Which new modern fighter jets being built today are less expensive? I don't know of any... But I agree, I think the EFV is too expensive as well... I would like to see something similar in concept for half that price...
High intensity forced entry by USMC?
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Could it be possible to just cancel the EFV and just buy more MV-22 and SH-60 helicopters instead for the ship to shore capability?
Why have marines storm beaches when they can just fly there and get there faster?
Yes the EFV has more armor than a helo but the helo can carry more weapons except for the 30mm chain gun.
But what I was thinking was cancel the EFV and buy more MV-22 Osprey's, SH-60 and AH-1Z helos which would be cheaper and get troops from ship to shore faster and at longer ranges.
Why have marines storm beaches when they can just fly there and get there faster?
Yes the EFV has more armor than a helo but the helo can carry more weapons except for the 30mm chain gun.
But what I was thinking was cancel the EFV and buy more MV-22 Osprey's, SH-60 and AH-1Z helos which would be cheaper and get troops from ship to shore faster and at longer ranges.
Well new and modern are not adjectives I used... but I'd imagine you can negotiate a JF-17 contract with a per unit flyaway cost less then that. I know for a fact second hand Fulcrums from VVS stock can be had for quite a bit less. But this is widely off topic.Which new modern fighter jets being built today are less expensive? I don't know of any... But I agree, I think the EFV is too expensive as well... I would like to see something similar in concept for half that price...
Why is it so expensive? Are it's amphibious capabilities that hard to develop? Where does it differ so fundamentally from an AVV-7 or from a BMP-3F?
The cost for the EFV was stated originally to cost about 12 million. I am using the price of 23 million as it was reported by Marine Corps Times. Both prices seem too high to me and I have no idea the reason why either cost estimates are so high.
But the idea that you just can use more aircraft to do the job just dose not work. Can you remember the results of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu? Without securing a high volume, low cost, reasonably secure, and defensible line of supply you are doomed. Air resupply conducted by air alone consumes all you air assets with just resupply only leaving all their other functions undone. And the farther you go inland the more the supply effort is just dedicated to maintaining the air resupply assets themselves. It is a no win situation. Regardless of how the first battle goes the last battle is won by the army that has the best logistics
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Well, if we take away this the only really logical reason for being able to cross such distances at high speed.
Surprising the enemy.
As I proposed before buying a less ambitious follow on AMTRAC and some additional LCACs should provide the USMC with the needed over the beach troop transports. And the LCACs give you the needed speed while also providing the ability to land vehicles which will be much more usefull once the Marines landed than the EFV will ever be.
The EFV is so expensive because they want a vehicle with high swimming speed, high troop capacity and a reasonable land combat capability. To get this into one package is a rather interesting engineering problem
Yes, that's why it is so expensive and the Americans have a knack for asking for very high end specs.
While surprise is important, it's not the only advantage. The faster the EFV equipped Marines are, the harder it is for the defence in a particular sector to react and for out of sector help to come in time to meet the landing force. And in modern high intensity war, the fight is also the fight of the reserves. The faster a Marine Division can get ashore, the less time the defenders have to react. In other words, it helps screw up a defender's ability act on his time based prepared plans.
There are only 3 ways for a defender to compensate for the EFV's speed in the Marine scheme of maneuver:
(i) To Fight Mobility with Mobility: Mobile, capable fast moving armoured reserves that have the capability to kill armour at every level (assuming that the reserves of a Brigade sector is a Battalion and the reserves of a Division sector is a Brigade) that move and operate under a SAM umbrella to neutralize American air power - which itself is vulnerable to detection and destruction by air power during their move to reinforce the 'front'/sector, as part of the defender's prepared defensive lines (but fighting Americans, mobility of reserves is always an issue unless there is air parity);
(ii) Pack the Front with a Tailored Force and Employ Counter Mobility Obstacles: Higher force densities, initially well hidden from American air power (until first contact), with lots of ATGMs (an ATGM platoon for every company sector) and engineer support (mines, IEDs and other obstacles), in other words a tailored force with some complexity (which is the greatest threat to the EFV); and
(iii) Defensive use of SSMs from Deep Positions: Use lots of artillery and surface to surface missiles (SSMs) to pre-designate kill boxes in the defence plan (which once fired will be subject to coastal counter battery by the USN). This means the defenders will need to rely on SSMs and predesignated kill boxes in the defence plans but in this case the defender must assume that their command and control network still works.
