NZDF General discussion thread

[MrConservative]

Per Tod's post, the specs being talked about for the ANZAC II are quite different to ANZAC. There's some information here on what the vessel is supposed to look like capability-wise, although I realise it's early days yet:

Defence Capability Plan 2009 - Public Version - December 2010 Update

Early last year Janes Defence Weekly had an article stating that the RN and the RAN were in talks about creating synergies in respect to the Anzac II / Type 26 as well as the C3 / OCV.

Is this progressing or are there too many interests / agenda's that will derail it.

I do remember that there was interest in this from our own Dr Mapp when this development was replorted. I also note that the design parameters of the RN's C2 are yet undefined and that the Canadians will be looking for a Halifax replacement around the same time as the Anzac II project comes to fruition.

Personally, I would love to see a way forward whereby the old four "Dominions" could work together in what could end up being 100+ vessels across the 3 platform/hull types. It might mean in terms of a surface combantant the RAN may choose 8 high end derivatives (A2/T26) and the RNZN 3 General Purpose (C2) derivatives with the Canadians and RN a mix of both.

I am waiting to see if indeed the C2 design (General Purpose Frigate) sees the light of day. Will it be a 5000t hull or a lower spec derivative of the propose 7000t hull.

 

[jeffb]

Early last year Janes Defence Weekly had an article stating that the RN and the RAN were in talks about creating synergies in respect to the Anzac II / Type 26 as well as the C3 / OCV.

Is this progressing or are there too many interests / agenda's that will derail it.

I remember talk of information sharing, there didn't seem to be any talk of a common design or production. Given recent history I would be pretty surprised if the talks resulted in that as well.

Regarding a joint P8 buy, its obvious to see why the NZDF would be interested but would there really be anything in it for the ADF? There would be little if any difference in unit cost due to the number of aircraft the NZDF would be purchasing while it could have a negative affect on the delivery schedule of P8s to the ADF. It would also add some more risk to the purchase due to the somewhat unstable nature of NZ defence policy.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Reading through some of this thread & some others has made me a little curious as to the current state of the ADF/NZDF relationship. These days is there really that much common ground between them? Its been a long time since the ANZACs were conceived and a lot has changed.

Its quite tight. Even when NZ and the US fell out Aust was still providing NZ with material - and the US certainly was. Publicly it was visibly different, but it wasn't severed. Aust certainly maintained active ties with NZ

Both seem to be going in completely different directions, ADF focusing on Asia, NZDF focusing on the Pacific.

we're both playing in the same space so I'm not so sure you're correct here. NZ has always had a bigger footprint in micronesia due to cultural links. NZ is very much focused on Asia even if its not coming across in the press

Procurement paths are heading in completely different directions and for the few things they do both have interests in you could almost argue the small amount the NZDF would buy would almost be more trouble than its worth to the ADF.

we've had different procurement paths basically ever since WW2, that doesn't alter the fact that we do have common platforms in some areas where savings are to both our benefit

Given what we've heard about the ANZAC replacements so far I'd be surprised if the NZDF would be interested.

from crew or from the press or a friend of a friend of a relatives friend?

Is there really anything left in it for either country?

we're tight across the INT space, specwarrie issues, mil exercises and at the foreign policy level - I assume that press in NZ is fundamentally disinterested and it doesn't end up with the general public.

At a Govt to Govt level its quite strong, and I would think that the NZ Govt has been more than appreciative of the fact that NZ was kept in the intel loop even though the US nuke issue was overplayed for public consumption. Even the US kept some of the tap on - irrespective of what was portrayed to the public by local politicians.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Personally, I would love to see a way forward whereby the old four "Dominions" could work together ...............

the wild card is NZ here

there's nothing wrong in the 4I's relationship - that has been quite strong and remains so. UK has made it pretty clear that she wants to increase her presence in this region and wants to re-engage with Aust and her old "familiars"

the issue is the depth of the 5I's relationship and that's entirely contingent on how NZ wants to engage. the brutal reality is that if 5I's stagnates, then the remaining partners are still engaged through 4I's.

in absolute terms, the only one who has anything to lose is actually NZ.

 

[ngatimozart]

Early last year Janes Defence Weekly had an article stating that the RN and the RAN were in talks about creating synergies in respect to the Anzac II / Type 26 as well as the C3 / OCV.

Is this progressing or are there too many interests / agenda's that will derail it.

I do remember that there was interest in this from our own Dr Mapp when this development was replorted. I also note that the design parameters of the RN's C2 are yet undefined and that the Canadians will be looking for a Halifax replacement around the same time as the Anzac II project comes to fruition.

I had a look at the link

Personally, I would love to see a way forward whereby the old four "Dominions" could work together in what could end up being 100+ vessels across the 3 platform/hull types. It might mean in terms of a surface combantant the RAN may choose 8 high end derivatives (A2/T26) and the RNZN 3 General Purpose (C2) derivatives with the Canadians and RN a mix of both.

I am waiting to see if indeed the C2 design (General Purpose Frigate) sees the light of day. Will it be a 5000t hull or a lower spec derivative of the propose 7000t hull.

