The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates

[1805]

Hmmm...

In your role within the procurement world, do you ever stop & wonder about how the equipment you're buying actually works ? :unknown

Do you have an understanding of the time spent in initial development, fixing the bugs in software so that the product operates correctly ?

....& do you understand the problems with modern procurement, forcing suppliers to provide stuff that they say is COTS, while it is in actual fact, a development model of new software in an old product, so they can get the software to a reasonable state, before fitting it to some new / similar hardware that's in the pipeline ??

That, is the modern model for software in military equipment, & by the time it's actually fitted to a ship, the supplier wants to do diddly-squat to fix any inherent bugs. :smooth

...Unless of course, the procurement people have actually negoatiated a contract that's got 'bells & whistles' & states they MUST, if it doesn't do exactly what it says in the contract.

..& how many times have these 'bells & whistles' been trimmed & whittled away by the procurement project manager, so that he looks good & the cost is low / looks cheap ?? :nutkick

Modern naval equipment really only gets software updates in a couple of ways....

#1.If it's written into the contract that in the warranty/support period, the supplier has been paid to fix all / any problems, so he must support it.

#2. There's a problem / bug in the software & the supplier has to fix it, but gets paid to do it !

#3. The supplier has designed the software so that it can grow thru the life of the equipment, but expects to renegotiate the contract every 3-5 years, so he constanly makes money.

#4. There is an operation requirement for a piece of equipment to be modified to cover off a newer role, which is an addition to the role it was initially bought for.


The Type-23 was / is a classic example of such an act, with the UK govt not fronting up for costs for thru life support of software(as it was too expensive to fix it) & only getting an update by default (at a discounted rate), 15years down the line after buying the 1st sets of equipment, due to a-n-other customer actually paying for the same software to be corrected, as it was full of bugs... :grab

So....

Do you think that suppliers are feverishly working away in little dark, back rooms, updating software for kit that's over 5 years old on ships that are in service, or are they actually just sitting back, waiting on the navy to pay for the privilage ??


Your thoughts..... :type


SA

Well I am not a software or hardware buyer, however I would assume all of the above have been applied they are not that different from private sector; who I can assure you are just as capable of botching it up. That said, there has been a big move towards buying off the shelf software and configuring or even hosted (effectivily renting the software) is more common, both models normally come with upgrades included. These are still far from cheap even to apply the batches, and hosting would be unlikely to be very suitable for military or at least frontline applications.

Once you buy software you are to a degree committed. What I have found in my limited dealings with software developers/integrators, they rarely say no to requirements, for them anything can be done....it can be at a price.

Mind a great deal of commerical software development is offshored to India, where developers are costing c1/4 of onshore rates. I think for a number of years IBM/Accenture and the likes, have employed more people there, than the US. This causes problems for UK MOD around security of supply and we are losing quality capability.

However the above and the issues you raise for me highlight the need for:

- Robust procurement/legal engagement in contracts around exit/warranty (as you said)
- A clear vendor strategy - to provide/share clarity short/long term direction etc.
- Great commercial skill in the general operation (military & civil).

To often I find business leaders meet with sales people or consultants and feel they are trusted advisors. They need to be managed. Someone once said to me that Procurement is like the fire brigade, turning up when the house has alight, when they should do more fire prevention.

The process clearly has issues in the MOD.

 

[riksavage]

Whilst carriers represent the ultimate display of overt force by virtue of the fact they can travel across two thirds of the worlds surface, require no friendly base support and send an unequivocal massage (play ball or be on the receiving end of a very big stick), they do suffer from a major disadvantage - cost and support. The amount of assets required to defend and maintain a strike carrier group at sea is huge, man-power alone exceeds that of 25+ SSN crews.

Whilst I accept an SSN does not send the same message during peace time once a shooting war starts it can restrict an enemies maritime options in the same way a strike carrier group can. The fact that you don't know where it is, or when it will strike (Harpoon, heavyweight torpedo or TacTom) will keep an enemy guessing and tie up a vast array of military hardware. So bang for buck ( unit price and manning costs), there is no other platform out there, which commands so much respect in a non-nuclear scenario.