When the defender uses any or all of the three options against EFV equipped Marines, they will need to expose themselves. Further, during Desert Storm, because Saddam's forces were watching the coast of Kuwait via their prepared force disposition, the Americans could sneak in from the rear. And in defence you can't be strong everywhere. You have to make some guesses and choices and once committed, you as defender can only hope your plan works. And an important part of a defender's plan, besides attrition, is to slow the advance of the attackers/Marines. The faster the Marines are, the better they can break through and exploit.
Depending on terrain, it's not too difficult for defenders to hide a tank platoon or a tank company (from US Air power) but once it becomes a bigger sized armoured force (at Brigade sized reserves), it will will have a signature due to the logistics tail. It is these reserves that the Marines must force to appear in their landing and after the landing they need to force the reserves to displace to meet the Marine advance. Once the defender's reserves appears, only then, it can be killed but not till then.
For me the bigger issues are reserves and temp management. And that's my incoherent two cents, which I hope other posters can salvage and mold into a cogent discussion.
The US Marine would then lose speed of maneuver and the associated ills of slower speed.
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Let’s crunch some numbers.
Assumptions
2 scenarios. One with the landing force located 10 miles offshore, the other with it located 30 miles offshore.
An initial beachhead perimeter with a minimum radius 8 miles / 10 km must be established ASAP to protect the landing area from mortar fire. In most cases the perimeter radius will need to increase to 20 km for protection against 105mm artillery, or 30 km for 155mm, within 24 hours.
A Wasp class LHD with maximum assets:
-- 24x CH-46, each of which can deliver up to 25 infantry or 2½ tons of material. Let’s assume a round trip time of 30 minutes at both ranges. The Wasp can only spot 9 helicopters at a time.
-- 3x LCAC, each which can deliver a 75 ton load. Round trip time for each load is 1 hour at 10 mile and 1½ hours at 30 miles, including loading and unloading. The LCAC has to dock inside the LHD in order to accept the next load for the beach, which is a major bottleneck. You may be able to squeeze a 4th LCAC in without the AAV / EFV compliment, in effect giving the same rate of delivering supplies to the beach in the 30 mile scenario as the 10 mile scenario, but due to the bottleneck will confer little advantage beyond redundancy in the 10 mile scenario.
-- 40x AAV, each capable of transporting 3+21 infantry – or -- 40x EFV, each capable of transporting 3+17 infantry
Case 1 -- No AAV / EFV
At the end of the first hour you have delivered the equivalent of a battalion of light infantry, with another still onboard. A beachhead perimeter will not be complete until at least 2 hours. But it will be at least another day, probably 2 or 3, will be needed to get enough vehicles on shore to break out of the beachhead, unless the intent is to march out on foot.
Case 2 -- with AAVs
At the end of the first hour you have delivered the equivalent of a battalion of light infantry, with another battalion of mechanized infantry on board the AAV still inbound on the water, arriving in hour 2 for the 10 mile scenario or 5 hours for 30 miles. A beachhead perimeter will not be complete until at least 2 hours. The big difference is the number of infantry vehicles [AAV’s] that arrive under their own power, permitting the LCACs to concentrate on support vehicles and equipment (fuel, artillery, tanks, etc.). Break out from the beachhead can probably take place 1 or 2 hours after the bulk of the AAVs arrive.
Case 3 -- with EFVs
For the 10 mile scenario, by the end of the first hour you have the equivalent of 2 battalions, one light infantry/airmobile and a second mechanized on shore. The beachhead perimeter is complete, and the break out from the beachhead is ready to go. In the 30 mile scenario things just take an hour more.
One more final item, the EFV can keep up with modern tanks and IFVs, the AAVs are 1/3 slower.
Now let’s look at it from the defenders perspective:
For the defender the single most critical thing is time.
Time to find out that the attacker is landing, and where. Yes, I know the attacker has taken out the coast watchers and lookouts, and is knocking out or are jamming all the regular communications, but someone will always, eventually, make it back to headquarters when they start send out people to find out why they cannot contact anyone in the area.