It would be nice to see us the RAN, Poms and Canadians work together on such a project but given the recent drastic cuts to Pommy Defence, IMHO it would be doubtful about such happening in the near future or medium term. The Poms have axed completely their fixed wing ASW (Nimrod) capability, their carrier capability in the short to medium term, plus other assets like the Harriers and Tornado strike force. They are replacing the 2 carriers 1:1 but only 1 will be crewed and operational whilst the other will be basically tied up permanently alongside. But after the very recent cuts I don't know if they will go ahead with construction of the second carrier.

If we exclude the Poms from the mix and replace them with the US that might be a more viable scenario because the US will not take the same path in defence cuts that the Poms have. It would be political suicide for either political party in the Senate or Congress, to entertain the idea of such drastic cuts to defence, no matter how logical or sorely needed. The American public would spit the dummy and toss all their toys out of the cot over it. Then you would have to factor in what the Soviets used to love calling the "US military - industrial complex" and in a way that is an apt description of the links between the Pentagon and private corporations. The defence industry contributes a lot to the US economy both directly and indirectly and with US unemployment running at around 9% none of the US political players are going to seriously do a UK style hatchet job on US defence. Secondly the US has security issues with the military rise of China so that too I think would preclude a significant hatchet job on defence.

I had a look at the link that Bonza so kindly put up and one of the impressions I got was that our Aussie mates want to do as much of the construction as possible in Australia. IMHO they seem to be working towards the possibility of less reliance upon external sources for arms which makes sense in one way. But also the down side, IMHO, is as technology advances the research and development costs increase exponentially and that is one reason why the F35 JSF programme is structured the way it is.

So back to the original discussion. Building on Mr Conservatives scenario of a joint program looking at a future destroyer / frigate replacement for the RAN, RNZN and Canadian Navy. This could be a modular design that could be used both as a destroyer and a frigate therefore having a high degree of commonality reducing both building and ongoing maintenance costs over the ships TOL. (A la Meko) The modular design would allow for the easy incorporation of specific mission modules allowing different mission capabilities to be built on a standard hull. The difference between destroyer and frigate would be tonnage and scale. The 4th party in this project could be either the US Navy or the RN depending upon economic circumstances, but not necessarily restricted to those two navies.

 

[ngatimozart]

the wild card is NZ here

there's nothing wrong in the 4I's relationship - that has been quite strong and remains so. UK has made it pretty clear that she wants to increase her presence in this region and wants to re-engage with Aust and her old "familiars"

the issue is the depth of the 5I's relationship and that's entirely contingent on how NZ wants to engage. the brutal reality is that if 5I's stagnates, then the remaining partners are still engaged through 4I's.

in absolute terms, the only one who has anything to lose is actually NZ.

And that is one factor I excluded from what just put up about a scenario for a destroyer / frigate replacement. Much to my disappointment Kiwi politicians and public give defence issues a very low priority and tend to rest on laurels earned by a previous generation. The last Labour government of Helen Clark (1999 - 2008) did a lot to damage our defence credibility and she was a PM who never held a real job. She studied political science at university and went straight into politics. Unfortunately she had advisers of similar ilk who did not understand the reality of the real word with regard to defence and security. I could be wrong but I do not think any of them ever served in our nations armed forces.

 

[MrConservative]

the wild card is NZ here

there's nothing wrong in the 4I's relationship - that has been quite strong and remains so. UK has made it pretty clear that she wants to increase her presence in this region and wants to re-engage with Aust and her old "familiars"

the issue is the depth of the 5I's relationship and that's entirely contingent on how NZ wants to engage. the brutal reality is that if 5I's stagnates, then the remaining partners are still engaged through 4I's.

in absolute terms, the only one who has anything to lose is actually NZ.

Yes. It is very early days in regards to NZ being back properly at the 5I's table (May 09), and rebuilding other players confidence is a priority. There is definite motivation to move ahead on this from the Key Government and a number of proactive steps have recently been made.

 

[MrConservative]

I remember talk of information sharing, there didn't seem to be any talk of a common design or production. Given recent history I would be pretty surprised if the talks resulted in that as well.

Regarding a joint P8 buy, its obvious to see why the NZDF would be interested but would there really be anything in it for the ADF? There would be little if any difference in unit cost due to the number of aircraft the NZDF would be purchasing while it could have a negative affect on the delivery schedule of P8s to the ADF. It would also add some more risk to the purchase due to the somewhat unstable nature of NZ defence policy.

Well Jeff, I hope they can move their discussions towards commonality of design. Economies of project scale would be beneficial cost wise.

Yes the timing of P-8 acquistition does not match regarding the NZDF and ADF. There is at least a 7 year gap. Four P-8's and have been indicated in recent NZ MOD documents.

I would say that any western democractic country with the probable exception of the US is always at risk from wide variations in political policy when it comes to defence. NZ defence policy was very stable and bi-partisan for the majority of last century. It quickly changed in the mid 1980's and only now has it begun to swing back towards normalcy. Still some way to go.

The ascendency of the urban liberal / leftwing faction within the ALP in co-alition with the Greens could drastically alter Australia's Defence Policy outlook.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The last Labour government of Helen Clark (1999 - 2008) did a lot to damage our defence credibility and she was a PM who never held a real job. She studied political science at university and went straight into politics. Unfortunately she had advisers of similar ilk who did not understand the reality of the real word with regard to defence and security. I could be wrong but I do not think any of them ever served in our nations armed forces.

the political problem for NZ was that they were seen as hypocrites by the americans, not because of the fact that NZ wanted a nuke weapons declaration made on any US assets entering her waters, but the fact that made a song and dance about being independant and "sticking it" to the US. The problem was that they were quietly and happily still receiving money and low level INT from the US and keeping their public in the dark about it.

there was a pretty clear view that NZ had the right to make those calls, but to really man up the govt should not have continued to accept port fees rates from US scientific assets which were still "US Govt", and expect FMS rates on gear.