Based on UK projected budget constraints, if I had to make hard choices between reducing my SSN force (7 to 5 Astutes), or lose a QE class carrier, I would opt for the latter and go for a cheaper but more capable Ocean replacement capable of sustaining a small F35B sqn (8-10).

 

[deepsixteen]

RT Hon member for Portsmonths North maiden speech is very good, made at 8.05pm.

Thanks for your response 1805 a good first outing in the house for your friend.

I think that others have covered your point about SSN’s and I would only add that often when exercising with surface and air assets SSN’s take active measures to enhance the chances of detection by those units.
The Type42 batch three are the ships as originally designed and when fitted with CIWS are effective air defence ships of that period which are constructed properly unlike the earlier ships which had some well recorded shortcomings (for example the cabling and colander like bulkheads). The accommodation to say the least is not very good, (it does not compare favourably with earlier ships like the counties) which I believe accounts for much of the increase in size of the Type45 and other modern warships alongside the dimensions required for a full size VLS. In short the batch three 42,s would/should have been the minimum acceptable standard that was being built for the RN in the late seventies.
I agree that the admiralty probably shares some of the blame for the carrier fiasco’s of the post war era however I lay the blame for the absence of proper naval aviation (particularly AEW) firmly with Mr Healy and the RAF who should be prevented from having any input to naval aviation considering the negative impact their politicking has had upon it historically both pre and post WW2.

I believe that the RN with Astute, CVF, F35B, (fingers crossed) and Type 45 is shaping up to be a potent force and hopefully at the mid life point the 45’s will get quad packed CAAM to replace the Astor 15 and possibly an ABM missile. The Type26 if we get it in sufficient numbers will maintain the fleet ASW capability, (although it will be much larger than you would like) I do believe that we wish it to have similar capabilities. I would expect that this next generation ship will be plug and play as far as Command and Control facilities are concerned I would hope that it will have space and be fitted for at least a 64 cell VLS capable of firing a full range of missiles although I suspect it will not get that many. It will naturally have an evolution of the Type 23 ASW suit, a CIWS and I would hope a full sized hanger for twoMerlin rather than the dog kennel arrangement that the present information suggests.
I disagree with you in regard to the utility of a large calibre gun and as previously stated would hope that the 155mm is adopted for the Type 26 and future vessels, this would not only be of utility in the NGS role, I suspect that guided munitions would be capable of use against a wide variety of surface targets and it remains more financially viable to fire 155 rounds than Tomahawk at shore targets when possible to do so. I expect that there is little chance of any funding being found for any kind of single role vessel as to your comparison with the ram NGS has been used successfully within the last decade and will I suspect be used within the next given the location of some of the presently perceived threats.

 

[AndrewMI]

I think you would hope that the T-45 gets a fair whack of upgrades in a decade or so.

The additional VLS would be sensible to accomodate an ABM sized missile silo, quad pack CAAM in lieu of Aster 15. There would be little harm in fitting the Harpoon system if available although i agree it would be unlikely to be used. The 155mm gun update would also be helpful, but non-essential.

T26 should be able to cover off all the capabilities that T45 does not. I.e. anti-sub, anti-ship, deep strike and be able to protect its self from air attack. 64CAAM missiles and 2/3CIWS should suffice for that. Are anti-submarine rockets still used today of is is all helecopter based launches? Having the 155mm gun (plus the fancy ammo being developed) and TacTom would make these very effective warships.

A UK CV Battle Group would be potent if these were linked in using CEC with a high level AEW and Satelite Data.

 

[1805]

Whilst carriers represent the ultimate display of overt force by virtue of the fact they can travel across two thirds of the worlds surface, require no friendly base support and send an unequivocal massage (play ball or be on the receiving end of a very big stick), they do suffer from a major disadvantage - cost and support. The amount of assets required to defend and maintain a strike carrier group at sea is huge, man-power alone exceeds that of 25+ SSN crews.

