T-90 in Comparison to Western Armour

[Abraham Gubler]

I'd be very interested to see the report.

Random defence media about APS developments.

Given that Relikt offered as an upgrade package for T-72s includes the option of adding ARENA, and given that the actual NII Stali only claims that Relikt is a form of ERA with improved performance and increased modularity of design (allowing easy retro-fit of premanufactured screens in field conditions), all signs point to it not having any sort of active elements, sensors, or anything else.

Sure but as I mentioned before if Relic doesn’t have stand off attack against long rod KE penetrators then it won’t be as effective. No argument from me on this issue from the beginning.

Lets be real, even if the 131st Maykop was equipped with M1s going into Grozny, the outcome would not have been much different.

Not in a tactical sense but a lot more Russians would have lived as many tanks would have been penetrated and not subsequently blown up catastrophically.

No argument there. However this is not quite the same as what you said earlier. You said: "This is a terrible example. The reason the Russians didn’t lose as many tanks second time as well is they were kept back from direct assault. This meant more Russian infantry had to die from unsuppressed fire points and more Chechnyan civilians had to die from attempt to suppress via mass artillery barrages."

Tanks were indeed used in the direct assault and direct fire support role. The key distinction being that instead of marching into the city blind, deaf, in parade-style columns, there were huge numbers of dismounted infantry assault teams moving through the city, with the tanks providing direct fire support for them.

No you still don’t get the key issue. What I said in my first post and further explained to make it clearer is the proximity of the tank to the enemy force was changed. Bear in mind that during the Second Chechen War the assault on Grozny only happened after a long siege in which much of the resistance and indeed the city was destroyed by bombardment before Russian forcs moved in to mop up.

However as I’ve said quite a few times before the key difference was more than just the use of dismounts or the nature of the New Years Eve thunder run. It was in that the tank support to direct infantry assaults was stand off rather than close in the Second Chechen War.

Your earlier claim was that there were greater infantry casualties between the first assault on Grozny, and the storm of Grozny in winter of 99-00.

No that was not a claim I have made at all. I have been repeatedly trying to show the difference in casulties to infantry between stand off tank support and close tank support. As in OIF with close tank support there were very low infantry casualties compared to Second Chechen War with stand off tank support very high infantry casulties.

No. It demonstrated the vulnerability of armored columns in a prepared urban environment against a determined and organized opponent. When you look at the Russian Army "thunder run" into Tshinval in '08 you notice that the Georgian army wasn't able to do much about Russian armor, not for lack of anti-tank weapons, but because they were too disorganized and unprepared, as well as positively lacking a desire to fight. When their comms went down, HQ and Arty got taken out by Tochkas and Iskanders, their infantry certainly didn't put up much of a fight, anti-tank weapons or otherwise.

You’re confusing wider tactical issues with tank survivability. In relation to tank survivability the point in the New Years Eve thunder run was not that the entire regiment was destroyed but that every tank engaged by the defences was totally destroyed. In the Baghdad thunder runs which were highly resisted – I don’t know where you get this crap about “too disorganized and unprepared, as well as positively lacking a desire to fight” – multiple tanks were engaged but none totally destroyed. The only tank crewman casualty was a commander hit while exposed outside the tank. The comparison of casualties between the two shows that when there is a four significant figure difference there is something hughly divergent rather than just the tactical nature of the particular engagement.

I'd love to see a source on higher infantry casualties in the assault on Grozny winter 99-00 vs winter of 94-95.

Again that is not what I said at all. I was comparing the difference between stand off tank support and close tank support on infantry casualties. This is going around in circles fuelled by your lack of understanding of this argument: difference between stand off tank support and close tank support on infantry casualties. If you want to debate anything else find someone else to waste their time.

 

[Waylander]

I also think it is highly debatable to compare the Chzechens and Iraqis.
Not that the Russians didn't made some alot of mistakes in the first round. They surely did but the foe they faced was different to what the Russians had to face.