I think the problem for any current and future NZ Govts will be the integrity test of being up front and not using the USG (for example) as a local politics emotional football. Considering that the US was still quietly handling over INT to the NZG then they've been pretty good to take those hits on the chin.

but as you say, the current govt is trying to do its best to repair things and turn things around - its made easier by the fact that the USG never really left at the real level, it was just the publicly obvious things like ship visits were effected. (and some of the more detailed INT was turned off, even though the US "knew" that it was probably being shared at some level.. obviously not all of it could be, but NZ didn't get turned off completely)

On the issue of shared platforms, I do think there are lots of opportunities for NZ to co-purchase, eg NZ can come under some of the FMS contracts negotiated by Aust rather than go through the 2 years herself that they can take to negotiate through State. eg, INT boxes, specwarrie gear, C2/3 gear etc.....

 

[ngatimozart]

the political problem for NZ was that they were seen as hypocrites by the americans, not because of the fact that NZ wanted a nuke weapons declaration made on any US assets entering her waters, but the fact that made a song and dance about being independant and "sticking it" to the US. The problem was that they were quietly and happily still receiving money and low level INT from the US and keeping their public in the dark about it.

there was a pretty clear view that NZ had the right to make those calls, but to really man up the govt should not have continued to accept port fees rates from US scientific assets which were still "US Govt", and expect FMS rates on gear.

I think the problem for any current and future NZ Govts will be the integrity test of being up front and not using the USG (for example) as a local politics emotional football. Considering that the US was still quietly handling over INT to the NZG then they've been pretty good to take those hits on the chin.

but as you say, the current govt is trying to do its best to repair things and turn things around - its made easier by the fact that the USG never really left at the real level, it was just the publicly obvious things like ship visits were effected. (and some of the more detailed INT was turned off, even though the US "knew" that it was probably being shared at some level.. obviously not all of it could be, but NZ didn't get turned off completely)

On the issue of shared platforms, I do think there are lots of opportunities for NZ to co-purchase, eg NZ can come under some of the FMS contracts negotiated by Aust rather than go through the 2 years herself that they can take to negotiate through State. eg, INT boxes, specwarrie gear, C2/3 gear etc.....

The problem was not us making a song & dance about the issue as stated by gf0012-aust, but the US reaction in 1985 when the legislation was enacted. This reaction was the driving force behind the Kiwi attitude towards the US, defence and foreign relations since. The interesting point is that the nuclear legislation did not have overwhelming public support. If memory serves me correctly I think it had far less than 50% public support. The main reason for the Lange Labour government electoral success in 1984 was the public dislike for the Muldoon autocratic & dictatorial style of government as well as the very poor economic performance and outlook. When David Lange took office in 1984 NZ Inc was literally bankrupt. In his first term he got the nuclear legislation passed into law which upset the US no end. The Americans do not like being told what to do and their reaction almost bordered on the hysterical with all sorts of dire claims. They demonised Lange and NZ and all that did was turn the majority of the country who did not support the legislation into fervent supporters of it.

NZ hypocrites? No. If anything the nuclear issue was an issue of principles and successive governments have stood by that law. Yes we did stick it to them and sometimes you do have to stand up and man up for your principles. In the end the US have dealt with their issues over it and we both have moved on. The science that gf0012-aust talks about is wide and varied from Antarctica to astronomy to geology. The only issues between the NZG and the USG was the nuclear issue and as to port fees, well the only thing I can think of is the US Antarctic Program that is based in Christchurch and any "port fees" would go to the airport company. Cooperation between NZ and US on Antarctica has been long-standing with a permanent US Navy detachment based in Christchurch until 8 odd years ago (I think) when it was replaced by the US Air Force who operate C17's & C130's to McMurdo along with the RNZAF C130's. Also the RNZAF have trialled the Boeing 757 at McMurdo on the ice runway with the intention of using that for Antarctic flights and have on occasion based a P3K down there. As to the claim of NZ quietly receiving money from the US an example or two would be appreciated please for clarification.

With regard to intelligence sharing. Prior to 1984 NZ along with Australia, Canada, UK & US was & still is part of the Echelon programme. As far as I am aware it has operated in the same capacity regardless of any public statements regarding intelligence and security operations issues between NZ and the US, much to the chagrin of some in the Clark Labour government (1999 - 2008). The interesting thing about intelligence operation's is what is not said.

What has shaped NZ defence policy and public attitudes towards defence and the US in particular was the US reaction to the nuclear legislation. The Reagan administration was on a crusade and little old NZ by not allowing nuclear weapons into its territory had turned to the dark side. Secondly still with the nuclear issue, French nuclear testing at Muroroa Atoll had always been a sore point in NZ. In 1973 the government sent a frigate (HMNZS Otago) complete with Cabinet Minister to Muroroa as a protest. In 1985 the French blew up and sank the Greenpeace ship, Rainbow Warrior in Auckland. In the 1990's we again sent a frigate and Cabinet Minister to protest the nuclear testing at Muroroa. Thirdly and the largest impact upon the NZDF was the political, social & economic change that occurred in NZ from 1984 - 2008.

