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SDSR: Expect the Worst and Hope for Slightly Better
14 September 2010
Update, 29 September 2010: As I rather expected the editorial below has quickly become dated. In particular the leaked letter from the Secretary of State for Defence, Liam Fox, to the Prime Minister, David Cameron, indicates that it may well be overly optimistic. The letter states:
... are [we] really prepared to see Defence spending reduced to this level. The impact on capability, particularly in the maritime domain, would be more substantial than one might imagine ....
Our decisions today will limit severely the options available to this and all future governments. The range of operations that we can do today we will simply not be able to do in the future. In particular, it would place at risk:
•The reduction in overall surface ship numbers means we will be unable to undertake all the standing commitments (providing a permanent Royal Navy presence in priority regions) we do today. Assuming a presence in UK waters, the Falklands and in support of the deterrent is essential we would have to withdraw our presence in, for example, the Indian Ocean, Caribbean or Gulf.
•Deletion of the amphibious shipping (landing docks, helicopter platforms and auxiliaries) will mean that a landed force will be significantly smaller and lighter and deployed without protective vehicles or organic fire. We could not carry out the Sierra Leone operation again.
•Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.
Separate reports indicate that the Prime Minister has ruled out any cuts in the Army before 2015, instead querying whether cancelling the Royal Navy's two new aircraft carriers (expected to cost £5 billion to complete) would really save just £1 billion.
Exercise Auriga in June 2010, the combined UK Carrier Strike and
Amphibious Task Groups being led by the American destroyer USS Barry
It’s been nearly two years since my last editorial, but I’ve decided to contribute my tuppence ha'penny worth to the rampant leaks and speculation surrounding the United Kingdom's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), whose findings are expected to be published in late October.
The UK's defence budget for 2010/11 is about £36.9 billion in 2010/11 in Total Departmental Expenditure Limit, or £33.62bn in actually spendable 'near cash'. Whilst this is undoubtedly a very large sum of money, it is also the same amount as was spent on the recapitalisation of the banks Lloyds and RBS, and it is dwarfed by other departmental budgets such as Work and Pension (£135.7bn), Health (£109.4bn) and Children, Schools and Families (£63.2bn).
The stated objective of SDSR is to "provide a coherent approach to security across Government and ... ensure that we have the right balance of recourses to meet our commitments”, the reality is that that deep cuts in defence spending are being sought. I expect the context behind this is well known to most readers, but to summarise there three main problems. Firstly the UK public sector is running a large budget deficit and the new Conservative-LDP coalition government is seeking real savings of at least 10%, and is targeting 20%, from all Departments except Health. Secondly, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been significantly under funded for a decade and faces an unfunded spending shortfall over the next ten years of approximately £37bn, over £20bn of which is taken up by the equipment and support programme alone (i.e. equipment the MoD has committed to buying but doesn’t have the money to pay for). And finally, the Treasury is pressing hard - and apparently successfully - for the £15-20bn Trident missile replacement programme to be funded from within the MoD’s remaining budget.
In the worse case, the cumulative effect of meeting these three demands will be a cut in UK defence spending of a third compared to current plans – which because of untouchable commitments such as pensions this probably equates to disbanding the Royal Navy (other than nuclear deterrent) and all of the "fast jet" part of the Royal Air Force. No wonder that American sources are suggesting that cuts of this magnitude will threaten the special relationship.
A number of interesting decisions already seem to have been made that may affect the outcome of SDSR:
1. An assumption that the UK will always operate as part of a coalition or an alliance (Green Paper, February 2010)
2. The “2020 option”, an assumption that the UK armed forces should be structured to support UK foreign policy goals at the end of the decade - this appears to be dangerously close to the infamous 10-year rule which lasted until 1932.
