Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Given the recent rash of posts about air defence systems, and their relative strengths, weaknesses and failures it seemed appropriate to open a specific thread for discussion on this topic which has ground, air and maritime-based elements.
IADS, or integrated air defence systems, is essentially a series/set of independent platforms/subsystems, which when working together are tasked with providing air defence over a (generally large) area. As mentioned above these individual platforms or subsystems can be ground-based air defence (GBAD), maritime-based, or airborne, or a combination of the above. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is in many cases a subset of an IADS.
At a very basic level, there are IMO four elements which are required for air defence. These are sensors, shooters, command and comms/communications. The sensor(s) are used to detect and track potential targets. The shooters are just that, they shoot at targets. Command makes the decisions on which targets are to be engaged and when. Meanwhile, comms relays information and orders back and forth between the other three.
Depending on the scale, the above can be met quite easily. Take something like a ZSU-23-4 SPAAG for instance. It has a crew of four consisting of a driver, radar operation (sensor), gunner (shooter) and commander (command). Given that the crew is so small and are in the same vehicle, communications between the crew can managed by speaking to one another. At the same time however, the area which something like a ZSU-23-4 can effective provide air defence for is quite limited. While the radar could detect targets are far away as ~20 km, the radar often encounters problems with clutter if a potential target was at low altitude (60 m>target altitude). Potentially even more important, the 23 mm AA guns had a max range of ~2.5 km.
As mentioned above, a ZSU-23-4 or any other SPAAG for that matter, can only defend a relatively small area on its own. This is where additional units, and Integration comes into effect.
By the inclusion of additional units, greater areas can be defended, and potentially with increased effectiveness as well.
Additional sensor units, be they radar, EO, acoustic or some combination thereof, can aid in the detection and track management of targets. This can also expand the area of situational awareness needed for air defence.
Additional shooters, as well as different types of shooters (missiles or guns, ground/maritime or airborne, predominantly) can then have the ability to engage more targets and/or over a greater area than a single shooter potentially could.
As more sensor and shooter units are added, additional command elements are required to make decisions and manage the units involved.
Lastly, as the network of command, shooter and sensor elements expand, the various disparate elements need to be able to pass information back and forth, or perhaps upwards, as required. This in turn requires expansion of communications capabilities.
Now, as has been mentioned repeatedly, some or all of these four basic unit types and be ground, maritime or air-based. There are some advantages, disadvantages and limitations to all of these.
Ground-based units can be fixed/stationary, or mobile. They can also very greatly in size, ranging from as small as a 15 kg. 1.5 m long SA-7 'Grail'/Strela-2 manpad, to as large as a building like airport ATC radars, or larger. A significant limiting factor for GBAD systems, at least amongst the sensors and to a lesser degree shooters, is the (negative) impact that ground cover, terrain and the horizon/curvature of the earth have upon line of sight (LOS). Areas where LOS is blocked are 'blindspots' where targets could potentially ingress/egress, or perhaps break any target locks upon themselves. The only way to reduce or eliminate these 'blindspots' is with the inclusion of additional systems to provide coverage of the area(s) and have a comm system capable of relaying information back from the offboard sensor. There are a few examples of Over the Horizon Radars (OTHR) where LOS is not an issue, however such radars are suitable for target detection and tracking, but not engagement since such radars do not provide 'target quality' data. IIRC the major limitation of such systems is that they only provide a 2D location of a contact and are unable to provide the third dimensional component of the contact's altitude.
I will not go into much detail for maritime-based units, as the limitations they encounter are quite similar to those of ground-based units, although they are more likely to run into curvature of the earth issues rather than clutter. Unless of course the vessel(s) is operating in the littorals or brownwater environs.
The last major area of coverage is for airborne systems. In many respects, airborne systems are the preferred type to utilize for sensors and shooters, due to systems capabilities. Airborne sensors (AEW, AWACS, etc.) still encounter potential issues with LOS due to clutter and curvature of the earth, however due to the comparatively high altitude (E-3 Sentry service ceiling is ~12 km) vs. ground-based sensors, the radar horizon is much less of an issue. Also, airborne shooters in a CAP can provide 'shooter' coverage of a significantly larger area than the same number of ground-based AA or SAM units could. Some of the disadvantages of airborne systems are the increased per unit costs, limitiations in availability due to pilot/operator and equipment fatigue and maintenance, as well as generally requiring a greater amount of technical and logistical support due to the increased complexity of such systems.
More to follow later, including examples showing areas of weakness in the GBAD system that Turaqistan uses for its IADS, as well as that of the US.