Literally overnight NZ went from being the most regulated economy in the world to being the freest. Pre Lange it was illegal to move freight more than 50km by truck. That was to preserve the Rail monopoly. In order to buy margarine you had to get a doctors prescription - that was to protect the dairy industry and so on. In the early 1980's the Muldoon government replaced 2 old frigates (Otago & Taranaki) with 2 second hand ones from the RN (HMS Dido & Blackpool). (HMNZS Southland & Wellington). RNZN were not that keen preferring 2 new frigates which would have been a more logical choice in the long term. But they were over ruled; it being a political decision which in the end proved detrimental to the RNZN & the country. In 1990 I was in the RNZNVR on Kiwi which was an IPC. We were participating in the 50th anniversary of the RNZN formation along with Southland. Whilst at Nelson a young rating on Southland was wire brushing the inside of the hull when he put the brush through the side of the hull. This was not an uncommon occurrence on both ships. They kept quite a few concrete firms financially solvent.

So to sum it all up, when we look at the NZDF and the wild swings in NZ defence policies as well as the public attitude towards defence and the US, it has to be looked at in the context of the economic, social and political upheavals that have occurred in the fabric of the NZ landscape from 1984 - 2008. I think that it is only very recently that these swings might be less wild.

 

[Lucasnz]

I am waiting to see if indeed the C2 design (General Purpose Frigate) sees the light of day. Will it be a 5000t hull or a lower spec derivative of the propose 7000t hull.

If NZ was looking for a pure ANZAC replacement the C2 seems the most logical replacement given the the natural increase in displacement that seems to be occurring in surface combatants, not to mention the ANZAC's are starting to max there design weight. To buy a C1 type ship is I think a step to far for NZ, but one we may have to take if NZ is to continue to contribute to ET type operations. Given you don't need a C1 for operations in the Pacific or even embargo operations in the Persian Gulf, I think the C2 is the politically best option.

Yes the timing of P-8 acquistition does not match regarding the NZDF and ADF. There is at least a 7 year gap. Four P-8's and have been indicated in recent NZ MOD documents.

Four I think would be on the light side, especially if you want to retain one of 24 SAR standby.

So to sum it all up, when we look at the NZDF and the wild swings in NZ defence policies as well as the public attitude towards defence and the US, it has to be looked at in the context of the economic, social and political upheavals that have occurred in the fabric of the NZ landscape from 1984 - 2008. I think that it is only very recently that these swings might be less wild.

True; the economic and political upheavals did influence public attitudes towards Defence. However the political upheavals and change to defence thinking were laid in the 60/70 Anti Vietnam peace movement. It was that generation that has controlled Defence policy and spending since the mid 80's. I agree that the swings are starting to get less wild as a new generation of politicians start to enter parliament - hopefully with it will come some common sense.

 

[Todjaeger]

The problem was not us making a song & dance about the issue as stated by gf0012-aust, but the US reaction in 1985 when the legislation was enacted. This reaction was the driving force behind the Kiwi attitude towards the US, defence and foreign relations since. The interesting point is that the nuclear legislation did not have overwhelming public support. If memory serves me correctly I think it had far less than 50% public support.

Just a correction here, and NOT to start and argument on who is morally right/wrong regarding nuclear power and weapons.

The incident which caused the initial trouble between the US and NZ regarding nuclear power/weapons occured when a Charles F. Adams-class DDG USS Buchanan was denied entry in Febuary of 1985, on the grounds that the vessel could carry nuclear weapons and US policy did not permit a statement confirming or denying the presence for nuclear weapons.

The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, which is what now requires Government to certify no nuclear power or weapons, was not passed for another two years, in 1987 and given Royal assent June 8th, 1987. As such, when the USS Buchanan incident occurred, it was due to Government policy, not law.

-Cheers

 

[MrConservative]

The US needed to react with strong displeasure as there was concern that the Japanese (who were in a far stronger position of global economic influence than today and posssesed greater geo-strategic importance) might be tempted to follow NZ's suit. Then an antinuke chain reaction may have eventuated around the region.

The anti-nuke issue was driven from within the feminist/academic faction of the Labour Government via Maragret Wilson as the Party's then Womens VP and also the parliamentary side from Helen Clark and Fran Wilde. They created huge pressure on the leadership via the liberal media and galvanising the grassroots party activists and union movement. In a nutshell their dream was for NZ to become a sort of neutral alligned and socially "progressive" and "principled" Switzerland of the South Pacific and it had to be said they sold that particular meme to the vox populi extremely well.

Muldoon was a typical Keynesian-Statetist and a poster boy for big government viz a viz eventual economic paralysis. It is a lesson for us to learn that Governments cannot fight change by putting up a myriad of restrictions and legislation. However he did try to maintain at least a credible defence posture. Though the purchase of two used frigates in the early eighties was problematic there was no realistic alternative. They were two extra Leanders replacing earlier Type 12's and new Frigates were not an option considering that NZ then had a GDP Public Debt of over 80%. Muldoon did pick up the 10 ex RAN A-4G's it must be said to his credit.