3. The assumption that civilians and civil servants cost as little as half of that of uniformed personnel performing the same role, and thus the greatest savings can be achieved by preferring cuts in the numbers of the later over the former. Whilst there are opportunities to utilize unformed personnel more effectively in front-line roles, the overall danger of a significantly worsened teeth-tail ratio is self evident.
One positive about SDSR is that it is a rare opportunity (arguably the first since 1998) for the Royal Navy to develop and sell a vision of its future that might be worth more than paper it’s printed on (e.g. Future Navy Vision, 2006). The RN has suffered grievously from ad-hoc cuts since 2003, with warships being paid off at short notice to achieve trivial immediate savings, and the construction of new ships either cancelled or repeatedly deferred. Given that the Royal Navy will be cut, the rest of this editorial speculates where these cuts might fall.
The elephant in the room is the sacrosanct 'Successor' (Vanguard-class replacement) project. There seems little doubt that at least three and probably four of these new ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will be built; the question is when and how they will be paid for. If the cost has to be met from the maritime share of the defence equipment and support budget, then the RN probably cannot afford to order anything else between now and late next decade given that its current (pre-cuts) planned shipbuilding budget for the next 10 years is about £14bn, and about £11bn of that is already on order.
There is also a direct link between Successor and the number of Astute-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) that will be built. Six of the later are least partially on order, with seven planned, but the MoD has been looking very hard at the impact of cancelling the final boat. The cancellation won’t save any money on construction costs as the underutilized facilities and staff will still have to be paid for in order to maintain the industrial capability to build Successor, but the running cost of a SSN (perhaps £40m per annum over a 25 year service period, but I can't find good recent numbers) will then be saved. On balance it seems likely that seven Astute's will be built as the MoD will probably slip the construction of the first Successor - the currently planned In-Service Date (ISD) is 2025 - by a few years in order to better fit in with American plans for an Ohio-class replacement, SSBN(X) (ISD 2029), with which it will share a common missile compartment design. To fill the resulting gap it will be necessary to build the seventh Astute as the construction rate for the class can’t be slowed any further (about one submarine every two years) without key staff leaving and skills atrophying between each submarine. The seventh Astute submarine will also add disproportionably to operational capacity as the RN's SSN force has to spend a lot of effort protecting the Vanguard class SSBN's. The new schedule will also allow the ending of Successor construction to dovetail with an Astute replacement - the first of class to enter service about 2035
The Secretary of State for Defence, Liam Fox made a speech on 13 August 2010 in which he validly described the need for armed forces with a “flexible, adaptable posture [that] will maintain the ability to safeguard international peace and security, to deter and contain those who threaten the UK and its interests, and where necessary to intervene on multiple fronts … capable of maritime-enabled power projection, the capacity to control air-space to guarantee freedom of manoeuvre and the ability to deploy land power with the logistical strength to sustain it”.
It’s impossible to imagine a better fit to the Secretary of State’s vision than the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike and Amphibious Task Groups. But cancellation of the new Queen Elizabeth-class future aircraft carriers (CVF) has for a decade been offered as the 'silver bullet' solution to the MoD’s funding crisis, and it is yet again being promoted with amazing success (at least in terms of column inches) by a segment of the media and defence establishment who seem to have a pathological hatred of any large grey warships that are able to carry aircraft. In practice – with over £1.2 billion in contracts already placed and the UK shipbuilding industry now totally dependent on the project - construction of the new carriers has almost certainly passed the point at which cancellation is viable under any rational criteria, however significant changes to the CVF programme are still quite possible. The most obvious problem is finding aircraft and helicopters to form air groups for the new carriers. The UK has theoretically committed to buying up 138 of the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to meet its Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement; indeed it has already ordered three of the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) JSF variant (designated F-35B). However there seems to be little chance that more than 50 JCA's (costing nearly £100 million each) will be affordable. One of the surprises of SDSR might be a decision to abandon the F-35B version for the F-35C which can carry a higher payload over a longer range. The F-35C is also slightly cheaper, but this will be negated by the cost of fitting at least one of the new carriers with two catapults and arresting gear. Adoption of the F-35C will avoid the dangerous looking 'rolling landing' technique that the UK has been studying for the F-35B in order to overcome its payload 'bring back' weight restrictions. Another potential advantage with the F-35C is that the Royal Navy would be able to cross deck aircraft with United States and French Navy aircraft carriers for the first time since 1978.