That the Thunder runs in Bagdad had so few casualties is as much a result of the incompetence of the Iraqis as it is of superior technology and tactics. The US were good at exploiting these weaknesses, though.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I also think it is highly debatable to compare the Chzechens and Iraqis.

Good thing then that is not what I did. I compared the results of those tanks in these battles that were hit by similar weapons under similar conditions. Russian T-80s: every tank hit catastrophically destroyed, US M1s: of multiple tanks hit only one disabled, no crew inside hurt.

 

[Feanor]

Sure but as I mentioned before if Relic doesn’t have stand off attack against long rod KE penetrators then it won’t be as effective. No argument from me on this issue from the beginning.

Wasn't arguing, simply clarifying. Relikt is not the shiny new super-toy that many portray it to be. It's a solid upgrade on K-5, and is a good addition to the T-90M package. It can hardly close a virtual 20 year gap in tank development, and the shutting down of 3/4 of the major tank factories and design bureaus.

Not in a tactical sense but a lot more Russians would have lived as many tanks would have been penetrated and not subsequently blown up catastrophically.

But the overall outcome was determined by other factors, which for many (I dare say most) militaries are more important. Venezuela would hardly benefit from forking up money for M1A2s, but they badly need the air support, modern arty, and infantry-armor coordination. So by spending on second hand refurbished and modernized T-72M1Ms they can save money that they can then spend on MLRS, fighters, training, etc.

I believe my point stands. There are more important things to spend money on.

No you still don’t get the key issue. What I said in my first post and further explained to make it clearer is the proximity of the tank to the enemy force was changed. Bear in mind that during the Second Chechen War the assault on Grozny only happened after a long siege in which much of the resistance and indeed the city was destroyed by bombardment before Russian forcs moved in to mop up.

Once again the key difference was produced by changes in strategy, tactics, and the use of and coordination with support assets. Note what I wrote in my original post: "In other words in major conventional conflicts the catastrophic explosion issue is going to be relatively minor compared to things like lack or presence of friendly air cover, arty support, and proper infantry-tank coordination."

However as I’ve said quite a few times before the key difference was more than just the use of dismounts or the nature of the New Years Eve thunder run. It was in that the tank support to direct infantry assaults was stand off rather than close in the Second Chechen War.

Or maybe the key difference was the use of intense amounts of arty and air? Or maybe all three combined for a differing outcome? Maybe it was the rotation of tanks, as the ones engaged in fire expended their ammunition, to keep the fire support permanent? Maybe it was the slower rate of advance through the city?

No that was not a claim I have made at all. I have been repeatedly trying to show the difference in casulties to infantry between stand off tank support and close tank support. As in OIF with close tank support there were very low infantry casualties compared to Second Chechen War with stand off tank support very high infantry casulties.

They may be other factors to account for that. You can't isolate the variable outside of controlled conditions.

You’re confusing wider tactical issues with tank survivability.

Nope. Simply arguing that one is more significant then the other.

In relation to tank survivability the point in the New Years Eve thunder run was not that the entire regiment was destroyed but that every tank engaged by the defences was totally destroyed. In the Baghdad thunder runs which were highly resisted – I don’t know where you get this crap about “too disorganized and unprepared, as well as positively lacking a desire to fight” – multiple tanks were engaged but none totally destroyed. The only tank crewman casualty was a commander hit while exposed outside the tank. The comparison of casualties between the two shows that when there is a four significant figure difference there is something hughly divergent rather than just the tactical nature of the particular engagement.

I'm not sure that's what determined the difference in outcomes.

 

[STURM]

Good thing then that is not what I did. I compared the results of those tanks in these battles that were hit by similar weapons under similar conditions. Russian T-80s: every tank hit catastrophically destroyed, US M1s: of multiple tanks hit only one disabled, no crew inside hurt.

Which would IMO confirm that the M1, along with the Challenger 2, Leopard 2 and Merkava 4, due to having a superior armour baseline protection/thicker armour, is much more survivable than T-72's, T-90's and T-80's, who rely greatly on ERA to survive on the battlefield.

