Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Todjaeger]

In the opinion of def pros here,what would cause the least heartache to aquire...10 to 12 virginias or 12 son of collins?
An australian collins 2 build with all the associated risks of a new class of submarine or an american virginia build with the associated reskilling of ran to nuclear sub tech?
Also just reading the virginias have been built at 1 per year and will increase to 2 boats per year from 2011/12 therby reducing the cost per unit,so add to that 1 ran boat per year to bring the output to 3.
Mabey has to be an expansion of us yards to move from 2 to 3 boats per year thereby incurring increased costs?
Mabey 2 usn and 1 ran virginia per year would still be cheaper than australian build collins 2 replacements and usn benifits from a higher builder programme thereby reducing their virginia aquisition costs?
Dont know the through life costs of 10 to 12 virginias versus 12 collins 2 and the amount of time and costs to skill ran personell to nuclear submarines but is it something that is no greater or less of a risk than australian build collins replacements?

edit-add to that the level of infrastructure needed here to support ran virginias.

Pretty easy question to answer. A dozen Son of Collins.

In addition to just the purchase costs for the submarines, there is also a significant amount of infrastructure required to support and maintain them. In the case of a conventional subs, Australia already has such facilities. Granted they might require expansion to accomodate changes in design, and perhaps even construction of another facility at FBE to support Fleet West and Fleet East, the expansion/construction would rather conventional if one will pardon the phrase.

If the RAN were to run SSN's, then personnel would need to be trained to operate, maintain and handle nuclear material, but under normal conditions but more importantly, in times of crisis. Additionally, equipment would need to be on hand for both normal ops as well as when things go pear-shaped. Does the RAN currently have facilities available which are configured to detect and clean up a radioactive submarine hull? Are there facilities in Australia to process and/or contain material which has been contaminated with radiation?

With nuclear power systems, there is underlying infrastructure which is required for safe and sustained operation. At present, Australia does not have that infrastructure, and unless there is a significant change within Australia (and/or the threat matrix) it will continue not to have the infrastructure which would be needed.

-Cheers

 

[aussienscale]

The simple answer to that is the Australian Government has categorically rulled out Nuclear.

Is there a possibility of a Virginia inspired SSK/SSG maybe, but build would have to be in Australia as well, but I don't know the class well enough to tell you if that would be an option or possible, others in here can though

So I would put my money on Son of Collins II

 

[Galrahn]

If the RAN were to run SSN's, then personnel would need to be trained to operate, maintain and handle nuclear material, but under normal conditions but more importantly, in times of crisis. Additionally, equipment would need to be on hand for both normal ops as well as when things go pear-shaped. Does the RAN currently have facilities available which are configured to detect and clean up a radioactive submarine hull? Are there facilities in Australia to process and/or contain material which has been contaminated with radiation?

With nuclear power systems, there is underlying infrastructure which is required for safe and sustained operation. At present, Australia does not have that infrastructure, and unless there is a significant change within Australia (and/or the threat matrix) it will continue not to have the infrastructure which would be needed.

I agree completely, manpower training and underlying infrastructure almost make the discussion mute - almost.

But I do wonder, because it really comes down to the strategic future Australia sees for itself. As of right now, I see three paths ahead for Australia, and one of them would make this a viable option.

1) Continue on as is. This is probably the most likely and least useful for Australia. Australia is on a course where the naval and air power of Australia is second tier to everyone in the region, with no truly strategic capabilities that give the nation significant influence to the political events between other powers. I do wonder if this will ultimately be the course taken by Australia over the next decade, even as it is the most likely course.

Remember, to have strategic influence, Australia would need to have strategic capacity not only to influence China, but also the United States. The plan today never gives Australia enough capacity in force to influence either. As a stakeholder, that might not be in Australia's best interest.

2) Reduce Force Structure. I still see this as a possibility for Australia - the Defense White Paper was not a very impactful document. Australia has had so much trouble fielding the Collins class effectively one could see a future where review after review sets Australia on a different course.

3) Open up Australia for US port. It is no secret the US would love to forward base ships in Australia, but what does that look like?

a) CRUDES squadron basing is easiest transition and might be how Australia adds BMD in depth using land based AEGIS defenses.

b) If Australia had a base for US submarines, is it possible the US would pay for some of the infrastructure costs of nuclear submarines? That might make Virginia class more possible for Australia as an option.

c) Carrier forward based in Australia would be very interesting, because it raises the question whether Australia could operate SH or JSF squadrons from the carrier. The USMC squadron embark tests have proven what is necessary for joint international squadron integration.

My point here is this. US basing opens up options for Australia for infrastructure investment by the United States, but it only makes sense if Australia is looking to be more influential in the regional strategic balance of the Pacific. That's a tough political choice btw, and absent the basing option I can't see Australia doing this without investing significantly more in defense. I'm not sure I believe that is prudent either, tbh.

