One of the excuses (sorry "reasons") for expensively building Apaches in marginal constituencies in the UK rather than buying them from the main production line at a lower cost was the decision to incorporate those special little items we evidently needed for maritime operations, like folding rotor blades. This would seem to me to be a reason to buy Cobras instead, but presumably they weren't shiny enough.
I cannot recall ever hearing of Apaches deploying on UK naval assets apart from trials on Ocean some years ago. The strain of deploying half a dozen (out of 67) to Afghanistan is stretching the AAC to its limit in terms of availability. Rather like the strain of deploying 24 GR4s (out of 100+) to Afghanistan and Libya is stretching the RAF.
Yes, yes, I know. Attrition spares, OCUs, deep maintenance and lack of trained pilots are major factors here but honestly, if you ran a business with this level of efficiency the shareholders would sack you without a moment's thought.
WillS
A-stan is a pretty hash environment and the Apache flying hours have gone through the roof, crews and airframes need rotating and the UK doesn't want to knacker it's fleet out completely. Deploying to Libya when other nations under less strain have comparable assets doesn't make sense.
The UK's decision to buy Apache over Cobra was driven by Longbow, weapons load and tank killing capabilities for use in an intensive armour soaked environment supported in the recce role by Lynx (and eventually Wildcat). Cobra couldn't match what Longbow offered. The UK version has an upgraded defensive fit, more powerful engines common to other UK helecopters (allowing for Longbow use in hot and high conditions) and folding rotors. The latter for storage aboard Ocean and movement by strategic lift to support 16 Air Assault once the DZ and closest air-base is secure.
Apache AAC regiments fall under 16, not 3 Commando Brigade's orbat, however it has a secondary role supporting which ever rapid reaction element is in role (Para or Commando).
With a shortage of F38C's, Apache will become a fixture aboard the deployed QE for the CAS role mimicking a USMC America Class rather than a true strike carrier. Currently they are used to escort Chinook in A-Stan, in future they can escort Chinook/Merlin deployed ship to shore in support of Amphib operations. Plus they can act as flying tanks during the initial landing by 3 Commando in thier armoured BV's, basically replacing Challenger, which will have to wait aboard the attached Bay's until the beach is secure.
Comparison as follows:
The America Class can accommodate
12 MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft,
Six STOVL F-35B Lightning II strike fighters
Four AH-1Z attack helicopters,
Four CH-53Ks and
Three UH-1Y utility helicopters
QE could realistically accommadate:
Eight - Chinook/Merlin.
Between eight & twelve F-35C Lightning II strike fighters
Between four & six Apache
Between four - six Wildcat
+ Commando Company(s) + support not assigned to Albion
I understand the current deployment over Libya is short of six aircraft to do the job properly and appease the rebels. The UK has decided it has deployed enough (considering other commitment's) and is now offering to fund refugee movements out of Misurata.
The following quote taken from Flight Global sums up nicely why the Harriers will not return.
Speaking before the article's publication, chief of the air staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton has defended the Ministry of Defence's decision to retire the Harrier in favour of safeguarding the bulk of the Tornado GR4 fleet, describing it as "in cold logic, unavoidable".
With reference to the Libyan operation, Dalton said: "The Tornados have delivered [MBDA] Storm Shadows to penetrate hardened buildings and the dual-mode Brimstone, neither of which could have been delivered by the Harrier."
"I am not knocking the Harrier, just those who have, often willfully, overstated its relative utility in this scenario," he told the Royal Aeronautical Society's Aerospace 2011 conference in London on 13 April.
"In operations such as Ellamy, on the periphery of Europe, the access, basing and over-flight restrictions that would necessitate carrier strike do not apply. There is simply no comparison in terms of platform capability, time on station or versatility between Tornado GR4s operating from a well-found NATO airfield in Italy and Harriers operating from a CVS."