Whilst I accept an SSN does not send the same message during peace time once a shooting war starts it can restrict an enemies maritime options in the same way a strike carrier group can. The fact that you don't know where it is, or when it will strike (Harpoon, heavyweight torpedo or TacTom) will keep an enemy guessing and tie up a vast array of military hardware. So bang for buck ( unit price and manning costs), there is no other platform out there, which commands so much respect in a non-nuclear scenario.

Based on UK projected budget constraints, if I had to make hard choices between reducing my SSN force (7 to 5 Astutes), or lose a QE class carrier, I would opt for the latter and go for a cheaper but more capable Ocean replacement capable of sustaining a small F35B sqn (8-10).

I am a big fan of SSNs and for the RN in particular; the likely growth over the coming decades of highly capable convention subs with AIP in smaller navies, is a serious threat to the RN and an SSN, with its deadly capability and ability to keep up with a task force, is a key component in suppressing these.

That said I can’t agree with you that it’s not worth sacrificing a SSN or even two (highly unlikely to go to five boats) for a second CVF for the following reasons:

7-6 (even 7-5) is a 1/7 reduction in availability, although not ideal it would still make available c2-3 boats to support a taskforce. With the Astute’s ability for rapid transit and larger weapons load, we would still have critical mass in the SSN force. Whereas a reduction from 2-1 CVFs would potentially leave us in a situation, where we were not able to respond quickly if in deep refit etc.

I am not detracting from the capability of an SSN, but I am saying the CVF has a broader capability to match the UK’s traditional requirements; which are not merely to have free unfettered access to the seas, but to use this freedom to project power on to land. This is not just a display of force, it has been reality on many occasion for the RN alone (Korea, Suez, & Falklands etc.) but also for India in 1971 and the USN countless times.

An SSN (as is a SSK) is a powerful tool to deny access to a blue water navy, but we don’t face blue water navies. Even the larger non carrier navies are structured around AWD & escorts they are not offensive focused forces. The problem states at most have FAC & SSKs.

Firing Tomahawks and sinking the Belgrano is sexy stuff, but the SSNs real value to the RN is as another very important layer in the ASW shield (and of course training with ASW units).

I would doubt the cost equation is quite as unbalanced as you imply, firstly a SSN last c25-30 years the CVF should be c50 years, the decommissioning cost of SSN and maintenance of anything nuclear is not insignificant. The real cost is the air group but we are only maintain one of these, and when operating in the LPH role the manpower requirement will be lighter, but I agree much greater than an SSN.


If you look at the Falklands, which is unusual in that the enemy was not fighting on home turf either, had we not had a SSN we would have still been able to undertake the operation, however without any carrier airpower we would not. Had we had the CVA 01, as has been said by a number of people its unlikely there would have even been a war.

 

[1805]

Thanks for your response 1805 a good first outing in the house for your friend.

I think that others have covered your point about SSN’s and I would only add that often when exercising with surface and air assets SSN’s take active measures to enhance the chances of detection by those units.
The Type42 batch three are the ships as originally designed and when fitted with CIWS are effective air defence ships of that period which are constructed properly unlike the earlier ships which had some well recorded shortcomings (for example the cabling and colander like bulkheads). The accommodation to say the least is not very good, (it does not compare favourably with earlier ships like the counties) which I believe accounts for much of the increase in size of the Type45 and other modern warships alongside the dimensions required for a full size VLS. In short the batch three 42,s would/should have been the minimum acceptable standard that was being built for the RN in the late seventies.
I agree that the admiralty probably shares some of the blame for the carrier fiasco’s of the post war era however I lay the blame for the absence of proper naval aviation (particularly AEW) firmly with Mr Healy and the RAF who should be prevented from having any input to naval aviation considering the negative impact their politicking has had upon it historically both pre and post WW2.