Yes the French role in the Pacific during the 1970's and 1980's was not actually helpful and kept the nuke issue very much alive even right through to the mid 1990's. As for NZ's role in the 5I's community even though it had long associations, it lacked the personnel, infrastructure and legal teeth to be an effective raw generator/contributor until the late 1970's. Hensley and Basset have written about the reduced military/intell parametres NZ had to work with effectively from 1985.

 

[RegR]

I also highly doubt a 1 for 1 P8 orion replacement due to cost however a mix of P8/UAV has been mooted so along with the new short range MPA we should not lose too much capability.
Id say 3-4 P8s along with 2-3 UAVs(maybe army could part fund 1 for land surveillance hours) combined with 2 MPAs should meet our needs.
As for the ANZAC IIs cost, size and fitout could be a problem however commonality, training and industry benefits should not be overlooked. min 2 preferable 3 would be ideal along with new NFH90s, we could get dummed down versions to satisfy the bank however future operations will dictate what the bare minimum is, either way should at least be an improvement on what we currently have.

 

[MrConservative]

I also highly doubt a 1 for 1 P8 orion replacement due to cost however a mix of P8/UAV has been mooted so along with the new short range MPA we should not lose too much capability.
Id say 3-4 P8s along with 2-3 UAVs(maybe army could part fund 1 for land surveillance hours) combined with 2 MPAs should meet our needs.
As for the ANZAC IIs cost, size and fitout could be a problem however commonality, training and industry benefits should not be overlooked. min 2 preferable 3 would be ideal along with new NFH90s, we could get dummed down versions to satisfy the bank however future operations will dictate what the bare minimum is, either way should at least be an improvement on what we currently have.

You have picked right on the money RegR.

Cabinet Strategy Document STR Min (09) 2511 outlines the optimised
Maritime Patrol Package once the P-3K2 retires in 2025.

4 x Boeing P-8
5 x Short Range Surveillance and Tactical Transport Aircraft (Rumoured CN-235/295)
3 x Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Rumoured RQ-4)

Plus
Sat-Com & Sat-Surv capability (Possible Multi-Agency NZGOVT).

 

[ngatimozart]

I also highly doubt a 1 for 1 P8 orion replacement due to cost however a mix of P8/UAV has been mooted so along with the new short range MPA we should not lose too much capability.
Id say 3-4 P8s along with 2-3 UAVs(maybe army could part fund 1 for land surveillance hours) combined with 2 MPAs should meet our needs.
As for the ANZAC IIs cost, size and fitout could be a problem however commonality, training and industry benefits should not be overlooked. min 2 preferable 3 would be ideal along with new NFH90s, we could get dummed down versions to satisfy the bank however future operations will dictate what the bare minimum is, either way should at least be an improvement on what we currently have.

I apologise for incorrect dates of anti nuclear law and as Todjaeger has correctly noted the dates it was made law and I agree that it was NZG policy to ask if the USS Buchanan was carrying nuclear weapons. The USG did have a neither confirm nor deny policy, but I am sure that if they were a trifle discrete and far less strident then an accommodation could have been reached that satisfied all parties concerned. But 20:20 hind sight is a wonderful thing and the game was played out as history records it.

As Lucasnz notes hopefully policy stability will become the norm. And then there are the bean counters. I was watching an item on Gareth Morgan, the economist, last night and he regards accountants (aka bean counters) as a far lower life form. With P8's and ANZAC II's we will need to have a minimum number that are operationally viable. That is allowing for 1 in transit, 1 training, 1 operational or at readiness and 1 in refit or scheduled maintenance. In the last 10 years we have not had that capability naval wise and historically we can prove valid arguments to support the minimum of 4 units. Again with the fitting out and arming, well the present government has to refit the P3K's to replace the ASW equipment that the previous government ordered removed. The argument for removal of the ASW capability was spurious, ideologically driven, flawed and short sighted fiscally because we now have to cough up more money to reacquire that capability.

History condemns those who do not learn from its lessons to repeat its mistakes and I wonder how many times will NZDF be condemned to repeat the mistakes of politicians because those same politicians have not learned from history.

 

[ngatimozart]

You have picked right on the money RegR.

Cabinet Strategy Document STR Min (09) 2511 outlines the optimised
Maritime Patrol Package once the P-3K2 retires in 2025.

4 x Boeing P-8
5 x Short Range Surveillance and Tactical Transport Aircraft (Rumoured CN-235/295)
3 x Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Rumoured RQ-4)

Plus
Sat-Com & Sat-Surv capability (Possible Multi-Agency NZGOVT).

Nice. Hope they stay with that. Maybe they might be looking at the A400M long term.

Since a fast mover ACM appears to be beyond NZDF fiscal capability I have copied the following from the Defense Update Website: Lethal Crop Dusters - armed and armored crop dusters U.S. counter-drug operations

"U.S. and international air forces are becoming interested and open to utilizing off-the-shelf equipment in low-intensity, counter-insurgency and counter-drug operations in remote areas.

The U.S. Navy is already evaluating an armed version of Embraer’s EMB-314 Super Tucano under a classified evaluation program known as ‘Imminent Fury’. The Navy is currently evaluating a single aircraft and is seeking a budget of $44 million to embark on a larger program. The Special Operations Command, Air Force and US Marine Corps are also interested in employing off the shelf assets for low-intensity Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and rapid target engagement. Armed Super Tucanos are currently operated by Brazil, Columbia, and the Dominican. Super Tucano can carry 1.5 tons of weapons, and can stay on a mission up to 6.5 hours."