If SDSR did decide to go for the F-35C over the F-35B, it’s the second CVF - HMS Prince of Wales - that would be adopted to the operate the aircraft. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be completed largely as planned, including a bow ski-jump. She would initially operate Harrier's (assuming that they stay in service as currently planned until 2019). Thereafter she would operate as a super-sized helicopter carrier (LPH), effectively replacing HMS Ocean, with the possibility that funding priorities might eventually permit her to be upgraded to the same standard as Prince of Wales.
The biggest loser under SDSR is undoubtedly going to be the RN’s amphibious forces. If there is one significant national military capability that the UK is set to formally abandon in SDSR, it is opposed force projection from the sea. In terms of amphibious shipping, the last seven years has been a “golden age”, with a level of sea lift (full combat brigade) and capability unmatched since the Second World War. Unfortunately this period has also coincided with the demise of the Sea Harrier FA.2 fighter (i.e. no carrier based air cover), the diversion of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (i.e. no troops), and the similar focus of the Joint Helicopter Command on Iraq and Afghanistan (i.e. no helicopters). In general the Amphibious Task Group has been badly underutilized, with large scale exercises few and far between.
It seems very likely that the Corps of the Royal Marines will be absorbed in to the British Army and that the Largs Bay-class auxiliary landing ships will be sold. It also seems probable that HMS Albion and Bulwark will start to alternate in active service, with the emphasis on the use of their C4I command and control facilities, rather than their amphibious capabilities. HMS Ocean will probably last to about 2018 (although she is not aging well), whilst the Point-class Ro-Ro’s will continue to provide a useful commercially run contracted sea lift service for many years yet.
In terms of the RN’s escort force, the six Daring-class Type 45’s destroyers (survivors of the twelve once planned) are now finally entering service and the remaining five Type 42 destroyers can be expected to disappear in double quick time, certainly none will be left by 2013 at the latest.
Despite hopes to the contrary, it is also very likely that the four Type 22 Batch 3 frigates will soon decommission without replacement. These ships have high running costs - totalling over £130m a year - because of their large crews (over 250) and increasing age (20+). A rapid withdraw from RN service and their sale for further service with foreign navies whilst they still have some resale value seems a very likely fate in SDSR.
An early artists impression of the Type 26 Surface Combatant, which is due to start entering RN service early in the next decade.
The big question in relation to escorts is the replacement of the thirteen remaining Type 23 frigates – currently due to pay-off from 2023. The new Type 26 frigate (formerly referred to as the Future Surface Combatant) is now in the Assessment Phase, with BAE Systems Surface Ship Solutions being awarded in March 2010 a four-year, £127 million contract to design the ship. It’s hoped that the first of class will enter service in 2021, and ten units are reportedly planned. However the Type 26 will be a relatively large (6,850 tonnes) and expensive design (about £500 million each), and the words 'up to' seem all too likely to soon appear before 'ten units', followed by 'fitted for but not with harpoon, tomahawk, [etc]'. The usual hopes are already being expressed that the Type 26 design will be a major export success (e.g. Brazil is being mentioned), but these seem optimistic given its cost and high end anti-submarine warfare focus - an unaffordable luxury for all but handful of navies. Indeed, I have severe concerns as to the wisdom of a path that seems likely to eventually deliver five or six vessels at a date (the 2010's) when upgraded Type 23’s should still be potent adversaries to submarines, rather than building a larger number (ten?) of less sophisticated and lower cost general purpose that will keep escort force numbers above twenty and thus allow at least two or three units to be deployed around the world on tasks such maritime interdiction, anti-piracy and the protection of national interests.