Please post any questions, comments or corrections.
-Cheers
IADS, or integrated air defence systems, is essentially a series/set of independent platforms/subsystems, which when working together are tasked with providing air defence over a (generally large) area. As mentioned above these individual platforms or subsystems can be ground-based air defence (GBAD), maritime-based, or airborne, or a combination of the above. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is in many cases a subset of an IADS.
At a very basic level, there are IMO four elements which are required for air defence. These are sensors, shooters, command and comms/communications. The sensor(s) are used to detect and track potential targets. The shooters are just that, they shoot at targets. Command makes the decisions on which targets are to be engaged and when. Meanwhile, comms relays information and orders back and forth between the other three.
Depending on the scale, the above can be met quite easily. Take something like a ZSU-23-4 SPAAG for instance. It has a crew of four consisting of a driver, radar operation (sensor), gunner (shooter) and commander (command). Given that the crew is so small and are in the same vehicle, communications between the crew can managed by speaking to one another. At the same time however, the area which something like a ZSU-23-4 can effective provide air defence for is quite limited. While the radar could detect targets are far away as ~20 km, the radar often encounters problems with clutter if a potential target was at low altitude (60 m>target altitude). Potentially even more important, the 23 mm AA guns had a max range of ~2.5 km.
As mentioned above, a ZSU-23-4 or any other SPAAG for that matter, can only defend a relatively small area on its own. This is where additional units, and Integration comes into effect.
By the inclusion of additional units, greater areas can be defended, and potentially with increased effectiveness as well.
Additional sensor units, be they radar, EO, acoustic or some combination thereof, can aid in the detection and track management of targets. This can also expand the area of situational awareness needed for air defence.
Additional shooters, as well as different types of shooters (missiles or guns, ground/maritime or airborne, predominantly) can then have the ability to engage more targets and/or over a greater area than a single shooter potentially could.
As more sensor and shooter units are added, additional command elements are required to make decisions and manage the units involved.
Lastly, as the network of command, shooter and sensor elements expand, the various disparate elements need to be able to pass information back and forth, or perhaps upwards, as required. This in turn requires expansion of communications capabilities.
Now, as has been mentioned repeatedly, some or all of these four basic unit types and be ground, maritime or air-based. There are some advantages, disadvantages and limitations to all of these.
Ground-based units can be fixed/stationary, or mobile. They can also very greatly in size, ranging from as small as a 15 kg. 1.5 m long SA-7 'Grail'/Strela-2 manpad, to as large as a building like airport ATC radars, or larger. A significant limiting factor for GBAD systems, at least amongst the sensors and to a lesser degree shooters, is the (negative) impact that ground cover, terrain and the horizon/curvature of the earth have upon line of sight (LOS). Areas where LOS is blocked are 'blindspots' where targets could potentially ingress/egress, or perhaps break any target locks upon themselves. The only way to reduce or eliminate these 'blindspots' is with the inclusion of additional systems to provide coverage of the area(s) and have a comm system capable of relaying information back from the offboard sensor. There are a few examples of Over the Horizon Radars (OTHR) where LOS is not an issue, however such radars are suitable for target detection and tracking, but not engagement since such radars do not provide 'target quality' data. IIRC the major limitation of such systems is that they only provide a 2D location of a contact and are unable to provide the third dimensional component of the contact's altitude.
I will not go into much detail for maritime-based units, as the limitations they encounter are quite similar to those of ground-based units, although they are more likely to run into curvature of the earth issues rather than clutter. Unless of course the vessel(s) is operating in the littorals or brownwater environs.
The last major area of coverage is for airborne systems. In many respects, airborne systems are the preferred type to utilize for sensors and shooters, due to systems capabilities. Airborne sensors (AEW, AWACS, etc.) still encounter potential issues with LOS due to clutter and curvature of the earth, however due to the comparatively high altitude (E-3 Sentry service ceiling is ~12 km) vs. ground-based sensors, the radar horizon is much less of an issue. Also, airborne shooters in a CAP can provide 'shooter' coverage of a significantly larger area than the same number of ground-based AA or SAM units could. Some of the disadvantages of airborne systems are the increased per unit costs, limitiations in availability due to pilot/operator and equipment fatigue and maintenance, as well as generally requiring a greater amount of technical and logistical support due to the increased complexity of such systems.
More to follow later, including examples showing areas of weakness in the GBAD system that Turaqistan uses for its IADS, as well as that of the US.
Please post any questions, comments or corrections.
-Cheers
