Argentine CAP spoofing may have happened from time to time – the Phoenix squadron was set up for this mission – but it didn’t with the Exocet strike that sunk HMS Sheffield. This is a specific instance with huge tactical and operational flow on effects.
The Tipsy radar used by the Argentines at Port Stanley was an excellent system with longer range against cruise altitude SHARs than just 50km. The lack of air warning of SHAR sorties was because of good tactics by the RN of approaching below the radar horizon after carrier launch. Also all of the Miro vs SHAR air combat happened within range and under direction of the Port Stanley radar. The Argentines were not deficient in this regard. In the air battles over San Carlos the Argentines didn’t have radar warning but neither did the SHARs because they were all below the radar horizons.
Yet the Argentines were never outnumbered in all of the fighter vs fighter engagements. In fact they often outnumbered the SHARs but still got bounced badly.
So? Poor gun and missile maintenance by the Argentines is no ones fault but the Argentines. The Shafir 2 missile was nicknamed the ‘killer’ by the Israeli pilots because of its excellent if inelegant looking guidance logic system. The RN didn’t have tracer ammo either yet still racked up gun kills.
LOL. The RN SHAR crews had much worse conditions and fatigue than the Argentines. They were flying multiple sorties every day with VTOL landings whereas the Argentineans had lots of rest between sorties. The entire, combined Argentine air forces only flew some 500 fighter and attack sorties while the much smaller British force few over 2,000 sorties during the same time period.
I see a lot of excuse making and very little focus on the real issue: the Argentine air force had very poor air to air combat training and tactics. They also showed very poor attack techniques with bombing too low for the fuses of their bombs. No one can doubt their bravery or natural ability but their technical competence was at a low level.
In addition their aircraft being all 3rd generation fighters were at a significant performance handicap to the 4th generation SHAR. The latter’s integrated radar-nav system, high thrust to weight ratio and snap turn ability gave it a significant combat advantage. Even though Miros and Skyhawks are generally considered some of the most manoeuvrable 3rd generation fighters.
Hugh McManners - Forgotten Voices of the Falklands: The Real Story of the Falklands, which consists of face to face interviews with the various combatants is now available in audio book format for ipod/ipad. Very, very insightful and candid first party interviews, which reveal a level of animosity between ground unit commanders and RN commanders I'd not fully appreciated. Particularly the failure of the latter to provide timely CAS to suppress Argie artillery fire following the taking of military objectives. The Argentine failure to counter attack (in most cases) against exhausted and ammo light units saved the day and would have only been suppressed by air or NGS. The RN's obsession with protecting the carriers and preserving airframes meant ground units had to hang-on and prey the Argies never got their act together and utilised their reserves.