Time to mobilize their forces and contain, disrupt, or counterattack the beachhead before the invading forces can break out and start a battle of maneuver.
Summary
Case 1
Because of the slow buildup of vehicles means that it will be several days before a land breakout can be mounted, this case is only workable if:
the enemy is so weak that his response cannot effect the outcome,
or the objectives are limited so that so that they enemy does not have time to respond before the attackers forces plan to withdraw,
or local air defenses (especially MANPADs) are weak enough to permit unrestricted airmobile close assault without ground vehicles,
or the landing location has only limited, and highly defensible access, which will also make the breakout phase difficult
or no surface vehicle (except LCAC) access is available or required.
Case 2
The 10 mile scenario may allow sufficient time for local forces to intervene in the breakout, but probably not to counterattack the beachhead.
In the 30 mile scenario the defender may have time to attack the beachhead before the arrival of the AAVs with local forces, naval fire support could prove critical to success. General reinforcements will be available to counter the breakout.
Case 3
In the 10 mile scenario EFV forces should be able to move directly from the landing to the breakout phase, leaving the airborne forces to establish the perimeter. High probability that local forces can be overrun before they can organize, possibly before they can be alerted.
The 30 mile scenario is midway between the 10 mile scenario and the Case 2 10 mile scenario, and could go either way.
I find your analyses to be simply brilliant. It is simplified, in that it assumes that the defending forces cannot quickly retask their air assets coming from other areas, like fighters and fighter-bomber to the scene fast enough to affect the breakout phase of the attack but then you can always add more what ifs to any scenario.
Just as an aside and this is not a criticism of your analyses. Are we are assuming that air superiority have been generally, though not absolutely, established before the assault begins or are we working on the assumption that the assault is being conducted concurrently with the establishment of air superiority? Ether by the full support of a Carrier task group or from within range land based assets.
Amphibious operations are not a field in which I have any great expertise so perhaps you could fill me in on two more things. First what would be the pre and post fire support plan to be by ships and naval aircraft? And second, if I know Marines they would want to get in their own ground air support in as soon as possible. When and with what priority would they bring in their own aircraft?
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Simple... continue to use the AAV7 (with some upgrades), create a new specification for a new amphibious combat vehicle, spend hundreds of millions of dollars developing it, then cancel it right before it's ready to field due to cost overruns/change of current operating environment/domestic politics. Repeat.
Hmmmm... I hope that wasn't to cynical....
F-15 Eagle
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No not at all that makes sense.Simple... continue to use the AAV7 (with some upgrades), create a new specification for a new amphibious combat vehicle, spend hundreds of millions of dollars developing it, then cancel it right before it's ready to field due to cost overruns/change of current operating environment/domestic politics. Repeat.
Hmmmm... I hope that wasn't to cynical....
Why don't they just use helicopters like the MV-22 and SH-60 to get troops from ship to shore instead of the EFV?
I say cancel the EFV and buy even more MV-22 and SH-60 helicopters.
I'd hate to be rude but... did you even read the thread?No not at all that makes sense.
Why don't they just use helicopters like the MV-22 and SH-60 to get troops from ship to shore instead of the EFV?
I say cancel the EFV and buy even more MV-22 and SH-60 helicopters.
Persistence. It's not just about transporting troops to shore, but about their protection subsequent to being landed. Armour and a stabilised heavy weapon backed by day and night sights is a very god friend to have if you are a grunt. Gunships overhead is nice - but may not be able to be maintained in extremely poor weather or in conditions where you may not have air superiority.No not at all that makes sense.
Why don't they just use helicopters like the MV-22 and SH-60 to get troops from ship to shore instead of the EFV?
I say cancel the EFV and buy even more MV-22 and SH-60 helicopters.
The essential problem with the EFV is the speed requirement which drove costs by increasing complexity and required a 2,800hp engine to enable a heavy IFV to water plane. While the capability (speed) sounds very useful it really doesn't matter if the program isn't affordable. The Corp should have settled on retaining a forcible entry capability with a new AAV that did not add in the high speed requirement if the requirement drives the cost so high the Corp ends up with a canceled EFV.