Some questions I'm curious about,

1. Is there any truth to reports that indicated that some of the Russian MBT's in Grozny had empty ERA panels with the explosives removed?

2. Can ERA panels be replaced easily in the field or does the tank have to be sent back to the rear for that?

3. To cope with the threat posed by top-attack munitions, are Russian tank designers looking at up-amouring the roof hatches., like what has been done on other MBT's.

4. Is the Ukrainian Nozh-2 ERA based on K-5?

5. Did Russian units in Grozny have direct fire support from artillery the same way U.S. units did when conducting the Thunder Run's?

 

[Feanor]

1. Is there any truth to reports that indicated that some of the Russian MBT's in Grozny had empty ERA panels with the explosives removed?

Yes, mostly in the first war.

2. Can ERA panels be replaced easily in the field or does the tank have to be sent back to the rear for that?

I'm fairly certain brigade and regimental repair elements can do it.

3. To cope with the threat posed by top-attack munitions, are Russian tank designers looking at up-amouring the roof hatches., like what has been done on other MBT's.

There are ideas floating around about up-armoring the whole top of the tank. Nothing concrete so far though.

4. Is the Ukrainian Nozh-2 ERA based on K-5?

Can't really be 100% sure, but more likely then not.

5. Did Russian units in Grozny have direct fire support from artillery the same way U.S. units did when conducting the Thunder Run's?

You mean arty used as a flat-trajectory weapon for direct fire support? Yes, most notably anti-tank guns. In fact they operate in this manner to this day, namely the MT-12 Rapira guns. During the war however all sorts of artillery was used in this manner.

 

[STURM]

You mean arty used as a flat-trajectory weapon for direct fire support? Yes, most notably anti-tank guns. In fact they operate in this manner to this day, namely the MT-12 Rapira guns. During the war however all sorts of artillery was used in this manner.

The question I should have asked was whether Russian artillery was able to respond to calls for fire missions from Russians units assaulting Grozny, in the same effective and timely manner that U.S. artillery did for units conducting the the Thunder Run's? During the Thunder Runs's artillery, using proximity fuses/air burst rounds, were very useful in inflicting casualties on the Iraqi's .

 

[Feanor]

The question I should have asked was whether Russian artillery was able to respond to calls for fire missions from Russians units assaulting Grozny, in the same effective and timely manner that U.S. artillery did for units conducting the the Thunder Run's? During the Thunder Runs's artillery, using proximity fuses/air burst rounds, were very useful in inflicting casualties on the Iraqi's .

No. Certainly not during the first war, and with relatively poor effects during the first half of the second war. Towards the end of the second war, they managed to make relatively effective (relative to their own performance during the first war) use of arty on call but I doubt it was as effective as US arty use in Iraq, mainly because this concept of arty on call was itself new.

 

[STURM]

Feanor, going off-topic here but please bear with me.

As result of lessons learnt in urban/FIBUA operations in Chechnya, do you think that the Russian army has made changes to it's urban/FIBUA doctrine that calls for the greater use of FAE/thermo baric warheads, whether shoulder launched or from the TOS-1? Logicly FAE rounds would be useful in assisting forces engaged in urban operations as even though they can't knock holes in walls like 125mm or 30mm guns, they are very useful for use against troops in buildings or enclosed spaces - it surprises me that the idea of using FAE for urban operations hasn't really caught on in other armies.

 

[Feanor]

Feanor, going off-topic here but please bear with me.

As result of lessons learnt in urban/FIBUA operations in Chechnya, do you think that the Russian army has made changes to it's urban/FIBUA doctrine that calls for the greater use of FAE/thermo baric warheads, whether shoulder launched or from the TOS-1? Logicly FAE rounds would be useful in assisting forces engaged in urban operations as even though they can't knock holes in walls like 125mm or 30mm guns, they are very useful for use against troops in buildings or enclosed spaces - it surprises me that the idea of using FAE for urban operations hasn't really caught on in other armies.

