Paul G Buchanan
New Member
NZ quitting Afghanistan?
The refusal to send 50 trainers to help the Australians and Americans in Oruzgam after the Dutch leave is a clear sign that the Key govt is planning an exit strategy by the end of 2011. That, plus the use of the NZSAS as a rugby World Cup protection force (talk about overkill! What happened to CTTAG?) indicates that National sees the ISAF mission as doomed. The WC gives it the perfect cover for the withdrawal of the SAS in line with the planned US drawdown beginning in July 2011 (and which now looks to be slowed considerably relative to previous timetables).
Key said that because the Oruzgam training would occur off-base, he could not allow it because the risks were too high. Yet we have just read reports of NZDF EOD personnel coming under attack near Khost, which is a high-risk zone quite removed from the relatively safe confines of Bayiman. So he appears to want to have it both ways--quietly offering troops in high risk zones outside of the publicly discussed PRT and SAS deployments, but unwilling to commit more troops to an essential advisory/mentoring role that could keep NZDF personnel in theater past 2011.
I foresee the US switching from an "inkblot" (seize, hold, build) strategy to a "drones and bones" strategy as part of the proposed drawdown/withdrawal of troops next year. I have outlined the contours of this latter strategy in the Scoop article mentioned earlier on page 108. Should that happen the NZSAS could still have a role to play in pursuit of an ongoing contribution to a mission that, as I said in the other article referenced, is actually quite important for international security over the long-term. But as things now stand, it looks to be over and out for the NZDF by the end of next year.
The refusal to send 50 trainers to help the Australians and Americans in Oruzgam after the Dutch leave is a clear sign that the Key govt is planning an exit strategy by the end of 2011. That, plus the use of the NZSAS as a rugby World Cup protection force (talk about overkill! What happened to CTTAG?) indicates that National sees the ISAF mission as doomed. The WC gives it the perfect cover for the withdrawal of the SAS in line with the planned US drawdown beginning in July 2011 (and which now looks to be slowed considerably relative to previous timetables).
Key said that because the Oruzgam training would occur off-base, he could not allow it because the risks were too high. Yet we have just read reports of NZDF EOD personnel coming under attack near Khost, which is a high-risk zone quite removed from the relatively safe confines of Bayiman. So he appears to want to have it both ways--quietly offering troops in high risk zones outside of the publicly discussed PRT and SAS deployments, but unwilling to commit more troops to an essential advisory/mentoring role that could keep NZDF personnel in theater past 2011.
I foresee the US switching from an "inkblot" (seize, hold, build) strategy to a "drones and bones" strategy as part of the proposed drawdown/withdrawal of troops next year. I have outlined the contours of this latter strategy in the Scoop article mentioned earlier on page 108. Should that happen the NZSAS could still have a role to play in pursuit of an ongoing contribution to a mission that, as I said in the other article referenced, is actually quite important for international security over the long-term. But as things now stand, it looks to be over and out for the NZDF by the end of next year.