It's one thing to have a forced entry requirement. It's quite another to have such a requirement based on the amphibs remaining 30 miles offshore. In my view this driving requirement may be part of accepted doctrine but it's simply a fictional construct. If the area of operations can not be prepared to allow the amphibs within 10 miles of the beach then it's a matter of debate that the landing area has been properly prepared for the landing force.
Another issue is requiring an IFV to be the amphibious assault vehicle. The AAV is an infantry carrier. It would be interesting to see the size, cost, and complexity of a new AAV class vehicle with the EFV's speed requirement. This is worth mentioning because the USMC plans to field a light, med, and heavy infantry carrier (JTLV, MPC, EFV) and there is no compelling reason for the amphibious vehicle to be the heavy infantry carrier in this family and indeed quite a number of reasons why it should not- especially if it's required to water plane.
It's one thing to have a forced entry requirement. It's quite another to have such a requirement based on the amphibs remaining 30 miles offshore. In my view this driving requirement may be part of accepted doctrine but it's simply a fictional construct. If the area of operations can not be prepared to allow the amphibs within 10 miles of the beach then it's a matter of debate that the landing area has been properly prepared for the landing force.
Another issue is requiring an IFV to be the amphibious assault vehicle. The AAV is an infantry carrier. It would be interesting to see the size, cost, and complexity of a new AAV class vehicle with the EFV's speed requirement. This is worth mentioning because the USMC plans to field a light, med, and heavy infantry carrier (JTLV, MPC, EFV) and there is no compelling reason for the amphibious vehicle to be the heavy infantry carrier in this family and indeed quite a number of reasons why it should not- especially if it's required to water plane.
I was addressing the enemies ability to bring ground forces into play only. Once the forces break out of the beach head and disperse aircraft alone can no longer defeat them. These are all scenarios that assume that the landing location and time are unknown to the enemy before the attack is launched. If they are known, then you are screwed and have to call the landing off and start over. But only after you find and plug the leak that gave it away.
Air superiority over the landing zone would be necessary of course, hopefully for the rest of the battle as well. The Marines own aircraft, other than the helicopters, would probably be the last thing to come on shore, because of the large logistics tail required to support them.
I cannot help you on the pre and post fire support plan to be by ships and naval aircraft. I probably have even less expertise than you, I just like to think things through in a logical manner.
That said, I suspect that the pre fire support plan would be concentrated everywhere except the landing zone to maintain surprise if possible, unless you have to go into the teeth of fortifications, like in WWII. Only communications, command and control, and the electric grid probably.
Question for anyone out there – Is there an easy way to take out a cell phone network?
I don't know for sure, but... knock down the towers?
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Thanks @ My2Cents for the interesting and informative post. Gives me something to think about.
Meanwhile LGB managed to write down my own thoughts much better than I could.
My question is what changed? What made the USMC think that suddenly an AAV7 like AMTRAC isn't enough anymore and that the Corps needs the mother of all gold plated vehicles to perform it's missions.
I mean if a vehicle costs 2-4 times as much as the most expensive other combat vehicle in your armed forces than this is going to result in a serious budget dent. And as money doesn't grow on trees something has to give in order to get the needed number of EFVs. So what will it be? Less rotary assets? Less fast air? No LAV successor? Less training resources? Whatever it is it is IMHO highly probable that it will hamper USMC operations at least as much as a beast like the EFV enhances them.
Well, in the end SgtGunn's crystal ball might very well be right...
Meanwhile LGB managed to write down my own thoughts much better than I could.
My question is what changed? What made the USMC think that suddenly an AAV7 like AMTRAC isn't enough anymore and that the Corps needs the mother of all gold plated vehicles to perform it's missions.
I mean if a vehicle costs 2-4 times as much as the most expensive other combat vehicle in your armed forces than this is going to result in a serious budget dent. And as money doesn't grow on trees something has to give in order to get the needed number of EFVs. So what will it be? Less rotary assets? Less fast air? No LAV successor? Less training resources? Whatever it is it is IMHO highly probable that it will hamper USMC operations at least as much as a beast like the EFV enhances them.
Well, in the end SgtGunn's crystal ball might very well be right...
Here's my theory on where the EFV came from.
The USMC is worried about their future as an organization.
There hasn't been a large scale forced entry amphibious assault by the US since Inchon in the Korean War.
