result of their training? In 'Kill Rommel' by Michael Asher, the author offered the opinion that the British officers corps on the eve of WW2 was the most orthodox and unflexible of any generation. The 'Life and Death Of An Unusual Hero' by John Wilsey has a detailed account of the complex planning for Goose Green, it makes one wonder how the Germans or Israelis would have approached the task.

General fights to clear the name of Col 'H' - Telegraph

‪Goose Green & H Jones, Falklands War 1982‬‏ - YouTube

Lt Col. Jones was a very strong character who didn’t tolerate fools or anyone questioning his authority. As stated before he micro managed everything with a rod of iron. Maj. Chris Keeble who stepped up following his death and Lt Col. Chandler who finally took over after parachuting into the South Atlantic were very different leaders.

Chandler issued orders ’fag packet’ style which lasted minutes not hours defining Company objectives and limits of exploitation before letting his Company Commanders work out the detail. Chandler also sent one of his soldiers (a terrible peace time soldier apparently, but made for war) to give his Company Commanders a warning order during one of the battles, Chandler on arrival found the solider in question had confidently given the assembled masses a thorough detailed battle appreciation using his initiative and observational skills, Chandler admitted they were bang on and didn’t need revising.

Warminster and Brecon instruct officers and NCO’s to use their initiative under duress. Field promoting Cpls to Platoon Sgt’s, Platoon Sgt’s to Platoon Commanders and Platoon Commanders to Company commanders is par for the course whilst the students are placed under extreme duress.’

As for Germany and Israeli running the Falklands differently, unfortunately an impossible scenario has neither have or had the capacity to mount an amphibious invasion thousands of miles away from home. People forget the Falklands victory was won not just by the soldiers on the ground but the logisticians. As one British PM said ‘the Army is a projectile to be fired by the Navy.

 

[kato]

As for Germany and Israeli running the Falklands differently, unfortunately an impossible scenario has neither have or had the capacity to mount an amphibious invasion thousands of miles away from home.

Both countries would have staged it considerably differently from the UK given the political realities of the time. Israel could have staged an airborne commando raid of some sort out of South Africa (remember they were quasi-allies at the time); Germany could simply have Argentine fold by getting Ernesto Geisel to ramp up for invasion (the Brazilian military dictatorship had excellent relations with Germany).

 

[STURM]

As for Germany and Israeli running the Falklands differently, unfortunately an impossible scenario has neither have or had the capacity to mount an amphibious invasion thousands of miles away from home.

No doubt the Germans or the Israelis would have not been faced with an exact scenario or a Falklands type operation. Allow to me to re-phrase what I meant.

If the Bundeswehr or the IDF had been faced with a similiar situation the Brits faced at Goose Green- a largely infantry operation over rough terrain at night, against an enemy superior in numbers, with limited artillery and air support - would their operational plan have been as complex as the one the Brits had for Goose Green. Would your average German or Israeli battalion CO, due to differences in training and doctrine, have planned and conducted the operation in a very different manner.

Whatever his failings, H Jones was a product of his country's military training system and traditions. Though it would be impossible to predict how others would have conducted such an operation, speculating on how they might have, based on what we know about various training systems and historical comparisons, to me at least is interesting.

 

[riksavage]

No doubt the Germans or the Israelis would have not been faced with an exact scenario or a Falklands type operation. Allow to me to re-phrase what I meant.

If the Bundeswehr or the IDF had been faced with a similiar situation the Brits faced at Goose Green- a largely infantry operation over rough terrain at night, against an enemy superior in numbers, with limited artillery and air support - would their operational plan have been as complex as the one the Brits had for Goose Green. Would your average German or Israeli battalion CO, due to differences in training and doctrine, have planned and conducted the operation in a very different manner.

Whatever his failings, H Jones was a product of his country's military training system and traditions. Though it would be impossible to predict how others would have conducted such an operation, speculating on how they might have, based on what we know about various training systems and historical comparisons, to me at least is interesting.

Lt. Col Chaundler (not Chandler) and Maj. Keeble were products of the same system as H Jones, but had a very different operating/leadership styles.

The raid on Goose Green was decided in London to get the ball rolling whilst the move on Stanley was planned/consolidated. Zero real strategic worth hence only a single Para battalion was committed with support from 3 x 105mm's, Milan, HMS Arrow and later on Harrier.

The eventual numbers of Argentines at the settlement exceeded earlier intelligence reports with the final tally of at least 1000 'shooters' of various types. The defenders had plenty of time to dig-in and arrange the defense of a very narrow peninsula (approx 2km across). They had at their disposal 6 x 20 mm Rheinmetall cannon (direct fire capable, and used as such), two radar-guided Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns and one battery of four 105 mm Oto Melara pack howitzers plus infantry support weapons and access to Pucarás based at Stanley, armed with rockets and napalm.

On paper the battle should have been an easy victory for the Argentines, and a bloody nose for the Brit's.

2 Para lost their CO and faced odds greater than briefed in the initial O-Group. They didn't then stop, regroup, withdraw and lick their wounds, write new complex orders and wait for Commando reinforcements; instead the battalion 2iC stood-up, the Company Commanders adapted and they went on to win a battle against superior odds which were dug-in along a very narrow front severely limiting any flanking opportunities. That kind of quick thinking and adaptability at Company, Platoon and Section level does not strike me as the behavior of a rigid inflexible command system bound by over complex written orders, which have to be followed to the letter?

I would be interested to hear which German battalion you would pluck out of the country's orbat in 82 who could have done a better job under the circumstances?

Kato - please expand? There are 3800+ miles separating Cape Town from Stanley. I would love to hear your views on how a large enough Israeli Commando Force would get to the Falklands in sufficient numbers to take and hold the island and be kept supplied with weapons and ammunition for the duration? Also I never realised that Germany in 82 had the political clout to force another South American nation to threaten outright war against a neighbor for no political or strategic gain other than to appear as a puppet to a European power.

 

[STURM]

I would be interested to hear which German battalion you would pluck out of the country's orbat in 82 who could have done a better job under the circumstances?

I was speculating on how a German battalion CO might have done things differently as a result of his training - a less complicated plan perhaps or a totally different or less rigid in command style - not how the Germans or anyone else would have done things better.

 

[Onkel]

I don´t think this might have mad a significant difference. The german "Auftrags"- Leadership doesn´t mean that there have to be tactical differences to Leadership operating with strict orders. Especially on company or platoon level you might hardly recognise any difference. The lower the tactical unit, the less possibility for the unit leader to reach his tactical aim by differing his approach.