The reluctance of the Royal Navy to buy 'second class' warships seems to set to continue to point where it is that or nothing. Similarly, the reluctance to 'buy American' or (even worse) 'European' off-the- shelf solutions will have to change - the UK and the RN can simply no longer afford to develop expensive and sophisticated naval weapon systems, radars, sonar's, command systems and other electronics that will then be manufactured and deployed in only tiny numbers.
The Royal Navy has already lost ownership of its fixed wing jet aircraft, and sadly its helicopter force is not in a much happier state. The Sea King HC.4 naval air squadrons of Joint Helicopter Command are set to be disbanded over the next 8 years. The mix of Merlin and Lynx (soon to be replaced by the ridiculously expensive Lynx Wildcat) helicopters perhaps made sense in the 1980's, but now seems ludicrous when even the USN can make do with one type (the SH60 Seahawk). As for the Sea King ASaC.7, the replacement Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) project has been moribund for years and anything that finally emerges will almost certainly be a RAF or 'joint' asset rather than RN.
In relation to mine countermeasures, the bottom line is that Royal Navy needs a deployable squadron of three or four vessels; this requires an overall strength of about seven or eight compared to the current sixteen. A decision needs to be quickly made between the Hunt class (more versatile) and the Sandown class (younger) and the other class should be disposed of.
For other minor warships a ruthless approach will again have to be taken if meaningful economies are to be achieved. For example the MoD can't afford the proposed replacement of HMS Endurance unless additional funding is supported by the Foreign Office; minor vessels such as the Archer-class will have to be eliminated or drastically reduced in number; economic zone and off shore protection tasking will have to be reviewed (yet again), and any hydrographical surveys beyond purely military needs must be funded commercially or by other government departments.
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Service has effectively been destroyed by the overly ambitious and ultimately unaffordable £2bn Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) programme - the chance of ideas such as the Joint Sea-Based Logistics ship ever seeing the light of day is now zero. Even the much lower cost and high priority MARS spin-off for new Fleet Tankers failed to gain funding approval last year. Sadly, it's now time to accept financial realities and disband the RFA. For single warship deployments, having an RFA vessel in company is economic madness - warships such as the Type 45 destroyers have very considerable endurance and can readily use allied replenishment vessels (usually American) and friendly ports when necessary. Also, RFA vessels are now regularly used as a poor mans frigate on the Atlantic Patrol Tasks North and South, when a genuine 'second rate' frigate with lean crewing would make far more sense. Of the existing RFA fleet, Fort Victoria and Fort George should be commissioned into the Royal Navy (armed and upgraded for operation with the Carrier Strike Task Group), whilst the two Wave-class tankers and possibly Argus and Diligence should be transferred to a commercial operator with sponsored reservist crews. If necessary an additional tanker could be chartered and economically fitted to support exercise duties around the UK out of Portsmouth, and arrangements entered in to with other EU navies to share auxiliary assets (certainly this is far more realistic than proposals such as sharing aircraft carriers!).
In other areas, the real cost effectiveness and utility of University Royal Naval Units and Royal Naval Reserve (at least in their current form) is very questionable and they should be shut down. In some instance, e.g. medics, a merger with nearby Territorial Army and RAF Reserve units might be appropriate.
A long hard look needs to be taken as to naval bases. Realistically, the reduced Royal Navy needs only two bases - Portsmouth for surface ships and Faslane for submarines. The location of refits - including nuclear submarines - should then be a matter for commercial competition.
Finally, the size of the Royal Navy will inevitably have to decline, excluding Royal Marines there are currently about 31,500 regular personnel, this seems inevitably heading downwards to perhaps 27,000.
In conclusion, I reluctantly look forward to publication of SDSR to see to what extent my pessimistic projections are realised, disappointed, or exceeded.