This the key data for the EMB 314 Super Tucano / ALX Trainer / Light Attack Aircraft. (From Specifications: EMB-314 Super Tucano / ALX Trainer / Light Attack Aircraft - Air Force Technology)
Key Data:
Crew: Two (one pilot and one navigator)
Introduced: 2003
Number Built: 259
Manufacturer: Embraer SA
Operators: Brazilian Air Force, Colombian Air Force, Ecuadorian Air Force and Chilean Air Force
Dimensions:
Wingspan 11.33m
Length 11.42m
Height 3.97m
Weights:
Empty Weight 3,020kg
Loaded Weight 4,520kg
Maximum Take-Off Weight 5,200kg
Engines:
Super Tucano - Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6A-68A turboprop, 969 kW
ALX - Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6A-68/3 turboprop, 1,600shp
Propeller: Hartzell five blade, constant speed, reversible pitch propeller.
Fuel Capacity: 695l
Performance:
Range 4,820km
Endurance 6hrs 30mins
Cruising Speed 530km/h
Maximum Speed 593km/h
Manoeuvrability +7G and –3.5G
Rate of Climb 4,724ft/min (24m/s)
Service Ceiling 10,670m
Weapons:
Hardpoints 5
Maximum External Load 1,500kg
Guns - Two wing-mounted 12.7mm machine guns, One 20mm cannon fitted under fuselage pod
Other Weapons
General-purpose bombs and guided air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles
FLIR - AN/AAQ-22 SAFIRE
Air-to-Air Munitions - Two AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missiles, Two MAA-1 Piranha air-to-air missiles, Two Python 3/4 air-to-air missiles
Air-to-Ground Munitions - Four 70mm rocket launcher pods, conventional drop bombs, guided smart bombs

The reason I have included all the EMB314 Light Attack data is that this is a relatively cheap option for an ACW that actual fills a need that has been identified by both the US Army and US Marines. If NZDF bought this and used it in a light attack and FAC role, it would greatly extend the FAC capability of the ADF and also release some ADF assets for other missions. I am sure our Aussie cousins would be highly appreciative. Also it is far cheaper to have one of these loitering around a low intensity combat zone rather than a F/A 18 or even a Hawk. I've had a look at the RAAF site and they do their FAC (Joint Terminal Air Controller) training on the Pilatus PC 9. They have 4 dedicated PC 9 armed with smoke grenade dispensers for FAC. At some stage the RNZAF is going to have to replace the CT-4E Airtrainer and this could be an option that has a variety of capabilities.

 

[MrConservative]

Nice. Hope they stay with that. Maybe they might be looking at the A400M long term.

Since a fast mover ACM appears to be beyond NZDF fiscal capability I have copied the following from the Defense Update Website: Lethal Crop Dusters - armed and armored crop dusters U.S. counter-drug operations

"U.S. and international air forces are becoming interested and open to utilizing off-the-shelf equipment in low-intensity, counter-insurgency and counter-drug operations in remote areas.

The U.S. Navy is already evaluating an armed version of Embraer’s EMB-314 Super Tucano under a classified evaluation program known as ‘Imminent Fury’. The Navy is currently evaluating a single aircraft and is seeking a budget of $44 million to embark on a larger program. The Special Operations Command, Air Force and US Marine Corps are also interested in employing off the shelf assets for low-intensity Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and rapid target engagement. Armed Super Tucanos are currently operated by Brazil, Columbia, and the Dominican. Super Tucano can carry 1.5 tons of weapons, and can stay on a mission up to 6.5 hours."

The reason I have included all the EMB314 Light Attack data is that this is a relatively cheap option for an ACW that actual fills a need that has been identified by both the US Army and US Marines. If NZDF bought this and used it in a light attack and FAC role, it would greatly extend the FAC capability of the ADF and also release some ADF assets for other missions. I am sure our Aussie cousins would be highly appreciative. Also it is far cheaper to have one of these loitering around a low intensity combat zone rather than a F/A 18 or even a Hawk. I've had a look at the RAAF site and they do their FAC (Joint Terminal Air Controller) training on the Pilatus PC 9. They have 4 dedicated PC 9 armed with smoke grenade dispensers for FAC. At some stage the RNZAF is going to have to replace the CT-4E Airtrainer and this could be an option that has a variety of capabilities.

Back in about 2002 we looked at piggy backing onto the RAAF C-130J buy in. The magic number that NZDF/MOD came up with was 8 C-130J's plus 2 Boeings. With the Army proposed to expand from either 5400 to 6000 over the course of the next decade funding pathway permitting and with a purchase of initially 4 CN-235/295's then recent supporting DWP documents and OIA released Cabinet Papers have indicated that possibly up to 6 new Airlift aircraft (A-400M's have been mooted) may replace both the C-130/B757.

A Tucano / PC-9M is on the right track for a Advanced Pilot Trainer, but the tricked up combat versions such as the PC-21 and A-29 (EMB-314) head into a new territory that would involve essentially all the infrastructual set up and thru-life costs required in operating an Air Combat Capability albeit numerically small in numbers. So even though it seems the A-29 will be able to recover the missing Air-Land integration annual training hours missing since 75Sqd went in 2001, but how would it fair recovering the remaining 580 missing training support hours that 75Sqd gave the RNZN? Certainly better than the present circumstances, but is it the A-29 the optimal solution going forward?