Well they recent planned to replace the RPO-A with RPO-PDMA presumably new and shiny. Beyond that I don't know to be honest. After the recent reforms I'm not even sure if the TOS-1A is still in service. There are no standard force orgs calling for its use. Then again there are also no force orgs for the BM-30 Smerch, but it is still in service (iirc in independent btlns).

 

[Feanor]

It looks like the T-90AM will displayed in September. The tank has had major changes done to it as a result of MoD criticism in 2009, including a new barrel, and a "protected" machinegun. I'm assuming this refers to the roof hatch machinegun. Also UVZ is re-iterating that they're continuing work on Object 195, despite cut of MoD funds.

Lenta.ru: Îðóæèå: Ìèíîáîðîíû ðàññåêðåòèëî íîâûé ðîññèéñêèé òàíê

The new vehicle will also include a more powerful then originally planned engine, panoramic sights, and a turret bustle for the ammunition storage. There are unspecified improvements to the auto-loader.

http://vz.ru/society/2011/4/7/482021.html

 

[STURM]

It looks like the T-90AM will displayed in September.

For urban operations, do you think an OWS for the commander would be useful? Apart from the Challenger 2's in Iraq, I'm not aware of any other MBT's which have been fitted with an OWS.

 

[Waylander]

The UAE's Leclerc Tropicaine feature an OWS and the French urban combat package (AZUR) is going to have one, too.

The German urban package for the Leo II is also going to get one.

 

[Feanor]

For urban operations, do you think an OWS for the commander would be useful? Apart from the Challenger 2's in Iraq, I'm not aware of any other MBT's which have been fitted with an OWS.

I'm sorry, what does OWS stand for? Is it a set of sights for the commander?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

For urban operations, do you think an OWS for the commander would be useful? Apart from the Challenger 2's in Iraq, I'm not aware of any other MBT's which have been fitted with an OWS.

The M1A1 Abrams comes as standard with an Overhead Weapons Station (OWS) for the commander so to do the entire T-64, T-72, T-80 and T-90 family of tanks. Just because they are mechanical doesn't mean they don't work providing underarmour, all angle fires with 12.7mm HMGs.

The M1A2 Abrams just has a flex mount that can only be operated by the commander outside the tank. So as part of the TUSK upgrade for operation in OIF many M1A2s have been fitted with a Protector Remote Control Weapon Station (RCWS). Also the IDF has trialled a RCWS on the Merkava Mk 4 but other systems have had priority for their upgrades.

 

[STURM]

Feanor, Overhead Weapons Station.

Thanks everyone for the feedback. So it think it would be accurate to say that most if not all major armies are in agreement that a Remote Control Weapon Station with day/night sights with a zooming capability like the Protector is essential, especially for for urban work.

Without a Remote Control Weapon Station with independent sights, how do commanders in MBT's operate and aim their turret mounted MG's?

 

[Waylander]

Like in the good old days. By hand...

It's also a question of philosophy. In Germany the tank commander doesn't even has a MG as he is supposed to fight his tank/platoon/company which is enough work to do.

Not that for example a 12.7mm HMG for the commander isn't usefull but it can also be in the way on some other occassions.

On the other hand did the Leo II feature an independent commanders periscope for the TC which was absent on the Abrams till the A2 came out. Such an independent commanders sight is also usefull in many situations.

It's always a question of mission and priorities.

IMHO the tank commander has enough to do. A RCWS is really usefull for urban combat but should mainly be operated by the loader with the TC being able to take control.

 

[STURM]

Like in the good old days. By hand...

Yes but without an RCWS how does someone fire a turret mounted MG from inside the tank with hatches closed? The reason I'm asking is because quite a number of tanks are reportedly able to do this and I'm very curious how they do it.

 

[Waylander]

Well just like it's done for ages. Mechanically. You crank it by hand.

Not that much of a mistery there. All of these MGs have mechanics which penetrate into the crew compartment and so can be used when buttoned up.

 

[STURM]

Well just like it's done for ages. Mechanically. You crank it by hand.

Not that much of a mistery there. All of these MGs have mechanics which penetrate into the crew compartment and so can be used when buttoned up.

Thanks. It never occured to me that it was that simple .