As things stand right now, without a US base, or without nuclear submarines, Australian military force structure is and will remain small and conventional well into the next several decades. The long range strike in the RAAF is gone, and a few AEGIS ships with a pair of LHAs doesn't tilt balance much in the Pacific when everyone else is many times larger in every category.

That political choice to exert strategic influence hangs out there as a political option, and the way to stand out would be with 10-12 SSNs - because it represents a significant capability South Korea, China, and Japan don't have.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

If one looks at it from a purely tactical perspective, nuke powered subs are better suited to RAN requirements. That's not to say the Collins aren't effective. Just less effective considering the probable areas of deployment for the subs.

I don't think the SSN infrastructure requirements is beyond RAN esp if the RAN obtained foreign built subs that will come with technical assistance.

However from a budget standpoint, subs like the Virginias are prohibitively expensive. Not many options out there and none of them cheap. Barracuda, astute, virginias, sea wolfs all are expensive projects. The RAN would not be considering Russki or Chinese versions. I can understand that cost would be the main reason why the RAN would still seek SSKs as its predominant sub requirement.

I think, despite earlier statements about no need for AIP, the next generation of RAN SSKs will feature AIP tech.

 

[alexsa]

With nuclear power systems, there is underlying infrastructure which is required for safe and sustained operation. At present, Australia does not have that infrastructure, and unless there is a significant change within Australia (and/or the threat matrix) it will continue not to have the infrastructure which would be needed.

-Cheers

If we ever (as would be sensible) take up the nuclear power option this would be easier but this is not likely under the current government. If we use nuclear power we woul dneed arrangments in place to store and transport fuel systems and their wastes. We may even need to look at reprocessing (not for weapons extratiion but moderation of wastes and recover usable material) and production of fuel elements rather than expensive (and politiclly difficult) transport of such materail to and from Australia.

Given we struglle to establishe a nuclear waste facility of the material we currently produce (most of which is medical) this could be a challenge unless the is bipartisan support.

 

[gf0012-aust]

I can understand that cost would be the main reason why the RAN would still seek SSKs as its predominant sub requirement.

they'll be SSG's

I think, despite earlier statements about no need for AIP, the next generation of RAN SSKs will feature AIP tech.

this would be despite ASC, Kockums, Navy doing real tests and determining that for the sub conops, there was no benefit?

this would be despite the fact that we have an AIP module sitting on a pallet being an expensive paperweight?

this despite the fact that there are other technologies which are more useful (which Abe has touched on in a few magazine articles he's written as well as in here)

AIP has been around for 20 years or so, in all those instances where "enemy ASW teams" thought they could "drown" a Collins and then sink it and paid a bit of a price.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

If we ever (as would be sensible) take up the nuclear power option this would be easier but this is not likely under the current government. If we use nuclear power we woul dneed arrangments in place to store and transport fuel systems and their wastes. We may even need to look at reprocessing (not for weapons extratiion but moderation of wastes and recover usable material) and production of fuel elements rather than expensive (and politiclly difficult) transport of such materail to and from Australia.

Given we struglle to establishe a nuclear waste facility of the material we currently produce (most of which is medical) this could be a challenge unless the is bipartisan support.

Minimal issue. If one buys it from a foreign supplier eg Northrop, just get them to handle the refuel and waste management. US will be less concerned over nuclear proliferation.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Minimal issue. If one buys it from a foreign supplier eg Northrop, just get them to handle the refuel and waste management. US will be less concerned over nuclear proliferation.

You cannot get a company to dispose of the nuclear waste - esp if the tech is foreign. The waste technically is an FMS issue, so thats a State Dept/CoA issue.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

this would be despite ASC, Kockums, Navy doing real tests and determining that for the sub conops, there was no benefit?

this would be despite the fact that we have an AIP module sitting on a pallet being an expensive paperweight?

this despite the fact that there are other technologies which are more useful (which Abe has touched on in a few magazine articles he's written as well as in here)

AIP has been around for 20 years or so, in all those instances where "enemy ASW teams" thought they could "drown" a Collins and then sink it and paid a bit of a price.

Does the existing collins have an aip?

If no, isn't that a lack of a need?

Its not a question of collins being ineffective. Its a question of it being more effective with aip. I would think aip of 20 years ago is different in capability compared to aip today.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

You cannot get a company to dispose of the nuclear waste - esp if the tech is foreign. The waste technically is an FMS issue, so thats a State Dept/CoA issue.

No. One might need govt clearance esp to house nuclear waste but the state dept is not going to clear/house the waste for the contractor. Just like many defence contracts, its a question of being subject to the necessary approvals which can be outsourced to the contractor. It is for the contractor to satisfy the necessary safeguards.