The only other major amphibious operation since Korea were the British landings in the Falklands - which were moderately large - and in many ways illustrate the risks posed to amphibious forces by the development of sea skimming anti-ship missiles.
Since Korea, the USMC has been primarily used in the exact same role as the army - though with more emphasis on light infantry forces. It has been used this way in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, the Gulf War i & II, and Afghanistan. I think the USMC is beginning to worry that eventually people are going to start seriously wondering why we have a very expensive amphibious warfare capable force that hasn't been used for its primary (and expensive) mission in 60 years. Once that capability is gone (dropped as irrelevant or made obsolete by changes in technology) the USMC becomes a redundant light infantry force just waiting to be downsized or axed in the name of deficit reduction and fiscal austerity. One way to try to remain relevant is to develop cool, high tech weapon systems that you can tout as the future of your service and keep amphibious warfare "relevant"- enter the MV-22, EFV, America-class LHA etc. Big expensive defense contracts for flashy gee-whiz systems make defense contractors happy, who then lobby congress (particularly the congressmen in whose states these weapon systems are built) to continue to fund the service and keep it alive.
I'm trying to imagine a scenario where the US would need to perform (and be able to do realistically) a large scale forced entry amphibious assault any time in the next 20 years. Iran? Maybe, but the Persian Gulf id very small, very easily mined, and the Iranian have an awful lot of shore and air launched ASMs to make that a fun place for an Amphibious Task Force to venture. North Korea? No real point. That war will be won in the air, and along the DMZ by the ROK Army - not by Inchon part Duex. Cuba? Irrelevant. Venezuela? Ditto - but it might be worth it just to see the look on Chavez's face..... China? No thanks!
I think the future of the USMC is not in large scale forced entry amphibious assaults but more as a rapidly deployable (from the sea) light combined arms force with a well developed sea borne special operations capability, which will probably mean a smaller USMC - the path followed by the UK and other NATO countries will a Marine force.
Adrian
The USMC is worried about their future as an organization.
There hasn't been a large scale forced entry amphibious assault by the US since Inchon in the Korean War.
The only other major amphibious operation since Korea were the British landings in the Falklands - which were moderately large - and in many ways illustrate the risks posed to amphibious forces by the development of sea skimming anti-ship missiles.
Since Korea, the USMC has been primarily used in the exact same role as the army - though with more emphasis on light infantry forces. It has been used this way in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, the Gulf War i & II, and Afghanistan. I think the USMC is beginning to worry that eventually people are going to start seriously wondering why we have a very expensive amphibious warfare capable force that hasn't been used for its primary (and expensive) mission in 60 years. Once that capability is gone (dropped as irrelevant or made obsolete by changes in technology) the USMC becomes a redundant light infantry force just waiting to be downsized or axed in the name of deficit reduction and fiscal austerity. One way to try to remain relevant is to develop cool, high tech weapon systems that you can tout as the future of your service and keep amphibious warfare "relevant"- enter the MV-22, EFV, America-class LHA etc. Big expensive defense contracts for flashy gee-whiz systems make defense contractors happy, who then lobby congress (particularly the congressmen in whose states these weapon systems are built) to continue to fund the service and keep it alive.
I'm trying to imagine a scenario where the US would need to perform (and be able to do realistically) a large scale forced entry amphibious assault any time in the next 20 years. Iran? Maybe, but the Persian Gulf id very small, very easily mined, and the Iranian have an awful lot of shore and air launched ASMs to make that a fun place for an Amphibious Task Force to venture. North Korea? No real point. That war will be won in the air, and along the DMZ by the ROK Army - not by Inchon part Duex. Cuba? Irrelevant. Venezuela? Ditto - but it might be worth it just to see the look on Chavez's face..... China? No thanks!
I think the future of the USMC is not in large scale forced entry amphibious assaults but more as a rapidly deployable (from the sea) light combined arms force with a well developed sea borne special operations capability, which will probably mean a smaller USMC - the path followed by the UK and other NATO countries will a Marine force.
Adrian
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No not all of it I don't have the time.
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I agree and this is where the MV-22 and the America-class LHA will still play a role for ship to shore.
Although I don't advise going below 200,000 marines IMO.