I believe that the RN with Astute, CVF, F35B, (fingers crossed) and Type 45 is shaping up to be a potent force and hopefully at the mid life point the 45’s will get quad packed CAAM to replace the Astor 15 and possibly an ABM missile. The Type26 if we get it in sufficient numbers will maintain the fleet ASW capability, (although it will be much larger than you would like) I do believe that we wish it to have similar capabilities. I would expect that this next generation ship will be plug and play as far as Command and Control facilities are concerned I would hope that it will have space and be fitted for at least a 64 cell VLS capable of firing a full range of missiles although I suspect it will not get that many. It will naturally have an evolution of the Type 23 ASW suit, a CIWS and I would hope a full sized hanger for twoMerlin rather than the dog kennel arrangement that the present information suggests.
I disagree with you in regard to the utility of a large calibre gun and as previously stated would hope that the 155mm is adopted for the Type 26 and future vessels, this would not only be of utility in the NGS role, I suspect that guided munitions would be capable of use against a wide variety of surface targets and it remains more financially viable to fire 155 rounds than Tomahawk at shore targets when possible to do so. I expect that there is little chance of any funding being found for any kind of single role vessel as to your comparison with the ram NGS has been used successfully within the last decade and will I suspect be used within the next given the location of some of the presently perceived threats.

It did read most of the debate and its was very positive to see so many MP from both sides of the house supporting the CVFs. I didn't see one statement against them which must bode well.

 

[harryriedl]

It did read most of the debate and its was very positive to see so many MP from both sides of the house supporting the CVFs. I didn't see one statement against them which must bode well.

The most important change from the Treasury is the promise to keep capital projects which is a huge change from past policy from the last government which had to cut expenditure, this including non defense projects as well such as Crossrail

 

[Moonstone]

I believe that the RN with Astute, CVF, F35B, (fingers crossed) and Type 45 is shaping up to be a potent force and hopefully at the mid life point the 45’s will get quad packed CAAM to replace the Astor 15 and possibly an ABM missile. The Type26 if we get it in sufficient numbers will maintain the fleet ASW capability, (although it will be much larger than you would like) I do believe that we wish it to have similar capabilities. I would expect that this next generation ship will be plug and play as far as Command and Control facilities are concerned I would hope that it will have space and be fitted for at least a 64 cell VLS capable of firing a full range of missiles although I suspect it will not get that many. It will naturally have an evolution of the Type 23 ASW suit, a CIWS and I would hope a full sized hanger for two Merlin rather than the dog kennel arrangement that the present information suggests.

Why would we need to build ships with large hangers sized to accommodate two Merlins when it seems the RN will only operate a total force of 30 in the future ? Many of which will be assigned to the carriers /training/trials etc .

If operating two large Merlin ASW helicopters is part of the rational for a 7000t Type 23 replacement then this seems utterly nonsensical .

 

[riksavage]

Why would we need to build ships with large hangers sized to accommodate two Merlins when it seems the RN will only operate a total force of 30 in the future ? Many of which will be assigned to the carriers /training/trials etc .

If operating two large Merlin ASW helicopters is part of the rational for a 7000t Type 23 replacement then this seems utterly nonsensical .

The RN at most will field 1 x Merlin and 1 x Wildcat/UAV. Can't see the logic or need to field 2 x Merlin on a T26 unless engaged in a full-on shooting war requiring 24-7 manned rotary AsW coverage. The future will be UAV driven, so stick with the plan - 1 x Merlin/Wildcat + rotary UAV in a dog kennel.

With the rise in unmanned rotary craft, the only advantage manned platforms bring is the ability to ferry personnel ship-to-shore/ship-to-ship and provide a fast ropping platform during a boarding.

 

[StevoJH]

The RN at most will field 1 x Merlin and 1 x Wildcat/UAV. Can't see the logic or need to field 2 x Merlin on a T26 unless engaged in a full-on shooting war requiring 24-7 manned rotary AsW coverage. The future will be UAV driven, so stick with the plan - 1 x Merlin/Wildcat + rotary UAV in a dog kennel.

With the rise in unmanned rotary craft, the only advantage manned platforms bring is the ability to ferry personnel ship-to-shore/ship-to-ship and provide a fast ropping platform during a boarding.