The assumption that Australia will need a waste facility is not a "must have" condition.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Does the existing collins have an aip?

If no, isn't that a lack of a need?

Its not a question of collins being ineffective. Its a question of it being more effective with aip. I would think aip of 20 years ago is different in capability compared to aip today.

I'm not talking about Collins being ineffective, I'm reinforcing that when ASW teams have made assumptions about this boats stamina on their assumptions about what the endurance cycles are, they have made ship killing mistakes.

Collins was originally intended to have AIP. Trials were conducted and it was established that it offered intangible and minimal benefit,

Hence why the AIP module is on gardening leave.

AIP has NOT improved dramatically in the last 20 years. Other tech has. (as Abe has exampled in the past)

AIP is like Stealth. Its a buzzword thrown around often without context

 

[gf0012-aust]

No. One might need govt clearance esp to house nuclear waste but the state dept is not going to clear/house the waste for the contractor. Just like many defence contracts, its a question of being subject to the necessary approvals which can be outsourced to the contractor. It is for the contractor to satisfy the necessary safeguards.

The assumption that Australia will need a waste facility is not a "must have" condition.

and I'm telling you point blank that the CoA would not be negotiating with NG, Booze Hamilton or Simon and Garfunkel about disposing of nuclear waste material without it being sorted between State and the CoA. The equipment generating the waste is (eg) a US reactor, that means that there will be flow on FMS issues.

State can actually direct a company of their choice to undertake contractual obligations. eg Just because the reactor is westinghouse doesn't mean that westinghouse are the prime. State has and does pick other companies of its own choosing - and they're not always.the Stateside owner of the IP. In FMS transactions State owns the IP. NOT the company

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

and I'm telling you point blank that the CoA would not be negotiating with NG, Booze Hamilton or Simon and Garfunkel about disposing of nuclear waste material without it being sorted between State and the CoA. The equipment generating the waste is (eg) a US reactor, that means that there will be flow on FMS issues.

State can actually direct a company of their choice to undertake contractual obligations. eg Just because the reactor is westinghouse doesn't mean that westinghouse are the prime. State has and does pick other companies of its own choosing - and they're not always.the Stateside owner of the IP. In FMS transactions State owns the IP. NOT the company

And the bottomline is whether Australia can outsource the waste management and refuel process?

The answer is still yes. This is not a can't do issue esp with new 4th gen civilian smr tech processes validating outsourcing of the same process.

As to the above, consider that DCNS is now developing the flexblue for export sales and that does not require host country to set up waste management facility. US is not the only option.

 

[gf0012-aust]

And the bottomline is whether Australia can outsource the waste management and refuel process?

The answer is still yes. This is not a can't do issue esp with new 4th gen civilian smr tech processes validating outsourcing of the same process.

As to the above, consider that DCNS is now developing the flexblue for export sales and that does not require host country to set up waste management facility. US is not the only option.

for goodness sake.

if its a US reactor, then its US waste product generated by THEIR weapons system provided to us under FMS.

Note - US vendor supplying US released system = State Dept as the primary negotiater and as the entity who can determine who THEY approve..

Australia cannot negotiate directly with a US company disposing of their waste product from a US weapons system,

reality bites here, not academic semantics.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

Collins was originally intended to have AIP. Trials were conducted and it was established that it offered intangible and minimal benefit,

Hence why the AIP module is on gardening leave.

The above validates my comment on AIP specifically "despite earlier statements about no need for AIP".

AIP has NOT improved dramatically in the last 20 years. Other tech has. (as Abe has exampled in the past)

AIP is like Stealth. Its a buzzword thrown around often without context

You should have highlighted "dramatically" instead esp as that's subjective and aip tech has improved. AIP improvements have continually evolved since ww2. In recent yrs, PEM fuel cells have extended range beyond what stirling is capable of (despite the R&D done by whisper tech). The 214 can achieve the same submerged duration at 8 kts (~300hrs or ~20 hrs for the collins) that a gotland can do at 5. RR's zebra is an improvement & there's heavy research into sofc.

More efficient power consumption/generation, better storage etc will continue to ensure that aip becomes standard feature in all next gen SSKs including the next RAN one.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

for goodness sake.

if its a US reactor, then its US waste product generated by THEIR weapons system provided to us under FMS.

Note - US vendor supplying US released system = State Dept as the primary negotiater and as the entity who can determine who THEY approve..

Australia cannot negotiate directly with a US company disposing of their waste product from a US weapons system,

reality bites here, not academic semantics.

Incorrect. In this case it will be waste management generated by an australian propulsion system, not US weapons system. That's the basic premise. That Australia buys an SSN from US. You can't buy an SSN w/o the reactor.