Which begs the question – if we are going to embark down that course of what at first look is a poor mans ACF - is the A-29 (EMB-314) the right aircraft? Does it actually represent that great a deal fiscally? The unit cost from published sources is around USD$12m flyway per airframe. It is not an advanced trainer I understand, thus a number of Advanced Trainers say 9-11 airframes would still be needed. These from published sources are around the USD$9m mark flyaway. Thus to have a short squadron of say 10 A-29's would cost (as an extrapolated example) USD$120m and a similiar sized Advanced Training unit would be for example USD$90m - meaning that we are looking at spending well over USD$200m just on the fly-away costs alone and not the through life and support costs which is where the costs mount up. From that point you start getting into the economic law of opportunity cost and begin to factor in potential alternatives.

Though I think the A-29 is a fine aircraft, I struggle to see it being the panacea to our current capability gaps collectively in advanced pilot training, the missing 900 annual training support hours per Army/Navy since 2001, let alone being able to provide the components of air combat that we used to conduct (and in my view still require) under the former ACF. It is a great aircraft for those roles that Defences Forces require in Latin and South America – but is it right for a maritime country with a Defence Policy predetermined towards the Asia-Pacific region and what would be the deployment chain be like?

As for the CT-4E replacement – easy the CT-4F.

 

[ngatimozart]

Back in about 2002 we looked at piggy backing onto the RAAF C-130J buy in. The magic number that NZDF/MOD came up with was 8 C-130J's plus 2 Boeings. With the Army proposed to expand from either 5400 to 6000 over the course of the next decade funding pathway permitting and with a purchase of initially 4 CN-235/295's then recent supporting DWP documents and OIA released Cabinet Papers have indicated that possibly up to 6 new Airlift aircraft (A-400M's have been mooted) may replace both the C-130/B757.

A Tucano / PC-9M is on the right track for a Advanced Pilot Trainer, but the tricked up combat versions such as the PC-21 and A-29 (EMB-314) head into a new territory that would involve essentially all the infrastructual set up and thru-life costs required in operating an Air Combat Capability albeit numerically small in numbers. So even though it seems the A-29 will be able to recover the missing Air-Land integration annual training hours missing since 75Sqd went in 2001, but how would it fair recovering the remaining 580 missing training support hours that 75Sqd gave the RNZN? Certainly better than the present circumstances, but is it the A-29 the optimal solution going forward?

Which begs the question – if we are going to embark down that course of what at first look is a poor mans ACF - is the A-29 (EMB-314) the right aircraft? Does it actually represent that great a deal fiscally? The unit cost from published sources is around USD$12m flyway per airframe. It is not an advanced trainer I understand, thus a number of Advanced Trainers say 9-11 airframes would still be needed. These from published sources are around the USD$9m mark flyaway. Thus to have a short squadron of say 10 A-29's would cost (as an extrapolated example) USD$120m and a similiar sized Advanced Training unit would be for example USD$90m - meaning that we are looking at spending well over USD$200m just on the fly-away costs alone and not the through life and support costs which is where the costs mount up. From that point you start getting into the economic law of opportunity cost and begin to factor in potential alternatives.

Though I think the A-29 is a fine aircraft, I struggle to see it being the panacea to our current capability gaps collectively in advanced pilot training, the missing 900 annual training support hours per Army/Navy since 2001, let alone being able to provide the components of air combat that we used to conduct (and in my view still require) under the former ACF. It is a great aircraft for those roles that Defences Forces require in Latin and South America – but is it right for a maritime country with a Defence Policy predetermined towards the Asia-Pacific region and what would be the deployment chain be like?

As for the CT-4E replacement – easy the CT-4F.

I included the A-29 data as a guide of what was available technically and work from there. I agree we are focused in the Pacific and Asia, as we should be, but if we are brutally honest, we have very low probability of acquiring an ACW of 18 F/A 18, F5, F16 etc., or the ilk given especially because a) our of economic situation where we owe 85% of our GDP; b) there is at present no perceptible political will too travel that track; c) there is no foreseeable increase to Vote Defence from it's present 1% GDP. These are the realities we live in at the moment.

In recent years the Army has created the Commandos and the Rangers so an increase in numbers and levels of Special Forces. Our Special Forces do need air support and at present we don't have the capability of supplying that to it's full extent. We have to rely on others and whilst I am most comfortable having ADF and Pommy air support when it involves US air support I do have a few prejudices in that area usually revolving around accuracy.