Nothing wrong with a large hanger, it would be more flexible then a smaller hanger and a "doghouse" for starters. Even if its "only" used for UAV storage.

 

[AndrewMI]

Nothing wrong with a large hanger, it would be more flexible then a smaller hanger and a "doghouse" for starters. Even if its "only" used for UAV storage.

Spot on. Assuming the T-26 is wide enough. No harm in having the capacity for overuse/storage, you never know when it may come in handy.

Rather like the QE class - would only operate the 50 odd aircraft max in a war situation. I bet they rarely have more than 20-30 on board.

 

[deepsixteen]

I am a big fan of SSNs and for the RN in particular; the likely growth over the coming decades of highly capable convention subs with AIP in smaller navies, is a serious threat to the RN and an SSN, with its deadly capability and ability to keep up with a task force, is a key component in suppressing these.

That said I can’t agree with you that it’s not worth sacrificing a SSN or even two (highly unlikely to go to five boats) for a second CVF for the following reasons:

7-6 (even 7-5) is a 1/7 reduction in availability, although not ideal it would still make available c2-3 boats to support a taskforce. With the Astute’s ability for rapid transit and larger weapons load, we would still have critical mass in the SSN force. Whereas a reduction from 2-1 CVFs would potentially leave us in a situation, where we were not able to respond quickly if in deep refit etc.

I am not detracting from the capability of an SSN, but I am saying the CVF has a broader capability to match the UK’s traditional requirements; which are not merely to have free unfettered access to the seas, but to use this freedom to project power on to land. This is not just a display of force, it has been reality on many occasion for the RN alone (Korea, Suez, & Falklands etc.) but also for India in 1971 and the USN countless times.

An SSN (as is a SSK) is a powerful tool to deny access to a blue water navy, but we don’t face blue water navies. Even the larger non carrier navies are structured around AWD & escorts they are not offensive focused forces. The problem states at most have FAC & SSKs.

Firing Tomahawks and sinking the Belgrano is sexy stuff, but the SSNs real value to the RN is as another very important layer in the ASW shield (and of course training with ASW units).

I would doubt the cost equation is quite as unbalanced as you imply, firstly a SSN last c25-30 years the CVF should be c50 years, the decommissioning cost of SSN and maintenance of anything nuclear is not insignificant. The real cost is the air group but we are only maintain one of these, and when operating in the LPH role the manpower requirement will be lighter, but I agree much greater than an SSN.


If you look at the Falklands, which is unusual in that the enemy was not fighting on home turf either, had we not had a SSN we would have still been able to undertake the operation, however without any carrier airpower we would not. Had we had the CVA 01, as has been said by a number of people its unlikely there would have even been a war.

I find it hard to believe that anyone seriously expects to save any real money by cutting a CVF the real cost is in the air group the vast majority of which is due to be purchased after the government has dealt with the structural deficit. On present plans a delayed/slowed purchase for part of the F35 buy may be a good method of cutting short term cost; however, it may yet turn out to be less expensive than official figures suggest as the LRIP aircraft are coming in 20% below the official estimates.

As to cutting SSN’s having paid the price to get back into the submarine building business it is clear that stop start production is not a true cost saving measure. In the long term it remains more sensible to maintain the present drum beat to ensure that the Vanguard replacement comes in on budget and on time and indeed it may be sensible to build an eighth if it is decided to slow the replacement program at all (if that is possible having served on the present and preceeding classes of SSBN).
Possibly one of the few things the last administration has got right is establishing a drum beat of production which should work for both industry and the mod. Seven SSN’s are almost certainly insufficient to meet all of the tasks that they are required to perform (we had nineteen SSN’s in commission in 1990) there is a need to understand that capability has been cut far too deeply already. For instance we operate four SSBN because that is the minimum number required to ensure the continuous deterrent do you really think that you can generate sufficient availability for the all tasks required with only seven SSN? I think not, even given the undoubted improvements in reliability that Astute will bring.