You appear to be vacillating over the bottom line. Are you claiming it can't be done by dismissing it as "academic semantics"?

 

[gf0012-aust]

Incorrect. In this case it will be waste management generated by an australian propulsion system, not US weapons system.

You appear to be vacillating over the bottom line. Are you claiming it can't be done by dismissing it as "academic semantics"?

One of us deals with FMS cases.

 

[alexsa]

And the bottomline is whether Australia can outsource the waste management and refuel process?

The answer is still yes. This is not a can't do issue esp with new 4th gen civilian smr tech processes validating outsourcing of the same process.

As to the above, consider that DCNS is now developing the flexblue for export sales and that does not require host country to set up waste management facility. US is not the only option.

No they cannot outsource in the manner you describe. In Australia all high level radioactive materials and urnaium ores are managed under the non-proliferation agreement and safeguard requirements. This is a government to governemnt function.

We cannot even export U308 without ASNO in DFAT giving the go ahead and a permit being issued by DRET. For high level materails all levels of goverment are involved in the process of moving fuel and wastes where they have any sort of regulatory oversight. Civilian assest are certainly central to the process but it is at government agreement.

Generally those who use the fuel rods are reaponsible for them but the source of the reactor technology also plays a significant part in setting up such arrangements (as indicated by GF).. If we were to accept technology from a supplier (as we did with Brazil for OPEL) part of the agreement will be how fuel is provided and how wastes are managed. These wastes will come home after reprocessing in storage form; as they have for HIFAR (and the previous small research reactor) and will be the case for OPAL ....... nobody is going to accept waste from a country who has enjoyed the benifit of the use of the fuel but want to distance themselves form managing the by product.

 

[SASWanabe]

realisticly would it be possible to just stick a whole heap of batterys where the virginia's reactor is? would it still be effective as a sub or too slow/not enough submeged time?

 

[JoeMcFriday]

Strategic Influence

Hi Galrahn,

Among all of the interesting points you make I found this passage to be very pertinent:-

"Remember, to have strategic influence, Australia would need to have strategic capacity not only to influence China, but also the United States. The plan today never gives Australia enough capacity in force to influence either. As a stakeholder, that might not be in Australia's best interest."


I'm not convinced Australia's political leadership [on both sides of the House] is mature enough to attempt exerting "strategic influence". Actually I think the mere thought of being responsible for truly strategic actions would scare the heck out of the majority. Even more frightening though, some may try, akin to giving a child a loaded gun.

They'll talk up 'our influence on strategy' in the region, for mainly domestic consumption IMO but have habitually fallen well short of actually equipping the ADF to be a strategic influence. Tactical force in parts, yes, strategic no.

The Australian military leadership has historically shown a far better grasp of future major events, usually advising clearly on the strategy and equipments required to best prepare the nation. Govts of all flavours have usually managed to ignore such advice until much too late.

I regard the latest round of our military purchases [while most welcome] as improving our tactical ability but not greatly changing our strategic weight in the context you suggest.

What's in a name? I can see where, no matter how capable, 12 Collins/2 subs would be seen as tactical boats and 12 SSN seen as strategic in political circles. The psychological effect of 'SSN' to 'SSG'?

However, I feel only direct, heavy US political involvement, tied to deals on bases, infrastructure etc. would have any chance of that strategic force replacing the SSGs or even being discussed seriously.

Would you regard an aircraft carrier [Brit. CV/F class] as a useful instrument of "strategic influence" or only SSNs, again in the context of your post?
As an observer, I see very little chance of AUS getting a CV but that's still a better chance than getting 12 SSNs.

We have another thread running here, 50+ pages on a "Hypothetical carrier buy for the RAN". In that thread I know of less than a handful of times the strategic value of a real carrier to Australia has been raised. On only one occasion that I can find has its potential political value to Australia been specifically raised.

Almost all of the discussion has focused on tactical applications, scenarios, light carriers, CAS, CAP, cost etc. No discussion has delved into the strategic value a CV would provide on the international stage.
This suggests that strategic value doesn't have a high profile ATM.

Despite what I stated earlier about our political scene, I would like to see Australia take the next step to a more independent stance within our alliances. What else could we as a nation do, besides SSNs to achieve this?

The new ships are a worthy start, no more begging for sealift is a good thing, but they alone don't alter our wider strategic influence much do they?

I hope your post raises the visibility of the strategic issues facing the Western Pacific/Asian areas above the [understandably] purely tactical issues dominating more localised discussions.

I liked your latest posting at InfDis BTW, the links between the pirates and others have been raised here as well. A bad scene, which will only get worse, I fear.

Cheers,
Mac