It is agreed that NZDF does need some form of an ACW but there is disagreement in what form it should take. The following is a list of trainers and advanced trainers available at the moment:

* AT-6B Light Attack Aircraft / Trainer, USA
* C-101 Aviojet Basic and Advanced Military Jet Trainer, Spain
* EMB-314 Super Tucano / ALX Trainer / Light Attack Aircraft, Brazil
* Hawk Trainer / Light Combat Aircraft, United Kingdom
* Hawk Mk127 / Mk128 LIFT Lead In Fighter Trainer, United Kingdom
* HJT-36 Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer, India
* IAR-99C Soim Lead In Fighter Jet Trainer Aircraft, Romania
* Javelin AJT Advanced Jet Trainer Javelin Family of MilitaryJetTrainers, USA
* KT-1 Basic Trainer or Light Attack Aircraft, South Korea
* L159 ALCA Advanced Light Combat Aircraft, Czech Republic
* M-311 – Basic Jet Trainer / Light Combat Aircraft, Italy
* M-346 Master Advanced Fighter Trainer, Italy
* Mako Advanced Trainer and Light Attack Aircraft, Germany
* MB-339 Jet Trainer, Italy
* MiG-AT - Advanced Flight and Combat Trainer Aircraft, Russia
* PC-21 Turboprop Trainer, Switzerland
* Pilatus PC-7 Turbo Trainer, Switzerland
* Pilatus PC-9M Advanced Trainer Aircraft, Switzerland
* S211A Jet Trainer, Italy
* SF-260 Trainer Aircraft, Italy
* SK 60 Trainer Aircraft, Sweden
* T-1 Jayhawk Trainer Aircraft, USA
* T-38 Talon Twin-Jet High-Altitude Supersonic Trainer, USA
* T-45A/C Goshawk Trainer Aircraft, USA
* T-50 Golden Eagle Jet Trainer and Light Attack Aircraft, South Korea
* T-6A Texan II (JPATS), USA
* T-6B Advanced Primary Trainer, USA
* TAI Hurkus Basic Trainer Aircraft, Turkey
* Yak-130 Combat Trainer, Russia
This was collated by Training Aircraft - Industry Projects Category - Air Force Technology

Which begs the question – if we are going to embark down that course of what at first look is a poor mans ACF - is the A-29 (EMB-314) the right aircraft? Does it actually represent that great a deal fiscally? The unit cost from published sources is around USD$12m flyway per airframe. It is not an advanced trainer I understand, thus a number of Advanced Trainers say 9-11 airframes would still be needed. These from published sources are around the USD$9m mark flyaway. Thus to have a short squadron of say 10 A-29's would cost (as an extrapolated example) USD$120m and a similiar sized Advanced Training unit would be for example USD$90m - meaning that we are looking at spending well over USD$200m just on the fly-away costs alone and not the through life and support costs which is where the costs mount up. From that point you start getting into the economic law of opportunity cost and begin to factor in potential alternatives.

A very valid point and this I believe is the hard part. Any of the aircraft on the list above is possible candidate but also has points against it. I note that last year the government seriously looked at putting the AerMacchis back into service but in the end the financial outlay wasn't worth it because e.g., the engines were no longer manufactured and supported. So now they are scrap.

If we work on the principle that most of our overseas deployments will be in conjunction with the ADF then we do not have to be concerned with CAP. They have Wedgetails and FA 18Es and F35s for that. IMHO where we need to concentrate is the down low in the mud stuff and maritime interdiction and strike. We were once very good at both. So what I see as the challenge is a platform that enables us to support our Special Forces and ground forces at close quarters without relying on Tiger AH availability, have the ability to loiter for 3 - 5 hours over an area, be quick enough and armed well enough to deal with opposition attack helicopters, have basic air to air abilities to defend itself against air attack, be able to attack maritime targets and be able to act as an armed FAC. Now a fast mover can loiter around for a long time but it needs refueling and it uses up a lot of fuel. I can't see the ADF wanting to detail a FA 18 let alone a F35 on a low intensity combat mission that may require a long loiter time. Thats the economics as I see it.

So IMHO we have 2 challenges. a) to find a platform that will meet the above criteria but not break the bank and will be politcially acceptable; b) to find a platform that will fill a gap in the ADF because it is with them we tend to work the most. If by filling a gap or by strengthening something that they perceive that have a weakness in then we are doing them a good service and not reinventing the wheel so to speak.

I know we are a sovereign nation but IMHO we do have to work with the ADF and we have shed blood with them in the past and undoubtedly will do so again in the future. People might think that ANZAC has been devalued but I think not as recent events bear this out. But NZ does need to work on the ANZAC relationship and repair some of the damage done by the 1999 - 2008 Labour government. This may be a way of showing that the ANZAC ties are as strong as ever. Now we just got convince the politicians and bean counters.

A new use for bean counters. Maybe the Army can use them as IED detection and suppression units in Afghanistan. They can send them in before we deploy any vehicles which cost money and if they are damaged or destroyed by an IED then a lot more money has to be paid. The use of a bean counter as an IED detector and suppression unit would be very cost effective. It costs a lot of money to train a soldier.

 

[Gibbo]

....Again with the fitting out and arming, well the present government has to refit the P3K's to replace the ASW equipment that the previous government ordered removed. The argument for removal of the ASW capability was spurious, ideologically driven, flawed and short sighted fiscally because we now have to cough up more money to reacquire that capability.

I think you'll find the ASW suite was never removed from the P3's - they refused to upgrade it, so as I understand it the P3's are still train for ASW, just with an ancient & no-doubt unreliable sensor suite.

I am concerned that the DWP only gives scant reference to P3 upgrades, including the all important self-defence suite - the strongest wording is 'might'.

To me the word "might" in the current financial climate is effectively saying it's not a high priority & is therefore very highly unlikely.

My pick is the P3 won't see any further upgrades and that new ASW, self-defence suite, & new weapons will only come as part of the P3 replacement.