In the Falklands the enemy were on home turf (I define that as anywhere that un tanked fighters can reach) and HMS Conqueror performed arguably a more important role after her sinking the Belgrano in giving early warning of enemy air raids.

 

[StevoJH]

deepsixteen,

Have you ever heard of these little things called paragraphs? Thanks.

Agreed on CVF/F-35B.

Regarding SSN's, I wouldn't be surprised if you end up with more then 7 simply from keeping up the drumbeat. Because the Shipyards will have to go back to SSN production as soon as SSBN production is complete,and by then the earliest Astutes should still be fairly young.

 

[deepsixteen]

Why would we need to build ships with large hangers sized to accommodate two Merlins when it seems the RN will only operate a total force of 30 in the future ? Many of which will be assigned to the carriers /training/trials etc .

If operating two large Merlin ASW helicopters is part of the rational for a 7000t Type 23 replacement then this seems utterly nonsensical .

You should be aware that the Type 26 as a multi mission vessel is to have capacity built in for an embarked EMF having the ability to hanger 2 CHF aircraft may be of some use or perhaps one and an ASW Merlin or……………. The list goes on why exactly is it a good idea to restrict the options, UAV would also fit in the space? It would not even require much if any steel. As an observer of the Falklands conflict you may be able to think of some occasions when having the capability to hanger additional aircraft on destroyers and frigates would have had immense benefit.

 

[deepsixteen]

deepsixteen,

Have you ever heard of these little things called paragraphs? Thanks.

Agreed on CVF/F-35B.

Regarding SSN's, I wouldn't be surprised if you end up with more then 7 simply from keeping up the drumbeat. Because the Shipyards will have to go back to SSN production as soon as SSBN production is complete,and by then the earliest Astutes should still be fairly young.

What if the present government decides to delay the program?

 

[Grim901]

What if the present government decides to delay the program?

Then more SSNS would be required BEFORE SSBN production, which is what i'm hoping for. I dont think they govt will forget the Astute problems in a hurry.

 

[deepsixteen]

deepsixteen,

Have you ever heard of these little things called paragraphs? Thanks.

Agreed on CVF/F-35B.

Sorry a bit tired just in from work.

 

[AndrewMI]

deepsixteen,

Regarding SSN's, I wouldn't be surprised if you end up with more then 7 simply from keeping up the drumbeat. Because the Shipyards will have to go back to SSN production as soon as SSBN production is complete,and by then the earliest Astutes should still be fairly young.

Agreed. Long term this makes sense. Over a 30-35 year life of a sub (hence a 35 year building cycle) construction of at least 8 SSN's and 4 SSBN's seems a reasonable number (one every 3 years or so).

The fact that there has been a gap of nearly a decade between Vanguard unit 4 and Astute unit 1 is potentially disasterous. If that gap was cut down to 3 years there would be 10 Astutes and probbably at a lower cost than we are paying for 7. These mistakes cannot be allowed to happen again.

Touch wood the T45 mistakes will not happen on T-26. Having only 6 T45 units could well be problematic in the future.

 

[deepsixteen]

Then more SSNS would be required BEFORE SSBN production, which is what i'm hoping for. I dont think they govt will forget the Astute problems in a hurry.

Spot on Grim!

 

[kev 99]

Agreed. Long term this makes sense. Over a 30-35 year life of a sub (hence a 35 year building cycle) construction of at least 8 SSN's and 4 SSBN's seems a reasonable number (one every 3 years or so).

The fact that there has been a gap of nearly a decade between Vanguard unit 4 and Astute unit 1 is potentially disasterous. If that gap was cut down to 3 years there would be 10 Astutes and probbably at a lower cost than we are paying for 7. These mistakes cannot be allowed to happen again.

Touch wood the T45 mistakes will not happen on T-26. Having only 6 T45 units could well be problematic in the future.

Potentially disastrous? I'd argue that it has been disastrous. The Astute programme is way over budget and massively behind thanks mostly to loss of skills due to the gap in orders.